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ABSTRACT
  The Buddhist tradition offers a reductionist view of the subject – the ‘weak’ view 
-which appears to undercut concern for the consequences of action. The doctrine of 
morally conditioned rebirth – that is, the perpetuation of a persistent individual through 
death - entails a ‘strong’ view. Each view has a bearing on morality, and each is 
problematic: the two seem incompatible. The notion of rebirth and the associated 
doctrine of karman are deeply connected with this. It is in this complex that I find what 
I call ‘the identity problem’.
  I give a general account of Buddhist ethics, placing it within the tradition of ‘virtue 
ethics’. I show the impact of the identity problem to be large but not total. I deal also 
with some related topics in Buddhist doctrine: anātman, the heterodox ‘Person school’ 
and the ‘two-truths’ notion.
   I consider the bearing of Parfit’s arguments for his version of reductionism on the 
problem’s solution. Their support for the ‘weak’ view is real but limited. When Parfit 
deals with the consequences of reductionism for morality, his conclusion is uncertain. 
When I consider these arguments on their merits, I find them largely unpersuasive. 
Parfit’s account of reasons for action, with some qualifications, is acceptable, and 
welcome in its vindication of disinterestedness.
  I consider how it stands with Buddhist ethics in this light and offer restatements of the 
doctrines of karman and rebirth. In the case of karman, I develop the idea of a guiding 
metaphor and suggest how it may be applied; in that of rebirth I draw on a broader 
Buddhist tradition of meditation practice and benvolence. This restatement leaves the 
‘strong’ view more sustainable, and its compatibility with the ‘weak’ view less 
problematic for morality.  I then present the Buddhist ethical scheme as largely intact, if 
with slightly diminished coercive force. 
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PREFACE
  The Buddha’s teaching and its practice make up a field of inquiry extending over two 
and a half thousand years and many cultures. Many languages have been employed in 
the record of the teaching and in its study and consideration. The scope of the present 
work is severely limited but still extensive. The sources on which I have drawn, and 
from which I quote, are in Sanskrit, Pali and versions of Prakrit. In making points of 
general application, I have normally quoted the applicable Sanskrit terms by 
themselves, but have sometimes used the Sanskrit and Pali together: for instance, 
Dharma/Dhamma. I have used English acclimatisations where they are uncontentious, 
presenting them, and also names, without diacritical marks. Some difficult terms have 
come to be acclimatised too easily, so that difficulties in their understanding have not 
been addressed. I therefore use – for instance - karman (Sanskrit), sometimes 
karman/kamman (Sanskrit and Pali), and only rarely ‘karma’ (English). I have however 
sometimes needed to use such derivations from this last as ‘karmic’. 
  Sanskrit nouns are referred to, in isolation, in their stem-forms: for instance, dharma 
and karman. In line with convention, Pali nouns are often (not always) given the 
nominative singular form: for instance, kamma, rather than kamman, attā, rather than 
attan. I have followed the practice which seemed most likely to make for clarity on each 
occasion. Plural forms will not always be recognised for what they are. For instance, the 
nominative plural of Sanskrit dhātu, a word of complex meaning, is dhātavaḥ. When I 
have used a plural form that is not obviously such, I have tried to make this clear.
 Quotations from Sanskrit and Pali texts, and from one or two in Greek, are presented in 
Roman script. Translations are sometimes my own, but I have often taken over the 
renderings of other translations available in print. Details of these are given in the 
Bibliography. Capital-lettered names in the footnotes should prompt a reference to the 
Bibliography. I have reserved italics for quotations from languages other than English 
and for all titles of works. For emphasis I use underlining.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
1. The identity problem in outline 
 
  My immediate concern in what follows will be with a complex of difficulties in the 
metaphysics of personal identity. My deeper concern is with the bearing of these 
difficulties on morality.  On the Buddhist conception of morality, this is notably 
problematic, and it is here that I find what I will call ‘the identity problem’. 
  I start with the problem in metaphysics. The notion of the person which I will call the 
‘weak’ notion is conspicuous in the record of the Buddha’s teaching.1 It is expressed by 
way of analysing the human subject in terms of process, so prompting the image of a 
‘stream’. The constituents and activities of the subject are found to be unstable and 
transient, and to give no basis for the postulate of a permanent entity. Such a postulate is 
taken to be neither needed nor demonstrable. The ‘weak’ notion should not be 
unfamiliar, as the line of thought behind it is paralleled in the Western tradition, notably 
in the work of Hume.  In the case of all such notions, there will be a tension between 
what is asserted and the common assurance of personal identity and continuity. That is 
to say that ‘reductionist’ notions, as they are commonly styled, are counter-intuitive. 
The first manifestation of the problem is therefore the bare credibility of the‘weak’ 
notion.  This notion is, at first glance, close - and I will later show that it is indeed close 
- to the version of reductionism presented by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons.  I 
will consider how far the arguments of Reasons and Persons may be applied to the 
resolution of the difficulties attaching to the ‘weak’ notion, and also how far those 
arguments are compelling. 
 
  We find in the record, also, another way of viewing the person, which I will call the 
‘strong’ notion’. This is to be found in the way the numerous individuals who people the 
11 I am using the terms ‘person’ and ‘human subject’ without discrimination. In 
Chapter Three I will differentiate them and other terms with the same broad 
reference.
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early record are presented as discrete and persistent. The ‘strength’ of the notion is to be 
registered in this matter-of-fact presumption. It is strengthened further by the concurrent 
emphasis given to karman/kamman. This is the supposition that the fruits of action will 
inevitably be bourn by the agent. If I do wrong or act unskilfully in some respect, it is I 
who will pay for it, and no other, and pay for it to the proper degree. Right or skilful 
action is accorded a correspondingly happy consequence. There is a yet further 
strengthening in the presumption of rebirth to be found everywhere in the Buddhist 
record. A text in the Pali Aṅguttara Nikāya records the appearance before Yama, ‘the 
Lord of Death’, of someone just deceased.  He is addressed as a persistent entity: ‘you 
have done the bad kammam; you [emphatic] will experience its vipākam (consequence, 
‘fruit’)’.2
  
  The identity problem is one of the co-existence of two notions of the subject, each one 
of which has points of difficulty of its own. My concern in what follows will be with the 
problem’s implications for morality. Concern for the future is amply secured by the 
‘strong’ notion. The ‘weak’ notion seems to subvert it. Doubts over personal continuity 
will raise questions over the responsibility going with agency and over the grounding 
for prudential calculation. Two verses in the Pali Dhammapāda, which I will treat as 
representative in what follows, tell the same story as that of the judgment of Yama.  A 
man having adultery in mind is warned that he would not greatly enjoy it: fear and 
furtiveness would be its concomitants, he would risk punishment through the law, and 
he would face a ‘bad’ and, no doubt, painful rebirth. 3 The last consequence certainly, 
and perhaps all four, will be the outcome of karman. The last is the most daunting, as 
even the rich and powerful cannot avoid it. The force of the warning owes everything to 
the presumption that the one who acts is the one who suffers. The ‘weak’ notion seems, 
at least, to impair this presumption, even in respect of a single lifespan. The ‘strong’ 
notion secures it, but at the price of bringing into sharp relief some daunting claims. 
What are we to make of the supposition of conditioning by karman and of the 
presumption that we have existed before and will be reborn again?
2 AN III, 36 [140]. I have translated a snatch of the words of Yama: atha kho tayā 
vetaṃ pāpaṃ kammaṃ kataṃ, tvaññevetassa vipākaṃ paṭisaṃvedissāsī’ ti.
3 DhP 309/10. In Pali, Apuññalābho ca gatī ca pāpikā. Literally ‘(There is) both 
acquisition of demerit and a bad destiny/destination’. This verse can be found in 
other recensions.
7
2. Is there really a problem?
  For this account of the problem I have drawn on the earliest stratum of the Buddhist 
record, which I will call ‘the early texts’. The composition of these texts was followed 
by a period of systematisation and commentary and then by one of summation. In this 
last phase, we find works of comprehensive exposition. In the later stages of this 
process, of which I will say more shortly, the identity problem was not left unaddressed. 
It was solved - or dissolved - or evaded - by way of taking the ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ 
notions to be telling the same truth in different ways. In effect, its solution was by way 
of understanding the ‘strong’ notion in terms of the ‘weak’. On this view, which is not 
without support in the early texts, the ‘strong’ notion was an inescapable simplification, 
acceptable in ordinary speech or when talking to ‘ordinary people’. 4  The ‘weak’ notion 
by itself was the one truly Buddhist view, at least for practitioners. Its expression 
through the image of a ‘stream’ – one of the subject as process, not substance – made it 
easy to claim that karmic retribution was registered ‘downstream’, perhaps in a life later 
than that of the related action. 5  Appreciation of this prospect – or risk – would bear on 
motivation.
  This answer – or reformulation – has been taken to be broadly conclusive by a main 
strand in current scholarship. The line between exposition and endorsement may be 
fine, and in several recent works we find exposition of the commentators’ treatment 
which amounts, more or less, to its endorsement. Here, I have in mind, in particular, 
well-received publications by Pye, Harvey and Gowans. These present a scholarly 
orthodoxy or, at least, a strong strain within it. 6  Its expression varies between them, but 
the common purport is that we must distinguish a ‘substance’ view of the subject (my 
‘strong notion’) and a ‘process’ view (my ‘weak notion’). 7  The latter is taken to be a 
reductionist reordering of the former, which should replace it in the practitioner’s 
understanding. 
4 Here I translate pṛthagjana/putthujana, the common term for those outside the 
Buddha’s circle.
5 In the terms of art employed by the commentators and, to a fair degree, within the 
early texts, the subject is a stream (Pali santāna, Sanskrit saṃtāna), made up 
entirely of the flow of elements within five ‘heaps’ or aggregates (skandhāḥ) and 
determined, at least in part, by karman. I deal with this in Chapter Three.
6 PYE (2) p.48/49, HARVEY (1) p.64 ff, and GOWANS, p.71 ff. 
7 Gowans’terminology. See GOWANS p.69ff.
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  As a summary of what the later Buddhist view amounts to, what we find in these 
writers may be unexceptionable. It is its barely critical adoption that I take to be 
dubious. An obvious objection to it is stated by Paul Edwards, writing in response to a 
review by Keith Ward: 
Reincarnationists are committed to some form of 
extreme dualism: a person’s body is different in 
every incarnation, but he is the same since the 
same mind animates all types of different bodies 
…… Ward evidently believes that the Buddhist 
rejection of a substance self … and its (sic) 
endorsement of the Humean view that the mind is 
a ‘bundle’ or series of mental states, avoid 
extreme dualism. This is not so. We do not have 
survival of the original person unless the mind 
associated with the later body is identical with the 
earlier one regardless of whether it is a substance 
or a bundle. (Edwards’ emphasis) 8  
The Buddhist commentators, we will see, might have granted that what we have may 
not be ‘survival of the original person’. What ‘the original person’ amounts to is not 
straightforward. To that extent, Edwards misdirects his fire. Nonetheless, his conclusion 
is highly relevant to the prime consideration of concern for the future. An element in 
such concern will be the fear of retribution. What is needed here, to put the point 
simply, is a candid answer to the riposte easily imaginable from the Dhammapāda’s 
prospective adulterer: ‘why should I care, if I don’t have a bad rebirth?’ What we find  – 
I maintain – is a tendency to evade the challenge, and the proffer of too easy solutions. 
Gowans offers an instance:  
.. all we need is causal continuity and similarity, 
not identity. As long as my process-self now 
stands in the right causal relationships to my 
8 EDWARDS 
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process-self in the past, it is reasonable to hold 
my current process-self accountable for the 
actions of my past process-self. 9
  This is much too easy.  It would seem even less persuasive if we suppose - not a 
looking-back - but a looking-ahead to a later stage in a succession of process-selves. 
Why should I – now – care for him or her, or fear now what he or she may suffer? Why 
should he or she be any more to me than any other stranger, yet unborn?
  There is another objection to the ‘weak’notion, which I mention now only in order to 
put down a marker. It is of a kind which seems to attach to all reductionist theories, and 
which finds its classic statement in Butler’s criticism of Locke’s presentation of ‘the 
person’ in terms of consciousness or memory-chains.10 Butler found Locke to be 
presuming the identity of which he took himself to be marking out the grounds. I will 
come back to this in Chapters Five and Six. What Locke is doing seems to be paralleled 
by the ‘weak’ notion’, and it may be that this too is open to the same criticism. The 
words just quoted from Gowans bring up the point: what is the reference of the ‘my’ 
employed three times? How is one flow of elements marked off from another?
  
  In pointing out these objections, I am not assuming that they are conclusive; I am 
claiming only that they need answering, and suggesting that what may be the dominant 
strand in current scholarship ignores or dismisses them too easily. The case for the 
present work should therefore be evident. My object is to consider if a better answer 
may be found to a problem that cannot be so easily brushed aside. In my concluding 
chapter, after considering what help may be found in Parfit, I will venture such a 
solution.
  The importance of any problem bearing on identity should be apparent. Responsibility 
is a vacuous notion if it does not extend over time – that is, if it does not attach to 
beings enjoying such continuity. Momentary responsibility amounts to little more than 
none. Other problems may seem more pressing to anyone concerned with Buddhist 
ethics. I am not playing down the importance of such questions as the morality of 
9 GOWANS p.107.
10 I deal with this, in opening my discussion of Parfit, in Chapter Five.
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engagement in war - for instance – in taking what I call the identity problem to be 
fundamental. If it does not be seem to be so, that will be because the continuity of the 
agent – and his or her responsibility – are being taken for granted. The obduracy of the 
identity problem or – more likely - its evasion is likely to compromise proffered 
solutions to such other subjects of debate.11
3. The Plan Of This Work
   In this opening chapter, I set out, and briefly defend, the method on which I will 
proceed. For this purpose, I mark out the field with which I will be concerned, which is 
very largely that of the Pali transmission, both the Nikayas and the later commentarial 
systematisation. I also offer certain definitions, and state and aim to justify some 
inescapable presumptions. My main object in this is to close off diversions from what is 
most to the point in the argument that follows. In Chapter Two, I give a brief account of 
the Buddhist ethical scheme. This is so pitched as to bring out the bearing on morality 
of the metaphysical problem over identity. In so doing, I mark out the place of karman 
and rebirth. I also point out strands in Buddhist ethics untouched by the problem. I 
suggest that the scheme is best seen as an expression of ‘virtue ethics’, and that 
arguments in support of that broader tradition are applicable to it. In Chapter Three, I 
offer certain clarifications. One such is of the notion of anātman/anattā, and I give 
grounds for taking the identity problem not to be located there. I also give a brief 
account of the assertions of a heterodox Buddhist school, the Pudgalavāda, or ‘Person 
school’, and of the so-called two-truths doctrine, suggesting that both take their shape, 
at least in part, from an apprehension of the identity problem. In Chapter Four, I deal 
further with the perplexities attendant on the notions of karman and rebirth, considering 
how far each is acceptable on its traditional understanding.
  In Chapter Five, I consider how far Parfit’s arguments, in Reasons & Persons, are 
applicable to these questions. They fall under three heads. In Part Three, which is my 
11 The argument of this paragraph might have been reinforced by anticipating some 
of Parfit’s judgments in Reasons and Persons. I have in mind those in Chapter 15, 
‘Personal Identity and Morality’. A reading of this chapter, especially of pages 324 to 
326, should support my claim that the problem, which I might have called ‘central’, 
is fundamental. See PARFIT (3).  
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prime concern, Parfit is concerned with personal identity, presenting what he calls a 
‘Reductionist’ conception of the person.  He remarks, in passing, on the resemblance of 
the view for which he is arguing to Buddhist doctrine – in effect to the ‘weak’ notion. I 
consider how far this seeming resemblance is a true one, and how far Parfit’s arguments 
might be open to expropriation. In Parts One and Two, Parfit has been concerned with 
reasons for action, in particular with the grounds for disinterested action incompatible 
with self-interest. He finds the reasons for action associated with religious profession, in 
which he includes Buddhist profession, to be essentially self-interested. I resist this 
conclusion, finding that much of Parfit’s argument may be applied to the support of a 
disinterested view of morality of Buddhist character. Though I deal only briefly with 
Part Four, it is not unimportant, being largely concerned with the claims of future 
generations. This becomes relevant to my own conclusion in Chapter Seven.  
  
Chapter Six is concerned with how far Parfit’s arguments in Part Three of Reasons and 
Persons are conclusive on their own terms. Here I take some account of Parfit’s 
response to critics, before concluding that the case for his version of reductionism is not 
made out – that is, it can provide no support to the ‘weak’ notion. In Chapter Seven, I 
consider how it stands with the identity problem in the light of this conclusion. My 
concern is now largely with the ‘strong’ notion. I consider the problem’s ‘outer’ 
dimension, made up of the doctrines of karman and rebirth and mark out the lines of a 
fresh understanding of each. I bring out the substantial convergence of this with Parfit’s 
conclusions in Part Two of Reasons and Persons, as I have revised them, and its 
compatibility in point of concern with those of Part Four. I conclude that the identity 
problem is very largely resolved in this way, though I grant that the threat of a bad 
rebirth, daunting on the traditional view, loses something of its coercive force. 
4. The formation of ‘Buddhism’
  I follow the usual reference of the term ‘Buddhism’ to a body of beliefs, a community, 
and a mode of practice. These find their origin in a historical figure with the clan-name 
Gotama, who lived and taught around the Ganges valley, perhaps in the period between 
12
480 and 400 BC. 12  The tradition distinguishes him as Sakyamuni Buddha.13 I will refer 
simply to ‘the Buddha’.
  
The tradition which derived from the Buddha is of great antiquity, yet still vigorous, of 
wide geographical extent and, on the face of it, admitting much variation. It is difficult 
to consider all this without some organising structure. In what follows I distinguish 
between the content of four phases:
Phase 1.    The time of the Buddha’s teaching. While scholarship has it that this teaching 
is not extant verbatim, it is the hypothetical original from which all else derives.
Phase 2.    The period of the earliest record, textual and archaeological, taken to be a 
rendering of the content, no longer extant, of Phase 1.
Phase 3.     The period of development: of the extension, systematisation - perhaps also 
revision - of the content of Phase 2. This is the period of the developed and distinctive 
religious system, in which it becomes possible to consider doctrinal claims against a 
standard of orthodoxy.
Phase 4.     The period of aftermath, in which doctrine and practice reflect those of 
Phase 3 but in which the concern for orthodoxy may be weakened or given up. This is 
the period of revisionism, perhaps thoroughgoing, of ‘demythologising’, and of 
openness to unfamiliar influences; it may also be one of reaction to such developments. 
              
   The Buddhism of the present-day is one the of the overlapping of Phase 3 and Phase 4 
- that is, of continuing orthodoxy, both in countries where Buddhism has been long-
established and in the West, and of new developments representing a more or less sharp 
break with orthodoxy.
   A suggestive parallel with Christianity needs little spelling out. In each case, there is 
shown to be a charismatic originator with a crowd of followers, with an inner and an 
innermost ring. He writes nothing but teaches, preaches, exhorts and explains copiously. 
12 The dating of the Buddha’s lifespan is a matter of scholarly dispute. 
13 The tradition has it that there have been many Buddhas. Sakyamuni (the wise 
man of the Sakya tribe) is the most recent.
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After much the same development in each case, we have what is unmistakeably a 
religious system, something on which textbooks could be written and examinations set. 
Some sharp differences in the formation of the Buddhist and Christian traditions are not, 
I think, such as to rule out the parallels between the two, and the contrasts, which I will 
sometimes suggest.14 
  
5. What I mean by ‘Buddhist ethics’: its textual basis
   My subject is not Buddhist doctrine as a whole but Buddhist ethics, and I must now 
define more precisely what I shall take this to be. I take ‘ethics’ to be that which is 
concerned with conduct - that is (not exhaustively), with prescription, precepts and 
counsel concerned with what to do and what not to do; with how to live, what to live 
for, and what to aim at. A vital strand of Buddhist teaching has this concern. I begin by 
proposing certain distinctions, which accord with the schema set out above:
      
  The ethics of the Buddha. This is what the Buddha, the originator, had to say on the 
subject of morality. It belongs to Phase 1 above, and is what would have been caught if 
the Buddha had been followed round by one or more reporters of vast and perfect 
memory, and what would have been available if this report had enjoyed a flawless 
subsequent transmission. The Buddhist tradition has it that at least the first of these 
conditions was met. Scholarship will wish to be persuaded of that.
  Buddhist ethics. This is the product of a long historical process, from the record of the 
earliest texts to a fully developed religious system. It belongs to Phases 2 and 3 above. 
My subject - Buddhist ethics – is concerned with the whole of this period, but I will be 
concerned more especially with the earliest part. In sum, I take ‘Buddhist ethics’ to be 
the teaching, exhortation and counsel bearing on ethics that is to be found in the records 
of a period which I will mark out more precisely below. 
      
14 The Christian record received written form much more promptly; it was recorded 
in one language within a literate culture. The earliest extant manuscripts are held to 
date only two or three hundred years from the composition of the texts. In this last 
respect, especially, the contrast with the Buddhist record is sharp. 
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  Buddhistic ethics.  This belongs to Phase 4 above. I use the term to denote a system or 
line of reflection on ethics which is of Buddhist provenance or inspiration - that is, one 
that is rooted in Buddhist ethics as defined above but offered without concern for 
orthodoxy, being ready to modify or discard features of Buddhist ethics that it is 
unwilling to defend.
  The textual basis of ‘Buddhist ethics’, as I have defined it, is vast and varied. In the 
next three chapters, I will draw largely on the Tipiṭaka, the Buddhist canon in Pali, in 
particular on the Sutta – that is, the sutta-texts making up the five Nikayas, in the first 
four of which we have the narrative and dialogue form of the Buddha’s teaching. I 
sometimes refer briefly to the Vinaya, the disciplinary code for monks. The Pali is the 
one recension of the canon still fully extant in the original, and no general treatment of a 
Buddhist topic can avoid substantial reliance on it. I refer in passing also to the 
equivalent to the Pali record in other Indian vernaculars - that is, to fragmentary 
survivals in the original languages and, in discussing the Pudgalavada, I make use of 
some translations from Sanskrit or Prakrit into Chinese. 15 I touch also on the Prakrit 
inscriptions on rocks and pillars, cut on the order of Asoka in the latter half of the Third 
Century BC, and refer occasionally to a narrative work in Buddhist Sanskrit, the 
Mahāvastu, which preserves some early material. I refer also to the Kathāvatthu, a 
component of the Pali Abhidhamma, a scholastic reordering of the doctrine to be found 
in the Vinaya and the Nikayas, and to some later works of systematisation and 
commentary. These are the Milindapañha, and the Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa, 
both in Pali, and the Sanskrit Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu. These are the 
works of summation I referred to in opening. I enforce a point I make in concluding by 
quoting from the much later Bodhicaryāvatāra. Where they seemed to provide the best 
illustration, I have referred to works of fiction, written on Buddhist assumptions: the 
Divyāvadāna and a celebrated Chinese novel.
  The field of inquiry which I have marked out is very large and its components are 
heterogeneous. It extends over seven or eight hundred years, and some of my references 
15 Fragments of the early record are still in course of recovery. For an account of the 
recovery and continuing decipherment of material which enlarges our knowledge of 
the Buddhism of Gandhara, in North East India, see GLASS.   
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fall outside this period. It may be thought that my concerns, or some of them, would 
have been more effectively addressed if it had been narrowed. This might have been 
done by considering either the early texts – broadly, the Nikayas – or the later 
development by way of commentary and synthesis. To have considered only one of 
these would, however, have had the consequence of ruling out of consideration the 
question of what the development of the latter from the former amounted to – that is, 
how far the formulations of the later period are a restatement in other terms of what is to 
be found in the Nikayas, and how far the expression of something distinct.
   Some remarks by Bertrand Russell, in discussing St Augustine, throw light on a 
closely comparable case:
  .. the writings of St Paul, particularly the Epistle to 
the Romans. These are treated by Augustine as a 
lawyer treats the law: the interpretation is able, and the 
texts are made to yield their utmost meaning. One is 
persuaded, at the end, not that St Paul believed what 
Augustine deduces, but that, taking certain texts in 
isolation, they do imply just what he says they do. 16
  Is the commentarial presentation of the doctrine of the early Buddhist texts best seen in 
this way? Do the commentators construct something essentially new, if only by way of 
straining the meaning of proof-texts drawn from the early sources?  My view of 
particular cases of this process should emerge from what follows in later chapters. I 
have already suggested that the co-existence of the ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ notions of the 
subject was appreciated early and registered as problematic. Some of the formulations 
of commentarial Buddhist orthodoxy, and of departures from orthodoxy, are best seen as 
having been shaped by that recognition. I anticipate what is to come by saying that I 
take the account, or accounts, of the rebirth-claim which we find in the later sources, for 
instance in the Visuddhimagga, to be less an explanation than a fresh account, so 
expressed as to be secure against obvious objections. Whether or not I am right in these 
conclusions, discussion of the problem needs to be broad enough to permit them to be 
offered. The course I have followed is not uncommon. Two of the works of scholarship 
16 RUSSELL p.362.
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to which I have referred have their basis in the Pali Nikayas, but range further as the 
needs of the argument seem to dictate. 17
  Much the same question is raised by the extension of my range of reference outside the 
Pali transmission. Several of the writers to whom I shall refer below have eschewed 
this.18 My own handling of sources is not, in fact, greatly different from theirs: if it is 
not quite confined to the Pali, it is that which is preponderant in the argument. In 
referring to texts in other transmissions, I have been guided by a sense of what was 
apposite and of what provided a telling demonstration. None of these other sources is 
problematic except the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. This well-known and influential work 
presents a form of Abhidharma other than the Pali Abhidhamma. Substantial reliance on 
it here would require a proper account of its provenance and theoretical background.19 
I deal only with its concluding part, where Vasubhandu makes useful distinctions with 
exceptional clarity. As this is decidedly helpful, I judge that strict confinement to the 
Pali would have been an impoverishment. It must, however, be granted that all 
quotation from the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya is at risk of being misleading, if only on 
account of the terseness of the Sanskrit in which the work is written. The text has to be 
expanded in translation, as it would otherwise hardly be readable. Translators will 
17 Harvey refers to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. Gowans confines himself to the Pali, 
but refers to Buddhaghosa.
18 For instance, PEREZ-REMON and SIDERITS.
19 For a useful – very brief - summary of this, see COUSINS (2).
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expand in a variety of ways, some of which may be tendentious. 20  I try to be alert to 
this risk in the quotation and summaries I offer. 
6. How to understand the early texts
  How far do the early texts, the Pali Nikayas and their parallels, catch the words of the 
Buddha verbatim? How far do they convey his teaching? These obvious questions may 
be taken together. Here, I concur with the scholarly consensus that the process of 
transmission from the time of the Buddha went beyond bare preservation. It is hardly 
disputable that the text of the first four Nikayas, in particular, represents a scholastic 
reordering. It bears the marks of having been so arranged, by subject and otherwise, as 
to make it memorisable and apt for oral transmission. This seems to have been achieved 
by its parcelling out and consignment to specialists.21 All this makes it plausible to 
ascribe all the essentials of the teaching of the Nikayas to the Buddha, but not to claim 
verbal inerrancy for its expression. 
  A related question is that of coherence. This bears on the doctrine which we find in the 
early texts, their internal consistency or shortfalls from it. Here, the natural presumption 
20 This can be illustrated by comparing each of two recent translations with the 
Sanskrit original and with the other. For these, see Bibliography. I take a passage 
where Vasubandhu brings out the distinctions with which I will be concerned, and to 
which I return:
  Pradhan (p.1) Yat tarhi vatsīputrīyaḥ pudgalaṃ santam icchanti|vicāraṃ tāvad 
etat|kim te dravyata iccantyāhosvit prajñaptitaḥ|kim cedaṃ dravyata iti kim vā 
prajñaptitaḥ|rūpādivat bhāvāntaraṃ cet dravataḥ| kṣirādivat samudāyaścet||
  Pruden (Vol IV, p.1314) ‘The Vātsīputrīyas admit a pudgala which is neither 
identical to the skandhas nor different from them. We should examine whether this 
pudgala exists as an entity or as designation of a nominal existence. If it has 
separate existence, like physical matter, then the pudgala exists as an entity. If it is 
only a collection, like milk, then it exists as a designation’. 
    
  Duerlinger (Sec. 2.1) ‘The Pudgalavādins, [who profess to be followers of the 
Buddha’s teachings,] assert that a person exists. [To determine whether or not their 
assertion conforms to the Buddha’s teachings,] we must first consider whether in 
their view a person is substantially real or is real by way of a conception. If a person 
is a distinct entity like visible form and other such things, he is substantially real; 
but if [by analysis] he [shown to be] a collection [of substance], like milk and other 
such things, he is real by way of a conception’. (Duerlinger’s expansions, reflecting 
early commentary, and brackets) 
      
21 See NORMAN Ch.III, especially p.44ff.   
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is that the process of reordering would have promoted consistency. This is because its 
imposition would have made written material more easily memorisable, and because 
what might appear odd or intrusive in what is received could be expected to drop out or 
to be written out.22  This common presumption, which I find entirely plausible, does not 
extend to denial that there are puzzles in the record as we have it, or that there may be 
evidence of misunderstandings on the part of those engaged in transmission. 23  In other 
words, there is a very substantial coherence, which is less than total. Shortfalls from 
coherence may be original, or they may have resulted from errors of transmission. 
  Two problematic passages are worth referring to now, as they bring out what is 
involved. One, a short passage in the Dīgha Nikāya, is merely curious.24 The Buddha is 
instructing Ananda, his attendant, on the way to deal with women. This passage is to be 
found in the record of the Buddha’s last days, a large part of which has the valedictory 
smack to be expected. It may have the place it has only because no one knew where it 
belonged.25  That cannot be certain, as it seems quite possible that this odd survival is 
indeed the memory of an exchange. Dying men will not talk only by way of summing 
up their message. It fits with this consideration that the dialogue might be humorous. 
The words may have come to us verbatim, while the tone has been lost. Perhaps the 
Buddha’s concluding words of counsel, sati .. upaṭṭhapetabbā, should be rendered 
‘look out for yourself!’ rather than, as Walshe has it, as ‘practise mindfulness’? 26 
Nothing is more easily lost than humour, even in transmissions less hazardous that this.
  A point of interpretation of much more significance is brought up by the Bhārasutta.27 
In its place in the Pali Saṃyutta Nikāya, this text is embedded among others of the 
same concern, which, present the ‘weak’ notion of the subject with much repetition. The 
Bhārasutta seems to give decided support to the ‘strong’ notion, at least if we take its 
22 I have heard Gombrich remark that the Chinese translations of the original 
versions of the Hinayana canon tend to omit passages which are hard to interpret. If 
that is so, it is an instance of the same tendency. 
23 Here, and elsewhere, in touching on the formation and transmission of the 
Buddhist record, I am much in debt to current scholarship, especially to Norman and 
Gombrich. I should also refer to an article by Mark Allon, which gives a persuasive 
explanation of the typical literary form of the Pali texts. See ALLON (1). 
24 DN No.16 Mahāparinibbānasutta [141].
25 A suggestion found in Walshe’s translation of the Nikaya, Thus have I heard’, note 
430. 
26 The Buddha’s tone seems jovial, but the word sati (mindfulness) suggests he is 
serious. Hence the puzzle.
27 SN III [25]
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concern to be with an individual, persistent across lives, referred to as a ‘burden-
carrier’.  It has therefore received much discussion.28 Should this discordance strengthen 
our sense of the likelihood of the Bhārasutta having come, more or less as it is, from the 
Buddha’s lips? Behind this question lies the problem, yet more basic, of how the words 
are to be understood. How should we render the word bhārahāra? 29 This has been 
much discussed: is it an agent-noun or an action-noun? Would those who first heard the 
Buddha utter the word – as the tradition would have it – have been open to that 
distinction? 30 If that is doubtful, is it wise to press the distinction now?
  
  These two examples bring out something of the difficulty of interpretating the early 
texts. This difficulty must not be exaggerated, as the Pali Nikayas, taken as a whole, tell 
the same doctrinal story. It is only on close reading that uncertainties over translation, 
form, context and tone come to be felt. I believe this is the common experience of those 
first acquainted with Buddhism in its Pali transmission. What is immediately striking is 
its coherence. We find a doctrinal system of a kind on which textbooks and other 
introductory accounts may readily be written. Much of the work required, of 
simplification and listing-off, was done centuries ago. It is however noticeable that this 
assurance tends to weaken with closer acquaintance. Over its 40-year span, the work of 
Richard Gombrich on the Pali transmission seems to show a modest shift on the writer’s 
part towards granting the decided complexity below the surface of the received text.31 If 
that is so, the difference in that respect between Gombrich’s approach to the texts and 
that of a scholar such as Masefield is rather less than it appears to be.32
  It is tempting to say that the distinction drawn above, between ‘the ethics of the 
Buddha’ and ‘Buddhist ethics’, justifies an effective disregard of the uncertainties, real 
28 For instance, in COLLINS (1) p.164/65.
29 Is it the ‘bearer’ or the ‘bearing’ of the burden?
30 The thoroughly orthodox Theravadin scholar who has translated the whole Nikaya 
adds this endnote: ‘Collins translates bhārahāra as ‘the bearing of the burden’, 
contending that hāra must be understood as an action noun … [Monier Williams], 
however, lists ‘a carrier, a porter’ as meanings of hāra, and it sems clear that this is 
the sense required here’. He goes on, however, to offer an interpretation giving no 
support to the ‘strong’ notion. See the translation of the Saṃyutta Nikāya, by 
Bhikkhu Bodhi, pp.1050/51.                                                               
31 See GOMBRICH (1) and (2). I also have in mind the Numata lectures which 
Gombrich delivered in 2006. I take account of these, and of Gombrich’s earlier work, 
in all that follows.
32 See MASEFIELD, p. xix: ‘ … the texts are themselves frequently fraught with 
contradictions’. I take ‘frequently’ to be much exaggerated. 
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or fanciful, brought up in discussion of the provenance of the early texts. This was, at 
first, my own assumption. I now find the complexity of the texts to be such as to make 
inescapable the question of their origin and formation. I am concerned, however, to 
maintain ‘Buddhist ethics’- on my definition - as the field of attention. Much of the 
point of that definition was to stiffen resistance to the temptation to go behind the record 
as we have it, on the presumption, or speculation, that – somehow - the Buddha ‘must’ 
have meant something other than what is found there. This hypothetical ‘other’ is then 
found to be more acceptable, on whatever standard of acceptability. This whole 
approach is damaging, as it is likely to issue in evasion. Real difficulties may be set 
aside, in the construction of a speculative substitute for what we have, in which such 
difficulties will not be found. I will, therefore, take the texts I have mentioned above as 
my ‘field’, dealing as necessary, but only as necessary, with problems in interpretation. 
 Masefield makes a point in passing, which must have been widely registered. In his 
preface he quotes from Johansson, with evident endorsement:
Views about Buddhism have very frequently been 
based on a very limited range of material, most often 
a few quotations from the Pali Canon. There are, in 
fact, a small number of quotations that appear again 
and again, while hundreds of others always pass 
unnoticed.33
This is a well-founded observation, though I take what Johannson remarks on to be less 
of a limitation than Masefield supposes. Narrowness of focus in quotation matters little 
if we recollect the extent of the exposition – a greater quantum by far than ‘hundreds of 
others’ - from which a few passages stand out for being helpful in summing up or for 
supporting a contention. Some of these, such as the Bhārasutta, or words or phrases to 
be found in it, stand out for their apparent departure from the teaching of the unquoted 
mass. The attention given to these cases seems unsurprising. In what follows, I will aim 
to give equal attention to the unremarkable contexts in which they are found.
33 MASEFIELD, p. xv
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Masefield’s comment points also to the practice of invoking what, in the Christian 
context, have been called ‘proof-texts’.34 What is the value of the style of argument 
founded on selective quotation as the means of clinching an argument? It is a style well 
established in the commentarial texts produced around the end of our period, and the 
germ of it is to be found at the beginning. An instance is to be found in the Pali 
Aṅguttara Nikāya, where the exposition is concluded by a quotation from the Sutta-  
Nipāta. We see from this reference how far the Buddhist record is scholastic in 
character, the mode of presentation being a manifestation of that. 35  The drawbacks of 
such a method hardly need dwelling on. 
7. Texts and slabs
  In seeing early Buddhism in terms of the textual remains I am following the scholarly 
consensus that has prevailed in the West since the subject began to be studied. There 
have however been dissenters from this consensus and I should refer to the work of the 
most recent, Professor Gregory Schopen.36 Schopen’s case is founded on there being 
archaeological and epigraphic evidence for early Buddhism, as well as textual evidence. 
He points out that this is durable, roughly dateable and early, whereas the texts are to be 
found on manuscripts, almost all of the modern period, containing material of which the 
age, provenance and evolution have all been controversial. If the texts and the slabs, as 
we may call them, told the same story, the difference would matter little, but Schopen 
claims they do not. The evidence from slabs to which he points suggests that at an early 
period, perhaps around the time the various recensions of the canon were being written 
down, Buddhist monks were making offerings of money, typically for the construction 
of stupas, for the benefit of others, typically relatives. 37 This seems to jar with the 
Vinaya, or disciplinary, rule prohibiting monks from having money and to jar also with 
the texts’ doctrine of karman, with its implication that that the agent and the agent alone 
34 ‘The Church to teach, and the Bible to prove’. This old-fashioned Anglican 
insistence, pitched against ‘Rome’ on one side and ‘Dissent’ on the other, catches 
what is meant by the term ‘proof-texts’.
35 AN III 33 [134]. The Buddha is recorded, not only as referring, but as giving a 
precise reference: Idaṃ ca pana metaṃ sāriputta sandāya bhāsitaṃ pārāyaṇe 
udayapañhe. Bhikkhu Bodhi translates: ‘About this, Sariputta, I have spoken in “The 
Questions of Udaya” in “The Way to the Far Shore”’. What more might scholarship 
require? 
36 SCHOPEN.
37 A ‘stupa’ is a funeral mound, often elaborately stylised.
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enjoys the fruits of action, good or bad. Schopen’s point is that, at least across this 
narrow range, the impression given of the day-to-day reality of Buddhist practice is 
quite at variance with what the texts would have led us to expect. The implication is that 
this should lead us to regard the texts with more reserve. 38 
 Against this, one might concede that the doctrine of transference of merit is indeed at 
odds with karman doctrine; this did not prevent it slipping into the orthodox mainstream 
some time after the date of the slabs, whose evidence perhaps does no more than prompt 
a re-dating of this development. As for the pecuniary offerings, might they not have 
been offered by the families and friends of the offering monk, the monk being the 
obvious agent? But that is to speculate.  Schopen may be right in pointing to the 
arbitrariness of the preference for one kind of evidence - textual evidence - on the part 
of the consensus, and may even be right in attributing this to an unconscious ‘Protestant’ 
preference for scripture, on the polemical principle of sola Scriptura, applied out of its 
context, For the present purpose however this is beside the point, which is that 
‘Buddhist ethics’, as I have defined it, and as I find it to be grounded in the texts, has to 
be considered for what it is. I take no position on the extent to which the precepts of 
Buddhist ethics, as I am using the term, governed the conduct of the members, or some 
of them, of the primitive Sangha.  This is to say no more than that Buddhist ethics can 
be discussed in the way in which we discuss Aristotle’s ethics, in disregard of its 
application within its own period or any other.
8. The method of this work
   In what follows, I will use the term ‘Buddhist ethics’, as I have defined it, without 
further explanation or defence. What it covers is grounded in texts, highly disparate in 
character, and to be dated, variously, over a long period. ‘Buddhist ethics’ – to use 
quotation-marks for the last time - is a derivation from specified texts, and there is no 
38 Conclusions close to Schopen’s may be pressed in other contexts. If there were 
space to consider them more fully, I would try to develop the implications of the 
following remarks, from a contemporary Roman historian: ‘… the two bodies of data 
[textual and archaeological] represent different kinds of reality, and have to be 
ordered and interpreted each according to its own rules.  ….  Most archaeological 
‘facts’ turn out to be a complex mixture of primary data and secondary 
interpretation.’ See CORNELL, p. 29.
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way to get behind this connection. The attempt to do so is likely to be a move into 
fantasy. It is also unnecessary, as I judge the process of transmission evident from the 
form of the early texts within the Pali canon to be such as to make it reasonable to treat 
them as ‘authentic’, in that they preserve the doctrine – however systematised in 
transmission – of a single teacher. There may be difficulties in the interpretation of the 
record, of a kind touched on above, and these must be dealt with ad hoc, as they come 
up. The method I shall follow is, therefore, one of putting my primary focus here. I will 
draw also on other sources, especially the later commentarial texts, in order – as 
discussed above – to consider the development and modification of doctrine. I draw 
quite widely, though infrequently, on other sources, heterogeneous in kind, as the 
interests of the argument seem to be served thereby.
 The Buddhist notion of rebirth will figure largely in what follows. I am concerned 
essentially with rebirth as a human being. The Buddhist tradition admits rebirth in other 
forms and on other planes of existence and full treatment of the rebirth-notion would 
require consideration of these other cases. This could not be given briefly, and I will 
deal with these cases only as the argument requires. The case of human rebirth is the 
most interesting case of the five and the most complex, which is why I make it my 
prime, and almost sole, concern. 39  
  It is because I hope my conclusions, if persuasive, will be found applicable across the 
whole Buddhist field that I quote in Sanskrit when illustrating general points. I do this 
despite my overwhelming reliance on the Pali, and trust that it will be a reminder of that 
hope.
39 Rebirth in hell – to point a contrast – is a simple matter. There will be no doubt 
who or what is reborn. 
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CHAPTER TWO
Buddhist Ethics
9. Introduction
  I now offer a general account of Buddhist ethics, which is designed to bring out the 
scope and bearing of the identity problem. I am also concerned to show the connection 
of the ethical scheme with other main strands in Buddhist doctrine, and to offer the 
sketch of a metaethical characterisation. My object is to show what the scheme amounts 
to, both from ‘within’, from the standpoint of the practitioner, and from ‘without’ – that 
is, from a philosophical viewpoint. The impact of the problem bears on both dimensions 
of the scheme, and so must any adequate solution.
   Buddhist ethics has only recently had much philosophical attention. The Buddhist 
approach to morality had to be made out in works of broader focus. A hundred years 
ago, these might have been those of Rhys Davids and R.S.Copleston; in the inter-war 
period, those of E.J.Thomas; after 1945, those of Christmas Humphreys. These writers 
are often helpful and instructive, and cannot be said to have ignored the place of 
morality in the Buddhist scheme of things. This is notably the case with Copleston, who 
has much to say about the moral deficiencies of his Buddhist contemporaries. What is 
not found in their work is a systematic presentation of the ethical strand within the 
whole. 40 It is to the lack of this that we must attribute the disregard of the philosophical 
dimension. Even an unsuccessful attempt at system would have brought up points of 
philosophical interest.
  
  The near-disregard of Buddhist ethics no longer obtains. In recent years, there have 
been systematic accounts in English by established scholars – notably by Damien 
40In Coplestone’s case, the chapter entitled ‘The Buddhist Moral System in General’ 
takes up fewer than ten pages. Copleston was Anglican Bishop of Colombo, and 
made his observations from that vantage point. 
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Keown and Peter Harvey.41  Since 1994, there has been a specialised journal.42 There 
have also been some illuminating accounts of the living religion.43 These are from a 
broadly anthropological perspective, and cast light on the ethical strand within the 
tradition in the course of dealing with contemporary practice.
  My debt to all these writers and to others will be evident in what follows. If my subject 
were Buddhist ethics per se, or contemporary understandings of it, I would need to state 
the debt more precisely and to mark out my own position. As it is, my account has the 
narrower purpose just stated. I am concerned only to show that the identity problem is 
of prime importance, yet less than total in its impact, and to bring out its philosophical 
character. The account which follows is therefore threefold. I deal, only briefly, first 
with the revaluation of elements in the brahmanical religion of his day, and second with 
the worship of the Buddha. These two strands are, I suggest, complementary. I then 
consider a third strand, which is made up of practice, both by way of subscription to 
precepts and by way of meditative and moral cultivation (bhāvanā). This last strand will 
be my main concern, as it is here that the identity problem is central, and it will be the 
basis for the philosophical characterisation with which I conclude.
   
  This is not the only way in which Buddhist ethics could be presented, and other 
argumentative purposes would have been better served in other ways. Not everything of 
religious or philosophical interest will be brought out: I will have little to say about 
Nirvana/Nibbana and nothing about pratītya samutpāda/paticca samuppāda 
(conditioned arising, dependent origination). Both are of prime importance within the 
Buddhist scheme of things, and an adequate treatment of pratītya samutpāda would 
have been a useful support to the discussion of anātman in Chapter Three. This 
adequacy would not however have been easy to achieve. From the Buddha’s own time, 
the difficulty of the notion has been manifest, and I simplify what follows in not dealing 
with it. 
41 For details of all these writers, see Bibliography. I should also mention a short work 
by the Sri Lankan, David Kalupahana. For a summary of recent and current 
scholarship, see KEOWN, Ch 1.
42 Journal of Buddhist Ethics. 
43 See GOMBRICH(1), KING, SPIRO and TAMBIAH. I have more to say about these 
writers below.
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10. Revaluation
   Much of the Buddha’s teaching is expressed in terms of reaction to the brahmanical 
orthodoxy of his time. This may be by way of plain repudiation or of appraisal with 
distaste. 44 Another form of reaction is the bare appropriation of a form of traditional 
practice. Yet another is what I call ‘revaluation’, by which I mean the appropriation of a 
belief or practice or attribution of excellence, and its employment in another way, or in 
another context. This fresh employment will be distinct from the original, yet not so 
distinct as to break all continuity. What is revalued remains recognisable in point of 
origin. I am concerned here with this last. 
  
 Out of many instances the Sigalakasutta , in the Pali Dīgha Nikāya, may stand as a 
case of revaluation. 45  This records an encounter between the Buddha and a young man 
found engaged in the ritual of brahmanical orthodoxy. Early in the morning, the Buddha 
has gone out to receive alms. He sees Sigala paying homage to the different directions 
and asks him why he is doing this. Sigala explains:
‘Lord, my father, when he was dying, told me “Son, you 
ought to worship in that way”. And so, Lord, out of 
respect for my father’s words, which I give weight to, 
esteem and worship … 46 
The Buddha responds:
‘But, householder’s son, that is not the right way to pay 
homage to the six directions according to the discipline of 
the Noble One …..’ 47
He proceeds to revalue (as I have called it) the ritual actions:
44 In the Pali Aṅguttara Nikāya, the Buddha associates brāhmānaṃ mantā (the 
hymns of the Brahmins) with womanising and ‘wrong view’. What the three have in 
common, it seems, is that they are done not openly but furtively. See AN I, 129 
[283].
45 DN No.31
46 Pitā maṃ bhante kālaṃ karonto evam avaca: ‘disa tāta nāmasseyyāsīti’. So kho 
bhante pitavacanaṃ sakkaronto garukaronto mānento pūjento 
47 ‘Na kho gahepatiputta ariyassa vinaye evaṃ chadissā namassitabbā ti’
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… the four defilements of action are given up; he does not 
do evil from the four causes, he does not follow the six 
ways of wasting one’s substance – it is through avoiding 
these fourteen evil ways that he covers the six directions 
… 48
  He enlarges on this at length, specifying the right actions that this avoidance amounts 
to, revaluing rather than prescribing afresh. Sigala receives no rebuke for the store he 
sets by his father’s precept. 49 Traditional practice is to be transformed, rather than given 
up. The newly inculcated pattern of action fills the place of what it supersedes, and so 
remain a component of filial piety. In this sense, Sigala’s future course of life continues 
to be, as it needs to be, what his father has commanded. 
  What the Buddha is shown as doing here finds parallels throughout the record, notably 
in the field of sacrifice and priestly function. By the time of the Buddha, the 
significance of sacrifice had come to exceed that of the gods who were its formal 
recipients. By way of revaluation, there followed a further development. Payasi, just 
brought to acceptance of the Buddha’s teaching by Kassapa, a leading disciple, proposes 
a sacrifice. He is told that sacrifice going with wrong view is useless. Better is right 
view (samyag dṛṣṭi) along with the avoidance of slaughter and with practical charity. 50 
A story in the Mahāvastu teaches the abandonment of the idea that salvation comes 
from ‘the fire-sacrifice and offering’. 51  Moral reformation is declared to be better than 
bathing in a holy river.52  
  
  What cannot be revalued may be appropriated for a fresh purpose. A plain case of 
appropriation is the Buddhist designation of Uposatha days, marking the points of the 
lunar cycle. Here is an adoption of something in popular religion for the purposes of 
monastic life: the monks come together to review their conformity to the Vinaya. 53 A 
48 Cataro kammakilesā pahinā honti; catūhi ṭhānehi pāpakammam na karoti, cha ca 
bhogānam apāyamukhāni na sevati, so evaṃ cudasapāpakāpagato chaddisa 
paṭicchādī …  
49 His attitude to his father’s precept is itself one of ‘worship’ (pūjento). There is 
some revaluation even in what the Buddha proceeds to revalue.
50 DN No. 23.31. ‘Right view’ is seeing things as they are – that is, as the Buddha 
sees them. 
51 Vol III [445]. Translation p.446 
52 DN No. 25 & MN No. 7
53 For an account of the benefits of this observance, see AN VIII 41.
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special form of revaluation is found in the demonstrative disregard of something central 
to brahmanical tradition. A case of this is the admission of a one-time barber to the 
monastic order immediately before his former masters, so ensuring him precedence over 
them. 54
  Revaluation is most resonant in the self-presentation of the great king, Asoka. The 
inscriptions which Asoka ordered to be cut on pillars, and on rocks round his frontiers 
proclaim his benevolence, not the glory proclaimed of themselves by the Achaemenid 
rulers of Iran, whose precedent he may have been following.  The word found 
everywhere in these inscriptions is dhamma, one of multiple meaning – here, normally, 
‘morality’. 55 The burden is one of Asoka’s dedication to morality, and also of his 
concern that his subjects should conform to it:
Katavya mate hi me sarva loka hitaṃ (I judge that 
what I ought to do is promote everyone’s welfare). 
Esa hi sesṭe kamme ya dhaṃmānusāsaṃ (this is 
the best work - instruction in morality). 56
The ‘morality’ declared is expressed in Asoka’s regard for his subjects’ wellbeing, his 
dedication to peace and to the minimisation of violence, and his respect for both 
orthodox and heterodox religion. How far this fits with historical reality must be a 
matter for the historian. Here, my concern is with Asoka’s conception of himself. His 
presentation by others, in the later Buddhist record, is rather different. This owes little to 
the inscriptions, knowledge of which is presumed to have been lost.  Its emphasis is on 
the reformation of the man of violence, who is now devoted to justice and benevolence. 
57  All this is emeshed in edifying legend, and likely to be less congenial to the moral 
54 This is the story of Upali. See the Pali Vinaya, Cullavagga VII [182].
55 A text in the Pali Aṅguttara Nikāya differentiates the dhamma of the righteous 
ruler, to whom it is effectively a joint-king, from that of the Buddha. Both are 
admirable. See AN III.14 [109/10].
56 Girnar inscriptions 6.9 & 4.10. The language is a form of Prakrit. I follow Hultzsch’s 
transcription. See HULTZSCH.
57 This is well set out by Strong in his introduction to a translation of the much later 
Aśokāvadana, one of the components of the Divyāvadāna. Asoka figures, in passing, 
in the chronicle history of Ceylon, the Mahāvaṃsa (XI 19) where, he is referred to as 
Dhammāsoka. For a general treatment of Asoka, see MOOKERJI.  
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sensibility of today than the burden of the inscriptions. The recovery of these, in the 
early 19th century, supplied a revaluation of kingship like no other. 58     
 I can refer only in passing to the Buddha’s employment of the terms brāhmaṇa and 
ārya, both of which are given a distinctive and newly moralised significance. 59  If space 
permitted, I would enlarge on the way in which, as Gombrich has it, the Pali 
Aggaññasutta is a parody of the brahmanical creation myth. 60  Both these revaluations 
are to the point, as we sometimes find among Indian commentators the presumption that 
Buddhism is a variant form of Hinduism. In the West this presumption is almost 
universally repudiated as misleading. While I would not claim that it is not misleading, 
it is not entirely mistaken. The Buddha’s revaluation of concept and practice was so 
pitched as to produce what may be called, if anachronistically, Hindus with a difference.
  In the Mahāparinibbānasutta, the record of the closing month of the Buddha’s life, the 
Vajjians are commended for sticking to custom, and declared to be wise and prudent for 
doing so. 61  Laypeople are not exhorted to give up traditional practices, though they 
may be prompted to a reconsideration of them.62  To say this is to point to a decidedly 
conservative emphasis. Such an emphasis, evident not only in formal prescription, but 
also by way of commentary on all aspects of life, is found everywhere in the early texts. 
It is plainly grounded in a concern for social harmony. Procedure by way of revaluation 
is by way of transformation through slow influence or permeation. This, on the 
evidence, was the Buddha’s procedure. 
11. The worship of the Buddha
58 Comparable instances are the Emperor Marcus Aurelius and King Louis IX of 
France, but these are presented as expressions of an ideal - Stoic sage and Christian 
hero - rather than as revaluations.
59 For the revaluation of brāhmaṇa, see the Dhammapāda. See CHOONG, MUN-KEAT 
for the Buddha’s appropriation of this term in the Chinese, originally Sanskrit, 
record. The Buddha regularly refers to himself as ārya.
60 DN No.27. Discussed in GOMBRICH (2). Such passages as this prompt the thought 
that what I have called ‘revaluation’ might as pointedly have been called ‘anti-
religion’. 
61 DN No.16
62 DN No.25
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   The worship of the Buddha is central to Buddhist practice and so to Buddhist 
morality. Every strand in the early record shows this, the Mahāvastu more richly than 
the Pali canon. What this amounted to is like nothing else. 
  Faith in the Buddha was commonly the beginning of conversion and of following the 
path. 63 This was not faith in a god. The Buddha is not, as the gods are, within the sphere 
of saṃsāra  (the phenomenal world) and he is not liable to rebirth. As a god is a poor 
thing beside a Buddha, there is little to this disclaimer. His humanity is a more complex 
matter. He is shown as being treated as normally human by nearly all those with whom 
he comes to deal, though also with the greatest reverence by his followers. The gap in 
time between his lifetime and the written record is such that day-to-day detail is largely 
lost. A little, indeed, comes through to us: the Buddha prefers agreeable surroundings in 
which to eat from his bowl, and he sometimes suffers backache.64 He makes an 
exemplum of his dying, plainly human, body, declaring that all compounded things are 
subject to dissolution.65 Here are plain touches of humanity.   In a celebrated passage, it 
is declared what the Buddha is not: there are four such assertions from his own lips; one 
is that he is not a human being. 66 Strictly, the denial is that he will become a human 
being or a being of any other kind in a future life, a denial that is founded on the claim 
that he is enlightened and no longer subject to rebirth. The text seems, however, to 
admit the reading that the Buddha is talking of what he is at the time. Insofar as the 
Buddha is in any sense not a human being, it is in the sense that he enjoyed the peculiar 
karmic history of a bodhisattva (Buddha-to-be) until his enlightenment, and that his 
final birth was the issue of this process, without sexual intercourse. The simplest 
conclusion seems to be that the Buddha is a human being but no common one. 
63 MN No. 12 & 47. 
64 DN No. 33
65 DN No. 16
66 Two versions of the passage are extant, one in the Pali recension, one in the 
Gandhari. See AN IV 36, and the reconstructed Gandhari in ALLON (2) p.124. For the 
background to the Gandhari, see GLASS. The future tense is employed in both 
recensions both for the interlocutor’s questions and the Buddha’s replies. In the Pali 
recension, before the dialogue opens, the interlocutor has noticed the marks of the 
feet left on the ground by the Buddha. This prompts him to reflect: na vat’ imāni 
manussabhutassa padāni bhavissanti (these will not be the feet/footprints of a 
human being). The future tense is used here too - surely with the significance of the 
present? A commentator remarks that there may be word-play, where the 
interlocutor uses the future in the polite sense, and where the Buddha replies as if 
the future were literally intended. Allon discusses the point exhaustively.
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   It fits with this complexity that the status and attributes of a Buddha are held to be 
ineffable. The question where the Tathāgata – that is, the Buddha - goes after death is 
one of those questions which he regularly refuses to answer. 67 This is in part because the 
question is unprofitable, but seems also to be because a Buddha is sui generis, covered 
by no familiar category, and - beyond this - that he represents the noumenal within the 
world of phenomena, admitting of none of the predication applicable only to 
phenomena. 
  Though not a god, the Buddha is found everywhere to be worshipped in a manner 
indistinguishable from that of a god. Robert Knox, when a prisoner in Ceylon in the 17th 
Century, observed the religion practised about him, and understood it in that way.68 On 
any comparative study of religions that works by way of structure, and which within 
that structure has a slot for God, that ‘slot’ in the Buddhist case is filled by the Buddha. 
Otherwise put, the Buddha is an object of the devotion accorded a god, though this is 
not the perfervid devotion (bhakti) often accorded Hindu divinities. He is also an 
exemplar. It is tempting to say, simply, that the record presents him as the type of human 
perfection. This would be true enough were it possible for an abstraction, ‘perfection’, 
to be realised in narrative. As it is, the record strains against impossibility to accomplish 
this. Exemplary actions are presented, a beautiful example being a well-known story 
found in the Pali Vinaya. 69 The Buddha finds a bhikkhu ill and left alone by the others, 
seemingly suffering from something like dysentery and lying in his own excrement. 
With his attendant, Ananda, the Buddha washes the sick man’s body, then summons the 
other bhikkhavaḥ (plural) and rebukes them. To all the other reasons why they should 
care for the sick he adds this: yo ... mam upaṭṭhaheya so golanam upaṭṭhaheyya 
(anyone who wants to care for me should care for the sick). Devotion to the Buddha, 
‘caring’ for him, is taken for granted. By itself it can take one to heaven.70 It is what 
follows from it that needs emphasis.
  The first part of the three-fold formula by which Buddhist profession is made is 
Buddhaṃ saranaṃ gacchāmi  (I go for refuge to the Buddha). The other two ‘refuges’ 
67 An instance is his refusal to answer Vacchagotta in the terms requested. See MN 
No.72. 
68 KNOX, p 136
69 Vinaya Piṭaka, Mahāvagga VIII [301]; translation Vol.IV, p.431.
70 MN No. 22. For the ‘planes’ of future existence, see p. 59/60. For rebirth in heaven, 
see p.113/14.
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are the Dharma ((here) the teaching) and the Sangha (the monastic order). The three go 
together. The Buddha regularly identifies himself with the Dharma, presenting it as a 
‘ruler’ and as the object of prime concern. 71  In the record of his last few weeks, he is 
shown to be reconciling his followers, the Sangha, to his absence. 72  There is, therefore, 
a sense in which Buddhist ethics can stand by itself: its claims to acceptance are not 
greatly diminished if its founder is left out of account, as the salvic power of his 
teaching would still conduce to the end of suffering. At the same time, the practitioner 
makes a commitment to beliefs, orientations, devotions and practices – that is, to a 
complex which finds its cohesive principle in the Buddha. It is here that commitments, 
moral exertions and doctrinal affirmations come together. It is in the element of 
worship, through the worship of the Buddha, that we find the seal and the solder. The 
lasting popular appeal of Buddhism would not have obtained without this fusion.
12. Living by way of precept
  Soon after his enlightenment - the tradition has it - the Buddha journeyed to a park 
outside Benares. There he delivered an address to a small audience of renunciants, the 
Dharmacakrapravartana ((literally) the setting -rolling of the law-wheel; the first 
declaration of the teaching).73 Here is to be found the first presentation of the four 
āryasatyāni (noble Truths, or Truths of the Noble One). These are set out on the model 
of medical diagnosis: sickness, the cause of sickness, the cure, and the way to the cure. 
The Buddha declares the unsatisfactoriness, disturbance and suffering (duḥkha/dukkha) 
of existence within saṃsāra  (the world of experience and rebirth); ascribes the cause 
of this, literally, to ‘thirst’ (tṛṣṇa/tanhā) - that is, to craving, grasping, attachment; 
declares the cure to be cessation (nirodha), synonymous with Nirvana/ Nibbana; and 
reveals the way to the cure, the āryāstaṅgamarga (the noble eight-fold Path, or the 
eight-fold Path of the Noble One) or, simply, the marga, identified with the madhyama 
pratipad  (the Middle Way).
71 AN III 14 [109/10] and elsewhere.
72 DN II No.16 [144]. Alam ānanda mā soci ma paridevi  … Taṃ kutettha ānanda 
labbhā ‘yantaṃ jātaṃ bhutaṃ saṅkhataṃ palokadhammṃṃ, taṃ vata 
tathāgatassāpi sarīraṃ māpalujjati.  Loosely translated, this means: ‘Don’t weep 
and wail, Ananda  … Everything born and come into being and compounded will 
naturally break up.  How could the body of the Tathāgata escape being broken up?’ 
73 The Pali version is at SN V 56 [420]
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  Duḥkha/dukkha, proclaimed by the first Truth, is one of the three ‘marks’ of saṃsāra. 
The three characterise what is to be found in saṃsāra or endured there. The other two 
marks are anitya/anicca (impermanence) and anātman/anattā (lack of self). The three 
are interdependent and concurrent. These are the three lakṣaṇāḥ/lakkhaṇā (marks), to 
which I will return in Chapter Three in discussing anātman/anattā. 74
 In the last of the four āryasatyāni, that proclaiming the marga, we have the ultimate 
basis for a system of auto-prescription, by way of the acknowledgement of precepts, 
which are then taken to be guidelines for action. The precepts are grounded in the 
āryasatyāni as a whole, taken to be a setting-out of the facts of existence. Each of the 
eight components of the marga is declared to be samyak. This is usually translated 
‘right’, and has a suggestion of consistent, harmonious progress. The terms so qualified 
are, in Sanskrit: dṛṣṭi (view), saṃkalpa (intention/ thought), vāk  (speech), karmanta 
(action), ājīva (livlihood), vyāyāma (effort/exertion), smṛṭi (mindfulness), and samādhi 
(concentration/absorption). The eight glosses are rough-and-ready; the first two terms 
and the last two - especially - elude one-word translation.
 In this context, śīla/sila (morality) picks out three of the eight, being a matter of right 
speech, action and livelihood. It goes with and supports, and should itself be supported 
by, the development of prajñā/paññā (wisdom), the first two components of the marga, 
and of bhāvanā (self-development through meditation), the last three. 75 The marga as a 
whole is directed towards the ‘cure’ and end, Nirvana. In the whole scheme, therefore, 
śīla may be regarded instrumentally: one acts – it may be said ‘morally’ - with a view to 
an end.
 We find mention of differing ways or degrees in the following of the Path. In the early 
texts, we find two levels of prescription: the Buddha prescribes one form of practice to 
one class of follower, usually lay-people, and another to the other class, usually those 
granted entry to the Sangha. The former is caught by the three words, dāna (giving, 
generosity), śīla, and śvarga (heaven – by which is meant immediate well-being and/or 
74 AN III 134. 
75 The Buddha is recorded as teaching the interdependence of the three in the 
record of his last days. Mahāparinibbānasutta DN 16 [81]. In the Visuddhimagga, 
morality is dealt with first and wisdom last. See below.  
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a good rebirth). 76 The latter is the full practice of the eight-fold Path. Another distinction 
is expressed in Buddhaghosa’s summation of Buddhist doctrine and practice, the Pali 
Visuddhimagga. It is between a mundane (lokiya) and a supermundane (lokuttara) 
following of the Path77. Lokuttara practice is reserved to those close to Nirvana - to put 
it technically, to who have ‘entered the stream’. How we should understand 
Nirvana/Nibbana is notoriously hard to state, but the point of immediate concern is that 
it represents the end of rebirth. Nirvana is the goal for anyone who accepts the Buddha’s 
teaching and who practises as he taught. For almost everyone, however, it cannot be the 
immediate goal, which is, rather, a good rebirth. A succession of good rebirths is a large 
advance towards Nirvana. The conception is not one of different goals, but of a single 
goal, not – for most of us – quickly or readily approached. Here is the sphere of lokiya 
practice. It is presented as an adjustment of the order of the categories of component of 
the Path, the three components of śīla coming first. This is the ordering which gives the 
Visuddhimagga its structure. It is a departure from the order of the Buddha’s first 
sermon, but no surprising one, as śīla can be supposed to be what the ordinary man 
most urgently needs to attend to.78
13. The content of  śī  la  
  I have translated the word śīla/sīla as ‘virtue’, which is not contentious. In the 
Mettāsutta, which I will shortly quote in full, sīlavā can only be ‘virtuous’. We will see 
shortly that the word is also rendered ‘’precept’ or ‘prescription for action’. 
Lexicographers find its prime meaning in ‘nature’, ‘conduct’ and ‘habituation’. These 
various meanings have a natural coherence.  Sometimes, the Pali word which must 
mean ‘precepts’ is not sīlāni but dhammā (both plural forms). 79 This suggests that sīla  
was only in course of becoming a term of art in the Buddha’s time.
76 AN VIII 36
77 Vism [13]. The distinction is found in the early texts at MN No. 117
78 What I have summarised here is the orthodoxy of contemporary Buddhism. It has 
been challenged by Masefield, who argues that the earliest Buddhist teaching knew 
no distinction between a mundane and a supermundane following of the Path. Only 
the latter was available, and entry to it was by way of achieving the first step on the 
Path. A probable condition of this first achievement was the practitioner’s all-
transforming contact with the Buddha. There is no room here for discussion of this 
challenge. I observe only that the development Masefield finds inauthentic was an 
indispensable condition of the development of Buddhism into an enduring and 
widely diffused religion. See MASEFIELD.  
79 See Bibliograpy for details of the Sanskrit and Pali dictionaries on which I have 
relied.
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  I have just brought out the centrality of prescription in Buddhist ethics. The 
āryāstaṅgamarga is its most general form, governing more particular systems. The 
Vinaya, in its various recensions, sets out rules for monks which are numerous and 
precise. This is, effectively, legislation; serious breaches of the rules will result in 
expulsion from the Sangha. In the Pali Nikayas and their equivalents there is something 
comparable for laypeople and for those not fully professed. This is not legislation, but is 
offered for guidance, acceptance and auto-prescription. I will be concerned with two of 
these presentations in list-form, both drawn from Pali sources. 
  One is the Dasakusalakammapatha  (list (or way) of ten good actions). This may be 
found expressed in terms of avoidance – that is, of the avoidance of the corresponding 
ten bad actions – and structured to cover, successively, bodily, verbal and mental action 
(or attitude). 80 The correction of the first of these, then of the second, is the most urgent 
concern and also the easier; the correction of the last is the deepest concern and the 
harder to bring about. It is this last that should be noted. Its three components are the 
mental factors   lobha (greed), dveśa/dosa (hatred) and moha (delusion, or distorted 
view). Here are the so-called ‘three fires’ or akuśala (bad) mūlāni (roots (here in the 
sense of basic propensities or factors of motivation)). 81 Their inclusion in the list seems 
to extend its scope beyond śīla, as narrowly defined, to the second component of the 
eight-fold path, samyak saṃkalpa  (Right Intention/Thought). This too needs to be 
purified. The ‘three fires’ are of prime importance in the Buddhist scheme. As I will 
show below, they are the defining factor of ‘bad’ karman.
 The second list, which may be called the precept-list, is at the heart of Buddhist 
practice. If the Dasakusalakammapatha is for everyone, as the context often suggests, 
the precept-list is for the lay follower, upāsaka or (feminine) upāsakā. It is found in 
five-fold, eight-fold and ten-fold versions. The first of these, in Pali the pañca silāni 
(the five precepts), functions as a statement of the basic moral standard for the Buddhist 
80 The Pali Saleyyakasutta records the Buddha’s address to the brāhmana 
householders of the village of Sala. The Dasakusalakammapatha is to be found in 
the context of his exposition of the conditioning of rebirth by conduct: 
adhammacariyā visamacariyā hetu kho gahapatiyo evamidhekacce sattā kāyassa 
bhedā parammaraṇā apāyaṃ duggatiṃ vinipātaṃ nirayaṃ upapajjanti 
(Householders, on account of conduct incompatible with Dhamma and which is 
unrighteous, some beings, on the breaking-up of the body at death, arise in 
deprived and miserable states or in hell). The opposite conduct is declared to issue 
in the opposite destiny. MN No.41 [285]
81 Set out by thenselves at AN III 33 [134/35]
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layman.  It begins with an undertaking to live harmlessly: pānatipātā veramini  
sikkhāpadam samadiyāmi (I undertake the training-rule of avoidance of injury to living 
things). There follows the same undertaking in respect of adinnādana (taking what is 
not given), kāmesu micchcāra (wrongdoing with regard to the senses, especially sex), 
musāvāda (falsehood), and  surameraya majja pamādatthāna (the state of torpor and 
intoxication resulting from strong drink). 82 The first four of these five follow the bodily 
and verbal prescriptions of the Dasakusalakammapatha. The eight-fold version of the 
second list substitutes brahmacariya (sexual abstinence) for kāmesu micchācāra and 
adds, as points of avoidance, eating after midday and such indulgencies as luxury in 
furniture, personal adornment and entertainments. The ten-fold version presents the 
eight-fold version as nine-fold and adds one further abstention, that from handling 
money.
  The three forms of the list can be seen to make up a progression. Within the five-fold 
version, the first four silāni are plainly matters of social morality. The fifth appears to be 
a condition of Right Mindfulness (samyak smṛṭti/sati) and so a condition of the 
observance of the other four. With the eight-fold version an ascetic standard is added to 
the ethical. The use of a high and capacious bed (uccāsayana mahāsayana) need not be 
given up in the way in which falsehood (musāvāda) should be given up: what harm can 
my sleeping arrangements do to others?  Its abandonment can however be seen as an 
element in the moderate asceticism that goes with the following of the Path. The ten-
fold version clearly adds renunciation to asceticism: there can be no viable existence in 
the world without money. As such, it is a further step and is the form of the precepts 
normally taken by monastic novices.
  The precepts are adopted through trust in the Buddha and by virtue of their own 
appeal. Their application calls for sensitivity and insight – qualities which bhāvanā 
(the practice of meditation) should develop – and is analogous to the treading of a way 
along a path. Here is the following of the madhyama pratipad, not only the threading of 
a way between extremes, but also progress in the light of appreciation of all the facts of 
82 The pañca sīlāni are found everywhere in the Buddhist record, often in 
combination with other points of moral teaching. A good example is the 
Mahānāmasutta at AN 8.1.3.5 [220/21]. Here the precepts are set out after the 
three Refuges and before a general account of the virtuous life. After expounding 
them, the Buddha declares: Ettāvatā kho mahānāma upāsako sīlavā hoti (So far, 
Mahanama, the upāsaka is virtuous).  
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the matter. Two examples may illustrate this. Pānatipata may seem not too difficult to 
avoid. I can easily avoid killing people and with a little care, avoid killing even insects. 
The precept points beyond this towards the cutting short of any approval of killing by 
others – for instance, by partisans of a cause to which I may be sympathetic - or any 
satisfaction in such acts. 83 The avoidance of adinnādāna is comparable. Reflection may 
suggest that what is kuśala  (good, skilful) in this respect goes beyond not taking 
objects; it extends to not seeking information, as a moral discipline on curiosity. Skilful 
action, in line with reflection, may make the following of a precept more demanding, 
not less.
 
14. The application of  śī  la  : some difficulties  
  The first, second and fifth components of the five-fold list are specific: what not to do 
is spelled out. The third and fourth proscribe ‘wrong-doing’, more generally, within 
specified areas. It may be be a question what this amounts to. The Pali Sāleyyakasutta 
defines it in respect of musāvāda:
Here .. someone speaks falsehood: when summoned 
to a court, or to a meeting …  and questioned as a 
witness: ‘So, good man, tell what you know’, not 
knowing, he says, ‘I know’, or knowing, he says, ‘I do 
not know’ …  in full awareness he speaks falsehood 
for his own ends ... 84
83 This is evident from the progression of bodily, verbal and mental abstentions in 
the Dasakusalakammapatha. The first of these is only the start. Endorsement of 
killing can only be rooted in dveśa/dosa (ill-will, hatred). The relevance of this will 
emerge in Chapter Seven. 
84 Idha … ekacco musāvadī hoti sabhāgato vā parisagato vā … abhinīto 
sakkhipuṭṭho: ‘ehambho purisa yaṃ janāsi taṃ vadehīti. So ajānaṃ vā aha na 
jānāmīti jānaṃ vā aha na jānāmīti .. Iti attahetu … sampajānamusā bhāsita hoti. 
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  The amplification of kāmesu micchācāra in the same text shows that the case is not 
always so simple:
 He misconducts himself in sensual pleasures; he has 
intercourse with women who are protected by their 
mother, father, … brother … who are protected by 
law, who have a husband, and even with those who 
are garlanded in token of betrothal ... 85
 
The thought behind this selection of instances is clearly that wrong would be done to 
the woman’s ‘protector’, her effective owner, and that this wrong should be avoided on 
the principle, as it appears, of the other three of the first four silāni, that of avoiding 
wrong-doing towards others. Here is a view of the matter likely to be found 
anachronistic. Its application seems correspondingly limited. How can Enlightenment, it 
may be urged, be so conditioned by cultural norms? 
 
  The answer is that prescriptions of action derived from general principles need not be 
rigid to be authentic. A precept is a fixed point, while its application is a matter for 
reflection. Reflection can only occur in a context, and contexts will differ. Whatever the 
context, the application of the precept will be governed by intention and attitude. Where 
these are grounded in the three kuśala mūlāni (good roots), the line of action which 
follows will be kuśala/kusala.86  This being so, nothing of significance is given up in 
granting the cultural specificity sometimes found in the Buddha’s expositions.
  
  It is here too that we find the answer to another criticism, sometimes made, that the 
emphasis of Buddhist ethics is ‘negative’. The first four precepts, whose application 
will be a matter for reflection, can readily be given a positive form. The first precept, 
not killing, can be developed, first, into doing no harm of any kind and, second, into 
positive benevolence. With such a development, even the lower road - that made up of 
dāna, śīla and śvarga - can be seen to be highly demanding. There is no limit, beyond 
85 Kāmesu micchācarī kho pana hoti, yā ta māturakkhitā piturakkhitā … 
bhāturakkkhitā … dhammarakkhitā … sassāmikā .. antamaso 
mālagunaparikkhittāpi … tathārūpāsu cārittaṃ āpajjita hoti…
86 For the akuśala mūlāni, or ‘three fires’, see above, p.41. The kuśala mūlāni are 
their opposites. I discuss kuśala/kusala below.   
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what is self-imposed, to the practice of generosity (dāna) and benevolence (śīla with a 
positive emphasis). The third stage, śvarga (happiness in this life, or a good rebirth or 
both) can be seen as the natural outcome - not the sole motivation - of this demanding 
practice. This is to say that this third strand in Buddhist ethics (of those I have picked 
out) is not confined to the following of rules, whether explicit in the texts or – to some 
degree – to be worked out by the practitioner. The third strand – that is, śīla – extends to 
the cultivation of good qualities, of positive value as kuśala, which may as well be 
called perfections or virtues.87  This was to become far more conspicuous in the 
Mahayana, though no more of the essence, than in the practice of our concern. 88
  This positive emphasis in the sphere of morality is deeply connected with practice 
within another division of the marga, that of self-cultivation or meditative practice 
(bhāvanā). To bring this out, I now quote in full, making the translation more literal 
than usual, one of the most celebrated Buddhist texts, the Pali Mettāsutta. 89 This text is 
a complete illustration of the working of the Path. Its quotation will show the place of 
components other than the three strictly constituting śīla and present their common 
operation. It will also serve as a summing up of what has been said above about śīla, 
and support my rebuttal of the charge of negativity.
   The sutta opens with an exposition of śīla, to use the Pali term here and below, in the 
sense of self-training. The training is clearly that of a bhikkhu, whose Right Livelihood 
is living simply and taking alms only in a proper way. Then comes the meditative 
practice of friendliness - or of loving-kindness, as mettā is sometimes rendered - falling 
within the sphere of Right Concentration/ Absorption (samādhi). There follows some 
account of this practice and its merits and, finally, an emphasis on Right Mindfulness 
(smṛṭi/sati) and the assurance of an end to rebirth:
What ought to be done by one skilled in the good 
(atthakusalena), who wishes to attain that calm state 
87 Pali pāramī, and Sanskrit pāramitā (state of perfection). The basic sense is ‘going 
beyond’.
88 Bhikkhu Bodhi has made available in translation a commentary on the perfections, 
‘found in at least two places in the Pali exegetical literature’. It appears to have the 
Visuddhimagga behind it, and to fall outside our period. The author’s discussion of 
the virtues is very much in Aristotle’s style, properly Buddhist though they are. See 
BHIKKU BODHI.    
89 Khuddaka Nikaya, 1,9 [8].
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(santam padam, ie Nirvana), is that he should be sincere 
upright and conscientious, of right speech, gentle and not 
arrogant, contented, living simply, peaceful and 
unburdened, with senses calmed, prudent, modest, not 
grasping among the dwellings (kulesu ananugiddho - that 
is, not anxious for support as a mendicant). He should not 
do anything trifling, for which other wise men would 
blame (him).
                                                            ‘May all beings be 
happy and secure, may they be happy in themselves
(sukhitattā), the feeble and strong altogether, tall, big or 
medium, short, small or large, seen or unseen, those who 
live far or near, in being or wishing for birth 
(saṃbhavesi), may all beings be happy in themselves’. 
Let no one deceive another, or despise anyone anywhere. 
Let him not wish harm (dukkham), through anger or 
repugnance, to any one at all. Just as a mother would 
protect her only child with her life, so let him cultivate a 
boundless heart (mānasam) towards all beings. Let him 
cultivate friendliness (mettam) everywhere, a boundless 
heart above, below and around, one without obstruction, 
hatred or enmity. Standing, walking, sitting or in bed - 
while he is awake, he should maintain this mindfulness 
(satim). This is said to be the godlike state/dwelling 
(brahmam vihāram) here. Not being attached to (false) 
views, virtuous (sīlavā), endowed with insight/vision 
(dassanena), giving up greed with regard to the senses, he 
indeed does not go again into the womb.90 
90 Karanīyam atthakusalena yam tam santam padam abhisamecca/ sakko ūju ca 
sūjū ca suvaco c’assa mudu anatimāni// Santussako ca subharo ca apakicco ca 
sallahukavutti/ santindriyo ca nipako ca appagabho kulesu ananugiddho// Na ca 
khuddam samācare kiñci yena viññūpare upavadeyyum/ sukhino vā khemino hontu 
sabbe sattā bhavantu sukhitattā// Ye keci pānabhuttatthi tasā vā thāvarā vā 
anavasesā/ dighā vā ye mahantā vā sabbe sattā bhavantu sukhitattā// Na paro 
param nikubbetha nātimaññetha katthacinam kañci/ byārosanā patighasaññā 
nāññamaññassa dukkham iccheyya// Mātā yatha niyam puttam āyusā ekaputtam 
anurakkhe/ evam pi sabbabhūtesu mānasam bhāvaye aparimānam// Mettañ ca 
sabbalokasmin mānasam bhāvaye aparimānam/ uddham adho ca tiriyañca 
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  This text makes it plain that the stress on negative prescription is not such to exclude a 
strongly positive emphasis. 91 It may none the less prompt the suggestion that Buddhist 
ethics is marked by certain limitations. Two of these can be discussed together. One is 
that Buddhist ethics is concerned with the perfection of the individual at least to the 
relative disregard of others. A second is that the tradition has too little to say about life 
in the world. These weaknesses, if they are such, seem to have a common source. If the 
prime concern is with the progress of a very few, almost certainly members of the 
Sangha, other concerns will be subordinate.
  An answer to the first charge is simply given. What is expressed in the Mettāsutta is 
indeed the perfection of the practitioner. At the same time, the text is an eloquent 
expression of concern for others and, more remarkably, of the ending of the distinction 
between those others and the self. What this makes clear is that there is an innocent self-
concern directed to the purification of that self’s connections with others. The perfection 
of the self, on the Buddhist view, memorably expressed in this text, is by way of the 
disregard of the self.    
  
The case with the second charge is not altogether different, though here some 
concession is necessary. It must, I think, be granted that the Buddhist tradition has not 
developed a tradition of concern for the problems of lay life as rich as that concerned 
with that of the professed. This should not be overstated, as the Buddha is often 
recorded as talking to lay people. We find exhortation to rulers on how to rule, how to 
deal with poverty and malefactors, and so on. There is much advice on how to lead a 
harmless, virtuous life and on how to be as happy as life in saṃsāra permits. All this is 
far from nothing. But there is, I believe, some force in the point that this is secondary 
and that Buddhist social morality is a thinner and less developed thing than the 
corresponding strain in the other ’great’ religions. 
asambādham averam asapattam// Tittham caram nisinno vā sayāno vā yāvat’assa 
vigatamiddho/ etam satim adhittheyya Brahman etam vihāram idha māhu// Ditthiñ 
ca anupagamma sīlavā dassanena sampanno/ kāmesu vinneya gedham na hi jātu 
gabbhaseyyam punar etī’ ti.
91 This claim is developed strongly by Cooper and James in the course of their 
presentation of the Buddhist scheme as a form of virtue ethics. See COOPER & 
JAMES passim, especially pp.54/55.
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  This must be attributable, in part, to a lack of necessity. There was no tradition of 
thought in India outside the brahmanical tradition and those formed in reaction to it. I 
have sought to show how that tradition was revalued by the Buddha for his own 
purposes. This, in the Indian context, must have seemed both sufficient and distinctive.
 It must be attributable also to the symbiosis of Sangha and world, taken to be 
something plainly good for the world. The world derives knowledge of the Dharma 
from the Sangha. The early texts point bear witness to a plethora of benefits flowing to 
the world from the relationship. Typical are two suttas within the Pali Majjhima Nikāya, 
where it is shown how the diligent practice of some monks is for the benefit of all the 
laity around. It is even said to illuminate the wood in which they dwell. 92 Here, again, is 
the answer to the charge of self-concern, where this has to be understood in an exclusive 
sense. I will return to consideration of this charge in Chapter Five, where, in discussion 
of Parfit’s treatment of Sidgwick, I will suggest further grounds for thinking it mistaken. 
In Chapter Seven, taking stock after considering Parfit’s work as a whole, I will revert 
to it in summing up.
   The Mettāsutta may also prompt a criticism of an entirely different order. In a critique 
of utilitarianism, Bernard Williams  insists that a human life finds much of its value in 
the development of projects and attitudes which can be fitted only with difficulty into a 
utilitarian calculus, and that these ought not to be sacrificed to the demands of such a 
calculus. 93  Some forms of utilitarianism are indeed highly demanding, sufficiently so 
to suggest a parallel with the universal self-denying benevolence expressed by the 
Mettāsutta. The cultivation of universal benevolence seems incompatible with particular 
affections and loyalties, and with everything else that marks out and gives value to a 
human life. With this comes an invocation of the old saw that the best may be the 
enemy of the good. In trying to universalise mettā, the practitioner may come to care 
less for the immediate and the particular.
 The response to reservations of this kind this has to be by way of recalling the variety 
of ways of following the path. The practitioner supposed by the Mettāsutta is plainly 
92 MN No.31 & 32.
93 SMART & WILLIAMS. In a footnote to p 114, Williams refers to ‘resemblances in 
spirit between utilitarianism and high-minded evangelical Christianity’. I am 
pointing also to a resemblance to an apparent resemblance to Buddhism.
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very far along this path. The pṛṭhagjana/puthujjana (‘plain man’, ordinary person) who 
hears it should admire the ideal and accept the practice as his or her ultimate goal. It 
does not follow that he or she should adopt it at once and without modification. There 
are degrees and levels of practice, with an acceptance of distinctions and gradations. 
15. Buddhist ethics as Naturalist
  Characterisation of Buddhist ethics finds a ready starting-point in the understanding of 
the word kuśala (Pali kusala). (This has the antonym akuśala (Pali akusala)). I have 
already used the word, in disregard of its complexities. How it should be translated has 
been the subject of debate. In translating the Mettāsutta, I took atthakusala to mean 
‘(one who is) skilled (kusala) in the good’. Other renderings, such as ‘skilful in well-
being’, would have been defensible. In their application to the mūlāni (roots), I have 
taken the Pali kusala and akusala to be ‘good’ and ‘bad’ respectively. 94  Discussion has 
ranged over the breadth of meaning which these translations suggest, and over whether 
the word has a primary significance, one of the those instanced – ‘skilful’, ‘good’ - or 
yet another. It has extended to such points of doubt as the ‘skill’ caught by the reference 
to ‘skilful’ action, and the distinction, if there is a distinction here, of ‘moral’ and ‘non-
moral’ good.
  The debate has been too complex for summary here. It may be enough if I state a 
position and draw out its implications.95 What I maintain is that the Buddhist ethical 
scheme is a case of ethical naturalism. By ‘naturalism’, in the present context, I mean a 
theory of ethics under which ‘moral’ terms are definable in non-moral terms and moral 
judgments are a kind of empirical judgments. Some such definition is implied in 
94 Sections 13 & 14 above
95 The field of debate has been surveyed exhaustively by Cousins, and from a 
different perspective by Schmithausen. Much of the ground was covered by Keown 
in a book published slightly earlier than Cousins’ article. See COUSINS (1), KEOWN, 
pp 116 –128, and SCHMITHAUSEN.
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Hume’s three-fold opposition to ‘natural’: ‘unusual, miraculous or artificial’.96 It is the 
sense of ‘natural’ that is opposed to ‘miraculous’ that is of our concern. To say that the 
Buddhist ethical scheme is naturalist is to say that the processes which the term seems 
to cover are governed by the laws operative within saṃsāra. Terms commonly marked 
out as ‘moral’ are to be analysed along naturalist lines. 
  If I am right in this, our understanding of the notion of the kuśala should fall into 
place. There will also be consequences for our understanding of karman. In Chapter 
One, I presented the notion of karman as one of ethically conditioned consequence. The 
agent bears the consequences of what he or she does, for good or bad.  I might as 
pointedly have said that it is the nature of karman to be kuśala or akuśala. We find in 
the early texts the claim that intentional action – that is, of the kind that is karmically 
potent - will have its outcome, or vipāka (fruiting), determined by the quality of the 
volition. 97  Action will have been, and outcome will be, either kuśala or akuśala. 98 
Every outcome will sooner or later be registered in the life of the subject, whether the 
present life or one to follow, not necessarily the next. It will be a determining factor in 
the subject’s rebirth. None of this is straightforward, and I will discuss karman and its 
considerable perplexities more fully in Chapter Four.
 Some remarks by Winston King also suggest this conclusion, though it is not King’s 
conclusion.99 In the course of a useful account of Buddhist ethics, based on his 
observations of contemporary Burma, he writes:
There is the further factor of the ambiguous ethical 
quality of the kammic process itself. What indeed is the 
true meaning of ethical badness and goodness in the 
kammic context?  ….  When ‘bad’ and ‘good’ are used to 
describe the kammic cause, i.e. those actions which 
produce kammically determined results in the future, they 
96 HUME (2): footnote to Appendix III, p.307.
97 A good example is the words of Yama already quoted. See p.9 above.
98 To avoid confusion, I should explain that both in the early sources and in 
contemporary discussion the word karman is commonly used both for the action 
that brings about the outcome – its strict sense - and for the whole process of action 
and outcome. This latter process is, strictly, one of karman and vipāka.  
99 KING, p 72
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are used in the purely ethical sense of ethically desirable 
or undesirable actions. But when the same adjectives are 
used with regard to kammic result, i.e. those states or 
conditions that follow from the morally good or bad 
causes in accordance with the law of Kamma, then they 
are usually defined in materialistic and hedonistic terms. 
That is to say: the ‘good’ result of an ethically ‘good’ 
action, such as a charitable deed, is a state of pleasurable 
existence replete with such non-moral, materialistic goods 
as health, beauty, wealth …..(King’s emphasis)
  This brings out a problem clearly enough. On King’s presumptions, I take it to be 
insoluble. Only an understanding that over-rides his sharp distinction of ‘moral’ and 
‘non-moral’ has any chance of being made coherent.100 It is on the appreciation of this 
that I ground my claim that the Buddhist ethical scheme should be seen as naturalist. It 
seems to follow that what is kuśala is best understood in terms of karman. The word 
should be left untranslated, to figure as a term of art, and to be understood as ‘that 
which brings about ‘good’ – that is, agreeable – karman.’ Akuśala would be taken to do 
the reverse. 
 This is not uncontentious and not without its difficulties. My claim that kuśala and 
akuśala are terms of art is supported only imperfectly by the sources. While the two 
words often have a technical and scholastic application which makes them distinctive, 
they seem at times to be interchangeable with other terms of approbation and 
reprobation, in particular with puñya/puñña and its opposite, pāpa. Puñya is also a word 
of debatable translation, but is commonly rendered ‘virtuous’. My claim is, moreover, 
one that is hard to support by quotation, being founded more on a broad impression of 
the early sources than on particular instances. Cousins’ conclusions, after discussion of 
the same point, offer support. 101  He agrees with Premasiri that
100 Hursthouse offers a useful summary of contributions to the continuing debate 
from Anscombe and Foot: ‘.. following Anscombe, [Foot] denied that this 
grammatical feature of the word ‘good’ … underwent a mysterious change when we 
started doing ethics. What goes for ‘good cactus’, ‘good knife’, ‘good rider’, also 
goes for ‘good human being’ even when we use that phrase in ethics.’ See 
HURSTHOUSE (2), p.195.
101 COUSINS (1)
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although there is some overlapping, puñña is most often 
used in regard to actions intended to bring about results of 
a pleasant kind in the future. It is almost exclusively 
kusala which is used in relation to the Buddha’s path. 
Indeed [one may go further and suggest] that puñña was 
almost certainly not a technical term in the thought of the 
Buddha and his early disciples…. 
This is, I think, correct, and I conclude with added confidence that there is nothing in 
the moral vocabulary which we find employed in the early sources to point against 
recognising the Buddhist ethical scheme as naturalist. Keown’s survey of recent 
commentators and his own conclusions suggest that this is a common recognition.102 I 
take kuśala and akuśala to be terms of art, applying to what produces ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
karmic consequence or vipāka – that is, ‘agreeable’ or ‘favourable’ consequence, or the 
opposite. What will in practice be called kuśala or akuśala, when these words are used 
as terms of art, will be those volitions and actions commonly called puñya - or bhadra,  
sādhu, or something similar - and their antonyms. These terms retain their common 
commendatory meaning, which becomes no weaker with the scholastic development of 
kuśala and akuśala. I am not saying that puñya and its near-synonyms should be 
accorded, in step with that development, a reductive definition. What I am suggesting is 
that where a contemporary open to the Buddha’s influence would have judged an act of 
generosity – for instance – as puñya, he might have found it also to be kuśala in respect 
of its place within the karmic scheme.103 The likelihood of his doing so must remain a 
matter of some uncertainty.
16. Naturalist and Prescriptivist?
102 KEOWN, pp 7,23, 232
103 Cooper and James make the same point. They refer to Harvey in stressing that an 
act is not to be held to be wrong because it produces ‘bad’ karman. See COOPER & 
JAMES, p.40, and HARVEY (2) p.59. See also the same point made outside the 
context of the Buddha’s teaching by Hursthouse: ‘No virtue ethics inspired by 
Aristotle is committed to a reductive definition of the concepts of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in 
terms of that of the virtuous agent …’ See HURSTHOUSE (2) p.81.
48
  An incompatibility has been found between naturalism and accounts of morality which 
give a central role to prescription. Hare makes much of this. 
… the naturalist kind of descriptivism leads 
inevitably to relativism. There are in most 
languages words which we translate ‘wrong’. 
These words are, as they are used, rough 
equivalents to one another. But the cultures 
that use these words call quite different things 
wrong ….. What is wrong with naturalism … 
is that it pretends that what are in fact 
substantial moral principles are nothing more 
than linguistic rules. 104 
  That the Buddhist scheme is a prescriptive – or ‘prescriptivist’ - account is hardly 
disputable. It matters little that neither the marga, by way of its components, nor the 
verbal expression of the precepts is in the imperative mode. It is enough that the marga 
is to be bhāvitabbam  (to be cultivated, brought about). The Buddha declares that in his 
own case it has been so cultivated (bhāvitam).105 The marga is plainly action-guiding, 
serving as the cap of a system of descending, ever more detailed, injunctions, to be 
realised in the life of every practitioner. 106  All this derives from the āryasatyāni, more 
particularly from the components of the āryāstaṅgamarga, and it is only on this 
foundation that they are action-guiding. The āryasatyāni are valid, on any Buddhist 
view, for all times and all people. On this view, the principles derived from the satyāni 
and based on the prescriptions of the marga will be safe from the disabling relativism to 
which naturalist systems have been said to be liable. This goes to the heart of Hare’s 
objection.
  If Hare had been familiar with Buddhist notions, he might have drawn on them for 
support. They suggest an answer to a widespread criticism of some assertions in an 
early statement of his own version of prescriptivism: he appears to claim that, if a 
104 HARE(4) p.68. 
105 See the account of the Buddha’s enlightenment in the Pali 
Dhammacakkapavattanasutta (SN V [420]) and elsewhere. 
106 See section 13 above.
49
structure of imperatives is fully coherent and so worked out as to take everything 
relevant into account, that is all that can be required. It seems to follow that there is no 
basis on which it might be criticised:
A complete justification of a decision would consist 
of a complete account of its effects, together with a 
complete account of the principles which it 
observed, and the effects of observing those 
principles ….. If the inquirer still goes on asking 
‘but why should I live like that?’ then there is no 
further answer to give him …107 
The Buddhist can say that the ultimate principles from which precepts and other forms 
of prescription derive enjoy the authority of the Buddha and are grounded in his perfect 
insight. The Buddha sees things as they are. If we follow the Buddha, there is this 
‘further answer’.  
17. Virtue ethics: the Aristotelian comparison
  By ’virtue ethics’, I mean - at its barest - the tradition of moral thought which is 
characterised by its focus on commendable dispositions. In contemporary meta-ethical 
theory, where the term is most at home, it is this focus which marks off virtue ethics 
from other lines of thought.  In its Western manifestation, the grounding of virtue ethics 
is to be found in Plato, in Aristotle – especially - and in the early Stoics. It is here that a 
useful, if limited, comparison is available. It may have been evident from what has been 
said already that Buddhist ethics has much of an Aristotelian form and something, if 
much less, of an Aristotelian content. By ‘form’, in this context, I have in mind the 
conception of the moral life as one that in large part consists of the exercise of human 
capacities with a view to an end. This may be conceived as a progress, inviting perhaps 
the image of a path. All this is to be done with skill and self-awareness, as if by treading 
a middle way between extremes of action.
107 HARE (1) p.69. It should be said that Hare seems to have modified this position in 
his later works.
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  All this raises the question of what the ‘end’ should be. How is it found? Aristotle’s 
presentation of the telos of action is hardly argued for, but rather taken for granted. This 
is because it is grounded in biological determination: the proper end of a man is evident 
from realisation of what a man is.108  Macintyre makes this point well:
Within that teleological scheme [that of the 
Nicomachean Ethics] there is a fundamental 
contrast between man-as-he-happens-to-be and 
man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realised-his-essential-
nature. Ethics is the science which is to enable 
men to understand how they make the transition 
from the former state to the latter. Ethics … 
presupposes … some account of man as a rational 
animal and above all some account of the human 
telos.109
This will be a problem for the proponent of virtue ethics, if only because Aristotle’s 
scientific understanding cannot be ours. If we take the human animal to be the product 
of a process of evolution, we may be unready to accord it a telos of quite other 
provenance.
  I will deal below with contemporary presentations of virtue ethics which are alert to 
this complication. For the present, I am concerned only to point out a parallel. This is 
between the form of Aristotle’s presentation and that of the Buddhists. For the 
Buddhists, progress towards the end is by way of practice within the three-part grouping 
of the eight components of the marga towards an end, which is nirodha (or Nirvana). 
This may be seen as the madhyama pratipad (middle way), primarily the way between 
indulgence and self-harm, but also the exercise of a developing power of skilful action. 
110 While the stress is more on the skill, on what is kuśala, than on a mid-way 
108 This grounding is conspicuous in the Nicomachean Ethics. A clear expression of it 
is to found around 1097b and 1098a. ARISTOTLE (3)  
109 MACINTYRE p.55. 
110 I cannot share Keown’s view that favouring ‘skilful’ as the normal translation of 
kuśala/kusala carries with it acceptance of a Utilitarian conception of Buddhist 
ethics. See KEOWN, p 119. 
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positioning between two extremes, there seems to be a true resemblance between the 
madhyma pratipad, so prominent in the Buddha’s first sermon, and Aristotle’s 
intermediary positioning of the virtues. 
  As for the content of morality, a degree of similarity should have been evident from 
my discussion of naturalism. There is a parallel in the psychological grounding of action 
between the Aristotelian conception of the multi-layered soul and the Buddhist 
diagnosis of the rooted-ness of ‘unhappy’ and ‘happy’ qualities. In neither scheme is 
there any abstraction of choice into some state of purity. Aristotle takes it for granted 
that the good for man is what men want or – rather – what they want if they have been 
well brought up or have reflected deeply.  His concluding treatment of eudaimonia finds 
contemplative activity (theoretike energeia) to be the highest good. 111 His 
commendation of theoria as godlike may mean that he has in mind the participation of 
the highest part of the human soul in God’s - the Prime Mover’s - self-contemplation. 
This suggests a parallel, not with anything Buddhist, but rather with the Vedantic 
tradition. The following, from the Eudemian Ethics, seems to sum it up:
The man who lived painlessly and pure of injustice or 
else engaged in some divine contemplation was really, 
as far as a man may be, blessed.
Aristotle attributes the reflection to Anaxagoras but seems to adopt it. 112  What is 
striking in these words, from a Buddhist perspective, is their aptness for translation and 
incorporation into the Buddhist record. The understanding of ‘blessedness’ is no 
different, and ‘divine contemplation’ might be rendered brahmaṃ vihāraṃ. This 
would not exactly catch Aristotle’s meaning, but it is broadly 
concordant with it.  
  As for the points of difference in content, I have already hinted at these. The precepts 
can be given a positive form and presented as virtues. So presented, and as a whole, 
they seem to be nothing with which Aristotle would have quarrelled. At the same time 
they are noticeably without the assertiveness and self-aggrandisement, with a touch of 
111 ARISTOTLE(3)1177a
112 ARISTOTLE(2)1215b
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swagger, which characterise his own examples. As they appear to be just that - examples 
- it is hardly a point against Aristotle to say that to some degree they reflect their place 
and time and the characteristics of one sex. The Buddhist virtues, in contrast, may be 
found to be ‘human’, a reflection of the claim that the diagnosis of the āryasatyāni is of 
the human condition.
  Both schemes have it that there is a strong correlation between the virtues, in the one 
case, or the skilful following of the marga, in the other, and wellbeing, prosperity and 
happiness. In each case this is assumed, rather than argued, and not unreasonably, as 
such an association seems to be implicit in the notions of virtue and skilful action which 
are employed. Both schemes are therefore open to the objection that happiness is not 
simply a question of being a certain kind of person. Rather, misfortune may strike 
arbitrarily and undeservedly. 113 Aristotle accepts this, saving his position by drawing an 
obvious and persuasive distinction: the good man cannot be miserable, though he may 
not be blessed with good fortune. 114 This defence works also on the Buddhist side, 
where it receives reinforcement. The karman doctrine has it that, in the long run, virtue 
and well-being will coincide. It follows from this that disaster in the present is likely to 
be the ‘fruiting’ of old karman, on which presumption it is not unjust or even surprising. 
This explanation, it hardly needs saying, depends for its full force on the supposition of 
a series of lives. 
  The karman-notion, at least in its bearing on a single life, can be brought to bear 
against a point made by Bernard Williams in discussing Aristotle’s way with people ‘in 
a bad way from the ethical point of view’.115 Such a person, perhaps the victim of a bad 
upbringing - a good one being of prime importance in Aristotle’s scheme - may be able 
to use reason to pursue his bad purposes. How then, after such an upbringing, is it in his 
interest to be other than he is? Williams also points to the more alarming case, ‘horrible 
enough and not miserable at all but, by an ethological standard of the bright eye and the 
gleaming coat, dangerously flourishing’. 
  The operation of karman brings it about that the state of mind of someone of this kind 
is as ‘horrible’ as his actions. To quote the first line of the opening verse of the 
113 In another tradition, the ground of Job’s complaint.
114 ARISTOTLE(3) 1100b
115 WILLIAMS B.(2) Ch.3
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Dharmapāda, in its Pali form: Manopubbaṅgamā dhammā manoseṭṭhā manomayā 
(entities/ states have mind-going-before-them; mind is chief; they are made of mind). 
What is true of thought is true all the more of action, if only because action seems to 
require an intensity of thought. What this means is that the consequence of a life of 
crime is a state of mind characterised by the vigorous burning of the ‘three fires’; put 
otherwise, it is grounded in the three akuśala roots. There may be an excited energy in 
that - what people register and react to - but no contentment. To quote the third line of 
the same verse: Tato naṃ dukkhamanveti cakkaṃ’va vahato padaṃ (Dukkha follows 
that man as the wheel follows the foot of the (draught-animal) pulling (it)). The claim is 
one of inevitable connection, with an implicit denial of Williams’ judgment, that he is 
‘not miserable at all’.
18. Virtue ethics: its contemporary development
  Virtue ethics has had a strong revival in the late 20th Century. An influential article by 
Elizabeth Anscombe gave an impetus to this revival, which has been carried forward by 
Philippa Foot. MacIntyre and Bernard Williams have had a more distant and critical 
relation to its development. There has recently been a general exposition by Rosalind 
Hursthouse. In 2005, a book on environmental ethics by Cooper and James presented 
the Buddhist scheme specifically as a case of virtue ethics. I am indebted to all these 
writers, especially to Foot and Hursthouse. 116
  Hursthouse presents three defining features of the form of virtue ethics she wishes to 
defend, all plainly Aristotelian. One is the centrality of eudaemonia, which she prefers 
to translate as ‘flourishing’ or ‘well-being’. 117 Another is the claim that it is constituted 
by the virtues. A third is that the virtues are to the advantage of their possessor, by 
which is meant both that the virtues benefit their possessor and that they make that 
possessor good qua human being. The congeniality of this to what the Buddhist 
advocate will wish to claim should be evident from what I have already said. The 
Buddhist claim is that the qualities implicit in the precepts and laid out in the Mettāsutta 
and in many other similar passages in the early texts will, benefit the practitioner. This 
116 See ANSCOMBE, MACINTYRE, FOOT, HURSTHOUSE(2), and COOPER & JAMES. In 
referring to B Williams, I have had in mind his publications over a long period.
117 HURSTHOUSE(2) p.10.
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may be a matter of plain observation and can safely be assumed to be the case by way 
of the operation of karman. They will constitute his flourishing, as a general rule here 
and now, and certainly in the long run. 118
  The successful assertion of this form of virtue ethics should be a support for the 
Buddhist ethical scheme, if only by way of acclimatising it.  I have already suggested 
that success seems to depend, in part, on the dispensability of an important part of 
Aristotle’s underpinning, or else its effective restatement. This was the presumption that 
the telos of a man or woman is determined by his or her biological characterisation. 
How far this is possible has been the subject of debate. Among contemporary writers, 
Foot is unusually bold in urging the possibility of a natural goodness of human beings to 
be found on a continuum with that of plants and animals. She proceeds to bring out the 
speciality of the human manifestation. Here is a form of virtue ethical theory notably 
close to Aristotle’s, though Foot makes little mention of Aristotle.  Much of the latter 
part of Hursthouse’s book is concerned with the same subject. 119 She develops her 
position in large part by way of running argument with Williams, whose views on the 
point were far from constant. It would be interesting to follow this debate, but of little 
relevance to my prime concerns. What does bear on these concerns is a peculiarly 
Buddhist understanding of what it is to be human, of which I must now give some 
account. It cannot be said to be four-square with Aristotle’s position or directly 
applicable to its support, but it offers Buddhists (at least) ground for disregarding the 
common criticism of Aristotle. 
  This takes us to the Buddhist cosmological scheme. The plane of human life is one of 
the five (sometimes six) planes within saṃsāra. On the traditional view, two planes are 
counted ‘good’, the human and the heavenly, and three ‘bad’, those of animals and of 
pining ghosts, and the hellish. All living things have their existence on one of these five 
and on one of them, which might not be the present one, they will be reborn. 120  This is 
best seen, and is widely found, in traditional Buddhist art, where the planes are 
118 It will be observed that this account of the claim does not present it as being one 
that the virtues lead to Nirvana. The virtues certainly lead to rebirth in heaven and, 
as the Mettāsutta states, to the experience of heaven in the present life. See p.46 
above.  
119 She presents a subtle qualification of Aristotle’s presumptions in her Chapter 10. 
See HURSTHOUSE (2).
120 I deal with rebirth in Chapter Four and in concluding. 
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commonly shown as segments of a disc in the grip of Mara (death), depicted as a 
demon. What is so conveyed is the ubiquity of death in saṃsāra.  At the centre of the 
disc are three animals: a pig, a cock and a snake. These symbolise the three ‘bad’ roots 
(akuśala mulāni) – otherwise ‘the three fires’ - and also, here, the three ‘bad’ planes. 
The human plane is to be regarded as the best and most favourable, even though it lacks 
the bliss, if impermanent, which is characteristic of the heavenly. It is almost always on 
the human plane that Nirvana is realised, however rarely. 121   
  The humanity of the denizens of the human realm has a teleological characterisation. 
To be human is to have the potential for enlightenment.  What is open immediately to 
human beings – thanks to at least some ‘good’ karman - is life in accordance with the 
marga. This will issue in the fullest well-being, both in the present life and later. 
Humanity is to be defined, in part, by way of its distinction and separation from pig, 
cock and snake. In their two-sided symbolism, it is these that promise not only a dire 
fate but also a loss of humanity. If in the course of my human life – human, at least, in 
its bodily location – I slip into the way of ‘living like a pig’, or if I am taken over by 
hatred or rage, I cease, if only momentarily, to be human.  The same is true of the 
corresponding ‘good’ states; the Mettāsutta speaks of ‘the godlike/heavenly state 
(brahman vihāram) here’. 122 Realisation here and now of this and similar states is the 
object of a familiar meditation-practice, of which I will have more to say below. 
  Here is the Buddhist contribution to the resolution of a difficulty.  It may serve as at 
least a partial response to the charge that the evolutionary understanding of human life 
cuts decisively against any understanding in teleological terms. Though it is a response 
fully available only to Buddhists, others may find it suggestive and so helpful, albeit 
they will find its cosmological frame fanciful. It should allow Buddhists to lean on 
Aristotle, if they wish to, with greater confidence.
121 What came to be pictured is set out in the early texts in accounts of the variety of 
future destinies. For instance, MN 4 [23].    
122 Page 46 above
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19. The complexities of virtue ethics
   I am not asserting that there is nothing in the sources to support characterisations of 
the Buddhist scheme as something other than ‘virtue ethics’. Various positions are 
arguable, and argument may itself be helpful and suggestive. Support for one such 
alternative comes very early in the Pali Dhammapāda, probably the most widely read of 
all the sources. There we find, literally: ‘Not by means of hatred do hatreds ever cease 
here; they cease by the opposite-of-hatred: this is endless law’.123 How are we to 
understand the words I have translated ‘endless’(sanantana) and ‘law’(dhamma)? The 
reference of dhamma must be at least in part to karman, but the word’s employment 
here has a solemn smack to it which might support characterisations of Buddhist ethics 
in terms of ‘Moral Law’. There are not a few such passages. The same breadth of view 
extends to the practitioner. I know of nothing in the texts to suggest that he need 
exclude other lines of moral reflection, even those of remote provenance. In 
considering obstinate cases and dilemmas, the Buddhist practitioner may come to 
appreciate the fresh perspective offered by other lines of reflection. 
  
  This freedom seems to be available to proponents of any school of virtue ethics. 
Hursthouse discusses cases where action seems required, where it is not at all clear what 
to do. She considers the virtuous agent, concerned to do the best thing, who may find 
himself, in the absence of any alternative, driven to do something which, on some 
‘objective’ understanding, must be bad. She concludes that such an agent cannot be held 
to act as an unvirtuous agent even if he does what might be characteristic of one. 124 
The Buddhist tradition offers a problematic case of a comparable kind, one in which the 
action is virtuous in a way that calls virtue into question. It concerns Prince 
Visvantara/Vessantara - that is, the Buddha in his penultimate previous birth. His life is 
happy and glorious: so much is assured by the piling up of propitious karman. 
Visvantara is famous for his generosity, which goes beyond his own resources to giving 
away the contents of the public treasury. Finally, by way of ultimate sacrifice, it extends 
to giving away his wife and children, on mere request and to their great anguish. In so 
doing, does he act as he should?  Collins has dealt at length with this dilemma. With 
much persuasive force he presents it as one of the simultaneous operation of two ideals. 
123 Dhp 1.5.
124 HURSTHOUSE(1) p.65 and HURSTHOUSE (2) Ch.3 passim. 
57
The central figure’s position is one of tragic anguish, on account of the impossibility of 
acting indubitably rightly. The centrality of the story in the literature of traditional 
Buddhism must be attributable to this. 125
  The problem brought up by the case of Visvantara/Vessantara should not be diminished 
by murmurs of ‘historical relativity’. It suggests that there are problems in moral choice 
to which the virtue ethical tradition provides no answer. In this respect, it may be urged, 
the tradition compares unfavourably with others. The categorical imperative and the 
Benthamite calculus are so set up as to provide answers, even if we are too obtuse to see 
them. The Buddhist virtue ethicist will hold that someone enlightened or close to 
enlightenment will see what is to be done through insight. 126 This will be of limited 
help to most of us. Hursthouse offers a different response, for which Buddhists may be 
grateful: 
… virtue ethics …. is well positioned  … to admit not 
merely the possibility but the liklihood of there being, 
as Wiggins puts it, ‘some absolutely undecidable 
questions – e.g. cases where the situation is so 
appalling or the choices so gruesome that nothing 
could count as the reasonable practical answer’.  …
….  Virtue ethics  …. can appeal to the very fact 
mentioned above, namely that ‘persons of good moral 
character are often the first to recognise that they do 
not know what ought to be done’.127
I find this persuasive in its suggestion that an apparent weakness in ethical theory is, 
rather, a strength, in its amounting to a recognition of the facts of the matter.
  What has to be stressed is the need for balance. We should appreciate both the 
strengths of the virtue ethical tradition and the need, from time to time, to look outside 
it. The Buddhist proponent, I have urged, will be content with both these emphases. 
125 COLLINS (2) Ch. 7, 
126 I refer to the dassana (instrumental case, dassanena) mentioned in the 
Mettāsutta. See p.46.     
127 HURSTHOUSE(1) p.62. 
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Some passing remarks by Hursthouse on the subject of vegetarianism betray a striking 
attachment to the school of thought for which she argues, even where recourse to an 
alternative might have been helpful. She writes:
… most of ‘us’ – that is, people in the 
circumstances that make it possible for them to 
write or read this sort of book – act as we should 
when we refuse to eat meat   ….   And I [incline 
to that view] on the grounds that (i) temperance 
(with respect to the pleasures of food) is a virtue, 
and (ii) that for most of ‘us’, eating meat is 
intemperate (greedy, self-indulgent). And ethical 
naturalism bears primarily on (i), not on (ii).128
   This merits the riposte that it misses the main point. At least in the first place, the 
debate over eating animals should be one about animals. It should be concerned with the 
claims to consideration (if any) of animals and with what ‘proper’ treatment of them 
requires. Hursthouse’s exclusive concern with the agent – with the agent’s moral honing 
of himself - subordinates what should come first. At least at such points as this, the form 
of virtue ethics which she commends seems open to the charge of excessive self-
concern. I by no means grant that the Buddhist form is open to this charge. A Buddhist 
may bring to bear wider considerations, such as those I have mentioned, while holding 
in mind the relevant claims of a moderate asceticism, the object of Hursthouse’s 
concern.
20. Moral incapacity
  Progress along the Path is a matter of so training and disciplining the feelings and will 
that certain actions, akuśala in kind, become unthinkable and unperformable. 129 This 
strict incapacity is well caught in a passage from the Pali Aṅguttara Nikāya. The 
Buddha declares that a monk who is an arahant 
128 HURSTHOUSE(2) p.227.
129 Bernard Williams has discussed moral incapacity. See WILLIAMS (3)
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……. is incapable of transgression in regard to nine 
things: he is incapable of intentionally  destroying life, of 
committing theft, of engaging in the sexual act, of telling 
a deliberate lie … [and so on]. 130
An arahant is one who has realised Nirvana in the present life, in other words one who 
is perfected, in that respect an equal to a Buddha. The incapacities ascribed to him 
correspond to prohibitions in the precept-list and to the ‘three fires’. For an arahant, 
incapacity in these respects is total. It need not be supposed that it will be much less 
than total in the case of those close to the state of an arahant, or that it will not be at 
least significant in others. The practitioner is on a path, and incapacity of the kind 
described is a matter of degree; however much less than total, it is a mark of progress 
along the path. The realisation of incapacity is close to the sense of shame, and the two 
may be experienced together. Such an expression as ‘I couldn’t do that’ may catch both 
reactions. The sense of shame is recognised and valued in the Buddhist tradition. Hiri 
and ottappa, usually translated from Pali as ‘shame’ and ‘(moral) dread’, are held to be 
decidedly kuśala.  
  
  I am picking up a hint from Williams’ treatment of the subject in taking the words 
‘moral incapacity’ literally, and not merely as an indication of actions of a kind to be off 
an agent’s ‘moral map’. Aldous Huxley once remarked that, in the course of aerial 
warfare, a civilised young man could be got to drop fire on babies when, back on the 
ground, he would be incapable – strictly – of throwing a baby on to a fire.131 Huxley’s 
example may have little to it beyond shock-effect, but he is surely right in crediting the 
inability to throw the child. This instance brings out what moral incapacity is. A survey 
of other religious traditions might show that the notion is widely found. One striking 
instance is to be found in the De Civitate Dei, where St Augustine treats of the state of 
the blessed in Heaven. They will be incapable of sin: ‘he who partakes of God’s nature 
receives the impossibility of sinning as a gift from God’. He continues: ‘Free will was 
130 AN IX 7 [370] Abhabbo sonavaṭhānāni ajjhācaritum …. Abhabbo … sañcicca 
pānaṃ jīvitā voreptum … adinnaṃ theyyasaṅkhātaṃ ādatuṃ … metthunaṃ 
dhammaṃ patisevitum .. sampajānamusā bhāsitum.
131 I rely on memory for this reference, which I have been unable to trace.
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given first, with the ability not to sin; and the last gift was the inability to sin’.132 These 
words enjoy the salience of their place in Augustine’s culminating chapter. Bating the 
specifically Christian expression, the Buddhist can concur with this, adding only that, 
for those at the end of the Path, Heaven is realised in the living body.
  All this calls for treatment at greater length. I grant that an ethical scheme in which 
moral incapacity enjoys esteem – where it is a mark of progress along the Path - will be 
one in which concern for consequences cannot be over-riding. This lays its acceptance 
open to challenge. The advocate of some form of consequentialism might claim that it is 
possible to be too sensitive – at least, that it should not be assumed without question 
that growth in sensitivity is admirable.133 At what point does sensitivity become 
squeamishness? Why should this squeamishness, or - more kindly - moral 
fastidiousness, be allowed to over-ride the concern for others which requires an 
appraisal of consequences?
   If space permitted, I would give some account of the thoroughly Buddhist notion of 
‘skill-in-means’ (upāya kausalya). 134  This notion might well be deployed in support of 
the consequentialist’s riposte, but its admission of degrees and gradations of practice 
seems also to support of the Buddhist form of virtue ethics. The tyro practitioner need 
not aim at universal benevolence and will not achieve moral incapacity. (It goes without 
saying that he should not affect the possession of what he lacks). The progressive 
following of the Path requires the highest standard only at the proper time.
21. How the identity problem is one of Buddhist ethics
132 Particeps vero Dei ab illo accipit ut peccare non posit ….  Primum liberum 
arbitrium posse non peccare, novissimum non posse peccare.  AUGUSTINE, Book 
xxii, ch.30. I have given Bettenson’s translation.
133 In the discussion of ethical dilemmas, moral incapacity may be brought up as a 
way of ending debate. Killing, and so soldiering, is as plainly ruled out by a taking of 
the precepts as anything could be. Here is a dilemma, both for the young man who 
has had his call-up papers and for the religious teachers to whom he may turn for 
advice. It might be urged that for someone well along the path there will be no 
dilemma as such a person will be incapable of homicide. Here is a solution – of a 
kind. Harvey discusses obligatory soldiering: HARVEY(2), Chapter 6.  
134 For a full treatment of this, see PYE (1). The notion, in its fully developed form, 
belongs to the Mahayana, and so falls outside the field of the present argument.
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  It should now be apparent why I am taking a problem of plainly metaphysical 
character to be – whatever else it may be - one of Buddhist ethics. It is because of the 
problem’s bearing on choice, conduct and expectation. The significance of this should 
be manifest. For all that, the impact of the problem is less than total.
   One reason for this is that the Buddhist scheme is one of virtue ethics. The practitioner 
will have something to sustain his position, even if the identity problem should be found 
obdurate. Someone with an ethical stance of this kind may be supposed to become a 
Buddhist, in the sense of adopting a Buddhist standard of values, while sitting light to 
Buddhist metaphysics. Such a person might take the three refuges and accept the five 
precepts as a guide to living; he might modify his conduct to a degree that would be 
noticeable, for instance in eschewing violence. The change would be one of the content 
of his moral practice, not one of its structure. The same position might be achieved by 
someone with a different starting-point, who - in moving towards a Buddhist position - 
might pick up for the first time something of the presumptions of virtue ethics. Such, 
observation suggests, is the position of many Western practitioners. It may be held with 
a high degree of awareness or with none. If this is so, we need wonder no longer why 
the identity problem brings about no more discomfort. 
  Another is that the problem has no bearing on what I have considered under the heads 
of revaluation and the worship of the Buddha. Taken together, these two strands provide 
a basis for practice. We can make out a form of devotional Buddhism, which is in no 
way inauthentic. The two strands are interdependent, and it is only by virtue of this that 
they are not incompatible. The revaluation of traditional religion might, otherwise, have 
been no more than an expression of ‘anti-religion’ – that is, of opposition to traditional 
practice. The worship of the Buddha restores, in another mode, the devotion which 
‘anti-religion’ alone would have ruled out. Taken together, they make of Buddhist 
profession something to which I know no equivalent. Here is a mode of practice which 
seems to be that of very many practitioners in traditionally Buddhist countries.135  
 The problem is to be found within the third strand of those which I picked out for 
discussion. What I described was the exercise of śīla/sila, both through the self-restraint 
135 The ‘anthropological’ commentators on whom I have remarked above all leave 
this impression. See p.30 above.
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of the precept-list and through the application of the good qualities recommended by the 
Mettāsutta and other sources .  This exercise offers release from the woes of saṃsāra: 
first, a good life here and now; next, a good rebirth; finally, the realisation of Nirvana. 
This view of the proper goal of practice seems to require an assurance of the persistence 
of the entity subject to training, throughout life (naturally) and through death into an 
inevitable sequence of lives. 
  What is needed is a decidedly strong presumption of personal persistence, which 
however has to coexist with quite another view. This is the ‘weak’ view, of reductionist 
character, on which the tradition seems to lay much emphasis. I will consider this in 
more detail in the next chapter, but must say now that it seems quite subversive of that 
presumption. Here is the problem. I hope for a good rebirth, but for the good rebirth of 
what? How can I, as I conceive myself now, be so concerned for this rebirth that this 
concern becomes a motivating factor? What of the frame in which these questions arise?
  The consequences for morality are, I claim, of such importance as to make the problem 
central to the Buddhist ethical scheme. My account of it here must remain preliminary, 
as it needs to be supplemented by the clarifications and by the further consideration of 
karman and rebirth which I will offer in the next two chapters. Even without this, I 
believe that the problem stands out. 
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CHAPTER THREE
Clarifications
22. The grammar and semanics of  ā  tman  and   an ā  tman  
  The Sanskrit word ātman means, at its simplest and commonest, ‘self’. The Pali 
equivalent of ātman, in the nominative case (as it is usually presented), is attā. The 
negative forms of these words, anātman and anattā, will normally be rendered ‘(X is) 
non-self/not self/not-soul’. They may also be used adjectivally, with the inflections of 
the words qualified - ‘(X is) not characterised by self/soul’, or ‘(X does) not have a 
self/soul’ - though this is infrequent.136 
  As this will have suggested, the un-negated word ātman has several employments.  It 
is used, first, as a reflexive pronoun: an example is ātmānam apaśyat (he saw himself). 
This is hardly controversial.  Another employment may be called ‘conventional’. In 
Sanskrit or Pali, as in English, it is everyday practice to refer to ‘your own interests’ – 
that is, to ‘the interests of yourself’ - employing ātman or attā in so doing. In translating 
the Mettāsutta above, I rendered the Pali sukhitattā as ‘happy in themselves’. Such 
usage is broadly uncontroversial, though there are instances where its distinction from 
another, which I will call ‘metaphysical’, may seem fine. This third employment also 
has a close parallel in English, evident in talk about ‘my soul’ or reflection on ‘the 
concept of the self’. My concern here will be almost entirely with this last employment, 
which is commonly taken to be the sole object of the repudiation expressed in the 
Buddhist insistence on anātman.
136 Collins discusses this helpfully, quoting from the Pali a statement that brings out 
the grammatical difference. The words anattaṃ rūpaṃ anattā rūpan ti 
yathābhūtaṃ na pajānāti should be translated ‘he does not understand the selfless 
(anattaṃ) body as it really is – that is, “body is (a) not-self (anattā)”’. See COLLINS 
(1) p.278, n.1 & 3.  
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23.  An  ā  tman  and the human subject  
  In marking out the identity problem, I found no need to say anything about anātman. 
It has often been held that an entity’s possession of, or identity with, ātman would 
suffice to ensure its identity and perpetuation, and that it is to the Buddhist insistence on 
anātman that we should attribute the problem.  While I have no wish to diminish the 
importance of the anātman-doctrine, which I take to be good philosophy, I take this 
approach to be misconceived. The assertion of anātman has a real bearing on the 
problem without amounting to the problem. It is one which is at the heart of Buddhist 
metaphysics. Anātman/anattā is one of the three concurrent lakṣaṇāḥ/lakkhaṇā (marks 
(of existence)) to which I referred in setting out the āryasatyāni. 137  It is declared to be 
such, in one of the most celebrated formulations of the Pali canon, in the words sabbe 
dhammā anattā.  No translation of these words will be uncontentious, and I by no 
means insist on what I offer:  ‘All things/entities/conceptions are without-self’.138  This 
very general application is of prime importance. On the Buddhist view, all experience - 
of the self as of everything else - is anātman/anattā.  It will be with the application to 
the subject of this declaration that I am now concerned. This calls for some preliminary 
account of that notion or doctrine of ātman/attā of which anātman/anattā is the denial, 
or rebuttal, or ruling-out from consideration.
  This can be given only briefly. The subject is highly contentious. What can be said is 
that the ātman/attā notion is to be found in the early Upanisads, especially in the 
Bṛhadāraṇyaka and the Chāndogya, and may be found elsewhere. 139 Its flavour is 
caught by the following representative passage from an Upanisad:
      That truly great, unborn ātman ..... among the 
breaths/organs .... that which goes within the ether that 
137 P.38 above
138 Sabbe saṅkhārā anniccā, sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā, sabbe dhammā anattā. 
Saṅkhārā (compound elements, formations) is to be distinguished from dhammā. 
This celebrated declaration is widely found. See, for instance, AN III 134 [286]
139 In the Rig Veda, we find different uses. For instance, Vata, wind personified as a 
god, is characterised as ātmā devānāṃ (the breath of the gods). Elsewhere, in a 
hymn addressed to Varuna, the guardian of morality, the speaker refers to his body 
(tanu) in the words ‘and thus I converse with myself’. It seems hard to render svayā 
tanuā in any other way. See RV X 168 and VII 86. At the time of the Veda, ‘self’, it 
seems, could be conveyed without ātman, and ātman might have a significance 
other than ‘self’.
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is inside the heart ... the controller of all, the lord of 
all, the ruler of all. 140
  The question is how the notion caught by these words came to be so widely credited, 
and why the Buddha – apparently - set himself so firmly against it. Gombrich’s 
summary of the relevant Upanisadic teaching in his Jordan Lectures of 1994 may be 
quoted in full.141 In all essentials, it is consistent with the much fuller account to be 
found in Collins. It is prefaced by the judgment that it is a ‘well-known fact’ that the 
central teachings of the Buddha were a response to the teachings of the old Upanisads. 
The summary goes:
      (1) Man is reborn according to the quality of his 
works (karman). ‘Works’ refers to following ritual 
prescriptions. The typical karman is a sacrifice; this is 
normally positive. Violating a ritual norm is negative. 
Each such act has a given, finite result, positive or 
negative: a purifying act will be rewarded, a 
bad/polluting act punished. The most important forms 
of such reward and punishment are long-term: rebirth 
in higher or lower forms of life. Such higher and 
lower forms are on earth and in heaven(s) and hell(s), 
but all are temporary.
       (2) The only escape from this cycle of rebirth is 
by gnosis of a hidden truth, brahman, which is the 
esoteric meaning of the sacred texts (the Vedas). That 
truth is to be realised=understood during life, and this 
will lead to its being realised=made real at death. He 
who understands brahman will become brahman. In a 
less sophisticated form of this doctrine, brahman is 
personified, and the gnostic at death joins Brahman 
somewhere above the highest heaven.
140 Sa vā esa mahānaja ātmā … prāneṣu ya eṣo ‘ntarhṛydaya ākāsastammicchete, 
sarvasya vasī sarvasyeśanaḥ sarvasādhipatiḥ. (Bṛhadāranyaka Upanisad IV iv.22).
141 Gombrich(2) pp.3 & 4.
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      (3) The truth to be realised is about the nature of 
reality. The microcosm (man) mirrors the 
macrocosm(the universe). Both have an essence, a 
true nature, a ‘self’ (ātman), which is the same for 
both. So at the cosmic level brahman and ātman are to 
be understood as synonyms.
      (4)  Being an essence, that ātman is unchanging: it 
is being as opposed to becoming ....
  In all this, Gombrich expresses the scholarly consensus. It has not been unchallenged. 
Dr Paul Horsch has contended that there is too little evidence for the claim that the 
Buddha’s teaching was by way of reaction to a strand within the Upanisads, and that 
this teaching was, at least as much, a criticism of other traditions. 142  Horsch calls into 
question Buddhist awareness of the brahman/ātman identification, taking the object of 
the Buddha’s repudiation to be a spiritual substance distinct from what makes up the 
human subject, the skandhāḥ. Relying in particular on the Pali Anattalakkhaṇasutta, he 
sees this ātman as being a substantial soul, that of an individual, not to be identified 
ontologically with brahman.143
  How far should traditions other than the Upanisadic be taken to be the target of the 
Buddha’s criticism? The evidence here is uncertain. There may well have been an 
embryonic form of Sāṃkhya before the full exposition of its characteristic doctrines in 
the – much later - Sāṃkhyakārikā, with their sharp distinction of puruṣa (soul) and 
prakṛti (nature). The ‘Jains’ (in modern parlance) were certainly familiar to the Buddha, 
as the founder of the Jain tradition is presented in the early texts as an opponent. Here, 
the difficulty lies in determining what notion of the soul was current among the Jains at 
the time the Buddha taught anātman. Was this of an immortal and transmigrating part, 
which had karman, the fruit of action, attached to it as an encumbrance, with the 
potential for liberation? This seems so much of the essence of the later, articulated, 
142 HORSCH. So far as I know, this paper has not been answered, except in so far as 
Gombrich’s continuing publications have served as an answer.
143 For the Anattalakkhaṇasutta, see section 24 below.
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doctrine that it may reasonably be supposed to be original. 144  It   therefore seems not 
unlikely that the Buddhist notion of anātman is a criticism of Jaina and, perhaps, early 
Sāṃkhya notions as well as of the Brahmanical notions with which it is commonly 
contrasted. In his Numata lectures, delivered in 2006 and not (I think) yet published, 
Gombrich is notably more willing to grant this, giving equal stress to the Buddha’s 
response to the Jains. What is evident is the patchiness of evidence and uncertainty of 
chronology. If the anātman-doctrine owes its presentation in the texts to the 
requirements of polemic, and if it is uncertain what notions were its targets, it is 
unsurprising that it should not be easy to bring it into focus. 
24. How the  an  ā  tman  - doctrine is conveyed  
  It will help if I set out what the anātman/anattā-doctrine amounts to, as we find it 
presented in the early Pali texts. For this, I draw on these texts as a whole and, in 
particular, on the Khandhasaṃyutta, in Part III (the Khandhavagga) of the Saṃyutta 
Nikāya, with especial regard to the Anattalakkhaṇasutta. This celebrated text, which is 
found also in the Pali Vinaya, is held by Buddhist tradition to be the Buddha’s second 
sermon.145 This prime position gives it unusual emphasis.
  The presentation of anātman/anattā comes in the context of a firm disparagement of 
speculation. Attachment to ‘view’ – as dṛṣṭi/diṭṭhi may be rendered – along with all 
attachments, should be avoided. We find a refusal on the Buddha’s part to make 
pronouncements on points of debate, on the grounds that his questioner would be misled 
if he did. Where the debate is about continuity through death, this may take the form of 
ruling out, if only by silence, both ‘eternalism’ and ‘annihilationism’ (as they have come 
to be called) – that is, both ‘going on’ and ‘stopping at death 146’.  What this comes to is 
144 The ‘soul’ of the Jains is usually jīva, the term employed in the Buddhist tradition, 
and elsewhere, to denote the life-force, that which makes a living thing alive. One 
early Jain text, the Prakrit Acaraṅga, uses aya, cognate with ātman, for ‘soul’. The 
Jaina tradition is recorded in works in Prakrit, which are hard to date, and in later 
works in Sanskrit. The Tattvārthasūtra, by Umasvati, is a polished account of a 
coherent doctrine. For details, see Bibliography.
145 See [66-69]; pp.901/03 of translation.
146 An example of this is the Buddha’s abstention from giving the ‘wanderer’, 
Vacchagotta, an answer. Vacchagotta is more than once shown to be rebuffed, for 
his own good, in this way. SN IV [400/01]; translation p.1393. 
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well summed-up by Priestley: ‘What the Buddha offers is not so much a theory of non-
self as a non-theory about self’. 147
  The polemical force of what the Buddha offers is registered through various forms of 
insistance. One of these is the repudiation of asmimāna. Sanskrit asmi is ‘I am’, and 
asmimāna may be translated ‘I-am-conception’ or as ‘ego-conceit’, so catching both 
senses of ‘conceit’.148  Here is a strong homiletic stress on the dangers and fatuity of 
‘self’-creation. Its burden is that asmimāna is nonsensical, and so harmful to anyone 
given to it. 149 On at least one occasion, the Buddha seems to suggest that this insistence 
is what his whole teaching, the Dharma, amounts to.150 He presents it as being a matter 
for self-training (sikkhitabbaḥ), with a resolution that within the conscious 
(saviññānaka) body there will be no construction of ‘I’ or ‘mine’ or ‘self-conceit’ 
(ahiṅkāramamiṅkāramānānusayā). 
  Another such insistence is by way of repudiation of the ātman-notion suggested by the 
words from the Upanisad quoted above. These will have conveyed the extra-mundane 
and controlling quality of ātman ‘embedded’ in the individual. The postulate is one of 
an immortal part, held to be identical with the conditioned, ephemeral existence of the 
subject, or in some intimate, if barely definable, relation with the subject. The summary 
quoted from Gombrich will have put this into context.  The Buddha’s riposte, as we find 
it expressed, is to point to the ubiquity of the other two lakṣaṇāḥ (unsatisfactoriness 
and impermanence) and to their incompatibility with such a notion of ātman. It is also 
to point out the practical powerlessness of any supposedly controlling entity. 151  
  A different emphasis is found in the repeated claim that no bodily or non-bodily part of 
the human subject is ātman: there should be no attachment to any part and no illusion of 
its permanence. 152  Here, the stress is on universal conditioning, such as to rule out the 
possibility of permanence. I touched on this in Chapter One. In its application to the 
147 PRIESTLEY, p 28.
148 Note 1136 to Thus Have I Heard, Walsh’s English translation of the Dīgha Nikāya.
149 DN No.34, MN Nos.22 & 62.
150 AN III 32 [133/34]. Sariputta’s plea to the Buddha to teach Dhamma produces this 
response. This must be because the practice advocated is declared to lead to 
cetovimutti (liberation of mind). It is notable that the Buddha does not expect the 
practice to be adopted widely: those who know (aññātāro) are declared to be hard 
to find (dullabhā).
151 See the Anattalakkhaṇasutta and MN No.35 [228].
152 Often expressed: see repeated instances in SN IV.
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subject, it is what I described as the ‘weak notion’. I suggested then that this should be 
seen as a ‘bundle-notion’, a phrase suggested by Hume’s account of personal identity. 153 
The ‘weak notion’ subsists in the analysis of entities, ‘wholes’, in terms of their parts, 
with the implication that there is nothing more to be found. The commonest form of this 
analysis is in terms of five skandhāḥ. 154 The importance of this may be seen from its 
place in the daily chanting of monasteries in the Theravada tradition, in which each of 
these parts in turn is declared to be anattā: rupaṃ anattā, vedanā anattā, saññā anattā, 
saṅkhārā anattā, viññānaṃ anattā (corporeality, feeling. perception/awareness, karmic 
and other conditioned factors, and consciousness – all anattā).  Each one is to be 
understood as a flow of conditioned elements or as a sequence of events, of great 
complexity and very highly transient. The account is one of process rather than of 
substance, and of experience – the experience of an individual entity - that gives no 
ground for an enduring subject. As a presentation, the skandha-account is by way of 
substitution for any such view.
  The texts’ account of sensory perception is concordant with this – as is that of mental 
conception, as the manas (mind) is held to be a sense. There are held to be eighteen 
dhātavaḥ (elements), set out as six sets of three. Each set of three consists of an object, 
a faculty of perception founded on a bodily organ, or on that of conception, and a 
segment of consciousness. Here, on the Buddhist view, is all that is needed to account 
for sense-experience. There is no need to postulate some further entity of a kind that 
‘owns’ consciousness. Realisation of this undercuts the postulation of ātman. In a Pali 
sutta already referred to, a sick monk is urged to contemplate non-self in this way – that 
is, in the internal and external sense-bases.155  This practice, anattasañña (perception of 
non-self), is recommended as a cure.156  Here we see the practical, and salvic, 
application implicit in the texts’ expression of the doctrine.
153 HUME (1), Bk.I Section 6. The whole section is to the point. I refer in particular to 
the words, ‘.. I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing 
but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with 
an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement.’
154 The Sanskrit word skandha (Pali (k)khandha) has the basic meaning of ‘heap’, 
‘aggregation’, and the derivative meaning of ‘category’.
155  ‘So he dwells, contemplating non-self in these six inner-and-outer sense-spheres’ 
(Iti imesu chasu ajjhatika-bāhiresu āyatanesu anattānupassī viharati) AN X 60 [110].
156 The monk is sick in body, but the suggestion seems to be that it is his delusion 
that needs therapy.
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 Anātman is no simple notion. In its application to the human subject, the term covers a 
complex of positive and negative emphases. The picking out of asmimāna as a source 
of suffering, may be found in other contexts. Other religious traditions have their own 
ways of presenting egoism as a danger, and it is this common counsel which takes a 
Buddhist colouring in its pointing to the danger – and nonsense – of self-construction 
and self-inflation. The other emphases covered by the notion – metaphysical, rather than 
moral - find no such parallel. They are best seen as differing, yet interconnected, 
expressions of the peculiarly Buddhist insight that anātman pervades all experience.  
25. How  an  ā  tman  has been seen as  the problem  
  I said in opening that the inherent difficulties of the anātman-notion are not exactly 
those of the identity problem, for all the undoubted interconnection of the two. The 
identity problem is one of the co-existence of ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ notions of the subject, 
with regard to the consideration of consequences and to motivation. It has to be 
considered in the context of karman and the rebirth-doctrine. It is no simple 
consequence or concomitant of the assertion of anātman, for all that the ‘weak’ notion 
is one of several expressions of anātman. This distinction of the two has been 
insufficiently appreciated. In consequence, the problem has been seized in a confused 
and confusing way. 
  I give two examples of this.  One is to be found in the presumption that rebirth is made 
problematic by the assertion of anātman, as rebirth can only be a process undertaken by 
the ātman or along with the ātman. In the Pali passages to which I have just referred, 
personal persistence is simply presumed, or asserted, without explanation; there is no 
supporting mention of ‘self’ or ‘soul’. Rebirth is indeed problematic, as I will suggest 
below, though for reasons unconnected with the ātman or its denial. Pye is, I think, 
correct in setting out a common misapprehension: 
The Buddha taught that there is no such thing 
as a disembodied soul or for that matter a 
soul beyond our ordinarily constituted 
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consciousness ....... Westerners who read 
about Buddhism are often puzzled over how 
it is that people are reborn or reincarnated if 
there is no invisible soul to move on from 
one life to the next. 157
A hint as to how the ‘puzzlement’ might be removed is to be found in some dismissive 
remarks from Gombrich. These concur with the present argument in redirecting the 
focus of concern from anātman:
Whether the Buddha believed in a self is 
revealed as a pseudo-problem. He certainly 
believed, above all else in moral agency; and for 
many people in the rest of the world that would 
be an adequate definition of the soul.158
This judgment is so expressed as to cut usefully through much misunderstanding, and is 
open to be taken over for my own contention, that anātman is not the problem. At the 
same time, it raises a question over the moral agency: the agency of whom, or of what? 
It prompts an identification of ‘self’ and ‘soul’ which seems unconsidered, while to say 
that ‘the soul’ can be defined as ‘moral agency’ is remarkable. The common view of the 
soul is one of a spiritual substance or immortal part. What Gombrich has to say is – here 
- so expressed as to point to a disabling terminological confusion. I will try to dispel this 
confusion, but will consider first if recent scholarship is able to help us. 
26  . Anātman   in recent scholarship  
  What I quoted from Pye and Gombrich was incidental to broader discussion. Other 
writers have made the anātman-doctrine their prime concern. Steven Collins’ book, 
Selfless Persons, provides an exceptionally thorough treatment.159 This is confined to 
the Pali transmission of the record, but it draws on the whole of that transmission, from 
157 PYE p.48
158 GOMBRICH(2) p.17.
159 COLLINS (1)
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the Nikayas to the Abhidhammic systematisation and to the work of Buddhaghosa. The 
process Collins deals with, in his own words, is that of the ‘construction’ of Theravada 
Buddhism over this long period: this is ‘finally crystalised … into a schematic religious 
dogmatism’. 160 
  These words bring out the anthropological smack of his approach, which is calculated 
to show how a complex or structure of beliefs functions in its social setting – that is, to 
show what it does and with how it ‘works’. Collins presents anātman as being of the 
essence of the Buddhist tradition, and so as being vital to its marking-off from others. It 
is declared to be central to the Buddhist soteriological scheme, and so to be at the heart 
of the aspirations of the practitioner, at least of the virtuoso practitioner.  Collins 
describes the stress on anātman as representing ‘a linguistic taboo in technical 
discourse’, and it seems fair to take this judgment to catch his whole argument. 161 
  He suggests that the ‘taboo’ is effective in two spheres. First, it is an especially strong 
instance of the ruling-out of what the tradition tends anyway to deprecate – that is, 
metaphysical speculation or ‘views’. Second, it is at the heart of practice: the 
practitioner cuts concern for self out of his frame of reference as delusory or dangerous. 
As he explains:
Views of self, then, are not merely castigated 
because they rest on supposedly untenable 
intellectual foundations; rather they are 
conceptual manifestations of desire and 
attachment.162
The emphasis, on Collins’ account, is therefore two-fold: there is no reason to postulate 
ātman in the metaphysical sense - in effect there is no ātman (here perhaps ‘soul) – and, 
also, one should live as if there were no ātman (here perhaps ‘self’) to serve as a point 
of reference or concern. This second emphasis is less a metaphysical stance than a 
matter of orientation within the soteriological sphere. 163 Collins sees anātman as the 
160 Op cit p.3
161 Op cit p.77
162 COLLINS(1) p.119
163 Op cit p.183
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grounding of the practice of the ‘virtuoso’ practitioner, in all probability a bhikkhu. All 
this is found to be compatible with the everyday, or ‘conventional’, use of anātman. As 
Collins says, ‘for the ordinary non-specialist Buddhist (that is, of course, the majority) 
… we might say that the self is not denied – meaning that the words ‘self’ (attā) and 
‘person’ (purisa/puggala) can be used without technical qualms’. 164 
  Collins conveys a strong impression of the coherence and comprehensiveness of the 
intellectual structure which he expounds – expounds rather than defends, though his 
vindication of its coherence comes close to defence. This is done in an impressive way, 
yet not, I think, so as to carry conviction that reliance on ‘linguistic taboo’ is enough to 
dispose of all difficulties. 
  One example may show this.  In the course of discussing sakkāyadiṭṭhi (personality-
belief; literally, body-belief), an instance of attachment to a ‘view, he remarks on ‘the 
sense of an ‘I’ which is gained from introspection and the fact of physical individuality’. 
165 On Collins’ account, it follows from the practitioner’s acceptance of the anātman-
notion that this sense and this fact must not be ‘converted into’ sakkāyadiṭṭhi. This may 
be an accurate expression of the Buddhist understanding, and a good instance of the 
shutting out of what would normally be admissible. It seems to invite the riposte that we 
are not concerned with ‘conversion’: rather, in their conjunction, the fact and the sense 
referred to are what constitute personal distinctiveness. Will not the strategy of living 
‘as if’ such-and-such is the case be insecurely based if it trusts overmuch to a willed 
disregard of how things are? 
  Later on, Collins brings up the question, ‘still to be asked’, of how the aspirant ‘might 
situate himself in a moral universe’. This might offer ‘a more recognisably human face 
to action and responsibility’ than does the Buddhist account. 166 Here, expressed in its 
own way, is the grounding of our problem. It is a question which will be brought up by 
any setting-out of the skandha-account of the subject. How may a congeries of elements 
be sufficiently ‘centred’ to be capable of moral responsibility?   Collins’ response to this 
is no more than a restatement of the grounds on which the Buddhist view is held. 
164 Op cit p.77
165 COLLINS p.93
166 Op cit p.182.
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  Joaquin Perez-Remon’s slightly earlier work does not appear in Collins’ bibliography. 
167 On the face of it, it is a sharply different production, both in method and contention. 
Its prime claim is that when the early texts are properly understood and taken on their 
own terms they do not maintain the anātman/anattā doctrine as this has been 
summarised above.168 The claim is made by way of distinguishing, on the one side, 
‘relative’ or ‘qualified’ and, on the other, ‘absolute’ anattā. The latter is ‘that that simply 
denies the reality of the self in man’. On Perez-Remon’s view, this denial finds no basis 
in the texts. He grants that ‘relative’ anattā is fully supported by the texts but contends 
that this notion is not such as to rule out ‘the reality of the self’.
  This position is defended as follows. The ‘relative’ notion finds support in the 
extensive use of the attā-notion in what Perez-Remon calls a ‘positive’ sense. He 
claims, of the examples he gives, that these are not to be weakened in significance by 
being dismissed as instances of what I have called the ‘conventional’ employment of the 
self-concept. Insofar as this employment is merely conventional, it is not a subject of 
dispute.  What is contentious is Perez-Remon’s view that the concept of the attan is not 
to be found employed only at this ‘everyday’ level: in some instances at least, which are 
not infrequent, it is accepted in the scheme of salvation. He claims that, in the version to 
be found in the Nikayas, this scheme admits a moral self. He finds enough in the texts 
to justify the conclusion that the attā of the Nikayas cannot be just ‘a conventional term’ 
or ‘a merely empirical phenomenon without roots in the deepest layer of man’s reality’. 
169
  Perez-Remon is well aware that this is not the position to be found stated in the later 
texts, that of the commentators, which is that of ‘absolute anattā’. He refers to 
Buddhaghosa’s expression of anātman in its application to what he calls ‘the 
metaphysical self’. This seems to entail the denial also of ‘the moral self’. His own 
claim, marked out against this, is that the early texts admit the notion of the self. The 
root of human ill is the common – almost universal – identification of this self, which 
must be taken to be non-phenomenal, with phenomena, typically with the skandāḥ. As 
167 PEREZ-REMON
168 Collins gives some earlier examples of this contention. Among them are Mrs Rhys-
Davids (in her later work) and Christmas Humphreys, whose first interest, in 
theosophy, seems evident in the position he took here. See COLLINS(1) p.7ff. What 
Perez-Remon now argues for is what there has been a widespread wish to believe.  
169 PEREZ-REMON p.55
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he puts it, the source of trouble is ‘the moral self working under the wrong notion of its 
mistaken identity with what is non-self’. 170 By way of argument for this position, he 
relies, like Gombrich, on the fact of moral agency: no one doubts that this is at the 
centre of the Buddha’s teaching. More contentiously, he argues:
The reality of the moral agent cannot stand 
without a corresponding metaphysical 
substrate. With the denial of the latter, the 
moral agent is reduced to a merely 
phenomenal congeries of factors, a mere 
succession of phenomena, a simple appearance 
without any abiding identity. This is not 
reflected in the way of talking of the Nikayas. 
171
Consistently with this, and bearing directly on the identity problem, he continues:
The Nikayas .... profess the doctrine of 
retribution in a straightforward way, taking it 
for granted and not showing any doubt about 
there being a ‘personal continuity’ running 
through successive existences. 172 
He then proceeds to consider the metaphysical self or ‘substrate’. Here, the treatment is 
by way of negation: all the emphasis is on what this self is not. 173 For Perez-Remon, 
however, this by no means excludes a stress on the reality of the attā: ‘... the pure, 
independent, absolute, metaphysical self’. 174  
170 Op cit p.81
171 Op cit p.132
172 PEREZ-REMON p.145
173 He finds parallels to this treatment, suggesting its justification, in the 
Saṃkhyakārikā  and the Yoga Sutras.
174 PEREZ-REMON, p.175.
77
  It hardly needs saying that this is not an easy position to sustain, still less present 
polemically. The argument is probably at its strongest when the ātman/attā is presented 
as an indispensable postulate of moral experience:
The true self is not assumed, it is experienced 
as a primary datum in the process of salvation 
... The process of salvation is ... the process of 
rejection by the self of what is non-self. The 
only characteristic of the true self ... is a 
negative one, that of not being characterised 
by what is empirical ..
More commonly, it is in the form – reflecting, as Perez-Remon would say, the emphasis 
of the texts – of plain denial, coupled with the insistence that all positive statement, 
even that of a kind positively favourable to denial, is misleading and to be avoided. He 
refers to the Sabbāsavasutta, in the Majhima Nikāya, by way of enforcing the point that 
all speculation on the point is damaging, including that issuing in such assertions ‘as my 
self exists’ and ‘my self does not exist’.175 This recalls, in seeming to approximate to, 
Collins’ demonstration of – and emphasis on - a ‘linguistic taboo’, though elsewhere 
Perez-Remon goes well beyond Collins, notably in discussing Nibbana and its 
attainment. Towards the end of his discussion, he remarks on the incomprehensibility of 
those still alive after achieving perfection: their continued existence is not ineffable; it is 
what is ineffable that we call the self. As for what happens after death,
If the person was real before entering Nibbana, 
it continues being real after that, with a reality 
that has escaped all conditions of existence 
and becoming, and is therefore 
incomprehensible for us. 176
This brings up questions about ‘the person’ and about what is ‘real’ which have been left 
more or less open in what has gone before.
175 atthi me attā and n’atthi me attā. MN No.2 [8]
176 PEREZ-REMON p.289.
78
  Perez-Remon’s reflections bear directly on our problem and, to the extent that his 
argument is persuasive, will suggest a solution. This might be expressed as follows: 
there is no problem because there is no shortfall in personal continuity; the ‘true’ attā, 
not to be confused with anything phenomenal, ensures this continuity.
  Exposition is not advocacy, and Perez-Remon may be right in presenting the doctrine 
of the Nikayas as he does. I leave that question open, in bringing up two obvious 
objections to it. One is the difficulty of seeing how a super-sensible entity such as 
Perez-Remon’s attā could relate to something purely phenomenal. More precisely, how 
may such an entity be supposed to be able to control the action and so the retribution of 
action, of the agent of daily experience?  By this, I mean the agent open to observation 
and introspection – that which is caught by the Buddhist presentation of five skandhāḥ? 
Here is a familiar objection. In one form or other, it is likely to apply to all metaphysical 
schemes admitting a spiritual substance. It is notoriously a problem with Descartes, who 
is unusual among metaphysicians of this school in appreciating the need for an 
answer.177 
 The second, not so different from the first, is that Perez-Remon’s attā is ineffable. This 
ineffability is slightly qualified in practice - as how could it not be?  It is however 
essential to Perez-Remon’s argument that nothing can be said about the attā, 
conceptualisation being a kind of reification. If this is so, there is another obvious 
objection: how do we tell the difference between such an entity and a nullity – that is, 
nothing? If there is no way of telling, why should we suppose a difference?  At this 
point, we see a parallel between Perez-Remon’s account and that of Collins, from which 
it seemed at first so sharp a departure. One talks of a linguistic taboo with respect to the 
self; the other insists on the ineffability of that entity which he finds admissible. 
  The two writers just considered stand out from the extensive commentary on 
anātman/anattā of the past 30 years. Among other writers, whom I cannot consider at 
177 Descartes suggests that a gland – it seems, the pineal gland - is the point of 
connection of the two. This will strike most of us as the wrong kind of answer. See 
the late work Les Pasions de l’Âme, translated as The Passions of the Soul, 
especially Articles xxxi and xxxii.  DESCARTES, Vol.I, pp.345/46. Parfit discusses the 
same difficulty in discussing, and disposing of, ‘the Cartesian soul’. His disposal of it 
is applicable to Perez-Remon’s suggestion. See PARFIT (3) pp.223/28  
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any length, I should mention the quite recent work of Sue Hamilton. 178  Her concern is 
well caught by the sub-title of her first book, ‘the constitution of the human being in 
early Buddhism’. It is developed by way of an extended treatment of the skandha-
account. The five skandhāḥ are not five things but five processes. In her second book, 
she found ‘Buddhist teachings [to be] ... not about whether or not one is or has a self or 
soul – what one is – but ... about understanding how one works. Any concern with the 
notion of self-hood ... was to focus on the wrong thing’. 179 This is not the same as 
Collins’ ‘linguistic taboo’, but it has a complementary emphasis. Hamilton’s point is 
that the question is not one of ‘don’t speak of it’, but rather one of ‘it’s not important’ or 
‘that is a misdirection of concern’.
  This cursory consideration of works which merit a fuller treatment would be 
inadequate if anātman were my main subject. This is not so, and I have not tried to 
appraise these writers, or to pursue to a conclusion some obvious objections. This is 
because my account of them should have brought out the distinction between the 
question of how to understand anātman and what I have called the identity problem. 
This distinction is not absolute, which is why it has been necessary to discuss anātman 
at this length. Anātman is of prime importance in the Buddhist scheme of things. What 
has, I hope, stood out from the discussion above is that it has only an oblique bearing on 
the place of personal identity in that scheme. This is, I think apparent at least to Collins, 
who remarks in passing on ‘the minimal sense of psychological continuity required for 
even the shortest sequence of coherent behaviour’.180 This ‘sense of continuity’ will 
come into play as soon as we question how the human subject is to be understood and 
consider what it is for the subject to be accounted a person. 
  Collins would, I think, justify his merely incidental treatment of what we would call 
‘personal identity’ with the plea that from the perspective with which he is concerned 
the sense of continuity is illusory. He would grant that this is not easily conveyed, 
referring to ‘the difficulty of expressing in ordinary language, to ordinary people, the 
teaching that ordinary language and psychology is based on an illusion’.181 Only shortly 
178 HAMILTON (1) & (2)
179 HAMILTON(2), p.115
180 COLLINS (1). Footnote to p.99.
181 Op cit p.135. It is tempting to comment on these words, unusually clear-headed 
and candid by the standard of discussion in this field, that ‘difficulty’ understates 
what must be meant, which might be better expressed as ‘self-defeating 
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afterwards, he qualifies his stance with the concession that, even from the Buddhist 
perspective, the sense of self ‘ is held to be necessarily a phenomenological reality for 
the unenlightened’. 182 It is in our understanding of this reality, that I locate what I call 
the identity problem. 
 
27. The terminology of personal identity
  All this may have suggested what I take to be the case, which is that it is far from clear 
how the anātman-notion should be understood. The field of the metaphysics of the self 
is one of unusual difficulty, and perplexity should not be surprising. The difficulty bears 
on my own concerns, as the anātman-notion certainly has a place within our problem. 
What I have called the ‘weak’ notion of the subject has the expression it has within the 
sources, in part because of the need to to exclude the ātman. Anātman is central to the 
Buddhist scheme of things by virtue of being one of the lakṣaṇāḥ. For all this, I 
maintain that anātman does not, in itself, bring about the identity problem. I have 
already tried to justify this claim, and will now try to do so by way of terminological 
clarification.  I have already touched on the need for this, remarking above on 
Gombrich’s apparently interchangeable use of ‘self’ and ‘soul’. How we should 
understand these terms is much to the point, as is our understanding of ‘person’, 
‘being’, ‘living thing’, ‘subject’ and other such terms. Such terms are often presented as 
interchangeable, yet must at other times be taken to be sharply divergent in meaning. 
Here is a problem, which is made worse by the complexities of translation. Among 
translators within the field, there is little consensus as to how key terms should be 
rendered. 
 With these difficulties in mind, I offer a tabulation of the terms most commonly 
deployed in the field of personal identity, so as to bring out the range of use. My object 
is no more than the simplest clarification. The glosses I have added are of the barest. 
Other ways of mapping the field are easy to envisage. 183  I have kept common currency 
enterprise’.   
182 Op cit p.155.
183 There is a comparable listing-off by Galen Strawson. See STRAWSON G. Strawson 
writes: ‘I use the expression “the self” freely, as a loose name for all the undeniably 
real phenomena that lead us to think and talk in terms of the self. This doesn’t rule 
out the possibility that the best thing to say, in the end, is that there is no such 
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in mind and attempted to reflect both Indian and Western usage. On this basis, I 
distinguish:
      (1)  The Experiencer, or the subject of consciousness. A necessary postulate if the 
concept of experience is to be admitted, in distinction from that of successive and mixed 
sensation. Not itself an object of experience.
      (2)  The Life-Element. The animating factor. That which ensures or expresses the 
vitality of a living thing, and the absence of which brings about, or marks, or expresses, 
its decease.
      (3)  The Person. The subject extended backwards and forwards in time. That which 
is founded on memory and the continuity of character. That which permits judgments of 
merit and demerit and an appreciation of development through time. Such notions as 
personality and character go along with it.
      (4)  The Soul. A spiritual substance, found in association with the body – perhaps 
also with the mind - but detachable from it and exempt from the death of the body.
      (5)  The Soul. As at (4), but also related, absolutely or in degree, through identity of 
essence, with God.
      (6)  The Mind. The ‘location’ of the totality of ‘mental’ functions and activities. In 
India, one of the six senses, the others being the five bodily senses.   
      (7)  The Self. The least precise of this set of terms, generally found to be equivalent 
to (1), (3) and (4) in combination, sometimes synonymous with either (1) (3) or (4) in 
isolation.
thing’. Also:‘Perhaps the best account of the existence of the self is one that may be 
given by certain Buddhists. It allows that the self exists, at any given moment, while 
retaining all the essential Buddhist criticisms of the idea of the self. It gives no 
reassurance to those who believe in the soul, but it doesn’t leave us with nothing.’ It 
is a pity that the ‘certain Buddhists’ are not further identified. Are they to be taken 
to be untypical? 
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      (8)  The Human Subject. The term I have employed so far, as being the one least 
likely to go with prejudging matters. The living thing. The psycho-physical complex. 
Distinguishable from (7) in extending to the body. 
  The terms I have listed are, I think, common currency in the West. They seem also to 
catch rather well the usage of the Buddha’s time, in that most of them find ready 
equivalents in Sanskrit and Pali. In Sanskrit, the ‘life-element’ is jīva; the ‘person’ is 
pudgala; the ‘soul’, perhaps also the ‘self’, is ātman; the ‘mind’ is manas.  In a way that 
is less clear-cut, the ‘experiencer’, the ‘soul’, the ‘self’, even the ‘human subject’ may 
be rendered as puruṣa.  This appreciable overlap, and the ready translatability of at least 
some terms, point to a fair degree of conceptual convergence. It makes it possible to 
offer clarifications and conclusions applicable within both fields. This is however the 
most that can be claimed. These are not terms with a strict and exclusive meaning, any 
more than kuśala/kusalais such a term. 184
28. The use of the tabulation and its limits
 This tabulation should have a use in clarifying obscure or complex notions. It will 
sometimes fail to clarify them, which may be enlightening and so, in its way, as useful. I 
will give one example of failure, Plato’s deployment of the notion of the soul, as this 
presents an interesting parallel to difficulties over the Buddhist account of rebirth with 
which I will deal below.
  It is a commonplace of philosophical history that Plato’s notion of the soul is that of a 
spiritual substance. His employment of it supersedes – or embraces - earlier notions of 
the soul as either breath or as shadow-body.185  The difficulty lies in determining how 
this spiritual substance comes into being and is composed, how it functions, and how it 
relates to the other conceptualisations or items of the subject’s make-up just listed. The 
argument of the Meno seems to be that a boy’s soul has carried with it in its move to his 
present embodiment the mathematical knowledge acquired in an earlier life. But 
184 This may be seen from the Commentary to the Kathāvatthu. Expounding the 
opening question, that of whether the puggala is a real and ultimate fact, the 
Commentary glosses the word as attā  satto jīva, as if all three – at the same time? - 
would do as equivalents. 
185 The earliest recorded use of psuche, in the Iliad, seems to require the translation 
‘breath of life’ or ‘enlivening factor’. The apparent synonym, thumos, is what 
departs when a hero is killed. For instance, the spirit ‘left the bones’ (lipe d’ostea), a 
moment associated with darkness coming down. 
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acquired by what? By the soul itself? By the boy’s mind or intelligence, if these are 
distinct from the soul, or by the boy in some guise as a psycho-physical entity in such a 
way as to permit its onward conveyance? In the Phaedo, the soul seems sometimes to 
carry attributes, sometimes to be good or bad per se, as if to be no ‘pure’ spiritual 
substance but to be characterised by those attributes. In the myth of Er at the end of the 
Republic, where Plato is frankly presenting a myth, the souls come to be reborn. This is 
much in line with the common Indian account, though in Plato’s version the souls suffer 
for their sins before, not in, rebirth. The souls are individuated - ‘the one who was Ajax, 
Odysseus’, etc - and it is unclear how far they will go on being Ajax and Odysseus in 
their new incarnations. Plato, one presumes, expects them to be capable of remembering 
their earlier lives, like Meno’s slave - or, at least in part, their earlier experience. 
Beyond this, will the reborn souls have same characteristics of personality? Will the 
former Ajax in a new life display a somewhat boneheaded ferocity? For this to be the 
case, we have to suppose that (4) somehow ‘carries’ (3) with it into its new incarnation. 
Without this supposition (4), the pure spiritual substance, seems barely distinguishable 
from (2), the animating factor. Or it may be that Plato never distinguishes (3) and (4), 
holding the soul and what I have called the person, and what might also be called the 
empirical ego, to be one and the same. If so, we may have a case of (7) as listed: 
everything that is in play apart from the body. Here, the value of the list lies less in 
clarification, than in exposing the problem of bringing it about.
  A useful work by H D Rankin sheds some light on these difficuties. Rankin sums up:
According to Plato, the individual … is born; 
he dies and is reborn into the world. He is a 
different individual qua soma + psyche, for his 
soma is a different one at each successive birth 
and his psyche has been altered in some snse 
by his previous … life. It has in most cases 
undergone purificatory or punitive experiences 
in the other world. But the new soma+ psyche 
is not spoken of as if it were an entirely new 
arrangement. It is in some sense the same 
individual that was previously alive on earth. 
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The psyche carries the human individual out of 
this world and back to it again.
Earlier he has spoken of bad habits being ‘adhesive’ to psychai – that is, not of their 
nature. Rankin exposes the difficulties, which seem to be radical, but is not as candid as 
he might be in pointing to the incoherence in which they seem to issue. 186 
  If this problem of interpretation were my prime concern, I would stress the 
development, and so the variability, of Plato’ understanding. I would also need to deal 
with the mythopoeic strain in his presentation and the compatibility of this with the 
philosophical. This cannot be done here. What is evident is the remarkable difficulty of 
intelligible soul-talk. What is a soul? How far is the soul-possessor the person of 
everyday acquaintance, with observable characteristics? Such questions were not 
confined to India.
 
29. What does the  an  ā  tman  -doctrine deny?  
  
  One target of the anātman-doctrine is full in view. The anātman-doctrine we find in 
the Buddhist texts, whatever else its object of repudiation or other significance, is 
directed against the conception of the ātman/attā/aya/puruṣa as spiritual substance - 
that is, against item (4) on our tabulation. Such an entity needs only to be set against the 
lakṣaṇāḥ for its inconceivability on the Buddhist scheme to be evident. 
  The question is whether the soul-notion is the only target. Has the insistence on 
anātman any bearing on the other elements in my tabulation? The Life-Element, or jīva, 
((2) on the list), is not prominent in the texts but is found both as a synonym for ātman, 
perhaps in the latter’s early significance as ‘breath’, and as that which makes or marks a 
living thing’s animate status. We see the latter in the Pali yavajīvam  (as long as life 
lasts, lifelong) and, from the Mahāvastu, jīvantaka (living being). 187  I find nothing in 
the texts to suggest that anātman bears by way of rebuttal on the Life-Element, 
whatever the verbal equivocation. It seems clear also that it does not bear on the Mind 
186 RANKIN, Ch.7, & pp.130 and 67.  
187 See Dictionaries: EDGERTON; RHYS-DAVIDS & STEDE.
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(6), as one of the six senses or modes of apprehension, or on what I have called the 
Human Subject (8). This is, as it were, the ‘animal’, the living thing found in daily 
confrontation. The point of anātman here is confined to an assertion of that Subject’s 
soullessness. 
  As for the other components of my tabulation, the Experiencer (1) stands out as a 
special case. I had in mind, in particular, Kant’s account of the self and of experience, 
and it is the one instance in my list of a term associated with a single philosopher. It 
may be that some such notion was a component of the Sāṃkhya conception of the 
puruṣa. This has little bearing on our present consideration.
  In considering the Person (3), we come to the heart of the identity problem. Problems 
over personal identity are, I have argued, distinct from those over anātman, for all the 
overlap between them. This should be evident from the summary account just offered of 
what a person is, which is at (3) on the tabulation. This is hardly obscure, and common 
experience should confirm its reality. I have made this point already, in discussing 
Collins, and quoted his admission of  ‘the minimal sense of psychological continuity’ as 
being something inescapable. Other writers, with their own emphases, have expressed 
themselves to similar effect. 188 These indications do not, however, amount to the 
establishment of anything clear-cut. The entity formed by memory and continuity of 
character is not, in the present context, made out so explicitly as to acquire its own 
label. The terms in common use - in particular, pudgala - seem not to measure up to my 
definition, though they on doubt catch the notion of the human entity as a particular. 
Karman will figure largely in any specification of the person-notion within the Buddhist 
field, and an account of its role would catch much of what is pointed to at (3), though 
not the contribution of memory. I will speak below of ‘the karmic entity’, employing the 
term as an imperfect Buddhist expression of ‘the person’. What we have, I find, as we 
look for a fuller expression, is a shadow-notion, always there in any introspective 
contemplation of what we are and periodically more substantial. I will shortly consider 
the case of a strain in the Buddhist tradition, the Pudgalavāda or ‘Person school’, 
which, as we will see, presented a ‘person’ so far substantiated as to be found to be 
reified and, it was claimed by opponents, indistinguishable from the ātman.
188 For instance, Harvey: ‘There may not be unchanging personal identity, then, but 
personal continuity is seen as very strong’. HARVEY(1) p.72.
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    This sense of something imperfectly articulated, yet indispensable as a notion, is not 
peculiar to the Buddhist tradition, or to India. It is to be found in some surprising places, 
for instance, in the De Rerum Natura of Lucretius. Remote from our concerns as it is, 
this is worth mentioning for the broader light it sheds. In Lucretius’ exposition, the 
person-conception achieves full definition at the point where the argument requires it. 
The poet’s notion of the ‘soul’ or ‘self’ or ‘mind’ is one of a fine material substance, 
made up of a non-enduring complex of atoms. Lucretius is concerned to show that death 
should be of no concern to us, as after it we are nothing. Suppose the atoms that make 
up the mind should by some chance be reassembled, after death has brought about their 
dispersal, and that they should come again into the same configuration – would that 
amount to a remaking of the same being? The answer is No, and the reason is that ‘the 
ability to recollect ourselves (repetentia nostri) would have been interrupted’.189 In other 
words, the continuity of consciousness would have been lost. The poet’s conclusion – as 
if in anticipation of Locke - seems to be that repetentia nostri is indispensable for 
identity.
  Quite as problematic as this is the case of the Self, item (7) on the tabulation. Should 
the assertion of anātman be seen as a rebuttal of the ‘self’? The imprecision of this 
notion also is at the heart of the difficulty. We have seen that Perez-Remon has an 
answer to it. He postulates a ‘true’ self, which he finds compatible with anattā, because 
he takes the proper (and original) conception of anattā to be limited to what he styles 
the ‘relative’ view, which rejects only any identification of the phenomenal with attan. I 
have treated above of obstacles to this understanding, and even to seeing what 
difference its substantiation might make. To the grounds I have already set out for 
dissenting from Perez-Remon, I might add one suggested by Collins. On Perez-
Remon’s understanding there can be only incidentals to differentiate Buddhism from 
Brahmanical religion.190  Perez-Remon’s ‘pure, independent, absolute, metaphysical 
self’ would serve as the Buddhist expression of a strand important within the 
Brahmanical religion of the Buddha’s day and destined to be central to its later Vedantic 
189 Interrupta semel cum sit repetentia nostri. De Rerum Natura III, 851. I have 
followed Kenney’s translation. He remarks that this is the only use of repetentia in 
ancient literature. The elusiveness of the concept is backed by that of the term.
190 I do not say that these may not have had their own importance. The 
disparagement of caste would be one such.
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development. We need not follow Collins in all respects to trust that this cannot be right, 
if only because polemicists on both sides would have concurred. 191 
    
  The best understanding of item (7) on the tabulation has already been suggested by the 
account of the practical application of the anātman-notion which I offered above. 
I presented this as being one of repudiation of ātman understood as ‘soul’ – and also as 
having a moral application in its opposition to asmimāna – that is, to any construction 
of self, grasped by way of inchoate apprehension and made an object of attachment.  It 
is the moral application which seems to be called up here. On this understanding, the 
thrust of anātman is against that ‘constructed’ Self, item (7) on the tabulation, as well as 
against the Soul, item (4), from which indeed it might hardly have been distinguished. It 
takes translation from the Sanskrit or Pali to make sharp the distinction of  ‘soul’ and 
‘self’. I take this to be the limit of its repudiation.   
30. Is  an  ā  tman   our problem? 
   My conclusion is that the anātman-doctrine is not simple and singular. It is to the 
simplification of something multi-faceted that we should attribute much of the 
misundertstanding commonly found. The doctrine is not one of the repudiation of the 
personal identity and continuity, of which the Buddhist tradition, in its distinctive - and 
problematic - way, is an affirmation. A common view of the matter is a 
misunderstanding: the problem is not one of the ‘invisible soul’ referred to by Pye in the 
words quoted above. The view caught by the quotation from Gombrich which followed 
is essentially correct, although it is not enough to point out ‘a pseudo-problem’. For 
clarity, we have needed a terminological precision which distinguishes ‘self’ and ‘soul’, 
and which makes plain their compatibility, or lack of it, with anātman. This I have just 
tried to supply.
191 The most fully worked-out Brahmanical response must be Udayana’s treatise, On 
the reality of the ātman. This was written centuries after our period, and may be 
seen as a summation. It criticises various expressions of anātman-doctrine, as well 
as making positive assertions. One of these is that perception offers a proof of the 
reality of the self, all living beings having an assurance of ‘I’. See 
ATMATATTVAVIVEKA, especially p.344.
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31. A Buddhist ‘Person school’
   I must now deal with two other topics where some clarification is required. Here, my 
purpose will be the limited one of recording the bearing on my argument of some points 
of contention and of vindicating the view I take of this bearing.
  The first of these is the Pudgalavāda or ‘Person school’. The differences between the 
‘schools’ into which the Buddhist tradition came to be divided were not such as to have 
made a generalising treatment of the tradition impracticable. The Pudgalavāda is the 
exception. It is plain from the records that there was a long-enduring school - or 
tradition or doctrinal succession - marked off by its postulation of a pudgala. 192 This 
entity’s place and role in the scheme of things was found by its opponents to jar badly 
with central Buddhist contentions. The ‘Person school’, now long extinct, has always 
been controversial.
  
  My own concern is well caught by a passage from an exhaustive study by Priestley, 
who considers why the Pudgalavādinaḥ advanced their characteristic thesis. I quote:
Without a real self, they believed, the operation of 
karma would be inexplicable, and the cultivation of 
benevolence towards other selves and the Buddha’s 
compassion in teaching them would be deluded if not 
actually meaningless. 193
This is tantamount to saying - as I have said - that, at least from one standpoint, much of 
the Buddha’s teaching is subverted by insistence on what I have called the ‘weak’ 
notion of the person. 
  The evidence for the Pudgalavāda and its contentions is set out clearly by Priestley.194 
It is patchy, elusive and debateable, consisting largely of passing references by 
contemporary chroniclers and travel-writers, of rebuttals by writers from within the 
192 Pudgala/puggala may be uncontentiously translated ‘person’, but with the proviso 
that no conclusion should be anticipated.
193 PRIESTLEY, p 217. I owe much to Priestley in what follows.  
194 Op cit, ch.3.
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Buddhist mainstream (as it now stands out as being), and of surviving texts by 
adherents. The first category seems to demonstrate no more than the bare existence of a 
Pudgalavāda. Until recently, the second category was almost the sole source of 
information. It must be a question how far such a mode of presenting it is reliable. 
Surviving texts are few. Recently, four texts which appear to be in the Pudgalavāda 
tradition have been translated from the Chinese and made available in English 
paraphrase. 195  Their interpretation is no easy matter, and it is hard to be sure that the 
doctrines to be drawn from them are compatible with those that can be deduced from 
the rebuttals. With this caveat, I offer a summary of what it seems possible to call the 
main theses of the Pudgalavāda. The supporting evidence for this is of disparate kinds 
and it extends over hundreds of years. Its main elements amount, in Pali, to parts of the 
Katthavatthu; in Chinese, to the four surviving texts just referred to; in Sanskrit, to the 
last chapter – perhaps a distinct composition - of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. 
32. The  Pudgalav  ā  da  : for and against  
 
  The principal Pudgalāvadin thesis is that the postulate of a pudgala is both well-
grounded and necessary. The pudgala is neither the same as, nor distinct from, the five 
skandhāḥ. Its reality may be called a ‘further fact’, to use Parfit’s term – that is, further 
to the fact of the existence of the skandhāḥ. It is not a spiritual substance of Upanisadic 
character, and its recognition is compatible with acceptance of anātman. This is because 
the person is an indispensable point of reference, and because much Buddhist doctrine 
cannot be made intelligible without such a postulate. Otherwise, what suffers 
consequences or achieves liberation? What it is must be an entity and a unitary entity. It 
is in line with this, goes the argument, that the Buddha is regularly recorded as teaching 
in ways that seem to assume the persistence of human subjects. The subject so persistent 
seems to need a designation and pudgala, with its familiar range of meaning, seems to 
serve well for that. 
  It has to be claimed that the postulate adds something, that the pudgala is not identical 
with the skandhāḥ. If that were all it was, the postulate would have no point. It has to be 
195 BHIKSHU THICH THIEN CHAU. The Chinese texts must be taken to be translations 
from Indian originals.
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claimed also that it is not distinct, that it is not a spiritual substance in temporary 
association with the skandhāḥ. Such a view would amount to the reassertion of the 
ātman. What has to be claimed will be finely poised. The argument may be extended to 
involve rebirth - that is, succession from one life to another, as conditioned by karman. I 
have touched on rebirth above in presenting the identity problem: if my interest is to be 
engaged in the possibility of succession through lives, this succession needs to be, in 
some way or other, personal. The postulate of a pudgala may be one such way. It seems 
to fit with the celebrated series of lives recorded of the Buddha himself in the Jataka 
stories, at least on a common and popular understanding of the Jatakas. Other series of 
lives, far from Buddha-like, can be seen in terms of a pudgala led on by craving 
(tṛṣṇa/tanhā).
The most determined opponent of the Pudgalavāda would have agreed that we may 
talk, permissibly, of the pudgala/puggala. One of the works making up the Pali 
Abhidhamma is the Puggalapaññatti. This deals with personality-types, employing the 
term puggala in the sense of ‘personality’, ‘character’ or ‘individuation’. This case is 
not to the immediate purpose, and I touch on it only to say that these senses seem to 
derive from the word’s basic sense of ‘person’. If this is so, those who use the derivative 
senses cannot afford to be too dismissive of the basic sense. The Abhidhammic use 
illustrates the difficulty over the meaning of basic terms brought out in the last section, 
prompting the tabulation offered there.
The main charge against the Pudgalavāda is that the postulate of the pudgala is in 
effect a reassertion of the ātman.  Another is simply that the Pudgalavāda is confused 
and unintelligible. The two charges seem to need to be considered together, as the 
standard reply to the first, that the pudgala is not distinct from the skandhāḥ, may seem 
to be almost a constitution of the second. The orthodox reject the Pudgalavāda on the 
grounds that there is a notional totality of existents in the world, and that further 
existents cannot just be wished into being. The Buddha’s habit, and ours, of using 
convenient verbal designations, which may be metaphorical, should not lead us to think 
otherwise. Is the pudgala an existent or the component of a metaphor? If the latter, the 
orthodox can be unconcerned. If the former, it will be a question where it is to be 
found? How is its existence to be established?196  These questions recall the style of 
196 For all this, see the opening of the KATHAVATTHU passim.
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criticism which we have seen used to establish the anātman-doctrine. It is to the effect 
that we need not and should not postulate an entity wherever a complete account of 
experience may be rendered without it. The Pudgalavāda has it that the pudgala differs 
ontologically from the ātman.  Is it therefore secure against this line of criticism?
In the Kathāvatthu the approach is by way of enquiring whether the pudgala is asserted 
to be an entity of the same order as the skandhāḥ. The question is asked also of the 
āyatanāḥ, the dhatavāḥ and the indriyāḥ - that is, of the basic elements, to be found in 
immediate experience, of the Buddhist account of the subject. 197 As the answer seems 
to be that it is not of the same order as any of these kinds of component part, it follows 
that it is not an entity of any sort and, if not a metaphorical expression, then nothing. 
The assertion that the pudgala is neither identical with the skandhāḥ nor distinct from 
them is likewise found to be unintelligible.
   Vasubandhu wrote some centuries later in a period of enlarged philosophical 
sophistication. As well as criticising the Pudgalavāda, he presents a positive account. 
This will have been suggested from the sentences from the opening to the concluding 
part of the Abhidharmkośabhāṣya quoted above. 198  It is to the effect that, when one is 
faced with another living being, one cognises the substantiality of the skandhāḥ, which 
are substantially real (dravyasat). At the same time, one conceives the person, which is 
real by way of conception (prajñaptisat). The conception is just that, a conception, but it 
is substantially grounded (dravyasiddha) – that is, grounded in the skandhāḥ. In other 
words, the person is dravya (substantial) in a secondary sense or at one remove. As a 
conception it is inseparable from the skandhāḥ. Vasubandhu suggests that the 
Pudgalavādin writers fall into error through a tendency to inflate or reify this 
conception. As Duerlinger puts it: ‘ … Vasubandhu assumes that if we do not possess 
either substantial reality or substantially established reality we do not exist at all’. 199 
197  I have touched on the dhātavaḥ above (p.75), and might have offered a similar 
account of the others.
198 Page 20 above
199 In a useful commentary to his translation of this part of the Bhāṣya (Sec 1.2). See 
DUERLINGER. Elsewhere in this section, Duerlinger writes: ‘According to 
Vasubandhu, the object of the conception of a person is a conventional reality. A 
person as a person is not just a collection of aggregates. A person and a collection 
of aggregates, he believes, are the same in existence, and so, when reference is 
made to a person, reference is made to a collection of aggregates rather than to a 
self’. The resemblance of this view of what is involved to Parfit’s Reductionism will 
become clear in Chapter Five. 
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   Is Vasubandhu, at the end of our period, asserting what the ‘mainstream’ Buddhist 
tradition would always have asserted? The roots of the tradition in the sutra/sutta 
literature certainly lack his precision, but this difference does not, I judge, amount to a 
distinction in what is asserted. Vasubandhu’s formulations have the precision typical of 
developing religious orthodoxy, formed by the concern to shut out the dangerous. This 
concern must have ruled out any accommodation with a Pudgalavādin attachment, as 
he would have seen it, to a fresh concept – that of the person. 
What we are concerned with is, I believe, not so much a Pudgalavāda school, of a 
millennium’s duration, as a succession of objections and reconstructions, to be accorded 
one label and prompted, we can suppose, by the concern summarised by Priestley in the 
words quoted above. All that can safely be claimed is a family resemblance between 
assertions more various than is generally recognised. Priestley’s impressive account 
brings out the difficulty – more, perhaps, than he appreciates – of being clear what the 
Pudgalavādin writers were about. My concern here, in this very brief account, has been 
the narrow one of showing that there existed, over a long period, a ‘school’, or (I prefer 
to say) succession, which offered a Buddhist notion of the person which came to be 
seen as deviant. It is a fair surmise that an impetus behind this offer was an 
apprehension of the identity problem. In other words, the contentions of the 
Pudgalavādin writers bring out the reality, and recalcitrance, of the problem. To lay 
bare the likelihood of this has been my object. 
33. What the two-truths notion amounts to
 
  The other topic I must address is the two-truths notion, which is often brought up in 
discussion of the identity problem. The way this is done shows that some clarification is 
necessary. From the viewpoint of our period, the notion is one with a great future before 
it, realised in its development within the Mahayana. In the context of its emergence and 
first expression, it is better understood as a reaction to the identity problem than as an 
approach to its solution. 
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  The notion is, in brief, that there are two kinds, degrees or levels of truth, where the 
word ‘truth’ must be taken to mean ‘significant or truth-achieving assertion’. Satya 
(truth) may be, in Sanskrit terms, either paramārtha or saṃvṛti  (in Pali, paramattha or 
sammuti). 200 The derivation of satya (Pali sacca) from sat, the present participle of the 
verbal root as (to be), may give warrant for glossing it also as ’reality’. This gloss may 
on occasion be illuminating. 201  Paramārtha and saṃvṛti are usually translated, 
respectively, as ‘absolute’, and as ‘relative’ or ‘conventional’. Monier-Williams glossed 
them as “self-evident’ (which has not caught on) and as ‘by general consent’. 202 These 
renderings all point the way to what the distinction must be taken to be, but have a 
Western smack which may be misleading. I will therefore leave the Sanskrit and Pali 
words untranslated.
  Outside the Mahayana, an explicit treatment of the two-truths notion is found only at 
the end of our period, in the commentarial works. What we find is well summarised in 
the best-known book of a contemporary bhikkhu in the Theravada tradition, the late 
Walpola Rahula, which has come to be accepted as a classic statement of ‘basic’ – more 
precisely, Theravada – Buddhism.  He shows there how the doctrine may be applied to 
the human subject
           .. it should be mentioned here that there are two 
kinds of truths: conventional truth (sammuti-sacca, 
Skt. saṃvṛti-satya) and ultimate truth (paramattha-
sacca, Skt. paramārtha-satya). When we use 
expressions in our daily life as ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘being’, 
‘individual’, etc., we do not lie because there is no self 
or being as such, but we speak a truth conforming to 
the convention of the world. But the ultimate truth is 
that there is no ‘I’ or ‘being’ in reality.
200 Paramārtha and paramattha are clearly forms of the same word. Saṃvṛti and 
sammuti are not. Here is a problem. Saṃvṛti, from root vṛ, means literally ‘covered’ 
or ‘concealed’. Sammuti, from root man, means, with its prefix, ‘generally thought’. 
Have we two different views here of the distinction, or is saṃvṛti the miscalculated 
Sanskritisation of a Prakrit term? Edgerton, in his dictionary article, seems to 
suggest the latter. See EDGERTON.
201 See BUESCHER passim, especially pp.55 to 83. 
202 MONIER-WILLIAMS.
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  For this account, Rahula can rely on the Abhidhamma writers and the commentators. It 
is notable that when he needs a philosophically richer statement of the doctrine, Rahula 
has to turn outside his own tradition, the Theravada, to a Mahayana text:
                      As the Mahāyana-sūtrālaṅkāra says: ‘A person 
(pudgala) should be mentioned as existing only in 
designation (prajñapti) (i.e. conventionally there is a 
being), but not in reality (or substance dravya) 203
The terminological distinctions employed will recall those of Vasubandhu.
  
  The Mahayana development began within the latter half of our period and continued 
for centuries. I mention it here, as it is there that we find the notion at its most 
significant. At this early stage of the development, there is little of the later, often highly 
scholastic, working-out of the notion. We find, rather, an acceptance of paradox, along 
with a willingness to live with the problematic. This is well caught by Guy Newland, in 
a book published in 1992. 204   In a section of his opening chapter, entitled Internal  
Contradiction in Buddhism, Newland quotes Conze. 205 Conze has cited a passage from 
the Diamond Sutra: ‘And yet, although innumerable beings have thus been led to 
Nirvana, no being at all has been led to Nirvana’. By way of explaining this, Conze 
explains:
A Bodhisattva is a being compounded of the 
two contradictory forces of wisdom and 
compassion. In his wisdom, he sees no 
persons; in his compassion he is resolved to 
save them.
   This is an excellent expression of a kind of innocent confusion, produced by the 
assertion of incompatibles. It seems likely that such confusion, innocent or not, counted 
203 RAHULA p.55 
204 NEWLAND. Newland’s bibliography records the extensive work done on the two-
truths notion over the past 30 years. Over the same period, much primary material 
in the Tibetan tradition has been made available and translated. 
205 Op cit. p 15
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for much in the formulation of the two-truths notion. The acceptance of paradox may be 
hard to sustain. The claim that there are two truths must have seemed to offer a way of 
passing beyond it, whatever the difficulty of sustaining the claim or even making it 
clear. Very much is found to be claimed for the notion. Nagarjuna makes it fundamental 
to his presentation: 
Those who do not know the distinction of 
these two truths do not know the deep reality 
in the Buddha’s teaching 206
Later on, and especially in the Tibetan tradition, the notion was to receive more than one 
form of philosophical substantiation. This further development went beyond the bare 
assertion that there were two truths, backing up the assertion with the resources of an 
elaborated logic. To deal with it here would be to go beyond the limits I have proposed. 
34. Where ‘two truths’ are unavailable
  There is an instructive contrast with the Christian development. In each case, we can 
make  out  the  construction  of  a  religious  system  from  the  teaching  ascribed  to  a 
charismatic originator. This construction – we may suppose - will tend to dispose of 
inconsistencies  within  the  original  teaching.  Often  these  will  be  no  more  than 
superficial differences, attributable to the varying circumstances in which the originator 
spoke. Others may be too deeply rooted for their elimination by way of the ‘ironing-out’ 
applied to these simpler cases to be possible. In the Buddhist instance, I take the two-
truths notion to have its origin in the need to accommodate their persistence. Its appeal 
is to be found in its making possible the simultaneous assertion of incompatibles. Such 
a solution was unavailable to Jews or Christians. There can be no basis for appeal to the 
co-existence  of  ‘two  truths’ where  the  divine  inspiration  and  verbal  inerrancy  of 
Scripture – the whole of Scripture - are taken for granted. Problems of inconsistency 
will be recalcitrant, and other means of resolving them will have to be found. These 
have often proved insufficient, as is evident from the extent of heresy and schism in 
206 Ye ‘nayor na vijānanti vibhāgaṃ satyayadvayoḥ ׀ te tattvaṃ na vijānanti 
gambhiraṃ buddha-sāsane ׀׀   Mūlamadhyamakaākārikā, 24.9. Nagajuna is most 
commonly taken to have lived in the first century AD
Christian history.207  In seeing this, we may gain some insight into the appeal of the two-
truths notion within the Buddhist sphere. Its usefulness for the purpose of minimising 
contention - or for its evasion - has been considerable.  
35. The two-truths notion in the canon and 
commentaries
  There is no plain statement of the two-truths notion in the early texts. The closest 
approach to one is to be found in declarations ascribed to the Buddha to the effect that 
language may be inadequate to catch what he has to say. An instance of these is the 
words addressed to Citta, the son of the elephant-trainer, with which he ends an abstruse 
explanation of kinds of existence:
  .. these [the terms he has employed] are names, 
expressions, turns of speech, designations in common 
use in the world, which the Tathagata uses without 
misapprehending them. 208
There is at least one instance where something like the developed notion seems to come 
into view. The bhikkhuni (nun), Vajira, is in dialogue with Mara, the tempter. She 
challenges him:
Why now do you assume ‘a being’? Mara, is that your 
speculative view? This is a heap of sheer formations: 
here is no being found. Just as with an assemblage of 
parts, the word ‘chariot’ is used, so, when the 
aggregates exist, there is the convention, a being.209 
207 A case of schism is the break of the Church in England from the Papacy, resulting 
from Henry VIII’s wish for his marriage to be found invalid. The problem here was 
one of apparently incompatible statements of divine law on the question of 
marriage to a brother’s widow. See Leviticus, xviii, 16 and xx, 21, and Deuteronomy, 
xxxv, 5. Discussed in SCARISBRICK, Ch. 7.
208 DN I No.9 [202].  Imā …. lokasamaññā lokanruttiyo lokavohārā lokapaññattiyo 
yāhi tathāgato voharati aparāmasanti. 
209 SN (Sagāthāvagga) 297. Kinnu sattoti paccesi māra diṭṭhigatannu te; 
suddhasaṅkhārapuñjoyaṃ nayidha sattūpalabbhi. Yathā hi aṅgasambhāra hoti 
saddo rato iti, evaṃ khandesu santesu hoti sattoti sammuti. 
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With a few exceptions such as these, the notion is to be found, not in the primary texts, 
but in their commentaries. Sometimes the commentaries enlarge on points unlikely to 
catch the attention of readers of the texts. The fifth sutta in the Pali Majjhima Nikāya 
contains a discussion of the kinds of ‘person’ (puggala) to be found in the world. The 
commentary on this Nikaya explains this term in a way that seems calculated to guard 
against Pudgalavādin understandings. The two-truth notion receives a full exposition.
  The words of Vajira just quoted seem to be taken up in the Milindapañha.210 This is a 
scholastic work in Pali, of unknown authorship, largely in dialogue. King Milinda, 
perhaps the historical Menander, is the enquirer. The monk Nagasena brings Socrates to 
mind in the way he resolves many and varied perplexities. Early in the dialogue comes 
some interchange over Nagasena’s name.211   Nagasena explains that his name is just 
that: it is a conventional designation, since no puggala (person) is ‘got at’ (upalabbhati). 
Milinda’s reply is the predictable one: designation of what? He proceeds to the 
questions that arise if he is indeed not faced with a puggala: who is it that functions in 
life? The force of these questions is plainly strong in the context of karman and rebirth. 
Where is the moral agent? Who is that ‘guards moral habit’ or not?  Who ‘kills a living 
being’?  The dialogue then shifts into the often-quoted discussion of the chariot. The 
king declares that he arrived in a chariot. Nagasena asks to be shown this, explaining 
that he does not mean the pole, the axle, the wheels or any other component. Is there a 
chariot apart from its components? Receiving the answer No, Nagasena claims that 
Milinda cannot substantiate his assertion, ‘I came by chariot’. He then proceeds to claim 
that what is true of ‘chariot’ is true of ‘Nagasena’: ‘according to the highest meaning’ 
(paramattha), ‘a person is not got at here’. This is found conclusive.
  It is not my present purpose to consider the merits of this particular – and celebrated – 
argument, though I will say that it cannot be decisive.212 It is, rather, the narrower one of 
210  I take this work to follow the Abhidhamma works, which themselves follow and 
systematise the Sutta and Vinaya texts, and to precede the work of Buddhaghosa. 
Dating much more precise than this is problematic.
211 Miln.I [25] & [27]: translation pp.34/36.
212 The parts of the chariot are co-ordinated for a purpose, and it runs as a unity. The 
chariot is, in that respect, comparable to something with animal life. This makes it 
possible to say that there is an entity distinct, if not apart, from its components. 
Locke’s discussion of identity, with which I deal below, offers the materials for an 
effective response. 
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showing the working-out in practice of the two-truths notion. An awareness of the need 
to solve – or, if not solve, evade - the identity problem seems likely to have prompted 
the extreme and question-begging position which the writer assigns to Nagasena. The 
two-truths notion is an element, though imperfectly formed, in this position. One 
component only of the paramattha/sammuti opposition is in place. Nagasena declares 
that, in the sense of paramattha, there is no person to be found. His position is extreme 
in being notably without the concession to ordinary usage offered by admission of 
sammuti sacca. The starkness of this position may (to speculate) have seemed such as to 
make this admission necessary. Once it is made, we have the two-truths notion.
  I have already brought out the fundamental importance assigned to the notion by 
Nagarjuna. The declaration I have quoted is vindicated throughout the 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.  What may be surprising is the way Nagarjuna’s dialectic 
marks out a sphere for saṃvṛti satya.  He seems in no doubt that expressions within the 
sphere of the saṃvṛti are intelligible ones. 213 We are told that without this acceptance 
there could be no pointing out of the paramārtha.214  Such expressions are indeed 
intelligible only in the qualified sense assigned to them. Newland refers to Stcherbatsky 
in concluding that this implies a three-fold distinction, one of the two we have been 
considering and the merely nonsensical. 215  For anyone attached to ordinary usage this 
is at least an easier position than that offered by the Milindapañha. 
36. The notion in contemporary polemics
  A defence of the notion from a Mahayana perspective is to be found, with much else, 
in a recent work by Jean-Francois Revel and his son, Matthieu Ricard. 216 It is in 
dialogue form, the son, a Buddhist monk in the Tibetan tradition, expounding and 
defending his position against the father. Though this is a book for the mass-market, it is 
grounded in scholarship on the monk’s side and both participants are practised 
polemicists. 217  I refer to it here, because Ricard’s assertions bring out the future 
213 Op cit, especially in parts 8 and 24: for instance, 8.12.
214 Vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate. Mūlamadhymakakārikā 24.10.
215 NEWLAND p.14 and n.14.
216 REVEL & RICARD. Revel was the author of “Without Marx or Jesus’ and ‘How 
Democracies Perish’.
217 Ricard has come to be taken as a representative Buddhist authority, at least by 
journalists. See his extended interview in the newspaper, The Independent on 
Sunday (18 February 2007). 
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development of the two-truths notion. It may stand also, not unfairly, for a common 
failure of rigour in its confrontation of difficulties.  Ricard states:
  As for ultimate reality according to Buddhism  ... 
we’d distinguish two different aspects. The 
phenomenal world, as we perceive it, belongs to 
relative truth. The ultimate nature of things, 
transcending any concept of being or non-being, 
appearance or cessation, movement or non-movement, 
one or many, belongs to absolute truth. 218 
  This is not quite what Rahula says, as it exposes the Mahayana smack inherent in 
Ricard’s monastic formation. Nonetheless, we find the same distinction.
  We also find what I take to be evasions of the identity problem. Further quotation from 
Ricard will illustrate this. In earlier passages, he criticises:
           ... the perception we have of ourselves as a 
person, as an ‘I’ that is an entity existing in itself, 
autonomously, either in the stream of our thoughts, or 
in our bodies. But if this self really exists, where is it? 
219 
What we find later on seems to have quite different presumptions behind it:
          What’s called saṃsāra .. .. is a world of 
suffering, distraction and confusion. We  wander 
endlessly in it, impelled by the force of our actions, 
called karma ..... Actions, once they’ve been carried 
out, will eventually bring their results and propel us to 
other states of existence   ...we oscillate up and down 
from one life to the next   .....220 
218 REVEL & RICARD, p 116/7
219 REVEL & RICARD p.26
220 Op cit pp.104/05
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  What wanders? What is propelled? What oscillates? Obvious as these questions are, 
Revel, the interrogator, fails to press them. In response, Ricard might have replied that 
he was using the language of one truth in the sphere of application of the other, having 
pragmatic grounds for doing so, these being expressible in Buddhist terms as upāya 
kausalya (skill in means). Such a response takes us to the heart of the question, and to 
discuss it adequately would require much more space than is available. For the 
immediate purpose, it may serve to point out that Ricard seems to work by way of 
disposing of the identity problem without answering it. It must be a real question 
whether or not I will wander, be propelled, or oscillate ‘from one life to the next’. If I 
am seized of the reality of this possibility, it may govern the direction of my life. To use 
a phrase employed by Parfit in a similar context, it seems to be ‘what matters’.
37. Two truths?
 Contemporary polemicists who deploy a two-truths notion have adequate warrant in the 
commentarial and philosophical texts for doing so, even though the notion has little 
explicit grounding in the early texts. What we find in the early texts are accounts of 
personal continuity which are, I maintain, problematic, and the occasion of the problem 
of my concern. I have suggested that it is the recognition of the identity problem which 
has prompted the formulation of the two-truths notion. If this is so, it is unsurprising 
that the availability of the notion has made it easy to evade the problem in which it 
found its genesis. A generally competent polemicist such as Ricard disposes of the 
persistent subject, while deploying the notion of karman in a way that makes sense only 
on the postulate of a subject. He does not, in so many words, appeal to the two-truths 
notion to resolve this awkwardness, but it is plain enough from the context that this is 
his strategy. It is one that is commonly found. There would be no point in proceeding if 
it were to be allowed to pass. My concern is therefore to identify – and so make 
innocuous - a habit of evasiveness among polemicists and their followers. This is why I 
have brought up the notion of ‘two truths’ in the context of the identity problem. In no 
way am I suggesting that I have disposed of that notion. An offer to do that would 
require a discussion deeper and greatly extended in range.  
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  Something more positive may be said in conclusion.  Strong grounds for not letting 
pass what I take to be evasiveness are to be found in the impression left by the record of 
the Buddha’s teaching as a whole. Throughout the early record, the Buddha’s approach 
is the straightforward one of the resolution of difficulties through explanation. Though 
this process is conditioned by differences in circumstances, and by the concerns of 
various questioners, it is always directed towards making matters plain and clear, for all 
the recalcitrance of the topics sometimes addressed. All questions found to be 
answerable, and which are not frivolous, find an answer. 221 I find nothing in the early 
texts to justify the understanding of what are presented as truth-claims as being 
something else, whether existential strategies, or modes of social adaptation. 222  In one 
form or other, and with diversities of jargon, such a approach is in vogue. Its proponents 
might wish to press it here, even in the absence of footing. I prefer to follow the 
Buddha’s practice, which on the evidence of the early texts is one of taking questions 
with an appearance of answerability to be answerable. 
  This is not to say that all questions are open to being put at all times. What I have 
called the identity problem could never have been put to the Buddha in anything like the 
terms in which it is now natural to express it. We can, however, imagine the Buddha 
being asked how personal persistence is conceivable, and how it should be understood. 
He could well have been asked about the consequences of different understandings for 
behaviour. Should we suppose that the Buddha would not have answered these 
questions? They seem not to be in the category of the unanswerable, as they have a 
manifest bearing on the end of suffering and on salvation. A celebrated passage in the 
Pali Mahāparinibbanasutta comes to mind. 223 The Buddha, close to death, avers that 
his teaching has had no distinction of ‘inner’ and ‘outer’. It has not been characterised 
by “a teacher’s fist’ (ācariya-muṭṭhi) - that is, by anything grudging. There seems no 
good reason to prefer to this encouraging emphasis a different and later emphasis, 
whatever its philosophical fecundity. 
221 Not all interesting questions are found answerable. Those bearing on the infinity 
and eternity of the world are instances. 
222 The more sophisticated expressions of views such as these may be given 
Wittgensteinian backing. I touch on this below. See section 92    and WITTGENSTEIN 
p 53.
223223 DN No.16.   Desito ānanda mayā dhammo anantaram abahiram karitvā; na 
tatth’ ānanda tathāgatassa dhammesu ācariya-muṭṭhi.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Perplexities
  
38  . Karman,  according to the Buddha  
  I gave some account of karman in Chapter Two. The word derives from the verbal root 
kṛ,  (do, make). The basic sense of ‘action’ or ‘doing’ underlies the developed notion of 
karman with which we are concerned. The passage from Gombrich quoted above 
conveys the broad agreement among scholars that this notion originates in Vedic 
ritual.224  In an exhaustive discussion, Professor Doniger O’Flaherty has related karman 
to the śraddhā ritual and to rebirth.225  It must be a presupposition of ritual that the 
‘doing’ of a sacrifice will have an outcome, and it is this that has come to be expressed 
more precisely in terms of the developed notion. So conceived, karman is not peculiarly 
Buddhist. It is prominent also in the brahmanical mainstream and in heterodox 
traditions other than Buddhism, notably in Jainism. 
 What may be peculiarly Buddhist is a further development. This finds its classic 
expression in the Buddha’s celebrated words, cetanāhaṃ bhikkhave kammaṃ vadāmi, 
commonly translated, ‘O monks, what I [emphatic] call karman is intention’. 226  Here is 
the plainest expression of the revaluation of karmic action which is fundamental to 
Buddhist ethics. Some ringing words from Gombrich make the point emphatically: 
   … the Buddha’s redefinition of ‘action’ as 
‘intention’, an audacious use of language, turned the 
brahmin ideology upside down and ethicised the 
universe. I do not see how one could exaggerate the 
224 See section 23 above. 
225. DONIGER O’FLAHERTY (2), pp 9,10. This essay goes on to bring out the range of 
the karman notion across schools and sects and its elaboration and florescence in 
the Puranic period (roughly, the first Christian millennium).
226 AN 6.63: Nibbedhikasutta [415] 
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importance of the Buddha’s ethicisation of the 
world, which I regard as a turning point in the 
history of civilisation. The Jains had taken a step in 
this direction  ….227 
  Insofar as the words suggest that the Buddha’s insistence has no precedent or parallel, 
this claim is overstated. Closely comparable redirections of emphasis are to be found in 
other traditions.228    With this decided reservation, I concur with Gombrich and agree 
that the thoroughgoing quality of the Buddha’s insistence finds no equal.
39. The varieties of  karman  
  As part of the common stock of classical Indian philosophy, karman is effectively 
taken for granted. This must be why it is hard to find any systematic treatment of it in a 
mass of traditions rich in the systematic treatment of concepts. That point is made by 
Professor Rajendra Prasad in the long essay, Karma, Causation and Retributive 
Morality, from which I quote:
..... in spite of the great importance accorded to the 
law of karma, it has not been given a detailed 
conceptual or logical analysis or scrutiny either in any 
classical or contemporary work    ....   I have not been 
able to locate even a slightly detailed theoretical 
account of the law in any classical work  .. (Prasad’s 
emphasis) 229
227 GOMBRICH (2) p.12.
228 There is much concern of the kind we would call ‘ethical’ in the brahmanical 
tradition. A similar transformation of view is to be found in the Hebrew prophets: ‘ I 
hate, I despise your feast days  …  though you offer me burnt offerings and your 
meat offerings, I will not accept them. Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of 
rams?’ (Amos 5 and Micah 7)   
229 PRASAD pp.210 & 212.
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This has also been my own experience, and Prasad’s conclusion, grounded (I have no 
doubt) on a very wide acquaintance with the sources, is one I follow. The scope of the 
notion, on the part of those employing it, has to be inferred. 
  In the Buddhist record, we find a variety of applications, with a family resemblance. 
The three most important are:
K1 This is the formation and perfection (or degradation) of character. It is 
what is to be found in the Buddha’s review of his previous lives on the 
occasion of his enlightenment. A popular employment is in the Jataka 
stories. It is the application basic to Buddhist practice within a single - that 
is, the present - life. As such, it is hardly controversial. The Aristotelian 
parallel has already been considered: by way of exercise in the virtues - 
that is, in Buddhist terms, by way of accumulating kuśala karman  - there 
is progress to a better, perhaps to a perfect, style of being.
K2 This is the retribution of action, agreeable or disagreeable, perhaps 
quite unexpected, over the course of a life. The distinction from K1 is 
clearly not total, but K2 catches the sudden consequence of earlier action, 
kuśala or akuśala. It has the smack of reward, rather than of natural 
consequence, and so lacks the uncontroversial obviousness of K1. Though 
necessitated, K2 does not have the direct relation to character of K1.
  Much the same distinction has been set out by Reichenbach, in what may be the only 
full study of the karman-doctrine by a Western philosopher. I have not employed 
Reichenbach’s terms in stating the distinction, but I find it well caught by his reference 
to
 .. its effects on the dispositions, character, passions 
and desires of the agent, or the creation of invisible 
qualities of merit and demerit which adhere to the 
agent. 230 
230 REICHENBACH, p.1.
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The two kinds of consequence described here correspond closely with what I have 
called K1 and K2.
K3 This is the extension of K1 and K2 over a sequence of lives. It is the 
notion we have seen employed in my brief account of rebirth in Chapter 
One. Karman may be seen both as the cause of rebirth in general, and as its 
content – that is, as the determinant of each particular rebirth. Buddhist 
orthodoxy has it that the assurance of rebirth goes inevitably with the 
karman-notion and that only the confused will accept one without the 
other.
We also find more specialised applications. Two of these are:
K4 This is the process that brings about rebirth as a god. It is to be found in 
the case of the individual who has been highly virtuous, but who is still 
attached to existence. The case is analogous to appointment to a job: the 
role is determined and the ‘job’ a matter of the discharge of this role. The 
characteristics of the god may be taken to be fixed. The karmic flow of the 
person to be reborn has to be taken to accommodate ‘itself’ to that. In time, 
a very long time, the accumulated karman will be exhausted and the 
‘occupant’ of the godhead fall to a lower state.
K5 This is the case of what may be termed ‘specialised embodiments’. An 
instance is the case of each successive Dalai Lama. It belongs to a phase of 
Buddhism outside our period, but I give it here as an example of how 
karman plays an explanatory role. Each newly discovered Dalai Lama is 
seen both as a rebirth of his predecessor and as a manifestation of 
Avalokitesvara, the Bodhisattva of compassion. In this last respect there 
seems to be a parallel with the Hindu notion of avatāra (divine 
manifestation).
  The range of these applications is a wide one, perhaps suspiciously wide. There must 
be a question over the explanatory power of a notion that extends to K4 and K5, beyond 
the range K1 to K3. There may be a further question whether a notion with this span can 
107
be fully coherent, and I will suggest grounds for this doubt below. As it is, it will be 
tempting to take K1 as the primary or typical case, and to see the other forms of karman 
as derivatives.  K1 is not so much easy to credit as hard to deny; it is the peculiarly 
Buddhist expression of something which seems to be inherent in all moral reflection. It 
is hardly deniable that character can be formed, and that the process can be seen in 
causal terms and to have within it something that smacks of retribution - that is, of 
happy and unhappy consequences somehow merited. Here is the basis for what might 
be termed a ‘modernist’ Buddhism – that is, to one now more palatable. The temptation 
to make this move should however be resisted, as K2 and K3 are far too prominent in 
the tradition for it to be feasible to play down their significance. If anything, given the 
scholarly consensus, there would be more to be said for taking K2 as the primary case. 
Sacrifice is a matter of particular acts and particular consequences. This is of the 
essence of K2.
  K1 and K2 may overlap and interconnect. From the very many instances of this in the 
record I take the Culadhammasamadanasutta in the Pali Majjima Nikaya.231 This sets 
out four ways of ‘undertaking things’. One’s actions now may be pleasant and their 
future consequences painful; they may be painful and their consequences painful; they 
may be painful and their consequences pleasant; they may be pleasant and their 
consequences pleasant. All four of these possibilities are workings-out of karman. The 
first case is that of the self-deluder and hedonist who is preparing trouble for himself; 
the second that of the self-torturer; the third that of the man with a bad karmic 
inheritance who yet ‘practises’ diligently – that is, follows the Buddha’s teaching; the 
fourth (perhaps the person of the third in a future birth) that of the man with a happy - 
and merited - inheritance, who can move on to felicity. Here we see that matters are not 
always obvious and straightforward; it takes great insight to see where we are on the 
Path. Generally, right action brings felicity, but this general truth, as it must be held to 
be, may not stand out from a welter of happenings. Here we find both the karman of 
self-training and that of merit.
40  . Karman   and memory 
231 MN No.45. 
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  Apart from its expression as K1, the karman-notion is likely to strike the Westerner as 
curious and unsupported. This perplexity may be eased by an appreciation of the 
analogy between the karmic process and memory. In consideration of rebirth, memory 
is often presented as the source and mode of validation of rebirth-claims. Only in the 
direct experience of the enlightened or of those close to enlightenment, does the karmic 
process itself become the object of awareness. It is tempting to see memory as itself a 
manifestation of karman - as consequence, if not as ‘ethically conditioned 
consequence’, as I have glossed the term. It is more faithful to the texts, however, to see 
the two processes as closely parallel. For the Westerner, both will be seen as person-
forming. Memory is held to be produced by the saṃskāra/saṅkhāra process.  This 
gives it the same etymological ground as karman: the verbal element kāra, in 
saṃskāra, and the word karman are both derivatives of the root kṛ. The connection 
seems more than just etymological; memory and karman go together in practice. 
Memory figures in Buddhaghosa’s account of the rebirth process. He describes the case 
of an evil-doer who, immediately before death, apprehends the sign of all the ‘bad’ 
karman of his lifetime, which will bring about hs unhappy rebirth. 232 It figures in day-
to-day karman-governed existence. I may have a flash of anger towards someone. This 
comes back as a painful memory. It will also come back, if not cancelled by an over-
riding ‘good’ action, as a painful karmic consequence. Or will the pain of the memory 
be itself the consequence, something to be lived with until naturally spent? On either 
understanding, memory seems to offer the best first step towards understanding karman. 
At the least, there is an imaginative equivalence.
 
41.  Karman   and moral significance 
  It stands out from the analysis which I have offered that karman is at the heart of the 
Buddha’s assertion of moral significance.  This is evident throughout the record of his 
teaching, whether addressed to his followers or brought out in debate with others. In the 
Pali Sāmannaphalasutta, the Buddha hears an account of the arguments, or bare 
assertions, of the well-known teacher, Purana Kassapa, to the effect that action counts 
for nothing.233 It is plain from the detail of this account that this means that morality is 
232 Vism [548] 
233 DN No.2.
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nothing. The Buddha does not deal directly with this, but responds with the vigorous 
claim that the way of life of the sāmanna (recluse, ascetic) is far from nothing: it bears 
‘fruit’, the term employed, with others, for the outcome of karman. Determinations of 
the human will – that is, manifestations of cetanā – will be grounded in the mulāni 
(roots), whether kuśalāni or akuśalāni, and will have consequences, good or bad, 
desired or not. It cannot be a matter of indifference what these determinations are. Only 
in this way, on the presumption of karman, could the moral scepticism of the Buddha’s 
opponents be rebutted, or their confusion removed. 234 This last point will be central to 
any final view to be taken of karman. I will come back to it in my concluding chapter. 
  Here, we may recall a line of thought advanced by Kant.235 It is to the effect that 
morality is autonomous – Kant’s repeated insistence – yet virtue needs to be rewarded if 
the highest good is to be attained. On the postulate of an omnipotent and benevolent 
being, this can be assured. Therefore, by something of a leap of faith, we can trust in the 
reality of such a being. It is worth noting, as we recall Kant’s conclusion, that those who 
accept the karman-notion will also find an assurance of the necessary conjunction of 
virtue and happiness. They need not be led on to belief in God. The operation of an 
impersonal law is enough, pace Kant, to meet Kant’s purposes. 
  I offer what seems to be a point against Kant in passing. Of more immediate interest is 
the possibility that a Kantian argument might be enlisted in support of the karman-
notion. This line of thought may be tempting, but would, I think, be misleading. The 
most we can see in the Buddhist record is the presumption of the necessary connection 
of virtue and well-being. One who follows the Buddha’s counsel should enjoy an early 
and obvious well-being, as is granted by the Buddha’s questioner in the sutta just 
considered. Karman is not a phenomenon to be postulated if the picture is to be 
complete. On the Buddhist view, it is something to be seen in day-to-day operation, 
perceptible (it seems to be suggested) to all but the wilfully blind.
234 Purana Kassapa is one of several opponents dealt with in this way. As a group, 
they are characterised by disregard of karman or by muddled apprehension of it.
235 The presentation I follow is the one found in The Critique of Pure Reason. See 
KANT, A 805 and B 833 and following pages. Keown discusses its presentation in 
The Critique of Practical Reason. See KEOWN p.126
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 Is Kant’s argument a good argument, even if it points to a conclusion broader than 
Kant’s and one which would not have met his concern?  It has been much criticised, and 
I can only say that it seems open to the obvious objection, well expressed by Mackie, 
that ‘… any such argument [as Kant’s] is back to front. What it is reasonable or rational 
to do may depend upon the facts, but the facts cannot depend upon what it is reasonable 
or rational to do’. 236 All that is to our present purpose is that on the Buddhist karman-
notion there are none of the difficulties which lie behind a classic problem of theodicy.
42. The credibility and appeal of  karma  n  
  For all the scholarly consensus over the origins of the karman-notion, it may still be a 
question how it came to be so widely credited. Here I can do no more than offer 
suggestions. One is that karman was never clearly disengaged from the wider notion of 
‘cause’. This wider notion will always be taken uncritically - except by philosophers - 
and karman has tended to enjoy the same virtual immunity from appraisal. To ask how 
karman works will seem to amount to asking how causation works. On this view, the 
karman-notion is one expression of the so-called law of universal causation, though one 
with a peculiar jargon attached to it. It follows that the question of how karman works is 
as little answerable as the general question as to how effects come about. It is too 
general for answerability, and each particular response has to be along the lines that ‘it 
all depends’.
 Another is by way of recalling that the karman-notion is widely focussed. I have 
pointed out five distinct applications. To the extent that even one of these is plausible, 
the others will come in for something of its credibility. I have already suggested that the 
reality of K1 is hardly deniable. It is evidently a moral commonplace, to be found under 
a wide variety of forms, perhaps in all traditions of thought. What I have picked out as 
K1 in the Buddhist tradition is caught memorably by George Eliot’s dictum, that 
‘character is destiny’.237 It seems likely that the persuasive power of one kind of use 
236 MACKIE (2) p.228. I am not suggesting that such a reply disposes of Kant’s 
argument so as to end discussion of the subject. The argument retains much 
vitality, and is deployed, with qualifications, by Kung. See KUNG, p.68. 
237 To be found in The Mill on the Floss, by way of a reference to Novalis. I enlarge on 
this line of thought in Chapter Seven.
111
spreads across the whole range of applications, giving each of the others something of 
its plausibility. 
  How and why the karman-notion has had so wide an appeal is another question. This 
is more easily answered, as the notion plainly offers a kind of satisfaction not otherwise 
found. Theistic religion offers the same satisfaction, but with less assurance. Belief in an 
omnipotent and benevolent deity should ensure that what happens in the world will be 
just. While justice ranges more widely than desert, due retribution, and the allotment of 
suffering and beatitude, will be held to lie at its heart. It is the common experience of 
the believer that this cannot be seen to be the case; there is a steady note of complaint in 
consequence. Job cannot see the justice of his suffering; the Psalmist cannot see the 
justice of the non-suffering of wrong-doers (‘Why do the wicked prosper?’). 
  In the Buddhist tradition, and in the wider Indian context, it must be part of the appeal 
of the karman-notion that justice is guaranteed. It comes, not through the will of a deity, 
but by process of law. The law needs space for its operations, and the notion of rebirth, 
to which I will shortly proceed, ensures that justice will finally be done. The appeal of 
this seems close to that of the Kantian notion to which I have referred above. The appeal 
of rebirth, at least to the virtuous, corresponds to that of the hope of immortality, which 
Kant thinks it reasonable to entertain.  The parallel may be close, but it is less than total: 
we will see below that in the Buddhist case there are the questions of justice to whom 
and of the final beatitude of what.
43. Does  karman   settle everything? 
   It will be a question whether karman settles everything. What is the scope of karmic 
action?  Does it provide a complete explanation of phenomena or states of affairs? 
There is much to be found in the record to suggest that it does not. In a Pali sutta 
already referred to, there is a listing of bodily afflictions and their causes. Among such 
causes as change of climate and violence we find ‘the fruiting of kamma’ 
(kammavipāka).238 Is this quite distinct from those other – as we would say, ‘natural’ – 
causes? Are those others – always or sometimes – expressions of karmic outcome? How 
238 AN X 60 [110]
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can one tell what is attributable to karman and what is not? Here is the main point of 
perplexity.239
  The question of scope is conspicuous in dialogues between the Buddha and the Jains. 
The Devadahasutta in the Pali Majjhima Nikāya is such a case.240 Here it is made plain 
that karman does not determine all action and there are other systems of causation. 
Buddhism is not made a fatalist system by its assertion of karman, and this is made 
clear to the Jains: not all painful present feeling should be attributed to past action. The 
supposition that it may be so attributed might lead to the disregard of present 
responsibility. The force of moral precept, with its presumption of free and responsible 
action hangs on this non-acceptance of fatalism.
  There is, however, much else to be found which points to a different conclusion. I have 
in mind explanations that attribute everything of any moment that happens in life to a 
karmically based appropriateness. These are ubiquitous. I take an apposite example 
from the Sanskrit Divyāvadana, a collection of narratives largely concerned with 
karman. Their content differs from what we find in the canon in elaboration rather than 
essential purport. At the end of a picaresque tale, which has received a Buddhist 
treatment, the monks question the Buddha about the successive rebirths of the central 
figure, Purṇa. They ask (I paraphrase): what did Purṇa do, what action (karman) was 
done, in consequence of which he arose in a family of much wealth, and in the womb of 
a slave, eventually cutting off all defilement and becoming an arhat (a perfected one)? 
The Buddha replies that Purṇa has indeed ‘heaped up’ the karman that has brought 
about these various consequences. He describes the force of accumulated action; it is 
like a stream. The force of actions is never lost. Causes eventually ripen, if only after a 
vast expanse of time: ‘they are not lost, even in hundreds of kalpas (aeons); achieving 
completeness and time, the actions of beings fruit indeed’.241   This illustrates the point 
with some colour. The kind and circumstances of each rebirth and much else besides are 
239 We find it said that karman governs what matters most in life – and presumably 
only that. This view is widely held and I have heard Gombrich endorse it in 
discussion. I know of nothing in the early texts to support it, at least not clearly and 
with emphasis. 
240 MN No. 101
241 Na praṇaśyanti karmāni api kalpasatair api/ sāmagrīm prāpya kālam ca phalanti 
khalu dehinām. In a note (184) to his translation and discussion of this story, 
Tatelman remarks that ‘this verse and the preceding paragraph form a stock 
description of the operation of the law of karma’. I agree, if by ‘karma’ we mean K2. 
See TATELMAN p.95; also see this note for textual references to the Divyāvadāna.  
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to be ascribed to karman. The case is not one of K1 – that is, of a slow, but cumulative, 
perfection of character; it is, rather one of K2 extended by K3, Someone living at some 
large distance of time from an action and (it can be assumed) quite without knowledge 
of the previous agent will, quite inescapably, enjoy or suffer a consequence. Here there 
seems to be more than a small concession to the fatalism which, on other occasions, the 
Buddha’s teaching is so plainly pitched to avoid.
  This last point may be made in another way. In pointing out the common operation of 
K1 and K2 in the Culadhammasamadanasutta, I may have implied that that co-
operation was assured. This seems not to be so. One can imagine a practitioner resolved 
to conform his actions to the marga – that is, to act with a view to K1. If such a person 
then suffers misfortunes which seem to fall together, he may be inclined to ascribe 
these, if not to pure chance, to the operation of K2. There is plenty of warrant in the 
texts for such a conclusion. Suppose he had previously been the adulterer envisaged by 
the Dhammapāda, already referred to, suffering only now for the actions of another 
man – as ordinary usage would have it (‘At that time, P was Q’). Such an outcome must 
surely impair his resolution. His view of what befalls him will be of the kind, ‘it has to 
happen’. This looks like a case where acceptance of fatalist assumptions may be 
demoralising. The immediate point, for the present argument, is that karman-doctrine, 
as we have it, seems less than fully coherent. 
  Another question is whether it is always right to act with regard to karman – that is, 
with a view to karmic consequences. After all that has been said above, this may seem 
absurd. Buddhist ethics is karmic through and through: incapable, it seems, of admitting 
an affirmative response without self-destruction. Yet the question is a lively one. 
Consider the case of a professing Buddhist in a poor country, who is found to be 
catching fish. This is a plain breach of the first precept, that against taking life, and as 
clear a case of akuśala karman as could be found. If challenged, the man pleads that he 
has to fish to feed his family. He might say: ‘I am obliged to feed my family and so 
obliged to catch fish’. How far can such a riposte be brought within the scope of debate? 
Such dilemmas, extending to the broader case of ‘the necessary murder’, are not 
infrequent in the Buddhist tradition, which should be inhospitable to them. A classic 
example is the case of Prince Viśvantara/Vessantara, with which I have dealt above. In 
presenting the Buddhist scheme as a case of ‘virtue ethics’, I suggested that, for the 
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‘deluded’ – that is, most of us - acting in partial ignorance is inescapable. 242 Everyone 
who has yet to reach Nirvana will be deluded to a degree. At least there need be no 
stigmatisation of the fisherman, who – we assume - will have adopted the first precept, 
as ‘insincere’.243  
 
 44. How does  karman   work? 
  In giving an account of how the karman-notion came about and of why it came to be 
credited, I have perhaps pointed to deeper conclusions. In the field of religious belief, to 
explain may amount to explaining away. Explanation may, in fact, be a discreet form of 
explosion. Hume’s presentation of the basis of religious beliefs is an example of this, in 
line (one can have no doubt) with Hume’s intention.244 In the present case, some 
obvious difficulties in the way of subscription to the karman-notion will already have 
become apparent. Ethicised karman seems no easier to credit than sacrificial karman. If 
we reject, as I have said we should, the ‘modernist’ reinterpretation, we need to find a 
plausible account of K2. I must therefore consider the bare credibility of the notion. The 
discussion above will have shown that that question is hardly distinguishable from 
another, that of how karman functions. A plausible account will be one which – at once 
– shows why we need the notion and makes comprehensible its working. As may be 
apparent, an account which achieves the second purpose is likely to be subversive of the 
first. To the extent that karmic explanation is readily accommodated, it is likely to seem 
redundant. 
  Fiction may show this more clearly than works of polemic or devotion. Some of the 
richest treatments of the topic are to be found outside the canon, in stories of a 
devotional, but entertaining, kind. The writer of such a story will need to show – beyond 
what happens - what has to happen, with an inevitability grounded in character and 
242 Section 19 above
243 This point has been put by Philippa Foot in criticising Hare: ‘Hare … who so 
defined the prescriptive use of language that anyone who assents to a prescriptive 
proposition that in circumstances C an action A is morally wrong, but nevertheless 
does A in C, is as a matter of logic insincere – said something that is not true’. Foot 
supposes, surely rightly, that the implication she is criticising is inescapable, given 
the way Hare’s ‘prescriptivism’ is set up. FOOT p.20.
244 I refer to Hume’s The Natural History of Religion. See HUME (3).
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circumstances. To show what had to happen on account of karman may be a problem, as 
this may either be indistinguishable from ‘what has to happen’, or it will be intrusive. 
The 18th Century Chinese novel translated as The Story of the Stone, also as The Dream 
of the Red Chamber, raises this problem – and, it may be thought, solves it. 245 Its 
authors take care to present outcomes both explicable in natural terms and as karmic 
consequences. The distinguished, but improvident, family round which the story is set 
loses all its money. The premature death of one of its members, a seemingly healthy 
young woman, is presented as more clearly karmic: the sufferer herself reflects that she 
must have done something very bad – in a previous life, she assumes – to have incurred 
– that is, merited – such a fate.
  The prime difficulty with karman – as K2 - comes into sharp relief with these 
instances. It is one of the scope of karmic action. As an explanation it seems superfluous 
in the case of the improvident family. In the case of the premature death it seems, not 
indeed so clearly superfluous, but of a kind that requires also the operation of natural 
causes. This raises the question whether these natural causes would not have been 
enough.246 The karman-notion looks like a fifth wheel on a vehicle than runs well 
enough on four. An account of the operation of karman in terms of natural causes will 
make the notion seem dispensable. Any other account will, it seems, strain credibility or 
– as the price for straining credibility less – drain from the notion a large part of its 
point and motivating force. 
  Here we have grounds for the perplexity which, I have to conclude, attaches to every 
version of karman but K1. The same difficulty is evident in cases of natural disaster. 
Suppose there is an earthquake leaving thousands dead. Here is a notorious problem 
within theodicy for believers in a benevolent god. It is also a problem here, for believers 
in karman as K2. Is the earthquake to be attributed to the workings of karman? If so and 
if all the casualties are to be attributed to karman, how was their co-location brought 
about? Or did only some of them suffer because they had to, in which case, what of the 
245 CAO XUEQIN & GAO E.
246 The same point bears on consideration of divine action, of unpredictable and 
dramatic kinds. Hare asks: ‘What is the difference between the statement that there 
is a god who, if we perform the right ritual, makes the fire burn, and the statement 
that the fire will burn if we do the specified series of operations? … [God’s] 
existence or non-existence makes no difference to observable phenomena.’ HARE 
(3) p.24. 
116
remainder? The perplexity that comes from this line of reflection hardly needs 
emphasis. The appeal of considering only natural causes will stand out.247 
  The consideration of Parfit’s work to which I move in my next chapter will involve 
reference to karman and will touch on the various perplexities which have been 
considered here. I come back to it also in my concluding chapter, which will take stock 
of what is left for Buddhist ethics after this consideration. What has been said so far will 
have suggested that, for all its historical importance, karman has little claim on the 
attention of living philosophers. This is not my position. I shall claim that the notion is 
one that cannot be discarded without some impoverishment of moral vocabulary. It has 
to be retained in any restatement of basic Buddhist ethics, however much modified.
45. Rebirth by way of  karman  
  What I will call the rebirth-notion is the notion implicit in claims of the kind ‘Smith 
has been reborn as Jones’. It is to be found in the reports of persons claiming insight 
into what they take to be previous lives, and in the accounts of others, notably of the 
Buddha himself, whose insight penetrates the whole process. I have shown that the 
notion is implicit in the karman-notion. Karman is bound to ‘fruit’, and may do so in a 
later existence than that of the originating agent, not necessarily the next, and - in a vital 
sense - bring about that existence. This was the process described in the case of Purṇa. 
The perplexities attaching to the karman-notion are such that a notion so far involved 
with it as that of rebirth may seem hardly worth discussing. In the context of my main 
argument this might seem evasive. I therefore begin with the conception of rebirth to be 
derived from the early texts. When we look at the Abhidharma and the later 
commentarial texts, especially the Visuddhimagga, we find a rather different emphasis. 
247 A recent obituary notice recorded that its subject died ‘when he was struck by a 
power cable brought down by a storm’(The Times, 12 February 2007). It is just such 
a catastrophe which we might find attributed to karman. In a different religious 
context, it might have been attributed to the wrath of God. Buddhist polemicists 
have at least an easier case to argue than traditional theists. The latter will have a 
problem if there was nothing notably wicked about the victim. Buddhists are able to 
suggest that ‘there must have been’ something to explain what happened, no doubt 
some action within a past life. This suggestion is, at once, unrebuttable and short on 
persuasive force. 
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This may amount to a criticism of the earlier one, even to an essentially different claim. 
248 
46. What kind of rebirth?
   The belief that there is carrying-on through death – to use the least specific expression 
– is widely found and has had many forms. In the sorting out these beliefs, it will be 
helpful to pose two questions:
(a) When I am dead, does my soul go on?
(b) When my body is dead, do I go on?
  The first of these is Socrates’ question, posed and answered to the speaker’s 
satisfaction in the Phaedo. The answer is ‘Yes’, by which Plato means that the soul will 
continue into another existence. In dealing with Plato’s account of the soul and its 
transmigration, I suggested that the soul of this account was item (4) on the tabulation in 
Chapter Three, but – it seemed – also item (3), the relation of (4) and (3) being 
uncertain. For the reasons given above, Socrates’ question cannot be the Buddhist’s 
concern.
  The second is the Buddha’s question. It will be answered ‘No’ by Buddhists, in respect 
of the Buddha himself and of those few others who have realised Nirvana and so will 
not be reborn, and ‘Yes’ in respect of everyone else.249  The doctrine to be found in the 
early texts seems quite clear: it is expressed in such reports by the Buddha as ‘A has 
been reborn as B’ or ‘At that time Sariputta was X’. In the later commentarial texts, as 
we shall see, its expression is not so clear-cut, but the doctrine is no less central.
248 In discussing personal continuity and rebirth, here and in the next Chapter, I have 
found useful stimulus in a thesis by Dr Nigel Tetley. See TETLEY.
249
 The Buddhist claim is that rebirth is universal. The arguments in support would be 
the same, one must assume, should the claim be that only some living things are 
reborn, though it would then need to be explained how those suffering rebirth were 
picked out. I need not go into this.
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47. What might amount to rebirth?
  The answer to the second question to be found in the Buddhist tradition prompts 
further questions, and I will be concerned with three of these. They bear on its 
intelligibility, on its point and on the grounds for crediting it. 
  Intelligibility goes with the question of what rebirth amounts to. A living thing dies; a 
living thing is born. With rebirth in mind, we might see one or more of the following 
instances of this sequence as amounting to it:
(A) Smith dies. At the same moment, Jones is conceived. There is nothing more to the 
process but this coincidence in time. 
(B) Smith dies. At the same moment, Jones is conceived and for some reason – let us 
suppose - would not have been conceived had not Smith died. Otherwise, as (A).
(C) Smith dies. As (B), except that Jones turns out to have capacities possessed by 
Smith, and his possession of these is baffling. For instance, Jones was three years old 
when he was found to have a good knowledge of the London Underground. Jones has 
been brought up in France and has never been to London. Smith was a Tube-travelling 
Londoner.
(D) Smith dies. As (C), but Jones is found to have, not only information within the 
public sphere, but also information peculiar to Smith – for instance, the date of Smith’s 
mother’s birthday – and, perhaps, also some of Smith’s attachments and loyalties. An 
example of these, evident on Jones’s maturity, might be the experience of lovers: not 
only ‘we were made for each other’, but ‘I’ve met you before’.
(E) Smith dies. As (B), except that the conditions of Jones’s existence are what they are 
because Smith’s life was what it was. For example, Smith’s life was morally bad and 
therefore Jones’s life is miserable. 
  
119
  Example (A) is of succession in time only. Example (B) brings in the necessitation of 
Jones’s existence, though not of its quality. No lodgement for the rebirth-claim is to 
found in either. I will say no more of (A) or (B).
   In respect of (C) and (D), I will assume that Jones’s memory-experiences are found to 
be veridical. At least two claims might then be made. One is the simple and limited 
claim that Jones has some of Smith’s memories. This may be called the Memory claim. 
The Memory claim need not amount to one of carrying-on through death, though many 
of those advancing it take it to do so. We will see in the next chapter that it is very much 
what is envisaged in Parfit’s presentation of ‘quasi-memory’. Stronger than this is the 
Going-on-claim, to the effect that such memories and other connections are evidence of 
the perpetuation of an entity, or that they constitute that perpetuation. Where the 
memories and other connections are numerous and significant, as in (D), there will be a 
broader basis for the assertion that Jones ‘was’ Smith. This is the claim which we find 
everywhere in the early literature, through such expressions as ‘At that time, Sariputta 
was X’.  
  Example (E) is the type of case on which the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth is founded. It 
may be seen as a special instance of the Going-on claim.  What makes it special is the 
introduction of karman. On the postulate of karman, a continuing entity, as Smith, has 
the experience of one life and then, as Jones, the experience of another. A continuing 
entity’s birth as Jones will be conditioned, the conditioning, as we saw in considering 
karman, being the volitions and actions of Smith. The experience that is had as Jones is 
inevitable and merited. It may be accompanied by memories of Smith’s experiences, as 
with Examples (C) and (D), and these may be evidence of the karmic connection 
without constituting it. This is what the orthodox Buddhist will take the rebirth-notion, 
in its simplest application, to amount to. For simplicity, I disregard applications 
involving the consequences of lives well before the most recent, and those marked by 
the concurrent effects of good and bad actions.
  There are two obvious objections, which seem to bear both on the ‘bare’ Going-on-
claim founded on (D) and on the specifically Buddhist version of that claim founded on 
(E). One is conceptual. It is the problem is one of how one living thing can possibly 
become another. There is an obstinate difficulty in conceiving this, beyond the one of 
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seeing how it might come about. Such becoming is quite distinct from the going 
through stages of a living thing, even stages of such sharply different appearance as 
those of the chrysalis and the caterpillar.
 I will open the next chapter with some reference to Locke’s work, which will be 
preliminary to consideration of Parfit’s. I must now anticipate this, as it bears directly 
on the conceptual problem and is admirably lucid. Locke’s concern is with the identity 
of the living thing – that is, of ‘the man’, in the case of the human species. His 
immediate concern is to show that this is not secured by the persistence of a soul, but 
the point does not have to be made with this in view to be telling. Locke claims that ‘the 
identity of the same man consists . . . in nothing but a participation of the same 
continued life, by constantly fleeting particles of matter, in succession vitally united to 
the same organised body.’250 I take this to be the careful formulation of something 
hardly disputable. A similar point is made by Geach, who points out that, where it is 
true that ‘at that time, Sariputta was X’, it should be possible for Sariputta to say ‘I was 
X’.On this model, I might find grounds for saying ‘I was Julius Caesar’. Can I then say 
‘I crossed the Rubicon’? This claim seems plainly false, as we are talking about 
different men. If I grant that I did not cross the Rubicon, it will be a question what point 
and substance there is to my claim that I was Julius Caesar. 251  
  The point I am making does not, I think, depart from what is widely supposed. If it did, 
and if I were therefore to need to, I would draw more fully on some powerful arguments 
by Kripke, supported by Mackie. 252  As it is, I need point only to Kripke’s point that a 
given woman – he instances the Queen – could not have been born of parents other than 
the parents from whom she actually came. Recognition of this is quite compatible with 
seeing that we might be mistaken about whose child she was, and that any given person 
might have a quite different destiny, so acquiring a different character and so a different 
karmic formation – in that sense being a different person. As Kripke puts it: ‘It seems to 
me that anything coming from a different origin would not be this object’. In broad 
support of this, Mackie observes: ‘Necessities of origin yield counterfactual essencies 
for individuals, just as necessities of constitution yield …. counterfactual essencies for 
stuffs like gold’. Here we seem to have a fatal objection to any straightforward 
250 LOCKE pp.331/32. 
251 GEACH p.6
252 KRIPKE p.113; MACKIE (1) p.153.
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acceptance of such claims as ‘at that time, Sariputta was X’. If this claim is to have any 
plausibility at all, it will have to be understood differently.     
  The other objection, not purely conceptual, finds an answer of a sort. It is well brought 
out by the contrasting case of metamorphosis, found everywhere in the literature of 
fantasy. Lucius Apuleius suffers metamorphosis and acquires the body of an ass, but is 
otherwise unchanged. 253 Metamorphosis is like nothing else, and it must be a question 
whether we should say that Lucius has become an ass, albeit with some oddities, or that 
he has stayed a man, acquiring some gross disabilities, such as braying by way of 
speech. What makes this a real question is that the ass has had no previous existence in 
which ass-specific, and peculiar, characteristics might have been acquired. Lucius’ 
transformation or ‘entry’ into another is therefore at least imaginable.
  The difference between this and what is involved in our consideration will be apparent. 
In the case of Smith and Jones, it seems that the ‘receiving’ entity is bound to have 
specific characteristics, at a minimum those coming from its distinguishing parentage. It 
has never been an empty container, as the ass of the fantasy is. A newly born child owes 
– to say the least - very much of its make-up to its parents. Appreciation of this ‘debt’ 
did not have to wait until explanation in terms of genetics became available. Much of it 
is plainly observable, most obviously family resemblance: children can often be seen to 
resemble their parents. The Buddhist tradition has no single account of how rebirth 
comes about. I touch on this below, but will say now that on all accounts it is granted 
that continuation by way of karman goes along with fertilising sexual intercourse: both 
are needed for a new life to come into being. There will therefore be two ‘claimants’, 
the karmic element and the element derived from parental inheritance, bidding for the 
same ‘space’. How is their coexistence within it to be arranged? 
 There is a ready answer to this, which is that rebirth must be taken to be brought about 
by karman in a greatly extended sense of ‘brought about’. Karmic conditioning fits with 
normal – that is, parental- conditioning in that the choice of ‘receiving’ entity is itself 
determined by karman. The conditions of each rebirth, by virtue of their determination 
253 I refer to the picaresque Latin novel, translated as The Golden Ass. See 
Bibliography.
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by karman, will be apt and merited. 254 Ex hypothesi, there can be no co-existence of 
incompatibles in the same space. Here is the answer to the second objection, though one 
that is available only to those who accept the karman-notion. It will not serve those who 
advance the Going-on claim on the basis of memory-connections alone, as at (3) and (4) 
above. 
  The answer also brings up complications of its own. If I merit bad parents in a future 
birth - perhaps on account of my deficiencies as a parent in this one - do these parents 
merit the unappealing child I shall no doubt turn out to be? If the answer has to be 
‘Yes’, how do we suppose this proper conjunction to be brought about? What 
conceivable process ensures the ‘right’ child for the ‘right’ parents? Reflection on what 
would be required to ensure this will show how much would have to be determined, 
most obviously the conjunction of the parents – and so of their parents? – along with all 
the contingencies going with any one conception. Such reflection makes it clear that no 
one karmic stream could be considered in isolation, if we assume, as we would have to, 
that ‘its’ encounters with others would be in accordance, at least to some degree, with 
these others’ karmic allotments. Here we glimpse the descent into the fatalism which 
much else of the Buddha’s teaching was concerned to repudiate. All this seems 
decidedly perplexing. 255 
  
  This line of criticism is, perhaps, open to be parried with the insistence that karmic 
desert will sooner or later be brought about, but ‘later’ may be late indeed. The words 
quoted above from the Divyāvadāna convey precisely that.256 Buddhaghosa’s account of 
the matter has it that the karman which will ‘fruit’ – that is, deliver desert - will take 
root only where the conditions for its reception are perfectly fitting.257 One can see that 
if a limitless expanse of time is envisaged this could indeed be expected to come about. 
The difficulty is that that an explanation so comprehensive explains nothing with which 
254 A classic commentarial expression of this is to be found in the Milindapañha: Miln 
[65]. This makes it clear that karman determines the lifespan, the looks, and the 
wealth and status of the birth-family – to instance no more – of the entity reborn. As 
an authority the text instances a sutta (MN No.135).  
255 Reichenbach and more than one of the contributors to DONIGER O’FLAHERRTY (1) 
address themselves to this difficulty. I think it fair to say that they find it intractable. 
See REICHENBACH, p 35. 
256 Section 43 above
257 Vism [600/01]. Translation pp.696/97. This is made especially clear by the 
Commentary.
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anyone can – realistically – be concerned. It can have no more force than the declaration 
that anything conceivable as happening will some day happen, given enough time.
  I hope it is now clear what might amount to rebirth, as it figures within the basic 
Buddhist claim. The notion is one of continuity by way of karmic connection - in 
principle accompanied, in practice sometimes evidenced, by memory - involving not 
only the continuity that will be held to be personal but also a fitness of bodily 
connection. This should make it a subtler claim than versions of the Going-on-claim 
without such elaboration. I think it would be claiming too much to say that it escapes all 
objections to the Going-on –claim, such as that presented above to the very conception 
of ‘going on’. In that light, is this Buddhist claim at least intelligible? Such grounds as 
there are for finding it so have, I trust, emerged from the discussion above. The most 
that it seems possible to claim is that it belongs within the Buddhist context, inseparable 
in this respect and in practice from karman. If coherence alone were in question, this 
might count for much. It hardly seems to tell in favour of intelligibility.
48. The commentarial Buddhist claim
 I have presented an account of rebirth which might stand as an answer to what I called 
the Buddha’s question:
(b) When my body is dead, do I go on?
This has simplified matters, perhaps overmuch.  Many Buddhist advocates would find 
my treatment of the subject to have conceded too much to the assumptions of those who 
would have pressed the first question, the one I found characteristic of Socrates. From 
this viewpoint, a proper presentation of the Buddhist view of rebirth should be 
expressed in terms of the analysis of the subject by way of the skandhāḥ. What I have 
called Jones should be seen as an aggregation of skandhāḥ in succession, as can only be 
the case, from an earlier aggregation, that which I called Smith. On this analysis, the 
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subject is a bundle in a state of constant flux. On death, the flow continues by means of 
a process of which accounts vary, but which involves at least the continuity of the 
skandhāḥ of consciousness (vijñāna) and of karmic elements (saṃskārā) in a fresh 
conception. The image to have in mind is that of the stream: in our understanding of 
such claims as ‘at that time Sariputta was X’ - we should think of X and of Sariputta as 
stages in the onward flowing of a stream: X is ‘upstream’, and Sariputta is 
‘downstream’. Buddhaghosa, at the end of our period, with the Pali Abhidhamma 
behind him, insists that Sariputta is neither the same as X nor different. In rebirth there 
is no migration of a past entity, yet the fresh entity does not come into being uncaused. 
258 He sums up: tasmā ettha na ekantam ekata vā nanata vā upagantabba (therefore 
neither sameness nor different-ness should be postulated absolutely here).259 
  
  Do we then have two Buddhist conceptions of rebirth, on one of which the answer is 
‘Yes’ to the second of the two questions with which I opened, and another on which the 
answer is ‘Yes’ to a different question, which might be expressed as follows?
(c) When my body is dead, is there going-on, of a kind 
conditioned by the volitions and actions (the cetanā) 
of the earlier life or of earlier lives?
There are indeed two conceptions, and my account of the matter should have brought 
out their distinction. The second, which I have summed up in the words of 
Buddhaghosa, though it long pre-dates him, is presented as an interpretation of the first. 
It is surely too radical a departure to count as that. It is at best an undeclared – perhaps 
unconscious - criticism of the first. So viewed, it has decided merits. It offers at least a 
partial answer to the objections, summarised above, to the basic Buddhist claim. We do 
not have to imagine one man ‘becoming’ another through rebirth. What is implied by an 
affirmative answer to Question (c) is something much less specific than the account 
presented above of the comprehensive and congruent arrangement of karmic chains. 
The commentarial Buddhist claim has the further merit of providing an answer to the 
challenge put by Paul Edwards which I quoted in my opening remarks. 260  On this later 
258 Vism [553]. Translation p.638.
259 Vism [554]. Translation p.639. 
260 See p.11 above.
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claim, there is no discrete part (Edwards’ ‘substance’) and also no ‘bundle’ identical 
with what came before. The image is of a stream, and we can quote Buddhaghosa’s 
words to explain what follows from that. Here is an answer, though it is doubtful how 
far it is a good one. The obvious riposte is that suggested by Edwards, that the stream 
fails to ensure ‘survival of the original person’.  
 It is a manifestation of the problem which I have made my subject – the identity 
problem - that there are two conceptions of rebirth. Here again the problem can be seen 
to issue in the simultaneous assertion of incompatibles. This means that the fundamental 
difficulty persists. According to my opening account of the matter, the Buddha spoke as 
if X and Sariputta were distinct. If he had not done so, the point of his declaration 
would have been lost. Only a long karmic process brought X to the point of being 
Sariputta - so much is common ground - but this process must be taken to be one of a 
long self-discipline and self-training on the part of X and (no doubt) of a succession of 
intermediate beings, acting with sufficient insight to envisage a goal. At least to a 
degree that admits this succession, reference to discrete entities seems inescapable. Such 
reference seems also the condition of any persuasive account of motivation. I hope it is 
no longer necessary to show how doubtful is its compatibility with what I might call the 
pure skandha-notion. Here, in fact, is the incompatibility which I pointed out in my 
opening chapter, in marking out the ‘weak’ and the ‘strong’ notions of the subject. Here 
too is the point on which Edwards seizes. On the ‘strong’ view, considered first, 
continuity through death seems inconceivable. On the ‘weak’ view, that of the ‘stream’, 
continuity may be conceivable but not in a way that perpetuates identity. 
 I need not, I think, deal further with the riposte, often made, that we are misled on this 
point by the language that we have no choice but to use. Buddhaghosa’s recourse is to 
the doctrine of the ‘two-truths’. It is on that which he relies on this in the context of the 
remarks quoted above, urging that talk of an ‘experiencer’ is no more than conventional. 
261  Here, I can only say that such an invocation, whatever its point or contribution to 
enlightenment in other contexts is no more than evasive in this one. In support of this 
summary dismissal, I can only refer back to my discussion of the two-truths notion. 
261 Vism [555]. Translation p.640. 
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49. The Middling Claim
  This must be the occasion for introducing another approach to the question. It is 
distinct from those discussed already in bearing on ‘what matters’ rather than on ‘how 
things are’. Examples (C), (D) and (E) may be the basis for what I will call the 
Middling-claim. On the Middling-claim, Smith is not asserted to become Jones but 
Jones is said to have very much of Smith about him. This will amount most obviously to 
memories, but may amount to more. Such a case would be that of example (4) above, 
with Jones supposed to have – for instance – the tastes, loyalties, distastes, and traits of 
character which characterised Smith.  The Middling-claim is that though Jones has not 
‘been’ Smith, as the rebirth-claim would have had it, Jones is so composed that the 
outcome is ‘as good as’ Jones’s perpetuation of Smith would have been. We might say, 
from Smith’s point of view, and assuming that Smith hopes for perpetuation, that it is 
‘as good as’ Smith’s perpetuation as Jones.
  I call this the Middling-claim because it seems to represent a position between the 
Memory-claim, which (I have argued) is not one of perpetuation, and the Going-on-
claim, at least on its stronger versions. It is specifically not one of going on, but it may 
be thought to catch what many people contemplating their decease might hold to be 
important in going on. Bare reflection on the components of rebirth-claim and counter-
claim seems to bring it up. If we are baffled by what it would be to persist through 
death, we may find relief in pondering our concern to persist and reflecting how this 
concern might be met in quite other ways. We will see shortly that the Middling-claim 
finds a parallel in Parfit’s understanding. It is at the heart of his assert that ‘identity is 
not what matters’. I will discuss it in that context, and mention it here to bring out its 
place on the ‘map’ of conceptions, speculations and evaluations bearing on rebirth. 
50. The point and credibility of the rebirth-notion
  The point of the rebirth-notion has to be seen in soteriological terms. Its central place 
in the Buddhist scheme of things is attributable to the role of karman in the Buddha’s 
vindication of moral significance. Action is held to have consequences, good and bad, 
and the range of these is not confined to one lifetime. Appreciation of this prospect will 
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be a large restraint on action. It should prompt anyone, Buddhist practitioner or not, to 
reflect that what afflicts us may have been merited, and that this consideration should 
govern the volitions and actions of the present life. I have mentioned more than once a 
typical instance of what might come to mind. This is the prospective fate of the 
adulterer in the Pali Dhammapāda. 262 He risks disagreeable things of a familiar kind 
and faces the prospect of a bad rebirth. To balance this, the prospective adulterer, or 
anyone else, might recall the steady accumulation of merit laid out entertainingly in the 
Jataka stories. In all this, the motivation towards action of the right sort will be clear and 
strong. 
  The credibility of the notion is less straightforward. The Memory claim is often 
brought up, and has often been presented as the substantiation of rebirth. It is on this 
basis that Professor Ian Stevenson, of the University of Virginia, presents what he takes 
to be cases of ‘reincarnation’.263  I have already suggested that the most that such 
evidence might support is the bare Memory claim – that is, that B has some of the 
deceased A’s memories. Such a claim is remarkable but, by itself, quite modest in its 
implications. Its scope is well short of what Buddhists have needed to claim in the 
context of moral choice. This has not always been appreciated, and the specifically 
Buddhist claim has sometimes been supported by evidence of the kind presented by 
Stevenson.264 Rebirth is prominent in the Buddha’s account of his own enlightenment. 
Tetley points out that one of the three components of enlightenment is knowledge-from-
the recollection-of-previous dwellings/lives (in Pali, pubbenivāsānusatiñāñña), and that 
this is a capacity which the advanced practitioner may hope to develop to some degree. 
He concludes however that pubbenivāsānusatiñāñña, whatever its importance, is not 
presented by the early texts as an argument for rebirth.265 This must be because the 
grounds for crediting the Buddhist claim for rebirth are barely evidential. We have seen 
that rebirth is entailed by the doctrine of karman. Here is one good ground for accepting 
it. Another is that it was taught by the Buddha and the Buddha is to be trusted. These 
262 See p.9 above.
263 Stevenson, an academic psychologist, is probably the most prominent 
contemporary advocate of the claim that rebirth or ‘reincarnation’ is possible and 
sometimes found. He has examined numerous supposed cases, by no means 
uncritically. See STEVENSON.
264 The various writings of Francis Storey, published by The Buddhist Publication 
Society, are an example of the backing-up of the Buddhist claim with evidence.
265 TETLEY p.98ff
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considerations will count for much among those already in the Buddhist tradition. They 
will have little persuasive force for those outside it.
    
   There is a sense of ‘credibility’ different from the one just considered, one concerned 
not with a doctrine’s claims to be believed on its merits but rather with the potential 
believer’s ability to believe it. We will see in the next chapter that Parfit considers this 
distinction, and the problem it poses, after making the case for Reductionism. 
Two lines of consideration suggest that there might be the same problem here. One is 
prompted by the publication of three works in the field of religious sociology, or 
anthropology, in each case around 1970, which have achieved something of a classic 
status, and to which I have already referred.266  All three are concerned with Theravada 
Buddhism in countries where it has been the national religion for centuries. The 
convergence of their conclusions is impressive. Each offers an account of an official, 
and generally ‘orthodox’, Buddhist teaching in co-existence with popular beliefs. These 
beliefs are in some tension with orthodoxy, a tension contained by means of confining 
heterodox belief to its own sphere. At least some of these ‘popular’ beliefs seem 
attributable to a lack of ability to believe. A prominent case of this divergence of 
orthodox and popular is that of the rebirth-notion. In Burma and Thailand, practitioners 
who would certainly style themselves orthodox are found to take rebirth to be the 
transmission of an entity, the word employed for which can only be derived, in each 
case, from vijñāna/viññāna (consciousness). 267  It appears to be an unconditioned entity, 
a soul-substitute. The question for us is whether this view of the matter is no mere lapse 
from orthodoxy, but a modification barely avoidable, suggesting that the orthodox view 
is beyond belief. If the orthodox view is indeed unintelligible, this would not be 
surprising. Here is a real difficulty, it seems one of very long standing. One of the early 
texts records such a departure from orthodoxy, and attributes it to the bhikkhu, Sati. The 
Buddha rebukes Sati with unusual asperity for his cherishing of the idea that there exists 
such an entity, exempt from universal conditioning. 268 
  Another line of consideration bears on the process by which rebirth comes about. It is 
one of which the Buddhist tradition gives more than one account. One such comes at a 
266 Page 30 above
267 Tambiah reports the Thai term to be ‘winjan’; Spiro the Burmese term to be ‘wi-
nyan’.
268 Mahatanhasankhayasutta. MN No.38
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later point in the exposition which answers Sati. This is at the margin of our concern 
and I need say only that accounts of the rebirth process become both more detailed and 
more diverse as the tradition develops. In the Pali recension of the early texts, there is 
reference to the presence of a gandhabba at the point of conception. When this presence 
goes with an act of intercourse and the right moment of the woman’s menstrual cycle, 
there will be a new birth. What a gandhabba may be is hardly clear. Bhikku Bodhi 
translates – or interprets – the word as ‘the being to be reborn’. 269  It has the look of a 
discrete entity, comparable to what performs the same role in accounts of the process 
within the Brahmanical tradition. 270 Yet the notion of a persistent entity running across 
lives is, we have just observed, directly excluded. An English re-translation of the 
Chinese translation of a parallel to the Pali Aṅguttara Nikāya, the Sanskrit 
Ekottarāgama, presents the word equivalent to gandhabba as ‘consciousness –genius’. 
271  This expression certainly suggests a transmission of consciousness, though - with 
two removes through translation from the original - it would be unsafe to put much 
weight on the point.  Harvey discusses all this, helpfully but hardly conclusively. 272 
Even in the Pali transmission, taken by itself, there is too much by way of suggestion 
and passing reference to be brought into unity.
 Later accounts, in the Pali Abhidhamma and the commentarial texts, describe the 
conditioning of the first thought-moment of the ‘new’ life by the last such moment of 
the previous one. This is Buddhaghosa’s account, calculated – it seems – to cut away 
any possible basis for a persisting entity.273 We find elsewhere - incompatibly with this – 
reference to a period of intermediate existence (antarābhava) before rebirth. 274 In the 
later tradition, especially in the Tibetan, this notion becomes important. This would be 
of no direct concern, were it not that it prompts the conclusion that such diversity of 
269 Op cit. The Pali word, gandhabba, is not easily translated, nor is its apparent 
cognate, Sanskrit gandharva. The lexicographers’ range of meanings for both is 
impressive.
270 There are various accounts in the Upanisads, and the Buddhist account just 
summarised fits easily beside them. The Upanisadic and later emphasis is on the 
transmission, not of an individual ātman, but of a sūkṣmaśarīra (refined or ‘shadow’ 
body), a collection of phenomenal elements. See POTTER, Vol.III, p.24ff.   
271 See EKOTTARAGAMA
272 HARVEY (1) pp.105/08
273 This is the reunion or rebirth-linking (paṭisandhi) brought up often in the 
Visuddhimagga. See Vism [554]and elsewhere; translation p.639.
274 It is found in the Hinayana school of the Sarvastivada. As this school seems to be 
contemporary with the Theravada, the view that there is an antarābhava cannot be 
dismissed as a late development, perhaps one which came in under under 
Brahmanical influence. 
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view on so significant a point betrays a deeper conceptual uncertainty. This too may 
suggest that the orthodox view is beyond belief. It certainly seems to suggest that the 
Buddhists of our period were least sure of their ground when they sought to make out 
what was involved in claims for rebirth, for all the assurance with which those claims 
are presented in the record.
51. The Pauline view of rebirth
   It may have seemed that the argument of this chapter has led to the conclusion that 
rebirth is inconceivable, at least if it has to be of a kind to secure the perpetuation of the 
individual, in such a way as to govern the motivation of action in the present life. Such 
a conclusion goes too far. There is at least one other account, the orthodox Christian, 
which is intelligible on its own terms – involving divine action - and which has the 
merit of it showing what must be the case if claims for rebirth are to stand up. I set out 
this account, briefly and only for its utility in comparison, as an appendix to this 
chapter. One conclusion prompted by this might be that St Paul should rank high as a 
theorist of personal identity. He has at least a clear idea of what is required for 
persistence, and seeks to satisfy correspondents for whom it is a prime concern. 
52. Where the argument stands
 
  It will be helpful if, at this point, I sum up and say where I take the argument to stand, 
after three chapters in which I have tried to put flesh on the skeleton of the problem, 
which I have called the identity problem, which I exposed in opening. 
  The problem is one of two notions of the person, each one problematic in itself and 
together plainly incompatible. The ‘weak’ notion was set out in brief in Chapter One 
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and more fully in Chapter Three, in the course of discussing anātman. It is counter-
intuitive, which need not be decisive against it, and it may be open to the charge of 
incoherence incidental to all ‘reductionist’ accounts of the subject and which Butler 
brought to bear on Locke. Whatever the final judgment on this, the ‘weak’ notion 
appears to be unfit for the purpose of grounding the responsibility for the past and the 
concern for the future which seem to be of the essence of morality. In contrast, in its 
application to the present life, the ‘strong’ notion fits with common intuitions. The 
difficulty comes from the karman and rebirth notions from which, on the Buddhist 
scheme, it is inseparable. For the reasons set out in this chapter, both these notions are 
problematic, the rebirth-notion conceptually as much as evidentially.
  The offer of a solution to the problem of compatibility generated within the Buddhist 
tradition itself, in effect through understanding the ‘strong’ notion in terms of the 
‘weak’, does not dispose of it. The presentation of the subject in terms of a ‘stream’ may 
realise continuity of a sort – though hardly identity – but not of a kind to ground 
motivation. The problem is not to be solved by recourse to the two-truths notion, which 
I have argued in Chapter Three, is evasive in this context.  Its obduracy may be seen 
from the unacceptability to the broad Buddhist tradition of the Pudgalavādin offer of a 
solution. It is from this standpoint that I turn to the question of the helpfulness of Parfit. 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER FOUR
The Christian doctrine of personal survival
  St Paul is much the most important of the New Testament writers on the question of 
personal survival. His letters show that this was a prime concern of many of his first 
converts, who pleaded for information and reassurance. 275  What he proclaims is the 
rising of glorified bodies, each one continuous with that of a deceased person.276    What 
this amounts to is the continuation of a unique embodiment, secured by divine action. 
What dies, and nothing else, will come back. The polemical merits of this account will 
be apparent, in that it seems at least to secure identity. As I have suggested in Chapter 
Four, this is no small achievement. It is over the details that doubts may come in. St 
Paul insists (rather than admits) that that which dies is not exactly what continues 
through being raised. What continues is, rather, a transformation or glorified replica. 277 
St Paul takes it for granted that this is, in Parfitian phrase, ‘as good as’ survival. 278  To 
minds made sensitive to the distinctions with which we have been concerned, this may 
seem uncertain.
275 See, in particular, 1 Thessalonians 4 and 1 Corinthians 15.
276 Jesus’ resurrection is seen as the prototype case of this sequence. Jesus is ‘the 
first fruit of them that sleep’ (aparche ton kekoimemenon), 1 Corinthians 15.20.
277 1 Corinthians 15.35 ff. 
278 In fact, better.
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   The fully formed Christian position reconciled St Paul’s proclamation with the 
marking out of a place for the soul. It has it that, on death, the body remains where it is, 
awaiting this resurrection, while the soul undergoes ‘the particular judgment’, an 
immediate determination of its destiny. At the Last Day, at the general resurrection, it 
will be reunited with its body, so that the bliss or agony of a particular fate will have an 
added bodily dimension. 279  In this way, the various references to the soul in the 
Gospels were brought into harmony with St Paul’s account of the resurrection of the 
body. 
  Not all confusions seem to be removed. St Paul seems not to envisage the resurrection 
of the damned. Yet if the souls of the damned have to be presumed to persist – being 
immortal - how could they not be in line for reunion with their bodies? There are also 
references in the Gospels which seen to envisage the continued union of soul and body 
of at least some deceased in the time before before the Last Day. One such is to the 
bodily anguish of Dives in the parable to be found in St Luke’s Gospel (Ch. 16). If I am 
right in seeing these difficulties, the Christian scheme may be less than fully coherent, 
but it has the considerable merit of reflecting an appreciation of what is needed for 
personal persistence: the continuation of the same body, or of some glorified equivalent 
of it that assures its identity, along with whatever the soul is taken to contribute to 
personal identity.   
279 See, for an authority, the latest Catechism of the Catholic Church (1992, English 
translation 1994). Protestant orthodoxy would concur, though there have always 
been dissenters, some arguing that the soul dies with the body, and that the two 
will be resurrected together. See also the article Resurrection of the Dead in the 
Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church (1957).
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CHAPTER FIVE
Can Parfit Help?
53.  Reasons and Persons  
  Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons was published in1984. 280  Some of its main 
contentions were presented earlier in periodical form.281  Parfit has published nothing 
since of the same scope, though he has responded to criticism in articles and in public 
debate. 282  This response has been by way of clarifying his positive assertions and 
offering minor qualifications. He has also offered fresh argument in rebuttal of 
criticism. In this chapter, I will be concerned very largely with Reasons and Persons,  
but I will touch on the later work as necessary.
  Parts One and Two of Reasons and Persons are concerned with ‘reasons’ – that is, with 
reasons for acting and, more especially, with reasons for acting in a disinterested way. 
Part Three, concerned with ‘persons’, sets out a version of reductionism, concluding 
with its bearing on morality. 283 Part Four is largely concerned with the claims of the 
future. My prime concern is with the argument of Part Three, which is almost self-
contained, though Parfit makes it plain in the concluding chapter to the whole work why 
he has chosen to consider reasons and persons together.
   At an early point in Part Three, Parfit refers to some work by Strawson and other 
philosophers, which – though apparently relevant – he does not consider there.284  It is 
unclear whether some discussion of Strawson’s work in an article published in 1999 
should count as the belated consideration left over from 1984, and I will not be dealing 
280 PARFIT (3). I will refer to the slightly amended edition of 1987.
281 PARFIT (1) and (2)
282 Notably in PARFIT (4), (5) and (6).
283 I will refer to Parfit’s version of reductionism as ‘Reductionism’.
284 PARFIT (3), p.225. Parfit refers to arguments from Kant, Strawson and Shoemaker: 
‘Because these arguments are at a very abstract level, I shall hope to discuss them 
elsewhere’. 
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with it here.285   In Parts One and Two, Parfit shows some acquaintance with Buddhism. 
He appreciates that the Buddhist account of the human subject has a decided 
resemblance to his own contentions in Part Three, and claims that the resemblance 
shows that Reductionism is not a complete novelty. With a rare concern not to be found 
original, he maintains that the Buddha took up an essentially Parfitian position on the 
person more than two millennia ago. To a modest degree, he claims the Buddha as an 
ally. My supposition, which is now to be tested, is that this relationship may be 
reversible. In particular, the view of the subject which I have called the ‘weak’notion 
may draw support from Parfitian arguments. This support may extend to the suggestion 
of a solution, in whole or in part, to the identity problem.
54. Part Three of  Reasons and Persons  : the Lockean starting-point  
   Part Three of Reasons and Persons finds much, at least, of its grounding in Locke’s 
consideration of personal identity, and I will open with some account of this. 286 
 Locke’s basic insight, and governing principle, is that entities of different kinds have 
differing conditions of identity. In the case of a living thing, what counts is the 
organisation of components for the maintenance of a common life. The living thing is 
individuated by its coming into being at a moment: its track through life preserves its 
identity through natural changes, and through such likely changes as changes in size. It 
is on such a conception that Locke grounds his conception of ‘a man’.287  It is to that 
which I referred above, in urging that the ‘becoming’ of one living thing by another was 
unimaginable. 288
  On Locke’s scheme of things, ‘the person’ is to be differentiated in concept from ‘the 
man’ - that is, from the living thing, the animal of the species homo sapiens - and from 
‘the soul’. Locke is of course aware that the terms ‘man’ and ‘person’ are often found 
used interchangeably. 289 He is aware, also, that there is something prescriptive about his 
285 PARFIT (6) p.231 and section vii.
286 An Essay concerning Human Understanding: Chapter 27 of Book II, added to the 
second edition of 1694. The Essay was first published in 1690. See LOCKE. 
287 Locke certainly includes women within the reference of ‘a man’. I will follow this 
usage.
288Above p.127ff. 
289 LOCKE, p 340. ‘I know that in the ordinary way of speaking, the same Person, and 
the same Man, stand for one and the same thing. And indeed everyone will always 
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own use – though only something. His appeal is to what is found in experience, his 
concern to make sense of experience; a use of the term ‘person’ with no resonance in 
daily life would do nothing towards this. In Locke’s time, the word is found with a 
wide, though hardly confusing, application. 290 His use of the term is therefore to be 
seen as an element in a larger clarification of ideas. 291 Men - or most men – are properly 
regarded as persons by virtue of their capacity for remembering and also on account of 
their possession of an attribute, consciousness, which extends to self-consciousness. 
This is the defining point made more than once in the Chapter:
 …what Person stands for … is a thinking intelligent 
Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider 
it self as self, the same thinking thing in different 
times and places; which it does only by that 
consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, 
and as it seems to me essential to it …. 292
These words suggest that ‘person’ is a classificatory notion: men are normally classed as 
persons, but exceptionally may not be. 293 The ‘empersoned man’ is distinguishable from 
‘the man’ in the bald sense. At the same time, a man’s personhood has its own identity 
conditions, grounded on consciousness, both as this stands at a time and as it extends 
over a period. On Locke’s account, ‘the person’ in this second sense is conceivable as 
separable from ‘the man’. Locke gives instances of such separation, by way of 
illustrating the concepts ‘person’ and ‘man’. He quotes from a contemporary account of 
an apparently rational parrot, capable of speech, in order to make the point that this, and 
have a liberty to speak, as he pleases, and to apply what articulate Sounds to what 
Ideas he thinks fit …’
290 Locke’s almost exact contemporary, Samuel Pepys, records his anxiety, after the 
disasters of the Dutch War, ‘whether any violence to this office, or perhaps some 
severity on our persons [is to be feared]…. though God knows I have in my own 
person done my full duty I am sure’. Diary, 12 June 1667. See PEPYS. Here the first 
use of ‘person’ catches the individuals, perhaps also their bodies, as against the 
collective (‘this office’) made up of Pepys and his colleagues; the second conveys no 
more than ‘myself’. Elsewhere Pepys refers to his wife’s possession of ‘a comely 
person’, meaning no more than her body. There is no confusion here, if no great 
clarity of conception.
291 ‘Idea’ in Locke’s sense and in our own looser sense.
292 LOCKE, p.335.
293 Some men will be disabled or traumatised, so that memory, and perhaps also 
self-consciousness, are lost. These cases present a problem, both in principle and in 
practice. Can such men be called to account for past crimes? 
138
no more, is what we have: an articulate parrot, not ‘a man’. 294  Another instance is the 
transfer of consciousness – that is, of personhood – between men. The soul of a prince 
passes into the body of a cobbler, carrying with it the prince’s consciousness, 
superseding, it has to be supposed, what was there before. 295  Here, as with the parrot, 
animal life persists, and we still have a cobbler – that is, we still have the same man. 
Equally, the prince’s consciousness persists, being a distinct entity. Two identities are in 
play.
   It is easy to imagine extreme cases – that is, developments of the kind where 
perplexity can be removed, as Mackie suggests, only by a degree of stipulation. 296 
Cases to some degree comparable are found in Locke’s own account. Consciousness 
may become infected by delusion. As its transference into another body is conceivable, 
a particular consciousness may become that of another man. This man might then 
become liable to the punishment attributable to a consciousness not his ‘own’. Here 
Locke declares that this can be ruled out; that a just God would not permit unmerited 
bad consequences on any account. 297  The solution of problems by way of divine action 
brings with it a sense of discomfort. What are the limits of such recourse?  Stipulation, 
also, may be problematic. It will certainly be harder to accept in the case of a living 
thing than in that of an artefact. A class of living things is resistant to definition along 
such lines as, ‘that is what I am calling [an entity]’. A living thing – a mouse, a man, a 
person – seems just to be or not to be, and not to be determinable by decision. This 
recalcitrance comes to mind when we come up against difficulties with the notion of 
personal identity.
  A more difficult question is that of how persons come into being. What can be said 
with relative safety is that what Locke calls the ‘appropriation’ of consciousness is what 
he takes to be a vital part of it, and that response to pleasure and pain – that is, attraction 
and recoil – goes with this process. 298  This should remind us strongly of what was said 
294 LOCKE p.333
295 Op cit p.340
296 MACKIE (1) pp.144/45. Mackie concludes, ‘This lends some plausibility to Hume’s 
claim that identity is a fiction’.
297 LOCKE pp.338 & 344.
298 LOCKE p.346. MARTIN & BARRESI, p 21. Martin and Barresi go on to an 
inconclusive discussion of whether Locke took persons to be substances. ‘One of the 
most puzzling aspects … is that of determining his view of the ontological status of 
persons’ (p 24).
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above about asmimāna. Much of the thrust of the anātman-doctrine is against delusory 
attachment – that is, against self-construction. This seems to resemble what Locke is 
describing. Locke, of course, sees nothing objectionable.
   The example of the prince and the cobbler also brings out Locke’s discrimination of 
‘person’ and ‘soul’. On the tabulation set out in Chapter Three, Locke’s soul can be seen 
to be both the animating factor and the pure spiritual substance; it is attributable singly 
to each human being and its loss is death. It is distinguishable from the soul of Homer, 
that which is both animating factor and shadow- body, escaping on death and capable of 
being restored to a degree of substantiality in the Underworld.299 It is also 
distinguishable from the soul that can be good or bad, corrupt or incorrupt – that is, the 
soul of Plato’s myths. The entity open to judgment, as Plato’s soul is open to judgment, 
can only be what Locke calls ‘the person’. Here is a point of prime importance: the 
notion of the person is ‘a Forensick Term’; it is one that marks out the subject’s liability 
to judgment and punishment. 300
  Locke’s soul appears to have the capacity to pass from one body to another in its 
conveyance of consciousness. 301 Beyond this, it is almost redundant. If animation were 
to be understood differently, no explanatory function would remain to it. It may well be 
that Locke saw this. It was not open to him, as a Christian, simply to dispense with a 
conception so prominent in his conceptual inheritance.  In respect of its near-
redundancy, the Lockean soul resembles the ātman. My treatment of the Buddhist 
assertion of anātman should have brought this out: ātman, on the Buddhist view, 
whether or not ontologically inseparable from brahman, is too pure to be useful. What 
matters, on the Buddhist view, is the entity formed by karman. Once this entity, along 
with consciousness, is taken to need no conveyance between one life and another, but to 
proceed by itself, the ātman of Brahmanical postulation will be redundant. As we have 
seen, the Buddhists would add that it is also a damaging postulate.
 
299 In the Underworld this may regain enough corporeality to be recognisable by 
those not yet dead. Odysseus’ experience (Odyssey XI) is an instance of this.
300 LOCKE, p 346
301 Op cit p.340
140
  Martin and Barresi offer a comprehensive treatment of the reception of Locke’s 
account, presenting it as one of the ‘naturalization of the soul’. 302  Talk of 
‘naturalization’ seems not to bring out the break with tradition – the Western tradition – 
represented by the Lockean person. This is not so much a soul differently conceived, or 
otherwise refigured (‘naturalized’); it is a seemingly novel entity. Martin and Barresi 
are, however, justified in taking the development of Locke’s notion over the course of 
the Eighteenth Century as inviting the description of ‘naturalization’. For many of the 
writers of this period, the ‘person’ had become both subject and soul-substitute, and the 
prospect of its instability and possible dissolubility was alarming. Martin and Barresi 
pick out an apprehension that if the permanence secured by the soul-notion were to 
come into question, there would be nothing that made for security. There is a parallel 
here with the Buddhist experience, and I will return to it in my concluding chapter. 
55. Parfit’s starting-point: ‘We are not what we believe’
  Parfit develops Locke’s analysis further, drawing out what was only implicit.  We may 
however be struck by his lack of attention to Locke’s careful discriminations. The 
discrimination of  ‘man’, ‘person’ and ‘soul’ makes up much of the burden of Locke’s 
chapter and I have emphasised it accordingly. We are not always sure which of these 
Parfit is talking about. 303   He offers an account more crisply argued which – it may be – 
brings weaknesses attaching to Locke’s whole approach into sharper relief. My use of 
Parfit will be for my own purposes, and I make no attempt to give a complete account 
of Part Three. This could be done only at considerable length. My object is to see if the 
components of a solution to the identity problem may be found by way of appropriation 
of what Parfit offers. My account will be no fuller than this object requires.
  There has been some lively discussion of personal identity over the last half-century. 
Some papers by Bernard Williams were at the centre of this. 304 I will touch on this 
discussion, as I need to, in the course of this chapter and the next. Shoemaker’s example 
of Robinson and Brown should be mentioned now, for its importance.305 Shoemaker 
302 See Bibliography.
303 PARFIT(3) p.205
304 Contained in WILLIAMS B(1).
305 SHOEMAKER(1) pp.23-25. Also WIGGINS p.206.
141
imagines an experiment in brain-removal and replacement where, through inadvertence, 
Brown’s brain is put into Robinson’s emptied skull, Robinson’s brain not surviving. 
Now we have ‘Brownson’. How far is Brownson the continuation of Brown? If Locke 
is Parfit’s original stimulus, it is from this now well-known example that we seem to 
have his immediate starting-point. 
  Parfit’s intervention will be of a kind to reorder the terms on which the debate over 
personal identity had been conducted. He opens by distinguishing the questions of a 
person and of personal identity over time. Shortly, he will advance a view subversive of 
common and natural assumptions: ‘We are not what we believe’. The person, the 
subject of debate, will be ‘reduced’, so as to end its central importance. McDowell, in 
an article to which I will return, catches Parfit’s polemical purpose in a few words: ‘… 
this ‘inner’ aspect of personal persistence should be understood in terms of relations 
between psychological states and events that are intelligible independently of personal 
identity’. 306
  I quote the opening of Parfit’s first conclusion, for which he will argue at length, from 
the end of the first chapter of Part Three:
We are not separately existing entities, apart from our 
brains and bodies, and various interrelated physical 
and mental events. Our existence just involves the 
existence of our brains and bodies, and the doing of 
our deeds, and the thinking of our thoughts, and the 
occurrence of certain other physical and mental events 
…
On the first topic, the nature of the person, he has already declared:
 … to be a person, a being must be self-conscious, 
aware of its identity and its continued existence over 
time. 307
306 DANCY p.230.
307 PARFIT(3) pp.216 & 202.
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With this, he considers what identity over time ‘necessarily involves or consists in’.308 
He summarises what he calls ‘the standard view’, in its application to objects. Here 
identity over time is secured by physical continuity: the thing is the same thing because 
it goes on.309 From this he derives ‘the Physical Criterion’ of personal identity, first 
stated as: ‘the physical continuity, over time, of my brain and body’. We may note a 
certain oddity in this formula. The brain is spoken of as if other than the body, not as 
part of it. This is not, however, the version Parfit offers, judging the following better:
X today is one and the same person as Y at some past 
time if and only if (2) enough of Y’s brain continued 
to exist, and is now X’s brain, and (3) the physical 
continuity has not taken a ‘branching’ form. (4) 
Personal identity over time just consists in the holding 
of facts like (2) and (3) 310
In sum, the Physical Criterion requires the persistence of (enough of the) brain, making 
no mention of (the rest of the) body. The decisive role accorded the brain must reflect 
the view that it carries what is vital for identity. This is Shoemaker’s assumption. It will 
be spelled out some pages later; it could not be introduced earlier without anticipating 
what will be said in justification of ‘the Psychological Criterion’. 311
  It is to the Psychological Criterion that Parfit proceeds. On a possible view, this 
involves the continued existence of a soul or spiritual substance. This is by no means 
what Parfit is concerned to assert. What he offers is a subtler version of Locke’s claim 
that personal identity is to be found in experience-memory. 312 This is broadened to cover 
psychological connections other than memory. 313 He does not instance karmic 
308 Op cit p.202
309 Op cit p.203/4. Parfit accepts of course that this may be through appreciable 
change.
310 Op cit p.204. 
311 Parfit remarks a bit later: ‘The continued existence of a person’s brain is at least 
part of the normal cause of psychological continuity’. Op cit p.208
312 PARFIT p.205
313 Op cit p.208: ‘Though it is memory that makes us aware of our own continued 
existence over time, the various other continuities have great importance. We may 
believe that they have enough importance to provide personal identity even in the 
absence of memory’
143
connection as one of these, despite what we will see to be his – limited - familiarity with 
karman, but this appears to be something of the sort which he envisages. 314 He also 
distinguishes psychological connectedness and psychological continuity. Connectedness 
is the holding of particular direct psychological connections; continuity is the holding of 
overlapping chains of strong connectedness.315. The distinction is plainly pitched to 
meet the points of contemporary critics of Locke’s original formula. On such analysis is 
founded a statement of the Psychological Criterion:
X today is one and the same person as Y at some past 
time if and only if (2) X is psychologically continuous 
with Y, (3) this continuity has the right kind of cause, 
and (4) it has not taken a ‘branching’ form. (5) 
Personal identity over time just consists in the holding 
of facts like (2) to (4). 316
There follows discussion of ‘the right kind of cause’. This may be the normal cause, any 
reliable cause or any cause. Where it is the normal cause, taken to be a state of the brain, 
the two Criteria will largely coincide. 317 The admissibility of the other two causes will 
be much to the point when we consider Buddhist notions of continuity.
The Psychological Criterion is the more demanding of the two: the continuity of the 
brain, or of enough of it, is necessary but not sufficient; the other conditions, just 
spelled out, need to be met. 
56. Reductionism
  It is notable that these Criteria are the only two brought into consideration. Both are 
found to be ‘Reductionist’. Here is a term that smacks of wide application. Parfit sets 
314 I touch on Parfit’s understanding of karman in treating of Part Two of Reasons and 
Persons below.
315 The distinction between these two is developed at length. Connectedness is 
simpler: X is Y if X now remembers having the experiences of Y twenty years ago. 
There is continuity if, even in the absence of such direct memory-connectedness, 
there is the connection made by overlapping chains. For instance, at its simplest, X 
remembers the experience of Z, part of which was memory of the experience of Y. 
Continuities may be extended in number and elaborated in nature. PARFIT (3) p.206
316 PARFIT(3) p.207
317 Op cit p.208
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out with an evident carefulness what he will take Reductionism to be: applied to 
personal identity, Reductionism is the view that the continuity of persons is to be 
explained in terms of events. Here is the first defining claim:
the fact of a person’s identity over time just consists in 
the holding of certain more particular facts.
The other claim follows from it:
these facts can be described without either 
presupposing the identity of this person, or explicitly 
claiming that the experiences in this person’s life are 
had by this person, or even explicitly claiming that 
this person exists. These facts can be described in an 
impersonal way. 318
 Parfit now proceeds to explain and to sketch a defence of ‘Reductionism’. His method 
is by way of the drawing of a succession of fine distinctions. Reductionism, as Parfit 
conceives it, is not a simple position and its characteristic assertions cover a range of 
possible positions. Parfit claims that all Reductionists would accept:
(3) A person’s existence just consists in the existence 
of a brain and body, and the occurrence of a series of 
interrelated physical and mental events. 319 
Some would claim (4) and others (5):
(4) A person just is a particular brain and body, and 
such a series of interrelated events.
(5) A person is an entity that is distinct from a brain 
and body, and such a series of events.
318 PARFIT(3) p.210
319 PARFIT(3) p.211. For ease of reference I follow Parfit’s numberings.
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Parfit expands on (5): ‘ … a person is not merely a composite object … A person is an 
entity that has a brain and body …But though (5) is true, a person is not a separately 
existing entity. Though (5) is true, (3) is also true’. Parfit sees that this claim is difficult 
to credit, and bolsters it with a reference to the case of a nation, at once just its citizens 
and territory and also an entity distinct from these. 
   Parfit proceeds to other, related, claims. One such is:
(9) Though persons exist, we could give a complete 
description of reality without claiming that persons 
exist.
It seems that the words ‘we could’, just quoted, are to be taken literally: we do not have 
to do this and will not commonly choose to do so. Parfit goes on:
We can describe this fact by claiming either
(10) that there exists a particular brain and body, and a 
particular series of interrelated physical and mental 
events,
or
(11) that a particular person exists.
He sums up: ‘If (10) and (11) are two ways of describing the same fact, a complete 
description need not make both claims’. 320  He sees that (11) will go with (5). Their 
joint assertion seems to go beyond (10). Parfit sees no real difference: ‘… Claim (10) 
may imply claim (11)…… if we know that (10) is true, we shall know that (11) is true’. 
321
320 PARFIT (3) p.212
321 Op cit p.213
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  I dealt in Chapter Three with the Buddhist conception of the subject, on the account of 
it most frequently found.322  Five skandāḥ are taken to compose the human subject: 
corporeality (rūpa) and four ‘psychological’ concomitants. All five are open to be 
understood in terms of happening rather than substance. Memory is a main element 
within the process, but no more than with Parfit is it the sole constituent. To describe the 
totality is to describe the association of a conditioned corporeality with conditioned 
events, at once transient and of great complexity. Each element within the complex is 
what it is because of what has gone before, whether this is internal to the subject or by 
way of impact from outside. Here we have the implicit denial, by way of redundancy, of 
the substantial subject. It is complementary to what is explicit in the texts and their 
commentaries. 
  Set out formally, with a view to explaining personal continuity, the closeness of the 
Buddhist conception to what is caught by the Psychological Criterion may be evident:
X today is one and the same person as Y at some past 
time if and only if (2) X and Y are connected by an 
unbroken flow of corporeal and mental experience, (3) 
this flow has the right kind of conditioning, extending 
to karmic conditioning, and (4) there does not exist a 
different person who is also so connected with Y. 
Personal identity over time just consists in the holding 
of facts like (2) to (4).
This formulation could, no doubt, be refined. It should be enough, as it is, to justify the 
claim that the Buddhist conception seems closely comparable to that of Parfit’s 
Reductionism. This part of Reasons and Persons should be open to appropriation in 
support of the Buddhist conception. 
57. Indeterminacy
322  It should be recalled also that this is not the only possible account. I have dealt 
above (section 24) with an analysis of experience (conceptual and perceptual) in 
terms of the dhātavaḥ.  Other such analyses are available.
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   Parfit takes Indeterminacy to go with Reductionism. He claims that it may be an 
empty question whether B at time-2 is the same person as A at time-1. All the facts of 
the matter may be agreed and available, yet opposing views on the point might each be 
sustainable. He illustrates this claim by instancing a club that goes out of existence, and 
a club that is formed – or re-formed - with the same name and objects after an interval. 
It is an empty question, he suggests, whether we have one club or two. The point could 
no doubt be settled by stipulation, just as the same doubt bearing on a physical object 
could be settled. The physical object seems open to stipulation with little difficulty 
(‘This is what I am calling an X’), which is not to say that stipulation has no limits. In 
contrast, natural kinds, and more especially human beings, seem resistant to stipulation. 
They are what they are, and it is a secondary matter what we choose to call them.  Parfit 
is, therefore, decidedly bold in claiming that the identity even of people may to be open 
to be found indeterminate. Part Three opens with the imaginary case of 
Teletransportation. By way of some ‘scanning’ process, someone on Earth is copied in 
every physical and psychological respect; the copy is then transmitted to Mars, there to 
be realised in flesh and blood. On one variant of the case, the ‘original’ on Earth is 
destroyed by the copying-process. On another, the ‘original’ survives. In this second 
case, the process of copying and transmission results in the co-existence of two beings, 
indistinguishable at least initially. If the ‘original’ then dies after a short interval, is there 
a going-on of the person that he was? The question may be answerable – in the sense 
that an answer might have to be imposed. In the context of an argument at law, a judge 
might have to answer it. But here we see the limitations of stipulation. Parfit’s view of 
the question as ‘empty’ may seem persuasive in the light of these limitations. Its appeal 
may seem enhanced when discussion shifts from ‘how things are’ to ‘what matters’. 323
  Parfit offers supporting arguments later in Part Three. He postulates two ‘spectra’ - that 
is, ranges of states of affairs, each successive state being distinct from the one before it 
to a regular degree. One covers a range of physical, the other of psychological, 
possibilities. In each case, a subject is taken to be at one end of a spectrum, and made to 
undergo successive changes: the body may be changed bit by bit, and so may the 
memory-store, the character and other components of personhood. At the far end, after 
the totality of these changes, there will be a subject sharply distinct from its forerunner. 
In each case, we may still entertain the idea of the same entity severely changed. The 
323 PARFIT (3), pp.199-200
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conjunction of these two makes up a third, the ‘Combined Spectrum’. Around the 
middle of this one, after substantial changes, both physical and psychological, it must be 
a question what subject we have. At just what moment does the change of identity come 
about? Even if we cannot detect it, must we suppose that there has to be such a 
moment? It is Parfit’s point that conceding the indeterminacy of such a case is at least a 
less vulnerable position than is the arbitrariness of any evident alternative. We can say 
that in such a case, with all the facts being known, and faced with A or with B, the 
choice between declaring ‘A’ or ‘B’ will be random or whimsical. To avoid this, we can 
take it to be an open question whether it is A or B. In the light of such an example, Parfit 
invites us to grant that the identity of persons is not always determinate. 324
I know of nothing in the Buddhist tradition amounting to a discussion of Indeterminacy 
on anything like Parfit’s terms. The logic of assertions supporting the Buddhist form of 
reductionism may indeed be such as to point to it. Parfit has no need to consider this 
possibility, which may be implied by his conclusion: ‘There are some people who 
believe that our identity must be determinate, though they do not believe that we are 
separately existing entities, distinct from our brains and bodies, and our experiences. 
This view I believe to be indefensible’ 325 If Parfit is right here, it might be a point 
against the Buddhist tradition if its advocates were to be found among those who accept 
an argument and then blink at its plain implications.
  I distinguished above between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ notions of the subject and have 
since pointed out the considerable difficulties in holding to the ‘strong’ view in 
understanding such claims as ‘At that time Sariputta was X’. It must be a question 
whether the ‘weak’ view implies that the subject it picks out should be counted as 
determinate in its identity. The weakness of the ‘weak’ view – its presentation of a flow 
of elements in constant flux - might suggest it does not. The view is, at the same time, 
one of a stream, which must be counted as one stream of indisputable identity. Here, it 
seems, the line of thought prompted by Parfit brings out difficulties more than it 
suggests their solution. 
324 In this paragraph I have summarised an argument of much complexity. Much 
detail has had to be left aside. I suggest a reference to Chapter 11 of Reasons & 
Persons.
325 PARFIT(3) p.239
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58. Memory and Quasi-memory: the charge of circularity
  Parfit’s case, with its grounding in Locke, may be vulnerable to Butler’s celebrated 
criticism of Locke. This is to the effect that Locke presupposes what he takes himself to 
establish:
 …. one should really think it self-evident, that 
consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and 
therefore cannot constitute personal identity, any more 
than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute truth 
which it presupposes. 326  
Otherwise put, Butler’s point is that remembering presupposes identity. When I 
remember, I remember that I (a continuing ‘I’) did or suffered such-and-such; I cannot 
otherwise suppose myself to be remembering.
   Parfit aims to deflect this criticism by restating his account of the person in terms of 
‘quasi-memory’. In practice I do not have, but I might conceivably have, quasi-
memories. Parfit explains:
I have an accurate quasi-memory of a past experience if
(1) I seem to remember having an experience,
(2) someone did have this experience, and
(3) my apparent memory is causally dependent, in the 
right kind of way, on that past experience. 327
Quasi-memory was already part of the philosophical currency at the time of Reasons 
and Persons. Parfit’s account is close to that of Shoemaker, though less elaborately 
326 PERRY p.100
327 PARFIT (3), p.220
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marked out. 328  In Parfit’s presentation, quasi-memory is given a touch of plausibility 
by being accounted for in terms of brain-scanning. For the purposes of Parfit’s 
argument, this is enough; the notion needs to be no more than conceivable. He goes on:
There is strong connectedness of quasi-memory if, 
over each day, the number of direct quasi-memory 
connections is at least half the number in most actual 
lives. Overlapping strands of strong connectedness 
provide continuity of quasi-memory. Revising Locke, 
we claim that the unity of each person’s life is in part 
created by this continuity. We are not now appealing 
to a concept that presupposes personal identity. Since 
the continuity of quasi-memory does not presuppose 
personal identity, it may be part of what constitutes 
personal identity. 329 
Putting the point in other words, I need not assume that the so-called memories which I 
find myself to have (Parfit’s quasi-memories) are all ‘my’ memories. In default of this 
assumption, I am not taking for granted what I purport to vindicate. ‘My’ memories will 
be a sub-set of the total of quasi-memories  - commonly, indeed, 100% of the total. Free 
from this assumption, I can see my identity as made up in part by this total, without the 
circularity which Butler attributes to Locke.
  Parfit seems to assume that, on its own terms, Butler’s objection is decisive. It follows 
that quasi-memory, or something like it, has to be postulated if a Lockean account of the 
person is to be sustained. If it cannot be sustained, it cannot be the object of Parfitian 
reduction. The Buddhist-advocate therefore has an interest in the notion being 
sustainable.
   There appears to be a Buddhist parallel. The ‘fruiting’ of karman may be seen as the 
‘invasion’ of my consciousness and memory-chain by an item of quasi-memory. I may 
suffer or enjoy the consequences of a deed done before my present life – or life 
328 SHOEMAKER (2)
329 PARFIT (3) p.222 
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‘downstream’ – in something of the way in which I might have the memory – Parfit’s 
example – of a holiday I never took. We may also recall the notion of knowledge-from-
the-recollection-of-previous-dwellings/lives ( pubbenivāsānusatiñāña). 330 The Buddha 
says, on occasion, ‘At that time I was Y’. Such recollection may be part of the 
consciousness of a living person in the same way as quasi-memory.  It will be (to quote 
Parfit) ‘causally dependent, in the right kind of way’ on the experience of an earlier 
living person. The notion of quasi-memory, if we accept it, seems at least to make 
pubbenivāsānusatiñāña less far-fetched. 
  
59. The subject of experience: alternatives to Reductionism
  From this, Parfit moves on to consider whether we have direct awareness of a subject 
of experience and a persistent one. This consideration opens up a broader consideration. 
He quotes from Reid:  
Whatever this self may be, it is something which 
thinks, and deliberates, and resolves, and acts, and 
suffers. I am not thought, I am not action, I am not 
feeling. I am something that thinks, and acts, and 
suffers. 331
Parfit comments: ‘In one sense, this is clearly true’. To show what he means, he 
distinguishes two assertions: one that ‘a person is the subject of experiences’; one that 
‘the subject of experiences is a separately existing entity’. It is the former which is 
‘clearly true’.
 The distinction is one with which the mainstream Buddhist tradition is concordant. We 
saw that in the response of Buddhist orthodoxy to the characteristic assertions of the 
330 Section 50 above
331 PARFIT(3) p.223. For Reid’s words, see PERRY p.109.
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Pudgalavada, well expressed in the appraisal of Vasubandhu, in his distinction between 
what is established substantially and what is established conceptually. 332 What is 
established conceptually may be described as substantially grounded (dravyasiddha), its 
grounding, in the case of the subject, being the skandhāḥ. The skandhāḥ are a 
collection of processes, embracing Reid’s instances of thinking, deliberating, resolving, 
acting and suffering. What Parfit regards as ‘clearly true’ is the assertion that there is a 
person, not ‘a separately existing entity’, who is the subject. This seems closely 
comparable to the conceptual entity, ‘substantially grounded’, of Vasubandhu’s account, 
both in what it is and in what it is not. Parfit’s argument seems open to enlistmen in its 
support.
  Parfit offers a review of what the alternatives to Reductionism might be. These come 
down to two, and the argument proceeds by way of exposing the difficulties in the way 
of subscribing to either. One is the so-called ‘further fact’ view. What this view amounts 
to is hardly made clear on its introduction: no doubt, it is part of Parfit’s point that it 
cannot be made clear. Later on, it is brought up in a way which at least brings out its 
point:
We cannot defensibly believe that our identity 
involves a further fact, unless we also believe that we 
are separately existing entities, distinct from our 
brains and bodies. And we cannot defensibly believe 
that our identity must be determinate, unless we 
believe that the existence of these separate entities 
must be all-or-nothing.333 
This seems a decisive objection if we are ready to grant that Parfit has disposed of all-
or-nothingness and determinacy. By way of reinforcement, his method is to ask 
questions - ‘just what?’,‘how?’, and ‘where is it?’ - and to remark on weak answers. 
Here, by implication, is his answer to Reid, developed at length, if not directly so 
attributed.
332 See section 32 above.
333 PARFIT(3) p.240
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 Parfit has rather more regard for the other alternative, what he calls the ‘Cartesian’ 
view.  He takes this to come in two versions. As first presented, it appears to be the 
postulate of a spiritual substance –one, no doubt, for every living human being – 
persistent at least through the present existence and capable of sustaining elements of 
the ‘inner’ life of that thing, notably memories. It must be taken to be unique and so to 
confer identity. Parfit leaves some such account as this to be inferred from the example 
he gives of a Japanese woman remembering living a life as a Celtic hunter and warrior 
in the Bronze Age. It should be possible to say what might count as evidence of this life, 
and what might tend to establish it as the woman’s previous life.  He accepts – at least 
for the sake of argument – the intelligibility of this view – and rejects it on the grounds 
that there is no evidence for it: ‘ .. there might have been evidence supporting the 
Cartesian View’. (My emphasis) 334 
  The other version, brought in just after this, is treated less kindly. Parfit says, ‘Some 
who believe in Cartesian Egos do not connect them .. to observable facts’. When this is 
the case, he suggests, nothing can be known; it seems to follow that nothing had better 
be asserted. The difference between the two versions comes out from Parfit’s discussion 
of his ‘Combined Spectrum’. Parfit takes the Cartesian ego of the first version to be 
such as to drop out of existence once the destruction of its concomitant and brain-based 
psychological elements has reached a certain point. Nothing of the sort is supposed in 
the case of the second version, there being no such concomitance. He concludes, ‘When 
the belief in Cartesian Egos is in this way cut loose from any connections with either 
publicly observable or privately introspectible facts, the charge that it is unintelligible 
becomes more plausible’. 335
 
  There is another point, which may tell against both alternatives. Parfit suggests that 
awareness of being a subject – even if found – falls short of what is required, if this is 
awareness of being a persistent subject. Why not a succession of subjects? ‘Memories 
might be passed from one to the next like a baton in a relay race’336.   Parfit criticises 
this as being an instance of the possibility envisaged (and disparaged) by Locke and 
Kant: ‘.. the Cartesian Ego that I am might suddenly cease to exist and be replaced by 
334 Op cit p.227
335 PARFIT(3) p.228
336 Op cit p.223
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another Ego. This new Ego might ‘inherit’ all of my psychological characteristics, as in 
a relay race.’ Understandably, Parfit thinks this hardly worth discussing. 
  The ‘reincarnation’ described by Parfit in the context of considering his ‘Cartesian’ 
view is not that of Buddhist doctrine, which, as we have seen, is one of persistence of a 
kind not attributable to a spiritual substance. His discussion of it bears on Buddhist 
concerns only where it presents the Cartesian Ego as lacking any significant application. 
The Cartesian Ego – on Parfit’s view of it– is to all appearances the ātman of 
Brahmanical religion or the puruṣa of the Sāṃkhya school. I touched in passing on 
these conceptions in Chapter Three. They are barely distinguishable: the ātman more a 
‘divine spark’, the puruṣa more ‘pure consciousness’. In the case of all three, it seems 
fair to say that the notion is too pure to be useful. What is surprising, therefore, is that 
Parfit even envisages its vital association with particular memories. He seems to 
concede more to his supposed opponent than he needs to, in granting that there might 
have been evidence to lead us to credit this ‘Cartesian ego’.
  Here we should recall the near-redundancy of the soul, on Locke’s view of it. Parfit 
goes beyond Locke in offering reinforcement to the case against the ātman, and so 
support for the vital Buddhist assertion of anātman. The similarity of style of argument 
is notable, leaning in each case on the non-necessity of the notion criticised and so, 
explicitly or not, on its uselessness as a postulate. It follows – so goes the argument – 
that what is apparent, a stream of events, is the only remaining basis for an account of 
the subject. In Chapter Three I judged that the anātman-notion was good philosophy, if 
not central to consideration of the identity problem. Parfit’s discussion supports that 
claim.
60. The mattering of Relation R
  Parfit has been concerned with how things are in the case of persons, and with the 
needfulness and coherence of the concepts brought to bear. There follows a move from 
consideration of ‘how things are’ to that of ‘what matters’, the shift in significance 
fitting well with the claim that identity may be indeterminate. The claim is now that:
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 Personal identity is not what matters. I claim what 
matters is Relation R: psychological connectedness 
and/or continuity with the right kind of cause. Since it 
is more controversial, I add, as a separate claim: the 
right kind of cause could be any cause. 337
  In making this claim for Relation R, Parfit relies in large part on arguments already 
advanced, with their steady subversion of the notion of personal identity. Any other 
account is found to be less plausible. The case of ‘Division’ enforces this. 338 Division 
occurs when the physical continuity which is the normal cause of psychological 
continuity is disrupted and, after a fashion, perpetuated. An example would be the 
transference, by means of surgery, of my two brain-hemispheres into the skulls of my 
two triplet brothers. 339  Do I persist through the continued life of both, or through that 
of either one, or through that of neither? We can see that the question is both, ‘Do I go 
on? and ‘Do I go on?. A clear-cut answer to the first question, bearing on identity, will, 
Parfit judges, be elusive. What sound like identity-claims may be uttered, but they 
should be understood to rest on perpetuation-claims, by way of Relation-R. The answer 
to the second question, that of perpetuation, will be Yes.  
  These perpetuation-claims may be illustrated by bringing out their application to 
particular cases. Assume the simplest case, that of supposed continuity across one 
lifespan. I opened by saying that the skandha-account of the subject, the ‘weak’ view, 
with its suggestion of perpetual flux, may be hard to square with this. If the question of 
identity is to be laid aside, and that of mattering to replace it, our claim will become one 
of the obtaining of Relation R. In the simplest case it can be assumed that the right kind 
of cause will obtain, here the normal cause, the persistence of a brain and body. If our 
concern is ‘mattering’, we may be happy to accept the skandha-account, disregard its 
difficulties, and find to ‘matter’ such connections and/or continuities as memories or – 
as much to the point in the Buddhist sphere – such lines of cause-and-effect as the 
cultivation of patience at one time and its realisation at another.  
337 PARFIT(3)p.215 
338 Op cit, ch.12, especially p.254
339 It is no part of Parfit’s case that this is practicable, or that it ever will be 
practicable. All that the argument requires is that it is conceivable.
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 The Buddhist advocate’s claim that continuity obtains across lifetimes takes us beyond 
the normal cause. This claim cannot be based on bodily continuity. It needs, therefore, 
to be grounded otherwise, and Parfit’s ‘separate claim’, if we accept it, should make it at 
least conceivable. It might, on the Buddhist view, be the case that X’s cultivation of 
patience bears fruit in the life of Sariputta. It is just such instances – that is, non-trivial 
ones – that draw forth the Buddha’s declarations as to how things are. This one, in 
particular, may seem difficult to accept.
  On the Parfitian scheme of things, causes other than the normal cause are at least 
conceivable. The claim, ‘At that time Sariputta was X’, may be acceptable if what we 
take to matter – and we are concerned with ‘mattering’ - is Relation R.  On this view, 
when the Buddha is recorded as saying, ‘At that time Sariputta was X’, he should be 
taken to mean that Relation R obtains between X and Sariputta. This relationship may 
be one of memory; it may be one of intention and its fulfilment and – of especial 
significance – of the working out of karman, here barely distinguishable from intention. 
This last point is not, of course, Parfit’s but it seems a fair extension of his claim.
  At a later stage in the argument, Parfit draws on some discussion by Nagel, offered 
from a different standpoint. On a view derived from this, Relation-R runs on through 
successive embodiments and is to be seen as the thread along which a succession of 
‘series-persons’ is extended. 340 Each one of these can be taken to be related through 
continuity and connectedness to those going before it. With the obtaining of the normal 
cause, bodily continuity, they enjoy relatively strong connection and continuity over the 
course of one life. In the case of successive lives, with a cause abnormal in Parfitian 
terms, this connection and continuity will be less but still existent.
  The notion of series-persons may be regarded as a speculative extension of Parfit’s 
main argument. By way of expounding the notion, Parfit explains
It may help to remember a mythical being: a phoenix. 
On the criterion of the identity of birds, a bird ceases 
to exist if it is burnt to ashes. If a phoenix existed, it 
would not be a particular bird. It would be a series of 
340PARFIT(3) p.289ff. 
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birds, or a series-bird. A phoenix would at any time 
have the body of a particular bird. But when this bird 
is burnt to ashes, only the bird ceases to exist. The 
phoenix comes to life again in the body of a new bird, 
rising from the ashes. Like a particular series-person, 
a particular phoenix would thus have a series of 
different bodies……… There are many series-
persons. These sentences are being typed by a series-
person, me. They are also being typed by a person: 
old-me. This person is named Derek Parfit. I, the 
series-person, hereby name myself Phoenix Parfit. 
Since my present body is also Derek Parfit’s body, 
both of us are typing these sentences…..[Old-I might 
be killed] but it would not kill me, the series-person. 
341
 
  The Buddhist-advocate will observe that, to all appearances, the ‘series-person’ is a 
personification of the karmic entity. The conception is one which makes more vivid, 
perhaps more intelligible, even more plausible, the Buddhist notion of conditioned 
rebirth. To that extent, it seems that Parfit’s partially speculative offering is a support for 
Buddhist claims.  
 
  This support may also be effective in reverse. The notion of series-persons stands to be 
strengthened by association with the karman-notion. Karman is a connecting factor, its 
process being one of intention and consequence, whether or not the intention is realised. 
It is an instance of connection rather than of continuity, and is claimed by the Buddhist 
tradition to obtain over long periods (I suffer now, perhaps in a striking way, for the 
sensational crime committed in a previous embodiment). 342 There is, however, a 
qualification. Parfit suggests that relations of direct connectedness will be less strong 
and frequent with time, and the significance of Relation R will tend to diminish. For this 
reason, thinks Parfit, not on account of the mere passage of time, I may rationally care 
less about my future. For the Buddhist tradition this will emphatically not be the case: 
341 PARFIT (3) pp.290/91
342 It is an instance of connection because it is not transitive.
158
the ‘fruiting’ of karman, on the traditional view, may be very far in the future. Recall the 
case of Purṇa, discussed in Chapter Four. 343  Here is an important point of difference. 
  Parfit’s account of ‘what matters’ – Relation R – seems to point to a solution to the 
problem of the intelligibility of persistence through death. The Buddhist advocate 
should find it easy to follow Parfit in understanding the ‘identity’ of X and Sariputta as 
amounting to the obtaining of Relation R. He can remind himself of Buddhaghosa’s 
words, ‘neither the same, nor different’, for the relation between the two. Relation R 
will not, in this case, have its normal cause, X being long dead and his brain having 
been long past serving as the carrier of continuity. Parfit’s argument now becomes 
useful, as it extends to any cause. The Buddhist advocate, talking to the converted, will 
present personal continuity in terms of karman. Talking to the unconverted, he must 
claim that it is just one of the facts of the matter that Relation R can pertain in the 
absence of bodily continuity. All Parfit’s arguments are open to enlistment in support of 
this claim.
61. Impersonal description
  In Reasons and Persons, Parfit claimed, in his own – later – words,  
that we could fully redescribe our lives without 
referring to ourselves, or explicitly claiming that 
we exist. This we can call the impersonal 
redescription claim or IRC. 344
This claim is to be found, otherwise expressed, in section 56 above, in my account of 
Reductionism. In an article published in 1999, Parfit withdraws it, observing that 
‘though IRC is a natural way to express Reductionism, it added little to my account, and 
is open to various objections’. 345 I need not enlarge here on these objections, as Parfit’s 
qualification seems hardly to weaken the support which his case, if made out, gives to 
343 Section 43 above
344 PARFIT (6) p.221
345 PARFIT (6) p.222
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essential Buddhist positions. What, in contrast, seems relevant to the holding of such 
positions is his advancement of a comparable claim, in the same article, in response to 
McDowell. This is to the effect that we can conceive of an impersonal scheme no worse 
than ours (INW). In the next chapter, in the course of reviewing McDowell’s remarks, I 
will consider how far Parfit’s presentation of INW is persuasive. Here, I can only say 
what it amounts to. 
  
Parfit’s object is to show
 that we can coherently imagine thinkers who 
could understand the facts to which a 
Reductionist account appeals, even though they 
did not have the concept of a person, or the 
wider concept of a subject of experiences. 346 
In other words, it would be coherent to think about experiences without thinking that 
these experiences have subjects. This is to be distinguished from the claim that it would 
be coherent to think that some experiences might not have subjects. To the extent that 
Parfit’s demonstration is persuasive, we should be left satisfied that we could have 
understood the Reductionist account before we acquired the concept of a person. 347 
Parfit’s argument proceeds by way of examples, and is resistant to summary. An 
example to which I shall return bears on our understanding of someone’s – or no-
person’s – climbing of a mountain:
Where … Tenzing climbed Everest, they 
[Parfit’s thinkers] would claim that in Tenzing – 
that is in the sequence with that name – there 
was a climbing of Everest. This sequence does 
not itself climb Everest; nor does its associated 
346 PARFIT (6) p.221
347 Op cit pp.228/30
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body. Rather, this sequence includes a climbing, 
achieved with this body. 348
Though Parfit’s assumption is that his imaginary beings, resembling ourselves in every 
other respect, have yet to acquire the person-concept, his account seems open to 
expropriation by those who urge that we should be ready to give up the concept or, at 
least sit light to it. Here, I have in mind such commentators as the author of the 
Milindapañḥa. We are also reminded of the observations of the bhikkhunī, Vajira. 349 
Parfit seems to be offering, by way of his INW, a detailed spelling-out of what we have 
found on those occasions. He remarks of his imagined beings: ‘… instead of “I am 
angry,” they would say, “Anger has arisen here.”’ 350 
  Having mentioned the 1999 article, I should make it plain that I do not see it as a 
retraction. It contains the important modification just mentioned but is, in general, an 
extended defence. It does however offer a mapping-out of various understandings of the 
subject, which allows Parfit to place his own account in relation to others less 
thoroughly reductionist and to those of two other writers, which he takes to be ‘hyper-
reductionist’. He also presents the Buddha as being less a support from the side as also a 
‘hyper-reductionist’ or eliminativist. 351 There are also some other restatements, which 
Parfit seems to offer as clarification only, but which I take to be fresh expressions of his 
argument, which leave it further from its starting point in Locke. 
62. Liberating
  In Reasons and Persons, Parfit goes on to appraise the credibility – in one sense - of 
the position for which he has argued – that is, its capacity to become part of the beliefs 
underlying day-to-day living. There is a distinction between this and the finding of no 
decisive arguments against a contention. As Parfit has quite often taken up this negative 
stance, the point is a real one. He says, candidly, that he does not always find the view 
for which he has argued fully believable; at some level there will always be doubts.352 
348 Op cit p.229
349 See section 35 above.
350 PARFIT (6) p.229
351 PARFIT(6) p.260
352 PARFIT(3), p.279. I discussed another instance of this kind of ‘incredibility’ with 
reference to rebirth. See above.
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This does not stop him recording, a little later, that he finds his conclusions ‘liberating’. 
He goes on to describe an enlargement of human concern: ‘Other people are closer. I am 
less concerned about the rest of my own life, and more concerned about the lives of 
others’. 353 His summing-up of this change of view as ‘liberating’ strikes a happily 
Buddhist note: ‘liberation’ (mokṣa) is synonymous with the attainment of Nirvana. 
Parfit’s complex reaction will, indeed, come as no surprise to the Buddhist: the teaching 
on the self is perplexing, yet its apprehension to any degree goes with progress along 
the Path. Beyond this, the conclusion accords, as we shall see, with that of Part Two of 
Reasons and Persons: it represents a defeat for egoism achieved by a route quite 
different from that of Part Two. 
63. How Reductionism bears on morality
  Parfit’s closing discussion of what his conclusions mean for morality is notably 
tentative. He is as concerned to expose differences and difficulties as to argue for 
conclusions. Among these difficulties, in one or other guise, is the identity problem. 
Here we come to the heart of the present argument. Parfit is well aware that many 
writers, past and present, have held that the deep ‘further fact’ of identity denied by 
Reductionism is indispensable to morality. Only on such a conception, can 
responsibility be attributed and desert assigned. 
  There are two points for debate. The first is concerned with my responsibility for my 
past. Here, the Lockean notion is explicitly ‘forensic’, attributing responsibility to the 
person, and so openness to consequences and liability to punishment. This view of the 
matter is taken over by Parfit. He holds that in the case of my brain – or part of it, as in 
the case of Division – passing directly into the body of another, responsibility passes 
with it. He writes: ‘Even when the person in Jack’s body cannot be called me … he can 
just as much deserve punishment or reward for what I have done’. 354 What are we to 
make of this when the punishment is bodily? Will it not be Jack who suffers, not 
Person-Parfit? Locke envisages a comparable possibility, but trusts to divine 
353 Op cit p.281
354 PARFIT(3) p.271. Parfit adds, by way of justification, ‘As Wiggins writes, “a 
malefactor could hardly evade responsibility by contriving his own fission”’.
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intervention to stop it being realised. 355 This recourse is not open to Parfit, who has to 
stomach the consequences of the ‘forensic’ conception.
  Parfit’s reflections are taken further. In cases where connection and continuity are by 
way of Relation-R, where they obtain only over a wide time-span, responsibility (and 
culpability) may be appreciably reduced. ‘When some convict is now less closely 
connected to himself at the time of the crime, he deserves less punishment’.356  For the 
Buddhist advocate, the point of concern is not quite the one which Parfit addresses here, 
which is one of what should most properly – justly – be done by way of judicial 
process. It is, rather, one of what should be taken to have happened, or to be due to 
happen, as a matter of course. On the distinctively Buddhist notion of consequence, 
extending to consequence through rebirth, desert is not assigned. Assignation goes  with 
judicial punishment, a process for which the identity of agent and assignee is plainly 
necessary. On the Buddhist notion, desert follows, through karman running through 
Relation R. If Relation R is ‘what matters’, the forensic notion becomes one of the 
assignee receiving the just due of the agent. Fitness and appropriateness are guaranteed. 
The same will be the case where concern for the future is in question. 
  The second point bears on the concern I should have for my future. It is here that the 
identity problem will be found to be acute. Parfit, rightly, sees it as many-faceted, and 
exposes it by way of well-chosen quotation. Here are three instances, the first, from 
Sidgwick, bearing on the Reductionist conception of the subject :
Why .. should one part of the series of feelings .. be 
more concerned with another part of the same series, 
any more than with any other series? 357
Parfit comments: ’Wiggins suggests that this question has no answer’. He goes on to 
quote Madell, exposing the hardly escapable self-concern attached to the problem: 
It is obvious that I have every reason to be concerned 
if the person who will be in pain is me, but it is not at 
355 LOCKE p.338
356 PARFIT(3) p.326
357 PARFIT(3)p.307. SIDGWICK, pp.418/19
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all obvious that I have any reason to be concerned 
about the fact that the person who will be in pain will 
have a certain set of memory impressions 358
Then, at the end of Part Three, there is this, from Haksar, bearing on general concern:
 .. if Parfit’s  .. theory is correct, if there are no 
persistent individuals (except in a trivial sense), why 
should we get so worked up about suffering in the 
world? Suffering would still be real, but how much 
worse it is when (intrinsically) the very same 
individual keeps suffering on and on.359 
  All three quotations tell the same story. Parfit now expresses their burden as the so-
called ‘Extreme Claim’. On this Claim, it follows from the reductionist view, whether 
Parfitian or Buddhist, that ‘we have no reason to be concerned about our own futures’ 
(Parfit’s emphasis). 360  In restating this claim a page later, Parfit puts it that ‘we have no 
reason to be specially concerned about our own futures’. The addition of ‘specially’ is 
significant, and it makes most sense to treat of this second version. The discussion that 
follows takes us to the heart of the identity problem, laying bare its intractable quality. 
Parfit considers the case of the Non-Reductionist who takes the ‘further fact’ to be the 
only defence against concession of the Extreme Claim. Suppose he then ceases to credit 
the ‘further fact’ and becomes a Reductionist. Does he have to concede the Extreme 
Claim or – instead – only what Parfit calls the Moderate Claim? The proponent of the 
Moderate Claim holds that Relation-R, in the absence of the ‘further fact’, is enough to 
give good grounds for special concern about the future.
  The discussion of the Extreme and Moderate Claims which follows ends on an 
inconclusive note. The Extreme Claim is ‘defensible’, but it can also be ‘defensively 
denied’.361 The Buddhist advocate is likely to be in the same state of indecision. In one 
respect, the Extreme Claim will be highly sympathetic: its acceptance will carry with it 
358 PARFIT(3) p.307
359 PARFIT(3)p.345
360 Op cit p.307.
361 Op cit p.312
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an undercutting of the grounds for egoistic self-concern. But this acceptance also makes 
it harder to continue to hold to a claim that seems of equal importance, which is that 
caught by the words, ’at that time Sariputta was X’.  Could X, many lives ago, have 
been in a state of indifference between a future life as Sariputta and one in hell? Here is 
the identity problem  at its plainest.
  A third claim is conceivable, though it is not one put forward by Parfit. It is founded on 
the possibility of my caring disinterestedly for the future of all sentient beings. It might 
then be claimed that I would be caring for my own future, as that category is one that 
must include myself, at least here and now. Parfit’s point is whether there are grounds 
for special concern for my future, when this future is a matter of Relation-R.  According 
to one’s view of this third claim, which I will call ‘minimal’, it either misses Parfit’s 
point or makes it irrelevant. I will not discuss this Minimal Claim here, but mention it 
here by way of putting up a marker. I will return to it below.
 
  Parfit seems to find the inconclusiveness of the argument by no means intolerable. He 
finds it possible to live with what amounts to the identity problem. He is far from 
finding in this an impulsion to moral scepticism. His position differs, of course, from 
the Buddhist’s in that he is in practice concerned only with a single life. In the normal 
case, the flow of series-persons sustained by Relation-R will bring about only that 
degree of difference between its first and last components which will leave many 
intuitions largely sustainable. The Buddhist advocate will not have this assurance, 
concerned as he is – at least in principle – with many lives and with large expanses of 
time. 
  From that perspective, there is little point in weighing up Parfit’s arguments, as they 
bear on the Extreme and Moderate Claims, or in tracing a path through the extensive 
debate which has resulted. From the Buddhist standpoint, the Extreme Claim would be 
better called the Extreme Negative Claim. For full reassurance, the Buddhist advocate 
needs to substantiate an Extreme Positive Claim, one which reflects the larger Buddhist 
concern. This would have to go so much beyond Parfit’s Moderate Claim that the 
substantiation (or not) of the Moderate Claim would add little to consideration of our 
prime concern . I will however return shortly to the persistent difficulty, in bringing up 
Paul Williams’ consideration of Santideva’s treatment of special concern for the future. 
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This is best dealt with in the context of Parfit’s exposition of a related question in Part 
Two.        
  Parfit’s second thoughts, expressed 1999, do not much advance matters from this. In 
summing up his exposition of INW, he concludes: ‘Even if this impersonal scheme is 
metaphysically no worse than ours, it might be worse in other ways’.362 He finds a good 
consequence of INW in its making easier a relative indifference to death, and the 
possibility of bad consequences in a weakening of sympathy for others and in 
indifference to morality. I will come back to the risk of this last consequence in my last 
chapter, remarking now only that, in these respects, the Buddhist and the Parfitian 
Reductionist are in much the same boat. 
64. ‘Can Parfit help?’ – a view from the side
  I end this discussion of Part Three by dealing briefly with a line of argument largely 
concerned with Parfit, but from another perspective. This has little direct bearing on our 
main concern but casts some useful illumination cast from the side. It is offered by 
Siderits in his book, Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy: Empty Persons.363 The 
first half of this work is given to Siderits’ vindication of a broadly Parfitian form of 
Reductionism, in the course of which he draws on arguments to be found within the 
Buddhist tradition. It will be apparent that his object in so proceeding is the reverse of 
my own. In the second half, Siderits considers the case for ‘anti-realism’, drawing again 
on the Buddhist tradition for support. The real threat to Parfitian Reductionism, he 
contends, comes from the anti-realist standpoint. In concluding, he recommends a 
stance of ‘ironic engagement’ – that of both seeing through useful assertions and 
sustaining them. Here, I can consider only what Siderits has to say about Reductionism. 
It should however be borne in mind that he goes on, after a fashion, to subvert his own 
arguments. In doing so, in the course of discussing ‘emptiness’, he raises questions in 
epistemology and semantics which could not be dealt with briefly.
362 PARFIT(6) pp.266/67.
363 Published in 2003. See SIDERITS. I have written more fully about Siderits 
elsewhere: see FARRINGTON.
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  There are two questions: whether Siderits makes out his own case, and whether I can 
draw on him for support in sustaining the reverse, yet not incompatible, position which I 
have been considering. In other words, can Siderits help?  In answer to this, one can say 
that Siderits brings out the compatibility of Buddhist and Parfitian arguments. To that 
extent he supports what I have said above.364 He also clarifies matters by placing the 
form of reductionism which he advocates on a scale, locating it between Non-
Reductionism and ‘Eliminativism’. Eliminativism is the account which cuts the person-
notion out of consideration. This ordering of conflicting views makes it possible to 
locate the Pudgalavada, which appears on the scale between Reductionism and Non-
Reductionism. 365 
  All this helps to clarify things. Its helpfulness in other ways is more dubious. Siderits’ 
own version of reductivism is notable for the detail of its specification. He goes beyond 
Parfit in the spelling out of what reductionism amounts to and how it works. 366 The 
person is seen as a congeries of elements, resembling an assembly or committee, so set 
up as to manage ‘its’ progress through experience in response to stimuli. What Siderits 
seems to suppose is a system driven by considerations of utility: the morality of ‘its’ 
actions is to be seen in terms of the minimisation of pain, its own and others’, and of 
serving the purposes of benevolence. This has to be ‘reductionism’, on Siderits’ range of 
options. It appears, however, more closely to resemble Siderits’ own ‘Eliminativism’ or 
the ‘hyper-reductionism’ of Parfit’s categorisation. It is hard to see how such a 
conception could support the ‘person’ of Parfitian Reductionism or that of Buddhist 
understanding. To the extent that it is persuasive, it is more likely to count the other 
way. As my account of his Reductionism version should have shown, Parfit maintains a 
delicate poise. If Siderits is right, this balance may be unsustainable.
 A reading of Siderits may prompt the thought that there are risks to any project of 
supporting Buddhist positions by way of recourse to contemporary Western philosophy. 
Matilal might have had such an instance in mind in observing that ‘Buddhism … should 
distance itself from modern reductionism … In spite of the allure of the moral theory it 
364 SIDERITS, chapters 1 and 2.
365 Siderits also distinguishes reductive and non-reductive ‘mereological 
supervenience’ – that is, the supervenience of the person on the skandhāḥ, which is 
non-reductive for the Pudgalavada.
366 SIDERITS, Chapter Three, especially p.47 and after.
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seems to endorse … [reductionism] seems to be of one piece with modern 
naturalism’.367 He goes on: ‘It may be necessary to revive, within the modern Western 
analytical circle, the old classical Indian or the eighteenth-century Western (anti-
scientist) ‘pre-modern’ concern for the dignity of human nature’. This line of thought 
deserves to be considered more fully than is possible here. It does not, I think, tell 
against my considering how far Parfit’s aguments may be open to appropriation in 
support of Buddhist notions. It is telling in registering the gulf between Parfit’s broadly 
Utilitarian presumptions and those of the Buddhist tradition. 368  Parfit ‘helps’, so far as 
he does, as much as in being open to appropriation, as in being truly sympathetic.
65. What does Part Three establish?
  A solution to the identity problem must have three components. First, it must make 
intelligible the Buddhist account of the subject. Parfit’s arguments for Reductionism 
offer strong support forwhat I have called the ‘weak’ notion. Anyone concerned to make 
the case for this central part of Buddhist metaphysics now has available arguments of 
striking ingenuity which, if Parfit is right, offer powerful support. For all the baldness of 
his reference to the Buddha as a predecessor, Parfit’s assurance of a convergence 
between his position and the Buddhists’ seems well grounded. 
  The second and third components of a solution are more problematic. The second must 
make intelligible the connection between subjects over time. This connection needs to 
be shown to obtain both within a lifetime and across lifetimes. It must make it possible 
to understand how Sariputta goes on being Sariputta, and also how, and in what sense, 
Sariputta was X, a living thing at a time gone by.  Parfit’s account of Relation-R and of 
‘series-persons’ offers a way of understanding this. This account is suggestive and, to 
that extent, helpful. It seems to mark out a way in which rebirth might be intelligible. 
The question remains whether it does any more.
367 See The Perception of Self in the Indian Tradition, contained in MATILAL, pp 299-
314. I quote from p.312.
368 I have in mind the presumption that human happiness is what matters, and that 
the more there is of it the better. This understanding in terms of quantum puts 
Parfit’s a long way from any ‘virtue ethics’ conception, whether Aristotelian or 
Buddhist. 
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 Third, a solution must show that the subject has grounds for concern for the future, in 
particular for the future of what he will conceive of as himself. I took the case of 
Sariputta (‘at that time Sariputta was X’) as a typical instance of what we find claimed, 
and of what needs to be vindicated. Sariputta should be concerned for the future of 
Sariputta. X must find a motivation to action or abstention in the prospect of being 
reborn as Sariputta. Here, as we have just seen, there is little help to be found in Parfit. 
Parfit finds the Moderate Claim defensible, but does not venture to exclude the Extreme 
Claim, that ‘we have no reason to be specially concerned about our own futures’. In this 
respect, Parfit sees what I have called the identity problem and leaves it open and 
unresolved. 
66. Parts One and Two of  Reasons and Persons  
   There is nothing in the earlier Parts of Reasons and Persons which bears as directly 
on the identity problem as does the argument of Part Three. There is a less direct 
bearing, which is important. Part Two has an extended discussion of reasons for action, 
extending to a sympathetic presentation of disinterestedness. Part Two also treats more 
fully than Part Three of the Buddha and his teaching. It presents Parfit’s critical view of 
the ethics associated with certain religions, Buddhism among them. This can be seen as 
the basis of the plea for ‘non-religious ethics’ with which the work concludes. In all this, 
we find an oddly ambivalent view of the Buddha. In the Concluding Chapter the 
Buddha appears as a probable precursor within the field of non-religious ethics, after 
having figured earlier as a proponent of notions inseparable from what Parfit is 
criticising. This ambivalence – or confusion – is, I will suggest, capable of being 
removed, to the advantage both of proponents of Buddhism and of defenders of Parfit. 
In what follows, I will be concerned almost entirely with Part Two. I start, however, 
with Part One, which marks out the concerns of Part Two.
67. Part One: a clearing of the ground
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  Part One clears the ground with its consideration of reasons for action.  Parfit opens 
with the question: ‘What do we have most reason to do?’ Answers to questions such as 
this, wide and generalised in their scope, amount to ‘theories’. He goes on:
We can describe all theories by saying what they tell 
us to try to achieve. According to all moral theories, 
we ought to try to act morally. According to all 
theories about rationality, we ought to try to act 
rationally. Call these our formal aims. Different moral 
theories, and different theories about rationality, give 
us different substantive aims. 369 
This process is best illustrated by Parfit’s own examples. These are presented as current 
and influential and, I think, as having an intuitive appeal and a certain obviousness.370 
One such is the Self-interest Theory – which Parfit calls S. This is a theory about 
rationality:
S gives to each person this aim: the outcomes that 
would be best for himself, and that would make his 
life go, for him, as well as possible. 371
Another, about morality, is Consequentialism, Parfit’s C. Another is the Present-aim 
Theory, Parfit’s P. 372
  Part One is entitled “Self-Defeating Theories’. A theory is self-defeating if acting on it 
works against the achievement of its aim. An instance of this, on Parfit’s showing, is a 
version of P. P ‘tells each to do what will best achieve his present aims’. 373  Parfit 
deploys arguments making use of dilemmas to show the weakness of this simple 
version. 374 If he is right, P can be charged with being self-defeating in the longer-term: 
369 PARFIT(3) p.3
370 As we shall see, the procedure follows Sidgwick’s isolation of his ‘methods’ in The 
Methods of Ethics.
371 PARFIT (3) p.3
372 I will follow Parfit in using such abbreviations.
373 PARFIT(3) p.92
374 Such as the familiar Prisoner’s Dilemma
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follow P, and on each occasion I may do best on P’s terms but worse overall than by 
doing S.  Part One is in large part given over to consideration of such cases. S is 
appraised against the same criteria. The distinction between the formal and substantial is 
plainly to the point. A particular application of S or P might be found to be self-
defeating, but that does not dispose of S or of P; the form of coherent rational action 
may still be of such a kind.
  Beyond this, Parfit considers Common-Sense Morality and finds it in need of revision. 
Close analysis shows that theories of rationality and morality may be taken to ground 
particular applications that are self-defeating. The broad conclusion, expressed most 
clearly only at the end of the whole work, is that our morality needs to become more 
impersonal. Self-concern of a kind natural in a context in which the consequences of 
actions were more readily seen is now – so goes the argument – likely to be bad for us. 
Later in the work, when Parfit enlarges on the ‘liberating’ aspect of the case for 
Reductionism, we can see the point of having this argument and that of Part Three 
within the same covers. 
68. Part Two: the method of  The Methods of Ethics  
  I simplify greatly and for my own purpose, but not, I think, in a disabling way, in 
saying that Part Two has as its prime concern the reasoned rejection of S. The ending of 
Part One has been inconclusive, insofar as Parfit has not disposed of S – of S as a theory 
about rationality – by way of bringing out its vulnerability to self-defeat. The rebuttal of 
S is the thread which can be seen to run through an argument of great complexity from 
the opening of Part One to the close of Part Two. I need to give some account of it, as I 
will argue that the conclusion is one which the Buddhist advocate should find 
congenial.
  We will not go very far into Reasons and Persons before we come to appreciate that 
Parfit’s S is related – just how is the question – to one of the ‘methods’ which Sidgwick 
styled Egoism. Parfit deals with Sidgwick as he deals with Locke, drawing on him to 
suit his own immediate purposes. There need be no complaint about this use of a 
predecessor, but it comes at a price. Sidgwick’s own position becomes plain only in part 
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and by degrees. This can be perplexing. I start therefore with some account of The 
Methods of Ethics.  375  
  By ‘methods’ Sidgwick means ways of proceeding, viewed systematically and 
critically. To quote his own words, from his opening paragraph, a ‘method’ is ‘any 
rational procedure by which we determine what individual human beings ‘ought’ - or 
what it is ‘right’ for them - to do ...’ A ‘method’, so defined, may be found articulated by 
anyone sufficiently aware of his practice. Viewed uncritically and in isolation, any one 
method may seem to enjoy a self-evident cogency. A properly critical approach is likely 
to weaken this assurance, and to call its rationale into question. Sidgwick therefore 
brings the various methods he finds employed under three heads. This restriction by 
way of categorisation, which much of the first Book is given over to making and 
justifying, is the method of The Methods of Ethics.
   The term, ‘method,’ has to be considered in relation to ends. Here, Sidgwick takes it 
that  ‘the only two ends which have a strongly and widely supported claim to be 
regarded as rational ultimate ends are ..... Happiness and Perfection or Excellence of 
human nature ..’ 376   Happiness as an ultimate is found to be divisible into that of the 
individual and that of the generality. Perfection or Excellence is found to be deeply 
connected with the exercise of the virtues and with a focus on the rightness of actions 
per se. On this view there are three ends and no more, to which the whole work is 
devoted by way of their consideration as ‘methods’. These are Egoism, the end that is 
happiness in individualist terms; Intuitionism, as Sidgwick terms the focus on 
Perfection, our power ‘of seeing what actions are in themselves right and reasonable’; 
and Utilitarianism. All other apparent ends may, on Sidgwick’s account, be subsumed 
under these three.
  After much consideration, Sidgwick finds the methods of Intuitionism and 
Utilitarianism to be compatible - indeed, to need each other. The distinct method of 
Egoism remains. Sidgwick judges, unwillingly, that Egoism cannot be argued down. He 
375 SIDGWICK. Parfit holds Henry Sidgwick (1838 – 1900) to be a figure of prime 
significance. See PARFIT (3), sec. 67: ‘I would prefer to have lived through the 
previous centuries, having had among my friends Hume, Byron, Chekhov, 
Nietzsche, and Sidgwick’.
376 SIDGWICK p.9
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refers to ‘an ultimate and fundamental contradiction’. 377  In other words Egoism cannot 
be squared with Utilitarianism, now with its Intuitionist grounding. It cannot, Sidgwick 
concedes, be shown to be in the Egoist’s interest to act altruistically, in the Utilitarian’s 
sense of this term. This conclusion, on which The Methods of Ethics will end, is 
indicated early on. In a note to Chapter 6 of Book 1 Sidgwick criticises Bentham’s 
doctrine, as he understands it, ‘that it is always the individual’s true interest, even from 
a purely mundane point of view, to act in the manner most conducive to the general 
happiness’. He comments (my underlining), ‘this .... which I regard as erroneous  ... 
may be inferred’. 378 Here is the point - the piece of unfinished business - that Parfit 
picks up.
69. The Self-interest Theory (S) and Sidgwick’s Egoism
  I have not yet brought out the various forms in which S is to be found, or the care with 
which Parfit distinguishes them. Three of the most plausible receive a brief summary at 
the start of Reasons and Persons: they are the Hedonistic, the Desire-Fulfilment and the 
Objective List Theories.379 It may be enough to say that Parfit’s designation of each 
variant gives a sufficient impression of its scope: it is clear that there can be different 
criteria for my life going, for me, as well as possible and, I think, it may be granted that 
what the variants have in common characterises S well enough for the purpose. Parfit 
has said, at the very start: ’On all theories, the Hedonistic Theory is at least part of the 
truth. To save words, this will sometimes be the only part that I discuss’.380 This may be 
so, though for most of Part Two the Desire-Fulfilment version is the more prominent 
and, it seems, the one principally under discussion.
  It is in the passages within Part Two where S is most clearly under attack that two 
features of the Theory – two which Parfit holds to be of the essence – are most in play. 
These are that S is neutral across time and that it is biased towards the self. 381 The latter 
needs no stating as an aspect of a Self-interest Theory; the former is only slightly less 
377 SIDGWICK p.508
378 Op cit p.88
379 PARFIT(3) p.4. The variants are considered much more fully at Appendix I. 
380 Op cit. p.4
381 PARFIT(3) Part Two passim.
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obvious, as concern for total well-being can readily be seen to have a temporal 
extension, with equality of concern along the extension. Both features are defining 
characteristics also of Sidgwick’s Egoism. In the case of the former, we find:
… this equal and impartial concern for all parts of 
one’s conscious life is perhaps the most prominent 
element in the common notion of the rational – as 
opposed to the merely impulsive – pursuit of 
pleasure.382 
In the case of the latter, Sidgwick relies on the acceptance of the principle as obvious:
  .. . the wide acceptance of the principle that it is 
reasonable for a man to act in the manner most 
conducive to his own happiness.383
It must be a question how Sidgwick’s Egoism and Parfit’s S are, together, to be 
understood. The terms themselves suggest an identity. This is however declared only 
rather late. As the work proceeds, the identity of S with Egoism - if identity it is - seems 
increasingly obvious. It is not however stated explicitly before section 54, entitled 
‘Sidgwick’s Suggestions’: 
Sidgwick’s Egoistic Prudence is the Self-interest 
Theory about rationality 384
It is the main concern of the first half of Reasons and Persons to rebut S. Part Two ends 
with the claim that this has been done. In effect, this is a claim on Parfit’s part to have 
gone beyond his master. Are matters so straightforward? Egoism is a method in ethics, 
while S is a theory about rationality. In section 49, Parfit writes:
 A moral theory asks, not ‘What is rational?’, but 
‘What is right?’. Sidgwick thought that these two 
382 SIDGWICK, p.124 footnote.
383 Op cit p.119
384 PARFIT(3) p.138
174
questions were, in the end, the same, since they were 
both about what we had most reason to do  .....   A 
century later, these two questions seem further apart . 
385
As a demonstration why Sidgwick was mistaken, as he seems to be judged to be, this is 
too bald to convey much. None the less, we can see why Parfit insists on the distinction. 
The approach that goes along with it allows the irrebutability of Egoism to be 
considered outside Sidgwick’s self-imposed framework; only so, it seems, in different 
dress, can it be found rebuttable.
  Sidgwick’s Egoism may have its origins, at least in part, in Aristotle. This is suggested 
by Sidgwick’s evident concern to distinguish what he calls Egoism from Self-
Realisation:
 …. We must discard a common account of Egoism 
which describes its ultimate end as the ‘good’ of the 
individual; for the term ‘good’ may cover all possible 
views of rational conduct. 386
The objective caught by such passages as this may be seen as a decided and conscious 
narrowing of the complex account of the good to be found in the Nicomachean Ethics. 
This narrowing may then be seen as the bringing about something more coherent. It is 
the isolation of a strain that has often been remarked in Aristotle, for instance by Ross. 
Commenting on Aristotle’s presentation of the megalopsuchos (great-souled man), Ross 
remarks: ‘The passage merely betrays somewhat nakedly the self-absorption which is 
the bad side of Aristotle’s ethics’. 387 It seems fair to say that Sidgwick isolates this ‘bad 
side’ as a ‘method’, and surveys it on its merits. Parfit will argue down and, on his own 
view, defeat what Sidgwick felt compelled to let pass. 
  This is not all that might have found its first prompting in Aristotle. The emphasis on 
‘equal and impartial concern for all parts of one’s conscious life …’, in the passage 
385 PARFIT(3) p.129
386 SIDGWICK p.91
387 ROSS p.208.
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quoted above, recalls Aristotle’s stress on ‘the whole life’ as the locus of consideration 
and concern. 388 This will be of the essence both of Sidgwick’s Egoism and of the Self-
interest Theory. I deal below with Parfit’s association of these theories, which he is 
concerned to rebut, with prominent strands in traditional religion. He might, it seems, 
have pointed also to a distinguished philosophical grounding. 
70  . Karman   in Sidgwick and Parfit 
  At the very end of The Methods of Ethics there is some discussion of how it could be 
made to be in the Egoist’s interest to act on Bentham’s principle – that is, ‘ .. in the 
manner most conducive to the general happiness’. On the postulate of God and of an 
apparatus of divine reward and punishment this could be made to be the case, but at the 
price of the sacrifice of the autonomy of ethics. Just after this, there is a tantalising 
reference in a footnote to karman, though Sidgwick does not use the word. He 
understands the Buddhist notion perfectly well, remarkably so for his time:
 In the Buddhist creed this notion of the rewards 
inseparably attaching to right conduct seems to have 
been developed in a far more elaborate and systematic 
manner than it has in any phase of Christianity. But, as 
conceived by enlightened Buddhists, these rewards 
are not distributed by the volition of a Supreme 
Person, but by the natural operation of an impersonal 
Law. 389 
 Marginal in its context, the point made is central to the concern of this thesis. What 
Sidgwick should have told us is whether he judges this ‘natural operation’  - as if one of 
divine action, but stripped of its divinity - to be open to the objection that he finds 
attached to divine action of the familiar kind. One thing seems clear that Sidgwick 
would not have denied. That is that the karman-postulate, if it should be substantiated, 
would give the problem quite a different look.
388 ARISTOTLE (3) 1098a
389 SIDGWICK p.507. The use of the word ‘enlightened’ is unhappy in this context. 
Sidgwick means ‘sophisticated’.
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  We find no such direct concern with karman-doctrine in Parfit, but it is this that Parfit 
is describing when he deals with the influence of religion on morality, at least with that 
of the Buddhist strand within such influences. He takes a high view of what he is doing 
in attempting to dislodge S. He sees S as having been dominant for centuries, having 
been shored up by calculations of religious origin, whether of divine judgment or of 
consequence by way of reincarnation. On such a view, karman - or K - is one 
expression of S. An S-theorist may become a Buddhist, and so take K as a guiding 
principle. He may come to see the need to modify his conduct in line with his newly 
acquired sense of what is kuśala and what akuśala. The shape and determination of his 
moral programme will, however, remain the same, even if its contents are somewhat 
different. He will continue to be concerned for the outcome that ‘would be best for 
himself, and that would make his life go, for him, as well as possible’. K, if he comes to 
accept it, will give him the assurance of achievement. 
  Parfit deals nowhere with the Buddha’s teaching of K, and the range of application of 
the karman-notion is, therefore, nowhere brought out. His few references to the Buddha 
are approbatory. This is no doubt because he recognises the closeness of his and the 
Buddha’s notions of the person. Beyond this, he sees the Buddha as a likely 
predecessor, one of only a few, in the field of non-religious ethics:
 … before the recent past, very few Atheists made 
Ethics their life’s work. Buddha may be among this 
few …390
 In its place at the very end of the work, this reference has a strong emphasis.
71.  Karman  and self-interest  
 
390 PARFIT (3) p.453
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  In the following paragraphs I shall consider the application of the karman-notion with 
a view to seeing how it interacts with other parts of Parfit’s presentation. K may be 
clarified and made more accessible thereby, to the advantage of its deployment in 
Buddhist ethics. For this purpose, I will take K to cover the first three applications only 
of those listed in Chapter Three. 391 It will be recalled that K1 is both the method and the 
fruit of self-training and moral discipline; K2 is the particular retribution and reward of 
action, maybe shocking and sometimes much deferred. K3 is the extension over more 
than one life of K1 and K2. I shall normally refer to ‘K’, being more specific only 
where necessary.
  The application of K which fits with Egoism and S, is - very largely - K2. Parfit 
therefore seems to have real grounds for associating certain strains of religious practice 
with support for S. The following puts the point forcibly, if in a way that betrays 
simplification:
The Self-interest Theory has long been dominant. It 
has been assumed, for more than two millennia, that it 
is irrational for anyone to do what he knows will be 
worse for himself. Christian writers have assumed 
this, since, if Christianity is true, morality and self-
interest coincide. If wrongdoers know that they will 
go to Hell, each will know, that in acting wrongly, he 
is doing what will be worse for himself. Christians 
have been glad to appeal to the Self-interest Theory, 
since on their assumptions S implies that knaves are 
fools. Similar remarks apply to Moslems, many 
Buddhists, and Hindus. 392 (My underlining)
The demolition of S may therefore tell at least against the doctrine of these ‘many 
Buddhists’. I have already suggested that Parfit seems none too sure what to make of K 
in its Buddhist expression, or indeed what to make of the Buddha. 
391 K4 and K5 are special cases, which can be disregarded here.
392 PARFIT (3) p.130
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72. The rebuttal of the Self-interest Theory
  K has a much wider range of application than Parfit appreciates. In what follows, I will 
suggest that there are some understandings which sort happily with alternatives to S. 
This is important, as it would be a substantial point against Buddhism if Parfit were 
correct in taking the Buddhist understanding of K to be one that sorted only with S, and 
were then persuasively to rebut S. If there are understandings of  K which sort with 
some preferable alternatives to S, Parfit’s vindication of these alternatives, or of any one 
of them, will be welcome. 
 The rebuttal of S – that is, of ‘philosophical’ or ‘principled’ selfishness, as it may be 
called - may be taken to entail that of Egoism, on Sidgwick’s account of it. It may also 
entail the rebuttal of what may be called ‘unprincipled’ or ‘vulgar’ egoism, the 
‘selfishness’ described by Sidgwick at the end of ‘The Methods of Ethics”. This comes 
at the very point where he is conceding the ‘fundamental contradiction’ which, I have 
suggested, Parfit offers to resolve. Vulgar egoism is described with some energy: 
 .. amid all the profuse waste of the means of 
happiness which men commit there is no imprudence 
more flagrant than that of Selfishness in the ordinary 
sense of the term, - that excessive concentration of 
attention on the individual’s own happiness … the 
selfish man misses the sense of elevation and 
enlargement given by wide interests; he misses the 
more secure and serene satisfaction that attends 
continually on activities directed towards ends more 
stable in prospect than an individual’s happiness can 
be …. (my underlining). 393
If we are concerned with how far Parfit can help, then on these successive grounds the 
rebuttal of S may be a welcome move. It appears to have wide-ranging consequences 
393 SIDGWICK p.501
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and to bear on a state of affairs where the identity problem remains intractable. To the 
extent that this intractability is damaging to the scheme of Buddhist ethics, a persuasive 
conclusion against Egoism (or selfishness), whether ‘philosophical’ or ‘vulgar’, may be 
a reinforcement of the scheme.
  Parfit’s arguments against S are extended and complex, going far wider than our own 
immediate concern. It therefore seems enough to state the outcome, then to consider 
whatever pertinent points the course of argument brings out. The outcome is that S is 
brought under attack as being doubtfully coherent, as being ‘a hybrid theory’.  As such, 
it is found to fail. The attack comes from two sides at once. It comes, first, from the 
standpoint of morality (M). Though Parfit nowhere says much to explain what he means 
by M, it seems safe to take it to be Sidgwick’s two remaining (and reconciled) Methods, 
those that become Intuitionism-with-Utilitarianism. One reason for so doing is that it is 
this conjunction that must come to seem decisively preferable to Egoism if Sidgwick’s 
outstanding problem is to be solved. It also fits with this presumption that Parfit finds M 
to be associated with Neutralism. This is Parfit’s term for agent-neutral theory. If M is 
what I have taken it to be, it will have that grounding in generalisability and impartiality 
that seems to sort well with Neutralism. 
  The attack comes, second, from what Parfit calls the Critical version of the Present-
aim Theory (CP). CP is a version of P that has self-criticism built into it. CP holds that 
some desires are intrinsically irrational, and so no reason for action, and that some 
desires are rationally required. 394 In offering it, Parfit stands out against the Humean 
tradition which has it that a desire cannot be per se rational or irrational. Rebuttal is by 
way of counter-examples. The upshot is that CP, as a theory of rationality, is found to 
defeat S. This is not quite the common case of one theory being found more persuasive 
than another. CP is not one such - delimited – theory: it is, rather, one of exceptional 
scope. One form of CP might be S. This would be the case of finding in a particular 
instance, after the appraisal that is of the essence of CP, that one’s best present aim is S. 
On another occasion, CP might require M. As Parfit says in his conclusion, ‘if we accept 
CP, we could claim that it is rationally required that our strongest desire be to avoid 
394 PARFIT (3) p.118
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acting wrongly’. 395  This is not the claim that CP and M coincide. Moral considerations 
cannot be the sole ground of action. 396
 
  On account of this width of scope, CP may seem a vacuous theory. Parfit is aware of 
this: ‘Remember finally that every possible theory about rationality is one version of 
CP’. 397  He explains that he is far from meaning that no purported version of CP should 
be rejected: a theory may fall short of the standards of CP by virtue of being biased or 
irrational. S is to be taken, in general, as a theory to be rejected. This being Parfit’s 
approach, I am inclined to take CP as a theory about theories about rationality - that is, 
to be a contribution to metatheory. This is not how Parfit puts it, but I believe it to be 
faithful to his line of argument to take CP as a theory of theories, specifying the 
standards a theory must reach for it to be worth considering.
73. The Self-interest Theory and the self
  The identity problem is at the heart of the clash between S and CP, which turns in large 
part on the recurrent charge of ‘hybridity’. It is of the essence of S that I want the best 
for myself over my whole life. I act therefore, if a follower of S, with a bias towards 
myself, and so with no interpersonal neutrality, yet with indifference, or a degree of 
indifference, with regard to timing, and so with intertemporal  neutrality. As Parfit puts 
it, ‘ ... the word ‘I’ refers to a particular person in the same way in which the word ‘now’ 
refers to a particular time. And when each of us is deciding what to do, he is asking, 
‘What shall I do now? Given the analogy between ‘I’ and ‘now’, a theory ought to give 
both the same treatment.’ 398 On Parfit’s view, P is a theory that fails to do this.
  The implications for the identity problem should be apparent. The discussion is one of 
the questions, ‘Who?’ and ‘When?’. Any response to the challenge, ‘Why should I give 
weight to aims that are not mine?’, will bring both into play, as the counter-challenge 
will be, ‘Why should you give weight now to aims that are not yours now?’. Recall the 
skandha-analysis of the subject and the karman-doctrine, and the questions they raise 
395 PARFIT(3) p.194
396 Op cit p.133
397 Op cit p.194
398 Op cit p.140
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can be seen to lie within the same discussion. How should we understand the subject? 
What is its future and what are the concerns of its future? Who will experience the 
realisation of the ‘aims’ that are postulated?
  
  This is the best moment to turn to some highly relevant consideration of the same 
question by Paul Williams. 399 This is founded on discussion of a verse in a celebrated 
Mahayana text, Santideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra, written in Sanskrit long after the end of 
our period: 
Tadduḥkhena na me bādhety ato yadi na rakṣyate ׀ 
nāgāmikāyaduḥkhān me bādhā tat kena rakṣyate ‌‌ ‌
 Williams translates literally:
Supposing one says that the suffering that happens to 
that [other] person does no harm to me, therefore 
(s)he should not be protected against [it] then since 
the sufferings of future bodies also is doing no harm 
[to you now] why is that to be protected against? 400
I paraphrase as follows:
If it should be said that the suffering of someone else 
does no harm to me, with the suggestion that I need 
not intervene to prevent it, then the response should 
be that future suffering does no harm to me now, yet 
I do not think that it is not worth preventing.
 Williams explains: ‘Santideva had already urged that suffering is to be removed simply 
because it is suffering … The fact that the suffering is mine does not make it morally 
more significant’.401 He now goes on to consider the force of this argument, drawing on 
399 WILLIAMS P: Ch.2. 
400 Verse 8.97. See WILLIAMS P p.30.
401 Op cit p.30
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the extensive Tibetan commentary  (where I can make no pretence of following him) 
and on Parfit.
  I simplify a complex argument by saying that, on Santideva’s view, whoever suffers, in 
line with karman, the future consequences of my present actions will not be me, and 
that he or she is as much other to me in this present life as contemporary others are other 
than me. 402  Therefore, if I am concerned to minimise future suffering, I should – to be 
consistent – be equally concerned to minimise the present suffering of my 
contemporaries. Here is a conclusion to a fair degree in line with Parfit’s in Part Two. 
Though Parfit lacks the Buddhist notion of karmic consequence, he has the concern for 
the future which makes up one part of it. It was this concern which prompted his 
inconclusive discussion of his Extreme and Moderate Claims. He differs from Santideva 
in lacking also the ideal of general benevolence. In his concern with consistency, he 
agrees with Santideva, but he cannot resolve his indecision over his two Claims by 
dissolving the difference between them in an invocation of such benevolence.
  It is important to note here that consistency can be two-edged. Williams finds it 
arguable that reflection on Santideva’s argument should lead us to conclude that it can, 
disconcertingly, be reversed. It is also largely Parfit’s view. I might conclude, therefore, 
that I have no grounds to care about my future - that is, I take Parfit’s Extreme View – 
and have therefore no reason to care for other contemporary beings. I will come back 
below to this resonant riposte, which I find telling.
  These are points on which Parfit’s master has already declared himself, not - Parfit 
judges - very happily. Parfit’s own discussion is prefaced by an extended quotation from 
Sidgwick, in which he judges Sidgwick to ‘go astray’. 403  Sidgwick, it seems, asked the 
‘Who?’ and ‘When?’ questions with two different notions of personal identity in mind 
The inter-personal question has behind it the sort of notion which Parfit will go on to 
criticise in Part Three; the inter-temporal question has behind it a ‘reductionist’, 
Humean, notion. Parfit finds that, ‘the two ...  cannot both be well grounded’. 404
402 At least in this context, Santideva seems to go beyond Buddhaghosa in judging 
‘his’ successor entity to be ‘other’ – without qualification. This is made clear in the 
verse immediately following the one quoted.
403 SIDGWICK p.418/19. PARFIT(3) p.137/38.
404 PARFIT(3) p.139. 
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74. How should  karman   be understood? 
   It should be evident that K - more especially K1 - sorts well with CP. This is to say 
that Parfit is wrong in his exclusive identification of it with S, but successful in 
providing a conceptual structure in which the mistake is readily corrigible. He will also 
be found to be right - without quite understanding how or why - in his appropriation of 
the Buddha as an ally. K, or at least a main strand of K, corresponds to CP because the 
training, self-discipline and self-cultivation (bhāvānā), which are of the essence of K1, 
are as ‘karmic’ as the concern with reward and retribution. K can therefore readily 
accommodate the need to appraise motivations, judge the rationality of desires, and 
train and develop the heart. K can very well accommodate the self-sacrificing action 
which, Parfit suggests may be required by CP. An example of this last is what Parfit 
calls My Heroic Death. This is required by the form of CP which Parfit labels CP2. 
‘There is at least one desire that is not irrational, and is no less rational than the bias in 
one’s own favour. This is the desire to do what is in the interests of other people, when 
this is either morally admirable, or one’s moral duty’.405 It may be misleading to speak 
of Buddhist concurrence with  this judgment, as its terminology  implies a conceptual 
scheme far removed from anything Buddhist. 406 It can however be claimed that the 
Buddhist tradition prompts action of the same order as the ‘heroic death’ which Parfit 
proceeds to describe, stating the obvious in adding, ‘This version of CP conflicts with 
S’. In this sense, there is a concurrence, which is well caught by a Pali Jataka story. 407 
The Bodhisatta (Buddha-to-be), embodied as a hare, moved by compassion for some 
hungry people, jumps into the pot over the fire. Parfit’s words, applied to his own 
example, seem to catch what the hare might say:  ‘I am doing what, knowing the facts 
and thinking clearly, I most want to do, and what best fulfils my present desires ..... I 
also know that I am doing what will be worse for me …’.  
  
405 Op cit, p131
406 This can be illustrated by pointing to the remarkable difficulty of translating 
Parfit’s words into Sanskrit or Pali.
407 No.316. This is a series of moralised folk tales, a component of the Khuddaka 
Nikāya, presenting the Buddha in his previous lives, often those of an animal.
184
  A critic might riposte to the hare/Bodhisatta that, in doing what is worse for him, he is 
doing what is best for him. K, even as K1, ensures that. On a long-view he cannot be 
worse off. Acceptance of this does not however entail acceptance of what Sidgwick 
calls ‘psychological Hedonism’ and Parfit ‘Psychological Egoism’. This is, in brief, the 
doctrine that I cannot but do what is, by some process of definition, in my interest. On 
this, I need say only that I find Parfit’s dismissal of it fully persuasive. 408 He plausibly 
claims that the doctrine may be made trivially true - by definition - but is otherwise 
rebuttable by observation. I think we are inclined to view the Bodhisatta sacrificing 
himself much as we view the case of Captain Oates walking out into the blizzard. To 
judge Oates to be self-interested - he was doing what he wanted - seems sustainable 
only on the trite, purely definitional, grounds I have just criticised. The same conclusion 
seems applicable to the hare or to some unknown practitioner acting with something 
like the hare’s sympathies.
75. Part Four of  Reasons and Persons  
  I complete this consideration of Reasons and Persons by touching briefly on Part Four. 
This is entitled ‘Future Generations’ and is concerned with how these generations 
should be regarded and with how a moral concern for them should be applied. It opens 
with some account of how persons are individuated by their genetic make-up. Parfit 
declares his concern to be with personal identity ‘in different possible histories of the 
world’.409 This is to be distinguished from the subject of Part Three, personal identity 
over time. Concerned to make a modest and, he supposes, uncontroversial, statement of 
the facts, Parfit offers the following, his Time-dependence Claim:
If any particular person had not been conceived 
within a month of the time when he was in fact 
conceived, he would in fact never have existed. 410
The words, ‘in fact’, should be noted. Parfit wishes to sidestep any treatment of the 
necessary properties of a person. He presents various views of these properties, but 
408 PARFIT (3) sec.48 
409 Op cit p.351
410 PARFIT (3) p.352
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declares that the holders of all plausible views would agree with him, if not about what 
could have happened, then about what would in fact have happened. A person is what he 
or she is by virtue of the fusion of male and female genetic material peculiar to a 
particular act of intercourse. It follows that, if I had not come into being when I did, I 
would almost certainly never have come into being. 411 Very slight adjustments to the 
conditioning factors – of great complexity – that brought about particular acts of 
intercourse would have resulted in the coming-into-being of different people. 412 When 
therefore, we consider the differing effects on future generations of differing practices 
and policies, we are not comparing the consequences for the same people. Differing 
practices and policies will have generated differing consequences, which will have 
brought about distinct future generations. It seems that this must affect our sense of 
what we are doing when we appraise consequences.
 Realisation of this opens the door to an argument which may be found disconcerting. 
Acting so as to damage the living-conditions of a future generation may be a matter of 
indifference, if a different and less damaging course of action would have brought into 
being different people. If the lives of those belonging to the former hypothetical 
generation are going to be at least worth living (Parfit’s phrase), what – on a proper 
view - will they have to complain about? If things had been different, they would never 
have existed. Parfit dislikes this conclusion and, to avoid it, claims that a policy or 
decision may be bad even if it cannot be shown to be bad for anyone in particular. He 
does not discuss the possibility of the same being the case with policies and decisions 
we hold to be good, but this seems a natural extension of the claim.
  Part Four has too little bearing on the identity problem to need to be treated at length, 
but I should point out one development of this argument to which I will refer in the next 
chapter. The case Parfit imagines is one of a great increase in population, where very 
many people lead lives which are just worthwhile. As he puts it:
411 Exactly the same combination of genes carried by a particular ovum and a 
particular spermatozoon may be possible, as it might occur twice within a period of 
a few days, but such an outcome is, clearly, unlikely in the extreme. 
412 Consider how easily it could have been the case that any particular set of parents 
never met, let alone how easily any instance of sexual congress might have been 
anticipated or deferred.
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For any possible population of at least ten 
billion people [Parfit’s argument requires this 
figure], all with a very high quality of life, 
there must be some much larger imaginable 
population whose existence, if other things are 
equal, would be better, even though its 
members have lives that are barely worth 
living. 413
How should we value this state of affairs, when we compare it with one of a greatly 
smaller total within which many people lead lives which are much more than just 
worthwhile? The aggregate of satisfaction is higher in the former case, while common 
intuition rates the latter case more highly. Parfit finds the conclusion just quoted 
‘repugnant’, while finding it not easily avoided. Here, it seems, is a problem.414 While I 
cannot consider it here as it deserves, I will touch in Chapter Six on those broader 
presumptions of Parfit’s which make it natural for him to bring up the difficulty..
  What is to the point is Parfit’s concern for future generations. We saw from the 
Mettāsutta that the expression and direction of mettā was toward ‘those-wishing-to-be-
born’, as well as to the living. 415 Parfit’s emphasis is fully compatible with this, 
however limited the relevance of his immediate concerns to the present argument. I will 
pick up this concern for future generations in Chapter Seven.
  
76. Conclusion
  Here I limit myself to what I take to have been established by my review of Parts One 
and Two of Reasons & Persons.  Part Three has been dealt with above, and I need say 
no more about Part Four. I believe that I have shown how the karman-notion (K) is a 
presence in the argument of both Sidgwick and Parfit. Both are aware of it, and their 
treatment is in part - not a large part - explicit. Parfit identifies K with the Self-interest 
413 PARFIT(3) p.398
414 In this paragraph I am summarising, and greatly simplifying, what Parfit sets out 
on pages 382 to 390.
415 Section 18
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Theory (S), which is itself to be identified, in a way that is not straightforward, with the 
Egoism of Sidgwick’s discussion. S is a theory of rationality, taken by Parfit to be 
dominant and uncritically accepted. Parfit presents arguments for taking S to be ‘hybrid’ 
and so, to a degree, incoherent. Though preferable to the naive form of the Present-aim 
Theory (P), S falls to be superseded by the critical version of P, CP. If we hold to S, K 
will suffer the damage inflicted on S. I argue that K, properly understood, is to be 
associated with CP rather than with S, though I grant that a common application of K is 
indeed close to S. It follows from this that Parfit’s arguments do not tell against K, nor 
against the scheme of Buddhist ethics of which K is an essential component. On the 
contrary, the ‘karmic’ approach receives some fortification. As Parfit is concerned to 
have the Buddha as an ally, though - it seems - without appreciating the difficulty of that 
on his own terms, the conclusion should be welcome.
  It follows that the Parfit of Parts One and Two can help with the problems with which 
we are concerned in several respects. First, the rebuttal of S, or of what I have called 
‘philosophical’ egoism, can only be of support to a tradition such as the Buddhist, 
especially if the rebuttal is taken to extend to that of ‘vulgar’ egoism or selfishness. 
Second, the corresponding vindication of CP has a comparable and more positive effect. 
It shores up the grounds for the principled adoption of self-sacrifice often found in the 
Buddhist tradition. Furthermore – and here is the closest approach to the identity 
problem – it allows the question of personal continuity inevitably raised by S to be 
disregarded. This conclusion seems to be permitted by Parfit’s argument for full 
relativity, treating ‘I’ as ‘now’ is treated, though in discussing Santideva’s closely 
comparable argument I pointed out the force of Williams’ indication that this argument 
was capable of reversal.  Third, not directly argued by Parfit but, I believe, going with 
his arguments, the Buddhist tradition is freed from the attribution to it of a notion of 
karman that is nothing but K2. Acceptance of CP as a principle of action fits well with a 
view of K that gives full weight to K1. 
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CHAPTER SIX
Is Parfit right?
77. What is Parfit’s subject?
  My discussion of Parts One and Two of Reasons and Persons was close to an 
appraisal. My summary of Part Four was too brief to offer ground for an appraisal. I 
will therefore be concerned here only with Part Three. 416  What follows will be more or 
less critical, and I will not expound on the power and ingenuity of much of Parfit’s 
argument, which should be recorded now and which I fully grant.417
  
  The first point to be made has already been suggested. 418 It is that there is an 
uncertainty in Parfit’s discrimination of terms, in Reasons and Persons, which may 
leave it unclear what his subject is. The unwished for pun is hard to avoid. We have seen 
that Locke offers a sorting-out of terms, with a discrimination of ‘man’, ‘soul’ and 
‘person’. Parfit’s grounding in Locke makes it surprising that he neither follows Locke’s 
discrimination at all strictly nor offers one of his own. He has nothing to say about 
‘soul’; his reference is commonly to ‘persons’, except where he speaks of ‘we’ or ‘us’; 
until Part Four, there is little about ‘man’.
  This is a sphere of thought where terminology is resistant to standardisation. Common 
usage follows that of philosophers in being imprecise. I have already noted Locke’s 
recognition that in common usage ‘man’ (or ‘human being’) and ‘person’ were 
interchangeable. Parfit conveys his recognition of this, when he considers the 
implications of Reductionism for morality, here for the moral standing of abortion: 
416 I find nothing plainly wrong in Part Three, except some remarkable assertions in 
section 77. Parfit is discussing the consequences of accepting the Physical Criterion: 
Those who do, ‘believe that someone cannot have a life after death, unless he lives 
this life in a resurrection of the very same, physically continuous body. That is why 
some Christians insist that they be buried. They believe that if … they were burnt on 
funeral pyres … not even God could bring them to life again’ (p 204). One wonders 
who these Christians are who credit such a limitation of divine power.
417 Sorabji, in a generally critical appraisal, comments that Parfit offers ‘the best 
challenge to normal views, worked out in depth with originality, clarity, and honesty’ 
(SORABJI, p.265). I agree.
418 See p.148 above.
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Most of us do not distinguish persons from human 
beings. But some of us, following Locke, make a 
distinction. These people typically claim that a human 
being becomes a person only when this human being 
becomes self-conscious. 419
These words are striking both for their lack of emphasis and for their place – very late – 
in Parfit’s exposition. The Lockean discrimination referred to here, almost in passing, is 
the one which has been fundamental to Parfit’s own handling of the matter. Why does 
he not make it at the start and insist on its importance?  We find no such insistence, and 
a wobbliness in making the distinction is noticeable throughout Part Three. At the 
opening of Part Four, there is a plain departure from Locke. What Parfit there calls the 
‘person’, in the context of ‘different possible histories of the world’, can only be the 
‘man’ or ‘human being’ of Locke’s analysis, now given greater depth by being presented 
in terms of his genetic make-up. 
 
  Considering the term ‘person’ by itself brings up further uncertainties. Quite early on, 
in answer to the question, ‘What is the nature of a person?’, Parfit writes: ‘.. to be a 
person, a being must be self-conscious [and other things] ..’. The thought behind these 
words appears to be that of an entity’s counting as a person. This is not – it seems - 
quite the same as that of its possessing personhood, personhood being the Lockean 
entity, marked out – at the least - for forensic purposes and accorded its own identity 
conditions. Possession, by itself, is something to be registered; what it will be to count 
seems to be, at least to a degree, for us to determine. This leads to a further distinction. 
Counting as a person is close to, yet distinct from, being accorded personhood, as if 
personhood were something analogous to citizenship. If the analogy is sound, we might 
be free to decline to accord it. 
  Both these notions – ‘counting as’, ‘being accorded’ – are likely to come into play in 
any discussion of what Reductionism might mean for the morality of abortion. It may 
be claimed that the entity whose abortion is in question is a person. It may also be 
claimed that its status is far enough from being clear-cut for us to need to agree (or not) 
that it should count as a person, or - a different approach - agree (or not) to accord it that 
419 PARFIT(3) p.322
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condition.420  Parfit’s words, just quoted, would be compatible with ‘being accorded’, a 
slight ambivalence noticeable elsewhere. Here is a departure, or two departures, from 
the strictly Lockean understanding which, indeed, may be judged to go with a simplicity 
of view not always sustainable. In sum, Parfit’s use of the term in Reasons and Persons 
extends from the narrow conception, in terms of consciousness, to the classificatory 
notion that both recognises and accords a status, and – further - to the common usage 
that admits no distinction from ‘human being’.
  So much for Reasons and Persons. In the later article already referred to, Parfit 
declares that it is:
acceptable to claim that what we are 
essentially is human beings, treating the 
concept ‘person’ as a phased sortal … so that 
we exist before we become persons and we 
may continue to exist after we cease to be 
persons. (Parfit’s emphasis) 421
  The words ‘acceptable to claim’ may suggest that Parfit is less than fully committed to 
this position. If that is so, it may be why this restatement, which I take to be of prime 
importance, has no greater emphasis. What he must be taken to mean is that ‘a human 
being’ enjoys, at least for much of the time, and assuming that that being and the 
conditions of existence are normal, the concurrent description ‘person’. In other words, 
some human beings are to be classified as persons. Parfit adds that we should accord 
‘special moral status’ only to persons. This restatement, which he presents as a 
concession, has the decided advantage of anchoring his conception of the person within 
a familiar philosophical frame. A sortal is a second-order classification. It is ‘phased’, in 
that an entity - here a human being - comes within the scope of its categorisation and 
may pass out of it. Ceasing to be an infant may be the point of entry, senility that of 
departure. Madness, or some comparable trauma, may remove one from it in midlife.
420 The distinction between counting as a person and being accorded personhood is 
comparable to that between recognising that someone has ‘human rights’ and 
favouring some process, legislative or other, that confers these rights on that 
individual. 
421 PARFIT (6) p.218
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  The details of all this are, no doubt, open to argument. What follows from this change 
of mind or shift of emphasis on Parfit’s part is that while the person is conceptually 
distinct from the human being, it is nothing of a substitute for a soul. From this fresh 
standpoint, it appears that Locke was badly misleading in seeing the person as even 
conceivably detachable from the human being of which it is a categorisation. 
  In sum, my first point is that something of a blur vitiates the whole argument of Part 
Three of Reasons and Persons. Parfit’s later reformulation of his position, if it is that, 
while highly suggestive, does not altogether remove this. I will come back to this below, 
where I will suggest that there is unfinished business. 
78. Does Parfit move too quickly?
  At least in Reasons and Persons, Parfit has to be considered as a follower of Locke. He 
opens by presenting a Lockean account, seeking to improve and clarify it, and finding 
all defensible versions of it reductionist. After that, the argument moves swiftly.
   Parfit continues the tradition of Locke’s early commentators in employing counter-
factual illustration.  422 He opens Part Three with an extended fancy, which prompts the 
question: ‘What can we learn from this imaginary story?’ 423  By ‘learn’ he will mean 
our being driven to appraise our assumptions about personal identity. In setting the 
frame of the argument that follows, he takes his grounding in Locke’s discussion, finds 
deficiencies in this, which are readily exposed, and states what he will take a criterion of 
identity to be:
  I shall mean what this identity necessarily involves, 
or consists in. 424 
He then offers two such criteria, both of which have been set out above. Introducing the 
Physical Criterion, he declares:
422 MARTIN & BARRESI: Preface.
423 The example is ‘Teletransportation’: see section 57 above.
424 PARFIT (3) p.202
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 This [Locke’s account of the identity of physical 
objects] enables me to state one of the rival views 
about personal identity.425 
It is not clear from these words whether the ‘rival views’ are two only, the other being 
the Psychological Criterion to which he will shortly move, or if a larger class is implied. 
Only two views are presented at this point, each related to one of the two Criteria 
offered, and both found to be ‘Reductionist’.426  Parfit’s procedure is, in effect, to mark 
out personal identity and then to ‘reduce’ it. The effect of this is to put the two Criteria – 
the only two - into possession of the ground. The burden of proof comes to rest on the 
proponents of Non-Reductionist views. To appreciate this need not be to register a point 
against Parfit. He has the difficult presentational task of giving expression to the very 
notion, that of personal identity, which he will find to be reducible. Reductionism can be 
given coherent expression only when the entities to be ‘reduced’ are clearly in view. 
  
  This narrowing of the field of consideration is the more noticeable in the light of 
Parfit’s offering a ‘better’ version of his Physical Criterion than the one that was first 
apparent. Both these were quoted in section 55 above. I remarked on the oddity of the 
first version’s reference to ‘my brain and body’, as if the brain were something other 
than the body. Parfit’s preferred version refers only to the brain, doing so in its 
expression of personal identity over time in terms of the continuity of enough of the 
brain – that is, of enough to ensure this, in the event of brain-splits or accidents.
  Parfit must find this ‘better’ because it makes the requirement for physical continuity 
minimal. The ‘better’ version has the further merit of largely coinciding with the 
Psychological Criterion on its narrow version – that is, with the normal cause of 
psychological continuity. Parfit’s presumptions and resultant strategy are clear. It must 
however be a question whether a ‘less good’ version can so easily be left out of 
consideration. This might be defined in terms of the whole brain or in terms of a 
sufficiency of it, one or other of these supporting whole-body continuity.
425 Op cit, p.204
426 Op cit p.210
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  This ‘less good’ version will be, in effect, a fuller version of the Physical Criterion, 
restoring specifications which Parfit discards. I will dub it the Living Thing Criterion. A 
first statement of this Criterion might be:
A person continues to exist if and only if his or her 
body, including the brain that is part of that body, 
continues to exist and to be the body of a living 
human being [or ‘man’ in Lockean terms, or possibly 
‘animal’]. Personal identity over time amounts to this 
continuance.
  This form of words will be open to criticism of the kind deployed for other purposes 
throughout Part Three. Does the brain have to be the whole brain? Suppose there were 
an entity made up of a part-brain, abstracted from a living thing, and then implanted 
into the emptied skull of another body. That possibility – if it were such - would be 
something like Shoemaker’s ‘Brownson’ example. 427  If the residual part-brain were 
enough to support the continued life of the original living-thing, should we say that that 
thing persists? 
  
  Parfitian ingenuity is a stimulus to invention along these lines; the challenges just 
suggested might be met by such elaboration. My concern is not to produce the most 
nearly watertight definition, but to suggest that there is an arbitrariness of selection in 
Parfit’s presentation or, at least, an excessive speed in the marking out of the ground. 
This will seem all the more plainly the case when we recall Locke’s account.  In 
summarising this account, I referred to the way we find both a classificatory notion of 
the person and a view of personhood as made up of persistent self-consciousness.428 
Both of these seem compatible with a Living Thing Criterion of personhood. 
  On the Living Thing Criterion, the person is an entity inseparable from the ‘man’, or 
living thing with which it is associated, and therefore no more ‘reducible’ than the man 
is reducible. The account of the genetic constitution and individuation of human beings 
which opens Part Four seems to fit well with this. In an endnote, Parfit discusses the 
427 Section 55 above
428 Section 54 above
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connections between the person ‘in different possible histories of the world’ and the 
continuity of the person over time.429  It will be recalled from Chapter Four that his 
account of the former dealt with the origin of the person, and that he claimed his view 
of this to be compatible with a variety of different views of the necessary properties of 
personhood. In the endnote, he comments on the congruity of some of these views with 
the Criteria (as he has defined them) of personal identity. There is no need, or space, to 
review these here, but one of them is much to the point. Parfit points out the ready 
compatibility of the Physical Criterion and the Origin View of what is necessary for 
identity in different possible worlds. The Origin View is that:
each person has this distinctive necessary property: 
that of having grown from the particular pair of cells 
from which this person in fact grew. 430
Parfit comments:
[The Origin View] could be combined with the 
Physical Criterion. On the most plausible versions 
of this criterion, one essential property of each 
person is that he has enough of his particular brain 
to support fully conscious life. It might be claimed 
that it is an essential property of any particular 
brain that it grew from a particular fertilized ovum. 
431
This might indeed be claimed. The riposte to Parfit’s words is, surely, that the claim 
might be made all the more plausibly, because all the more naturally, with regard to the 
whole body. Genetic endowment serves as an explanatory factor that bears on the whole 
life. The stronger and more obvious claim would be that the Origin View is open to be 
combined with the Living Thing Criterion. If this is right, Parfit’s failure to bring the 
Living Thing Criterion into consideration will seem all the more a weakness in the 
argument of Part Three. In the 1999 article, we find the – admittedly offhand – 
429 PARFIT(3) Note 6 to Part Four
430 Op cit p.352
431 Op cit Note 6 to Part Four
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modification of this argument by way of the proffer of a phased sortal. The essential 
concurrence of this modified account with what I have offered here is, I think, plain 
enough. This adds force to the point that Parfit moves too quickly in the setting-up of 
the argument to which he will proceed in the remainder of Part Three.
79. Quasi-memory
  In Chapter Five, I gave some account of Parfit’s exposition of the concept of ‘quasi-
memory. I remarked on its importance for Parfit’s argument. Wiggins states this well 
enough, remarking that the defender of Parfit 
needs to invoke some mental state or capacity that 
closely resembles plenary or identity-involving 
experiential memory, yet is neutral with respect to 
identity. It will be this that has to make survival 
conceivable without identity …432
This ‘invocation’ is a late move in a very long-drawn-out argument. I remarked above 
how Locke’s account of the person prompted an objection from Butler, which has hung 
over discussion of the subject  ever since.433 Wiggins’ recent contribution records his 
final acceptance of the force of Butler’s point.434 It is therefore of prime importance to 
Parfit’s argument that his presentation of quasi-memory should be persuasive. 
  There is a simple objection to quasi-memory with some resemblance to the more fully 
elaborated appraisals to which I will proceed, and I will state it now, in the hope that it 
points the argument the right way. Parfit supposes the case of Jane, who wakes to a new 
set of memories: ‘She seems to remember looking across the water to an island, where a 
white Palladian church stood out brilliantly against a dark thundercloud’. 435 Jane has 
never been to Venice, but identifies this as a memory of Venice and (let us suppose) 
knows how she has acquired the ‘memory’, one of quite a number. These ‘memories’, 
432 WIGGINS p.212
433 See section 58 above
434 WIGGINS p.211
435 PARFIT(3) p.220
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Parfit’s quasi-memories, come to her in ‘the first-person mode of presentation’, and 
from inside are indistinguishable from memories tout simple. From outside, they are 
readily distinguishable, as Jane can investigate her own past. Her case is instanced by 
Parfit to establish that ‘her’ assemblage of memory-chains is not to be defined as hers, 
quasi-memory being conceivable. It may therefore be taken to constitute her self-
consciousness and so, on the Lockean conception, her personhood. 
  A riposte to this is that, in practice, it is open to Jane not to take ‘true’ memory to be a 
subset of quasi-memory, as Parfit’s argument requires. In practice, she will mark off 
each of the two from the other in such a way as to make possible self-definition in terms 
of the former alone. This would seem to be no more difficult or surprising than a 
making of the same distinction between her ‘original’ body parts and a substitute organ 
of different provenance. The implanted heart, for example, may be fully part of its 
present owner’s life-system and, in that significant sense, his or hers, yet continue to be 
judged other and distinguishable. If I have many such implants, I might say, ruefully, 
‘there’s not much of me left’. If this is right, the claims made for quasi-memory stand to 
be subverted by the existence, in each and every case, of an inner core of memories 
defined by reference to a person. Here is Butler’s point revived.
  A criticism which seems closely comparable to this is made by Cassam, who observes:
….. even if it makes sense to suppose that one might 
quasi-remember someone else’s past experiences, 
ordinary memories necessarily have what might be 
called epistemological primacy over mere quasi-
memories…… [If this is so] one will be guilty of 
falsifying the actual nature of psychological continuity 
if one describes it as involving anything other than 
continuity of memory. It is not acceptable to regard 
psychological continuity as involving continuity of 
quasi-memory rather than continuity of memory, 
given that experiential remembering must be ….. the 
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primary form of access ‘from the inside’ to past 
experiences.436 
Cassam considers how this ‘primacy thesis’ might be parried by the Reductionist. For 
this purpose, he distinguishes between internal and external views of personal identity. 
The former, involving the consciousness of personal identity is an epistemological 
question. Here is the concern of the passage just  quoted. The latter is metaphysical – 
specifically, ontological: its concern is the challenge made by Butler. It may be argued 
that the primacy thesis has no bearing there. Against this, Cassam claims that even an 
external view must do justice to someone’s ‘subjective take’ on his persistence. Parfit’s 
Psychological Criterion, as set out at the beginning of his argument, offers – at least as 
to (1) and (2) of its defining elements – an appealing account of personal identity. The 
introduction of quasi-memory will weaken this appeal. Here is a dilemma: without a 
persuasive case for quasi-memory, Butler’s objection is telling; with such a case, 
Parfit’s account will lose, to the extent of its persuasiveness, what Cassam calls ‘one of 
its central motivations’
  A complementary line of criticism is to be found in McDowell. This is one of denial 
that quasi-memory can be what it is required to be – that is, ‘an autonomously 
intelligible faculty of knowing the past from a participating perspective but without 
commitment to the participant’s having been oneself’. McDowell claims that in Parfit’s 
expression of it the notion is of something less than memory, one fewer thing being 
involved. His own claim is that reflection shows memory to be the prime notion, with 
quasi-memory a derivation from it. The case is not one of one fewer thing being 
involved; it is one of an element in the notion of memory being discarded. It will then 
be a question whether what is left will permit what he calls ‘adequate explication’ of the 
concept. He suggests that there will be a crippled notion of memory rather than the less 
demanding one which would be up to meeting, and needing only to meet, something 
less than the normal demands going with the notion of memory. In sum, Parfit ‘reduces 
the idea of the first-person mode to unintelligibility’ by detaching memories in the first-
person mode ‘from their purporting to be about ourselves’. 437
436 CASSAM(3) p.175/76
437 DANCY, especially sections vi and vii.
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    McDowell also considers the counter-factual cases adduced by Parfit to show what 
quasi-memory might be like in practice. One such is that of amoeba-like splitting, 
where two or more successor-beings keep a cognitive hold on the experience of the pre-
split unitary entity. McDowell’s point here is that the content of the consciousness of the 
successor-beings need not be seen as identity-neutral. It would be quite as plausible to 
suppose that a radically different context of facts would make intelligible the content of 
backward-looking consciousness and that this might be of the kind to involve identity. 
Otherwise put, a complete reordering of the context of experience, such as that 
produced by a move towards proliferation through division, might conceivably lead to 
me – say – grasping and tracking my experience in a way now hard to imagine. This is 
not to say that I can take it first as experience  and then, having apprehended it in first-
person mode, add or not add an apprehension of it as my experience. As McDowell puts 
it, ‘we have been given no good reason to believe in the substratum of identity-free 
relations’. 438
  What might Parfit say in reply? McDowell anticipates one response, which would be 
to say that he and other critics of Reductionism ‘impose parochial restrictions on the 
imagination’ in taking the operations of consciousness to be what we now experience 
them to be. Are we so numbed by the normality of the normal that we keep out of view 
alternative conceptual possibilities which may be real ones?  On this, I can say only that 
one can grant Parfit’s ingenuity, with its large reliance on the counter-factual, yet 
question the basis on which he sets the argument up. McDowell’s response is the brisker 
one that ‘one can imagine tamperings with nature after which the only possible response 
would be to shrug one’s shoulders’. 439
   Wiggins’ treatment of the topic recalls Cassam’s remarks on ‘epistemological 
primacy’. He asks,
….. could a species of memory that was identity free 
play the role that is played in the epistemic economy 
by ordinary memory? 440
438 DANCY p.245
439 DANCY p.245
440 WIGGINS p.219
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The question, inviting the answer No, comes in the context of weighing up the notion, 
offering sophistications of it and considering ripostes. Wiggins remarks that it was ‘wise 
[of] Parfit to define ‘quasi-remember’ positively and outright rather than by an attempt 
at subtraction’ and then to evoke ordinary memory only obliquely. For his own part, he 
is clear that quasi-memory is a notion involving subtraction: it is memory-minus – that 
is, minus the identity of an agent (‘Minus’, it seems, suggests something other than 
‘quasi’, as the latter might be taken to have, whatever the distinction, the weight and 
scope of memory tout simple). He proceeds to assert the unviability of memory-minus. 
Knowledge, experience and memory are bound together and registered in a partial 
narrative of a life, extending to what I am to do in the next five minutes. Identity is not 
eliminable from this:
Any serviceable or intelligible notion of quasi-
memory that depends on the given meaning of 
‘remember’ needs to respect the links that connect 
experience with knowledge. And these involve 
identity.
What this seems to come to is that there can be no such ‘serviceable and intelligible 
notion’. 441
   These three appraisals of Parfit’s notion have much in common. They add substance 
and detail to my own opening criticism, which is why I call them in support. The broad 
conclusion is that quasi-memory has to be very much like memory to serve the purpose 
assigned to it, yet to differ from it sharply in lacking the association – the necessary 
association, it is urged - with identity. What would Parfit say by way of reply? The most 
promising line of defence – not one employed by Parfit - might be to set out a notion of 
what might be called ‘inchoate experience’. This term would denote experience before 
it is pondered or sorted out into kinds and categories. The experience of the first few 
moments after waking up might stand as an instance of this. In these moments I may be 
aware, with minimal self-awareness or none, of the content of a dream, of the state of a 
body, perhaps of a discomfiting need to get up. What I call ‘awareness’ would be a 
matter of feeling as much as of apprehension. Different instances of the experience 
441 WIGGINS p.219     
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might be connected by way of the resemblance of components, which yet, as being 
inchoate, need not be taken to be in any necessary association with a subject. ‘Inchoate 
experience’ – it might be argued – might then replace ‘quasi-memory’ in an amended 
Parfitian scheme. It might be claimed:
Since inchoate experience does not presuppose 
personal identity, it may be part of what constitutes 
personal identity. It may be part of what makes me 
now and myself at other times one and the same 
person.
Here is something of continuity: if we take experience of waking moments as typical of 
the category, successive inchoate experiences will have a certain family resemblance, 
and so have an aptness to constitute personal identity without there being any 
presumption of it. The notion may therefore be capable of development into something 
which would serve Parfitian purposes at least to a degree. This is, I think, the best that 
can be done. 
  In discussing quasi-memory, and concluding as I have, I am not dismissing the notion 
as one might dismiss an unfounded assertion of fact. Parfit’s brain-scanning conjectures 
are certainly imaginable and may be realisable. The point is, rather, that the concept of 
quasi-memory is a curiosity. The formation of concepts comes about from the need to 
order and make sense of experience. Concepts will be open to revision in the light of 
fully, or more deeply pondered, experience. Fresh concepts become established to the 
extent that they are useful, and on their first presentation will fall to be appraised in that 
respect and in that of their compatibility with those other concepts which are certainly 
useful. In time, the acceptance or employment of a new concept may bring about the 
giving-up or sidelining of concepts employed before, even those seemingly 
indispensable. 
  If this is how fresh concepts come into play, the concept of quasi-memory seems a 
poor prospect. It should be suspicious that the notion seems to be formulated, and to be 
offered, with the sole object of providing an answer to a philosophical difficulty – in 
this case, Butler’s criticism of Locke. That is to say that it is not a notion which the 
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contingencies of existence force on us. Strawson’s dismissal of the comparable notion 
of ‘process-things’ is usefully suggestive here. That notion is found to lie behind the 
suggestion that ‘Caesar’ is the name of a series of events, a biography. Strawson 
comments
 [Those inclined to this view] draw attention to the 
possibility of our recognising a category of objects 
which we do not in fact recognise: a category of four-
dimensional objects, which might be called ‘process-
things’ …442
If quasi-memory – also - falls short of being a notion that we ‘in fact recognise’ - or 
need – we should be shy of building very much on it. 
80. Determinate or Indeterminate?
  On a narrow view of the question whether Parfit is right, it would, I believe, be 
defensible to end discussion at this point. If quasi-memory is unsustainable as a notion, 
and if Butler’s criticism of Locke is decisive, it follows that Parfit’s development of 
Locke’s treatment of identity will also be unsustainable. On a broader view, this 
conclusion will be strengthened if I succeed in making a positive case for the Living 
Thing Criterion with which I dealt in opening. So far, I have shown only that Parfit 
leaves it out of account. I will however consider, before attempting this, Parfit’s 
treatment of the determinacy or indeterminacy of identity. It is one of his prime 
contentions that identity may be indeterminate – that is, all the facts of a case may be 
known without it being clear whether a specified entity is in existence or how what is in 
existence should be identified. Indeterminacy has more than its own importance in 
Parfit’s assertions. It is important also because Parfit has it that it is one component of a 
group of claims which stand or fall together. 443 It is, therefore, much to the point 
whether his arguments for indeterminacy are compelling. If they are not, the damge to 
his whole case may be appreciable.
442 Strawson P.(1) pp.56/57
443 PARFIT(3) p.216
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    Any good argument for indeterminacy would have some appeal, if only because it 
should allow us to avoid some unpalatable conclusions which, in special cases, may 
follow from the assumption that determinacy is assured. The Brown/Brownson example 
has been taken to show that personal identity on the Psychological Criterion would 
persist even through even extreme distortion of what normally obtains.444 
Understandable as this reaction may be, it involves remarkable contortions of thought.445 
The appeal of Parfit’s quite different approach will be obvious.  I will argue that the 
Living Thing view excludes these unwelcome and implausible conclusions at least as 
well as Parfit’s contentions. However, there is much point in showing that even on 
Parfit’s own terms the arguments for indeterminacy are not decisive. This is what I will 
now seek to do, by way of recourse to the stipulation which Parfit himself touches on 
but proceeds, too readily I think, to dismiss. 
  Mackie has commented helpfully on the perplexing identity questions sometimes 
brought up by living things. 446  He finds it undeniable that it will sometimes be difficult 
to accommodate the passage of living things through time within the logic of identity. 
He finds that special provisions will sometimes be required. The example he offers is 
that of the splitting of a daffodil bulb, where we are likely to say that the larger of the 
two resultant parts carries the identity of the original, especially when it is much larger 
and yet more especially when the other part has been destroyed. If this is challenged, we 
may say that a touch of arbitrariness does less damage to an otherwise sound conceptual 
scheme than does acceptance of indeterminacy. A defence on these lines seems also to 
be available to proponents of stipulation in the case of the Combined Spectrum. Parfit 
can have no ground for objecting to stipulation per se, as he employs it at an important 
point in his own argument. In defining psychological connectedness, he makes the 
common-sense stipulation, taking it to need no defence, that ‘we can claim that there is 
444 For this reaction, see WIGGINS p.206/07. 
445 Do these need to be spelled out? If the entity we may call ‘Brown’s-brain-in-
Robinson’s-body’ recovers sufficiently from his trauma to resume sexual relations 
with the woman whom he will remember to be Mrs Brown, the children who may be 
born will be - presumably? – Robinson’s by virtue of their genetic inheritance from 
Robinson – that is, Robinson understood as Robinson’s body. We may then have to 
admit the possibility of a man begetting another man’s offspring. Or do we say that 
the ‘body’ does something quite alien to the ‘person’, though the two make up a 
living unity? Here is the reductio ad absurdum of one widely held view of 
Brown/Brownson.
446 MACKIE(1) Ch.5, especially pp.144/45
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enough connectedness if the number of direct connections, over any day, is at least half 
the number that hold, over every day, in the lives of nearly every actual person. When 
there are enough direct connections, there is what I call strong  connectedness’ (Parfit’s 
emphasis). 447
  
  In suggesting what stipulations might resolve the difficulties of the Combined 
Spectrum, I can do no more than offer examples. I am concerned to vindicate an 
approach, not to proclaim an unquestionably best solution, which is something likely to 
emerge only from much discussion. With this caveat, I recall Parfit’own example, 
presented in that context, of ‘his’ transformation, at once physical and psychological, 
into a replica of Greta Garbo, and claim that once at least 20% of ‘Parfit’s’ body and at 
least 20% of his brain-state have been destroyed, we may take ‘Parfit’ to have gone out 
of existence. 448 At the other end of the spectrum, we might say that, when we have at 
least 80% both of the body and of the brain-state of Greta Garbo – at a particular point 
in Garbo’s life - then we would have a replica of Greta Garbo. As for the intermediate 
stages, we might say – supposing the process to be slow – that a human entity will 
always be in being and that beings notable as distinct will be observable in succession.
  This suggestion will be more persuasive if I suggest a parallel. One is available in the 
sequences of photographs sometimes produced in newspapers, which start with the face 
of some well-known person and end with that of someone notorious. 449 The images in 
between, perhaps half a dozen, represent the stages of transformation. An unbroken 
process is presented, as it has to be, as a succession of stages. In the same way, we 
might say that we have successive beings in the course of the transformation of ‘Parfit’ 
into Greta Garbo, observing that there is always a living thing, just as there is always a 
face. This does not mean that the points at which one living thing is marked off from 
those on each side of it are the only possible ones. There is no inevitability in this, and 
the markings off of discrete living beings, and so, in a sense, their creation, will be as 
much a matter of choice as the marking off of images in the process of facial 
transformation. While certainly arbitrary, it is defensible on the ground that, in 
447 PARFIT(3) p.206, also p.222
448 For Parfit’s example, see PARFIT (3) p.237
449 A recent comparison by a retired Treasury official of Gordon Brown to Stalin 
prompted the publication of facial sequences- Brown at one end, Stalin at the other 
- along with jocular comment.
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exceptional conditions – and those of the Combined Spectrum are certainly exceptional 
- there will be no alternative to a form of stipulation which makes it permissible to 
claim that at any point on the spectrum, at any time, there is one thing or another. This 
will be less hard to accept if we imagine the ‘Parfit’-Garbo transformation being 
brought about at an uneven speed. If the changes, physical and psychological, were to 
be brought about in alternating bursts and near-pauses, we would in all likelihood take 
the entities in existence between the bursts to be distinctly marked off? Do we then have 
to suppose that the imposition of uniformity of speed, by itself, would be sufficient to 
over-ride these distinctions? It would surely be as plausible to maintain that the 
distinctions remain but are harder to grasp.
  Parfit has in mind arguments such as this one when he considers the view that identity 
must be determinate: ‘If we hold this view, we do not believe that the true criterion of 
personal identity must draw some sharp borderline somewhere in the Combined 
Spectrum. Rather we believe that, to avoid incoherence, we should draw such a line.’ 
This is indeed what I believe. Parfit’s comment is that in such a procedure there can be 
no basis for mattering.
When I consider this range of cases, I naturally 
ask, ‘Will the resulting person be me? By drawing 
a line, we have chosen to give an answer to this 
question. But, since our choice was arbitrary, it 
cannot justify any claim about what matters. 450 
He claims that this view, if persuasive, supports his claim that personal identity is not 
what matters. He sees no reason to bother further with a perverse version of his 
Reductionist claim, as he takes this to be, which ‘abolishes indeterminacy with 
uninteresting stipulative definitions’. There is force in this response. The riposte to it 
has to be that my claim is that the identity of a living thing will always be determinate 
or can defensibly – as above – be presented as such. Mattering is something else. I will 
discuss Parfit’s understanding of what it is to matter, and the broader concept, below. 
450 PARFIT(3) pp.241/42
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  My criticisms of Parfit’s contentions are not, perhaps, decisive. It is not easy to see a 
way out of the impasse to which discussion of them has led. A more effective response 
is to be found in the Living Thing view, on which the bizarre conclusions which seem to 
follow from the Brown/Brownson example are as readily avoidable. On the Living 
Thing view, it is natural to claim that Brown has gone out of existence on the removal 
of an organ, the brain, vital to his continuity as a living thing. ‘Brownson’, whatever he 
is, is not Brown. This conclusion is only less obvious than it should be because the 
parallel case of Robinson’s-brain-in-Brown’s-body has been ruled out (This stipulation 
simplifies the question, but at the price of making the conclusion weaker).  Parfit’s own 
examples invite the same revision of view. One such is the division of ‘my brain’ and 
the transplantation of its two halves into the emptied skulls of my triplet brothers. Parfit 
asks whether I ‘go on’, in the sense of preserving my identity, through connection with 
one or other brother (in which case, which?), or through connection with both, or 
whether I do not go on. Objection is found to all three, or four, options. We are 
encouraged to conclude that there is indeed going on, through both brothers, though of a 
kind that does not bring up the question of identity. 
   What I take to be a much more plausible conclusion is, simply, that there is no going 
on. If I am the object of this process, I go out of existence when my brain is extracted 
from my skull and divided. Parfit cannot see this, because he does not take as primary 
the concept of the living thing. If I am, first and foremost, an animal, a living thing of 
the human species, it is inevitable that my existence will be interrupted – to say the least 
- by the removal of that vital part, my brain, and brought to an end by its division. 
Contemplating this contingency, I am clear that that would be the end of me. I may note 
that there would be psychological continuity between what I was and two persisting 
entities. As a living thing, I would not take this as my perpetuation. Whether I would 
take it to be ‘as good as’ - or, possibly, ‘as bad as’ - that perpetuation is something I will 
consider in Chapter Seven. 
  
  In this section, I have been concerned with questions which are less than fully 
arguable. My appeal, like Parfit’s, has been to acceptability and plausibility, rather than 
to demonstrability beyond doubt. I must not, therefore, claim too much, but will rest on 
the negative claim that Parfit has hardly made out his case that the determinability 
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which goes with personal identity is insecure. We have only to keep living things in 
mind, however classified, to find dubious any suggestion that it is.
     
81. Aristotle and neo-Aristotelian contemporaries
  What I have called the Living Thing view has a philosophical grounding and also a 
grounding in pre-philosophical innocence. The ultimate philosophical grounding is to be 
found in Aristotle’s account in the De Anima.  Aristotle’s deployment of the soul-notion 
in this account is such as to serve as a mode of classifying living things. What he 
describes, in respect of human-kind, is a rational animal, which does not cease to be an 
animal by virtue of its endowment with a rational soul of some complexity. This allows 
us to form a conception of the human subject as such a thing, more specifically as an 
animal endowed with reason. The living thing – and so also the human or rational 
animal - enjoys a systemic unity and, when its existence is concluded, whether by death 
or by the breaking up of this unity, there will be no doubt about the fact. Its existence 
cannot be indeterminate. 451
  What might be called the plain man’s way of holding the view I recommend may be 
brought out by an example, which will be found unsatisfactory. Imagine we are in a 
crowded public place and I say ‘That’s Jones over there’, pointing with my arm. If you 
say ‘Is that Jones you are pointing at, or Jones’ body?’, the answer has to be ‘Jones’ 
body’, as only a physical object can be indicated by pointing. I might go on to explain 
my utterance, saying that I was picking out Jones by means of that indication of his 
body, adding that ‘Jones’ is a metaphysical conception, and that the words ‘Jones’ body’ 
refer to an object in space, a thing in the world. There seems to be more to ‘Jones’ than 
to his body - or more to Jones than his body - and the debate between Parfit and many 
of his critics, and many other such debates, is around whether this is really so and about 
what the ‘more’ might amount to. It extends to such issues as whether the notion of 
‘Jones’ involves a further fact – further, that is, to his body, in which we might agree to 
451 The broad thrust of Aristotle’s account seems to rule out anything resembling the 
detachable, immortal, soul of Plato’s conception. There is, indeed, one much-
discussed passage where Aristotle may be read as admitting such a conception 
(ARISTOTLE (1) 413b). I think my highly summarised account catches the dominant 
assertions of the work as we have it.
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include his brain – and whether Jones has, or truly amounts to, a spiritual substance or 
immortal soul; it extends also to the possibility of the conception ‘Jones’ being fully 
reducible – that is explicable in terms which make it dispensible, if conventionally 
useful. Much of the discussion so far has involved such points.
  On the Living Thing view, the way this consideration has been set up is deeply flawed. 
On that view, what I was pointing to was the living thing, Jones. That I was doing this 
this was as indisputable as my picking out of a living dog by means of pointing to and 
so identifying ‘Fido’. Jones is, no doubt, a much more complicated entity than Fido. 
Just how, is the question. Here – baldly expressed - is what I take to be the view of pre-
philosophical innocence, to which many philosophers, commencing with Aristotle, have 
accorded their broad endorsement.
  The three contemporary philosophers whom I have already discussed are, I hope to 
have shown, broadly sympathetic to a Living Thing view. Wiggins is explicitly ‘neo-
Aristotelian’ and McDowell is most clearly understood in such a way; Cassam is 
explicitly ‘animalist’. It is on this basis that I draw them into support.  
   McDowell’s examination of Parfit’s procedure issues in a conclusion approximate to 
the one I have been urging. He begins by quoting Locke’s presentation of a person as ‘a 
thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, 
the same thinking thing, in different times and places’.452 I suggested in section 77 above 
that Parfit’s treatment of Locke opens up a distinction between the claims:
(a) that a person is a living thing (‘a man’) – that is to 
say, one such who is ‘a thinking intelligent being …’ - 
or a man who can be esteemed or granted to be such, 
and
(b) that a person is ‘a thinking intelligent being …’ in 
association, perhaps necessarily in association, with a 
living thing (‘a man’) throughout the existence of this 
last.
452 LOCKE p.335; DANCY p.230
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  For most of the time, Locke is clearly concerned with the second of these - that is, with 
the entity which it is his distinction in philosophy to have isolated and described. 
Sometimes, however, accepting, as we have seen, that ‘man’ and ‘person’ are often used 
interchangeably – he seems to be writing of the first. Much the same, as we have also 
seen, is true of Parfit. McDowell also seems to trade on Locke’s concession of 
interchangeability and to employ both conceptions. This allows him to follow his 
quotation from Locke by recording Locke’s stress that ‘the continuity that constitutes a 
person’s continuing to exist has ‘an “inner” aspect’. 453  This continuity can only be that 
of the living thing – that is, of the first of the two senses of ‘person’ spelled out above. 
What is described as its ‘inner’ aspect is what is caught by the second of the two. 
  McDowell then characterises Parfit’s innovation – quite accurately – as the 
recommendation that ‘this “inner” aspect of personal persistence should be understood 
in terms of relations between psychological states and events that are intelligible 
independently of personal identity’. In other words, the Lockean person should be 
‘reduced’ to the elements that have been taken to constitute it. From this, consequences 
follow which McDowell will proceed to discuss. He observes that Parfit finds only two 
ways in which what he has called ‘the “inner” aspect’ of a life may be understood, one 
involving the existence of a purely mental entity (a soul, or spiritual substance), the 
other being the reductionist view just sketched. McDowell suggests that, on Locke’s 
premises, ‘the continuity of “consciousness” does involve the continued existence of an 
entity; but the entity is not a peculiar Cartesian item, but a person of whose continued 
life that continuity is, precisely, an aspect’. 454  By ‘person’ here, he goes on to make it 
plain, he means ‘human being, in the case that we have to regard as, at the least, 
central’. It is this that is picked out by the Living Thing Criterion. McDowell’s analysis 
points to the arbitrariness in Parfit’s disregard of it on which I remarked above.
   McDowell then makes a closely comparable point from another angle, that of concern 
for alternatives to reduction.  He has it that Parfit, on taking up Locke’s conception, 
finds that ‘there is no alternative to reduction except to commit ourselves to continuants 
whose persistence through time would consist in nothing but the continuity of 
“consciousness” itself’. 455 This alternative is plainly Cartesian in character. It seems to 
453 DANCY p.230
454 DANCY p.232
455 Op cit p.231
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derive from the supposition that awareness of an identity through time goes with 
consciousness, the persistence of this identity not going beyond the flow of 
consciousness. The components of memory – events and the like – will then be found to 
figure in the passage through time of this entity. The divorce of what is so conceived 
from the life of the living thing with which it will be associated is clearly sharp. It is not 
this divorce that troubles Parfit however but, rather, the postulation of an unnecessary 
entity in what I have just summarised. The appeal of Parfit’s Reductionism lies in the 
simplification which it offers: all that need be postulated is a relation of serial co-
consciousness  ‘which might subsequently enter into the construction of a derivative 
notion of a persistent subject if such a notion seems called for’. As Parfit puts it, 
referring to this construction by way of our everyday talk of persons, ‘that is how our 
language works’.
    McDowell’s case against Parfit, in sum, is that the arbitrariness of Parfit’s procedure 
derives from yielding more to Descartes than he acknowledges. He writes
the fundamental Cartesian mistake is not the 
postulation of spiritual substances, but rather the 
assumption, which is preserved in this implicit 
defence of Reductionism, that seems to pose that 
choice: the assumption that Locke’s phenomenon 
must be understood in isolation ……456
in isolation, that is, from the life of a living thing. He grants that Parfit follows Locke in 
explicit dissent from Descartes, while finding Locke’s procedure also to be vitiated by 
assumptions which he calls ‘Cartesian’.457  This sorts naturally with his reference to 
Lichtenberg’s celebrated objection to Descartes: ‘ .. one ought to say, not “I think”, but 
“It’s thinking”, on an analogy with forms of words like “It’s raining”. This leads to the 
claim – against Parfit – that Lichtenberg is proceeding by way of reductio ad absurdum, 
saying in effect that on Descartes’ own premises, properly understood, there is no basis 
on which a subject might be postulated.458 All this supports a sceptical view of 
456 DANCY p.232
457 McDowell grants later on that Locke can also ‘carefully distance himself from 
Descartes’.
458 PARFIT (3) p.224ff and p.517 n.20
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Descartes’ whole procedure, making the suggestion of unacknowledged Cartesianism all 
the more telling.
 It was McDowell’s criticisms of the claims of Part Three that were the prompt for 
Parfit’s extended defence of the dispensability of the person-notion in the 1999 article. I 
gave some account of this in the last chapter. How far is it persuasive? Parfit suggests 
that McDowell makes Reductionism harder to defend than it needs to be by over-stating 
what needs to be claimed for it – that is, ‘that “the flow of experience” must be able to 
be impersonally understood’.  None the less, Parfit finds ‘it worth asking whether this 
requirement can be met’. 459 There follows an argument somewhat different in style from 
those of Reasons and Persons. As I have shown above, it amounts to a setting-out in 
some detail of what life would be like on reductionist premises – that is, to how beings 
imagined (for this purpose) by Parfit would get through life. I quoted above his account 
of how such beings would understand Tenzing’s climbing of Everest.460
  Parfit claims that his INW is a coherent account and ‘no worse’ than our familiar 
metaphysical scheme, and so claims to have answered McDowell. 461 Is this plausible? 
The ‘imaginary beings’ must be assumed to have the concept of a living thing, even 
though they lack that of a person.  Lacking even that, they would hardly be capable of 
maintaining their position in the world: I need, if I am going to be safe, to be afraid of a 
lion. They must also be supposed to have normal powers of vision and so to be capable 
of watching Tenzing walk up Everest. This suggests that they would inevitably record 
that a living thing, a human being, a man, Tenzing, climbed Everest. If this is correct, 
they catch everything obvious about the action. Parfit suggests that lacking the concept 
of a person their understanding is of a process, ‘a climbing of Everest’, achieved within 
a sequence, which may be called ‘Tenzing’. This may be ‘no worse’ than it would be 
with the concept but, on the Living Thing view, there will seem to be no point in 
arguing whether it is ‘worse’ or not. This view goes along with everything obvious and 
observable in the process, and is – I claim – ‘no worse’. I cannot see that there is 
anything in what Parfit presents here to prompt us to reverse the burden of proof and to 
conclude that its persuasiveness brings the Living Thing view into question. Here, I find 
it hard to avoid the conclusion with which I ended my brief treatment of Siderits. This 
459 PARFIT (6) pp.220/21
460 P.168 above
461 Op cit p.263
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was, effectively, that the more fully the implications of any sort of reductionism are 
spelled out or presented imaginatively, the less the plausibility it is likely to enjoy.462 
 
   Wiggins’ approach to reductionism, in its application to personal identity, is incidental 
to his prime concern, which is the individuation and tracking of continuants. Two of his 
three books on this subject were published earlier than Reasons and Persons. The third, 
Sameness and Substance Renewed, has been published only recently. I have referred to 
it already, and will treat it here as Wiggins’ last word on the subject. 463
 Wiggins declares his position to be neo-Aristotelian. 464  It is on this basis that it is set 
against that of Locke and against the whole strategy of isolating the conscious subject. 
He remarks on the power for confusion latent in this concern, at least where the subject 
is taken to be ‘a peculiar kind of thing reached by a special kind of abstraction’.465  His 
approach is determined by the very concern for identity, taken to be absolute, which we 
have found Parfit to play down. The argument is extended and elaborate, dealing with 
personal identity only in conclusion. Here, Wiggins urges that the sortals under which, 
he says, every identity-claim falls to be considered are, on a proper view, ‘human being’ 
and ‘person’. He sums up his position as being that of a ‘human-being theorist’, a 
labelling plainly at one with ‘neo-Aristotelian’. 466
462 As I have been discussing the 1999 article, this may be the most convenient place 
for considering whether Parfit’s retreat from the position of regarding the Buddha as 
a support is well grounded. Is he right in this? The point is, I think, hardly worth 
discussing, as Parfit’s acquaintance with Buddhism is so plainly limited, and as the 
Buddha’s support, on his original view, amounted to so little. Parfit quotes 
Vasubandhu, at second hand, to explain this move. My own discussion of 
Vasubandhu has, I hope, established him as a reductionist rather than an 
eliminativist (p.97 above) For what it is worth, therefore, I think Parfit is wrong in the 
1999 article. 
463 WIGGINS
464 WIGGINS Preface p.xi
465 Op cit p.196
466 WIGGINS p.195
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  It is fortunate for the present argument that, in pressing his positive assertions, Wiggins 
deals explicitly with Locke and the impetus deriving from Locke, and also with the 
fresh opening offered by Shoemaker. His treatment of Locke is by way of a 
straightforward vindication of Butler’s well-known subversion of his account of the 
person. Butler claims that Locke presupposes what he takes himself to establish. 
Wiggins takes this riposte as settling the question, and as narrowing the field of choice 
to a soul account of the person and a human-being account. He elaborates on this, with a 
demonstration how his two sortal concepts are related. ‘Person’ is a narrower 
categorisation than ‘human-being’ but inseparable from it; ‘ a person is … a subject of 
interpretation, a being that both interprets and is interpreted’. 467 This enables him to 
make use of some of Locke’s material. As immature human-beings, we learn how to 
adjust to experience and to inter-act and co-operate with others. In so doing, ‘what 
stereotype of personhood do we have to catch on to, clearly if not distinctly, and learn to 
elaborate?’ This process of person-construction finds, suggests Wiggins, its last and 
soldering stage in experiential memory: ‘… when people do or suffer something, this 
[the faculty of memory] will express itself on their minds, extend their information, 
colour their experience and influence their future responses’. 468 Admirers of Locke may 
be to a degree propitiated, supposes Wiggins, by the resemblance of this account to 
Locke’s own, already quoted: ‘A person is a thinking, intelligent being ….’
  Wiggins’ consideration of Shoemaker’s Brown/Brownson example conveys something 
of a retraction. He records that he was at first impressed by the example: ‘… the special 
thing about Brownson was that he was the functional inheritor and continuator of all 
Brown’s vital faculties …. Neither Brown nor Robinson nor Brownson was a brain. But 
the brain … was the essential nucleus of a person (of a human being) …’.469 His 
endorsement of Shoemaker was not without its qualifications and special provisions, but 
it was clear. His move away from endorsement has come about through reflection on 
the complications of the example offered which have put it under strain. It was such a 
strain that prompted Parfit to cut free from inconclusive argument and to declare that 
identity was not what matters, what matters – at least to Brown – being the perpetuation 
of a chain of connections and continuities.
 
467 WIGGINS p.196
468 Op cit p.199
469 WIGGINS, p 207
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  Wiggins’ position may be seen as directly opposite to this. He reacts against the 
perplexities deriving from the exposure of identity-presumptions to extreme and 
destabilising contingencies by holding fast to identity and casting doubt on the 
procedure. Beyond this, he claims that Parfit’s consideration of extreme contingencies – 
with a view to the conclusion that identity is not what matters – depends vitally on ‘the 
prospective availability of something like the relation R’. 470 Wiggins questions this 
availability: ‘All we really know about R we learn from purported cases of it and the 
role that R is meant to play – in philosophy’. Wiggins, like McDowell, finds that there 
is no good reason to credit such a relation – that is, one that will do what is required of 
it and yet be independent of identity.
  More generally, Wiggins brings out the extent, in Parfit’s thought, of the departure 
from the common employment of the notions, ‘living thing’ and ‘human being’. (An 
instance of such departure, on Wiggins’ view, would be the case, already considered, 
which Parfit may derive from Shoemaker’s example: his brain is divided and half-brains 
inserted in other skulls – say, those of his triplet brothers). Wiggins now suggests that 
what is presented in this example is better described as Shoemaker’s Brown becoming a 
‘concrete universal’. 471 By this he means that the ‘human-being-ness’ to be assumed of 
Brown comes to be replaced, without acknowledgement, by something more abstract 
that is to be seen only in its realised manifestations. The inadequacy of this as an 
account of our existence provides the theme of Wiggins’ conclusion, with its emphasis 
on the living thing and on the formation of living things as persons. Here again there is 
an adaptation of insights from Locke in the taking-over of remarks on person-
formation.472  There is acknowledgment also of Strawson, for his bringing-out, in a well-
known paper, of the interpersonal context – not ‘inter human-being context’ – of this 
formation.473 Throughout, Wiggins emphasises natural process and the interaction of 
persons, one with another, this being a component of the capacity by which we find our 
way about the world.
  If this is persuasive at all, we will - to that extent - have less time for reductionism of 
any kind. The short point is that a great deal would have to be given up, or at least made 
470 WIGGINS. P.227
471 Op cit p.229
472 WIGGINS p 234
473 STRAWSON P.(2)
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vulnerable to be given up, in an acceptance of Reductionism. There is correspondingly 
less need for close analysis on the ground that Parfit has marked out. Like McDowell, 
with his shrug of the shoulders, Wiggins is inclined to put aside such ingenuities as 
Teletransportation, perhaps with the concession that on his own terms Parfit is hard to 
argue down.
  Cassam takes an approach rather different from that of McDowell and Wiggins. It is, 
however, effectively complementary. In an article published not long after Reasons and 
Persons, he suggested that Parfit’s choice not to deal fully with Strawson’s ‘Kantian’ 
contentions may have been ill-judged.474  He questions whether Kant, properly 
considered, has to be that opponent of Reductionism that Parfit takes him to be. Though 
I have followed Parfit in leaving Strawson’s contentions aside, it is worth considering 
Cassam’s observations. He points to the distinction of (3) and (5) in Parfit’s outline of 
Reductionism.475  It will be recalled that (3) has it that a person ‘just consists in the 
existence of a brain and body’ and  (5) that a person ‘is an entity that is distinct from a 
brain and body’. Both, Parfit claims, are true, prompting a comparison of ‘person’ and 
‘nation’, a nation being an entity that does not exist apart from its citizens and its 
territory.
  Rather than pursue this, Cassam sketches out a version of reductionism that might be 
called ‘explicative’ rather than ‘eliminative’. This has it that the retention of certain 
notions is needed for explanation. I might accept Parfit’s (3), yet hold that ascription of 
experiences to a person is essential to explain unity of consciousness and so to explain 
what a subject of experience is. As we have seen, this is not Parfit’s reductionism. Is this 
last therefore ‘eliminativist’? It seems not: ‘Reductionists do not deny that people 
exist…. This is true because of the way we talk.’ 476 Of this assertion, Cassam makes 
what is surely the telling criticism that ’the justification for our thinking and talking in 
this way cannot be that we do so think and talk’. 
  Cassam now proposes:
474 CASSAM (1)
475 See section 56 above for these components of Reductionism
476 PARFIT(3) p.223
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 Suppose that the Kantian argument is sound, and 
that it is provides a way of combining (3) and (5). 
Given that this combination is precisely what the 
Reductionist wants, why not regard Kant’s 
argument as deepening the basic Reductionist 
insight rather than refuting it?
 This ‘deepening’ is achievable because the Kantian and the Reductionist are taken to be 
working at different levels and on different questions. Cassam supposes that we regard a 
given mental life from outside it. We observe the thinking of self-ascriptive thoughts 
and the place of these thoughts in sustaining the notion of independent enduring objects. 
This does not mean that – from outside – we need ascribe these self-ascriptive thoughts 
to subjects. In this, we are, as it were, Reductionists. We can acknowledge that this 
impersonal conception could not be adopted from inside the life. Here we put ourselves 
into the Kantian position. 
 
Parfit’s recommendation of (3) and (5) is more problematic. He writes:
Most of us are Reductionists about nations. We would 
accept the following claims: Nations exist. Ruritania 
does not exist, but France does. Though nations exist, 
a nation is not an entity that exists separately, apart 
from its citizens and its territory. We would accept
(6) A nation’s existence just involves the existence 
of its citizens, living together in certain ways, on its 
territory.
Some claim
(7) A nation just is these citizens and this territory.
Others claim
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(8) A nation is an entity that is distinct from its 
citizens and its territory.
We may believe that (8) and (6) are not inconsistent…. 
  If (8) and (6) are compatible, should we conclude, as Parfit would have us, that (3) and 
(5) are also compatible? Not even those most concerned to resist the view of the nation 
attributed to ‘most of us’ would claim that the nation is a living thing. Its comparability 
to the person will be found difficult to catch, even by those persuaded that it is in some 
sense more than its parts. Parfit’s claim seems open to attack from two sides. On one 
side, we may doubt if it follows that we should be reductionist in the case of persons, 
when we are reductionist in the case of nations. On the other side, we may not be 
persuaded that we are, or should be, reductionists in the case of nations. Quite apart 
from its citizens, a nation may be an object of devotion, or a ground for self-sacrifice. It 
is possible to love a city or a country, yet to despise its human components.477 
  In an article which followed this, Cassam pursues his scrutiny of Parfit by way of 
limited close observations. 478  He now questions whether the propositions with which 
Parfit defines Reductionism hang together. As we have seen, the necessity of their 
connection is an important part of Parfit’s claim. By way of challenge to this, Cassam 
denies that the postulation of a Cartesian ego is incompatible with supposing that 
personhood consists of other facts, of which an impersonal description might be 
possible. As he puts it: ‘ The basis of the claim that a person is a spiritual substance 
need not be the assertion that the concept of a person is that of a soul, any more than 
someone who claims that a person is his brain is committed to thinking of this as a 
conceptual truth’. On the assumption of a Cartesian ego, why should this, any more than 
the ātman, or – a different case – the brain, be what personhood amounts to? As he 
declares: ‘ .. from the fact that the survival of one’s brain is necessary and sufficient for 
477 An example of this is to be found in Georges Clemenceau, French Prime Minister 
in the latter half of the First World War. Keynes remarked of him: ‘He had one illusion 
– France; and one disillusion, mankind, including Frenchmen …’. See KEYNES. 
Keynes’ distinction lends itself naturally to dramatisation. The first three acts of 
Shakespeare’s play, Coriolanus, make up an extended debate about ‘Rome’. The 
hero, Marcius is the target of a question which catches Parfit’s view to perfection: 
‘What is the city but the people?’ Is this a devastating point of self-evident force? Or 
is ‘Rome’ much more than an ignoble rank-and-file?
478 CASSAM (2)
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one’s survival, it does not follow that persons are of the kind ‘human brain’. The same 
point might be made of the kind, ‘immaterial soul’.
   Cassam’s  approach is one of incidental criticism, by way of advancing his own 
positive assertions. Central to these is an assertion of ‘animalism’. By ‘animalism’, 
Cassam means ‘a view of persons which claims that a person is an animal of a certain 
kind, and that it is necessary and sufficient for the persistence of a person that the 
animal with which he or she is identical persists’. 479 It needs no labouring that this is in 
line with what I called ‘the Living Thing Criterion’. It makes of ‘person’ a classificatory 
notion. Its successful assertion would be a challenge to Parfit.
 The assertion of animalism prompts a further reference to the supposed analogy 
between persons and nations. Cassam continues:
 … the Reductionist needs to show that thinking of 
persons as like nations is better than the best 
substantialist conception …… this is not a challenge 
which Reductionism can meet, once it is recognised 
that the best version of Non-Reductionism is not 
Cartesian, but animalist. 
 Cassam relies on this contrast between ‘person’ and ‘nation’ in criticising Parfit’s 
account of indeterminacy. He takes the case of Parfit’s Physical Spectrum, it the middle 
of which, it will be recalled, it may be impossible to say whether or not identity persists. 
Parfit would claim that Non-Reductionists who are animalists will be baffled by this 
difficulty. Cassam, however, claims that many Non-Reductionists would be willing to 
accept indeterminacy in exceptional cases, preferring this – along with Parfit – to the 
drawing of an arbitrary line. He claims: ‘A situation in which it is indeterminate 
whether an animal identical with me survives is preferable to one in which it is beyond 
dispute that no animal identical with me survives.’ 480 Other Non-Reductionists  would 
question Parfit’s writing in to his example the stipulation that all the relevant facts are 
known, so as to anticipate, and rebut, the claim that a dividing line exists within the 
479 CASSAM(2) p.17
480 CASSAM(2) p.28. 
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Spectrum, even if it cannot be found: ‘…. it is not really conceivable that we should 
know how to answer every question except the question of identity’. 
  Cassam then comes, in his turn, to the Brown/Brownson example. Brownson is clearly 
Brown on both of Parfit’s Criteria. Enough of Brown’s brain persists, and psychological 
continuity and connectedness are ensured. Parfit, as he frequently tells us, is concerned 
not with identity but with mattering, but he seems to be committed to this conclusion if 
forced to one. For the animalist, Brown is not Brownson, as they are different animals, 
and because the answer to any identity-query has to be ‘ the one which accords with the 
nature of persons as they are in nature’. Cassam supposes a Parfitian response to this on 
the lines that it would be irrational of Brown, on the eve of the operation, not to see that 
the relation with the future Brownson carries on ‘what matters’ to him. A riposte to this 
response might be that, to the animal, what matters is the survival of the animal. To this, 
a counter-riposte might be, from Brown, that even on animalist assumptions he is a 
person in intimate association with an animal, which fact gives him a concern for the 
perpetuation of the person.481 What this supposed debate should suggest is that 
‘mattering’ is less obvious in its meaning than Parfit seems to appreciate, although he 
relies on it heavily. For this and other reasons, I will consider ‘mattering’ more fully 
below.
  Both McDowell and Wiggins criticise reductionism, explicitly or not, from within a 
broadly Aristotelian tradition. McDowell conveys this with his closing reference to 
‘ourselves as rational animals’. It is with a rather different purpose that Cassam defends 
what he calls ‘the materialist conception of self-consciousness’ in a book, Self and 
World,  published in 1997. 482 The argument is summarised, in part, as being that ‘the 
existence of persons is a substantial fact about the world, and that it is not possible to 
give a complete description of reality without claiming that persons exist’.483  It was this 
argument by Cassam, presented earlier elsewhere, which led Parfit to abandon the IRC 
of Reasons and Persons. After developing his main argument, which I will not try to 
481 For the words ‘in intimate association with an animal’, one might substitute ‘by 
way of the classification of an animal’. It is a nice question how far this would 
weaken the supposed counter-riposte.
482 CASSAM(3)
483 Taken from the description of Cassam’s argument on the cover of the paperback 
edition of the book
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consider here, Cassam comes to Reductionism. 484 He returns to the question of the 
compatibility of Reductionism and Neo-Kantianism, and to the distinction, already set 
out, between observation from the outside and that from an internal perspective. He 
now goes further than before in considering objections to arguments for their 
compatibility. He seems more inclined than he was before to find them telling. One such 
objection is that the external ‘sideways-on’ perspective – that is, observation from the 
outside, 
 - fails to explain the relations between thoughts and 
experiences in a way which fully captures their 
contents, since thinkings of I-thoughts will be among 
those physical and mental events which, by being 
interrelated, constitute a particular life.485 
There follows an argument of much complexity. At its centre is an account of mental 
processes characteristic of ‘Functionalism’, taking this to be ‘the view that mental states 
are individuated by reference to their place in a complex causal network’. 486   Cassam 
invokes Shoemaker’s view of Functionalism as drawing on the concept of a person: a 
mental state works with other mental states of the same person.487 He brings forward an 
objection of Parfitian character to this view, to the effect that the elements within this 
complex work with others in what is functionally the same space, which space will be 
marked out by its being the locus of the appropriate effects. If this is right, the 
specification of ‘the same person’  seems to lose its foundation. This is not, however, all 
there is to be said. Cassam continues:
  .. while the content of a person’s belief or intention 
will depend to a certain extent upon all .. preceding 
states, there will often be a particular preceding state 
484 On Cassam’s own account (op cit, p 3 footnote): ‘My main concern is not with the 
question of whether self-consciousness requires that each of us is a corporeal or 
physical object, but with the question of whether it is a necessary condition of self-
consciousness that we are presented to ourselves as physical objects among 
physical objects. It is a further question whether it follows from the fact that one’s 
thinking self is presented to oneself as corporeal that it is corporeal’.
485 CASSAM (3) p.184
486 Op cit p.193
487 Op cit p.193
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… It is of that earlier state that the current state is the 
“successor state”488
To explain this connection, Cassam assumes extension through time. Only on the 
modelling of this extension on the lives of subjects is it possible to capture the idea that 
one element in the space prompts another. This appears to meet the object which 
Cassam has set himself: an explanation of the way ‘we are presented to ourselves as 
physical objects among physical objects’. It seems to go with this that ‘it is not possible 
to give a complete description of reality without claiming that persons exist’. To the 
extent that this is persuasive, as I take it to be, it will be telling in rebuttal of Parfit.
82. Recapitulation 
  The argument has become complicated, and it will be helpful to recapitulate. In the 
argument to date, we have been concerned with various accounts of the subject. Four of 
these have been prominent: 
(1)The spiritual substance, the ātman of Indian religion and the soul of Christians. In 
Parfit’s presentation, it appears as ‘the Cartesian soul’. In Locke’s account, ‘the soul’ 
co-operates with ‘the man’ and ‘the person’ in the constitution of the Lockean 
subject. It has been widely held to be the bearer, or vital constituent, of personal 
identity.
As the carrier of personal identity, this is disposed of, at least to Locke’s satisfaction, in 
these often quoted words from Chapter 27 of Book II of the Essay: ‘I think no body, 
could he be sure that the Soul of Heliogabalus were in one of his Hogs, would yet say 
that Hog were a Man or Heliogabalus’. Parfit goes further in finding no reason to credit 
any such entity as the soul. 
(2)The Lockean view, the defining characteristic of which is the differentiation of ‘the 
man’ and ‘the person’ and the attribution of a persisting identity to the person 
distinct from that of the man. The identity of the person, so cut loose, may become 
488 CASSAM (3) p.194
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contentious and perplexing in extreme contingencies, in the invention of which 
Locke sets an example. 489 Even in such cases as that of Brown/Brownson, on which 
views will differ sharply, Brown is either perpetuated or he is not.
The polemical configuration of Parfit’s position is to some degree one of reaction to the 
Lockean view.
(3)The Reductionist account set out in Part Three of Reasons and Persons.  Parfit 
offers an escape from the impasses to which Lockean reflection seems to lead, in 
finding that identity is not what matters: the perplexing cases to which the Lockean 
account gives rise are found to be empty as questions; in any one case, such as the 
choice between Brown or not-Brown, all the relevant facts might be known, 
leaving no more to be said. If, in any one case of this kind, there had to be an 
answer, more than one view might be sustained. Even if one such view had 
polemical advantages over the others, it would make more sense to grant that 
identity may not be determinate.
In the course of this chapter, I have set out objections to accepting Parfit’s version of 
reductionism. I have done this, in part, by pressing the greater cogency of the remaining 
option.
(4) A view of the subject which finds some grounding in Aristotle, and in support of 
which I have drawn on McDowell, Wiggins and Cassam. This has it that the subject 
of concern is first and foremost and essentially a living thing with systemic unity. 
On this view, Locke’s distinction of ‘the man’ and ‘the person’ may retain its point 
and utility, but only in so far as ‘person’ is a classification of ‘man’.
  We can see from this listing that the first account is subverted by the second, and the 
second by the third. Locke has cut out the soul from any effective role in the assurance 
of personal identity, and Parfit has found Locke’s account to buckle under the pressure 
of extreme contingencies. Parfit’s account is then, I maintain, shown to be inadequate 
by a clear statement of the fourth. 
489 The Prince and the Cobbler referred to above. See LOCKE p.340.  
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  From the Buddhist point of view, the elimination of the first account is welcome. The 
second and – much more strongly – the third accounts go well with the ‘weak’ view of 
the subject, as I have distinguished it above. If our conclusion is that only the fourth is 
viable, the Buddhist advocate will be forced back on the ‘strong’ view. We have seen 
that the ‘strong’ view is implied everywhere in the early texts, but the problem of its 
compatibility with the explicitly stated ‘weak’ view, and with the characteristic Buddhist 
assertions that go with this, will then persist. The identity problem will remain 
unresolved.
83. Parfit’s further thoughts
  I should not end this consideration of Parfit’s Reductionism without drawing attention 
to a shift of presentation in the 1999 article. (I have already mentioned another shift, the 
conception, which Parfit is now inclined to admit, of the phased sortal). This is the 
careful marking-off of Parfit’s version of reductionism from others, which he calls 
‘hyper-reductionist’. 490  A similar distinction is to be found in an article published in 
1995. There, Parfit responds to the objection that his version of reductionism would 
make all facts to be facts about fundamental particles:
We are not claiming that, whenever there are facts 
at different levels, it is always the lower level 
facts which matter ….Relative to the facts at 
some lower level, the higher level fact is … 
merely conceptual. Such conceptual facts cannot 
be rationally or morally important. 491  
Identity-claims – to the effect that Brownson is or is not Brown – are a case of what is 
not ‘rationally or morally important’.
490 PARFIT (6) p.218: ‘According to some Reductionists, such as Bernard Williams and 
Judith Thomson, each of us is a human body. This view is not, strictly, reductionist, 
but that is because it is hyper-reductionist: it reduces persons to bodies in so strong 
a way that it doesn’t even distinguish between them.’ 
491 PARFIT (5) p.13
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  In sum, what Parfit now emphasises is a conceptual entity, the concept being one of a 
fact made up of other facts - ‘lower level’ facts, to employ his own distinction. 492  This is 
no substantial novelty in his thought, as the same emphasis is at the centre of his first 
presentation of Reductionism, but it stands out more distinctly in this restatement, where 
it is cut free from the extended critique of Locke pervading Reasons and Persons. The 
difference between this and the Living Thing view will be evident. It is well brought out 
by one of Wiggins’ observations. Wiggins remarks that the biological scientist, 
Professor J Z Young had arrived  ‘… at a conception of identity and persistence through 
time that is strikingly similar, where living things are concerned, to the neo-Aristotelian 
conception that I defend’. Young did this ‘in response to all the facts that confront the 
biological scientist’. Wiggins quotes the following from Young:
“The essence of a living thing is that it consists of 
atoms of the ordinary chemical elements we have 
listed, caught up into the living system and made 
part of it for a while. The living activity takes them 
up and organizes them in its characteristic way. The 
life of a man consists essentially in the activity he 
imposes upon that stuff … it is only by virtue of this 
activity that the shape and organization of the whole 
is maintained.”
Wiggins goes on to remark on ‘the recognition [since his own first publication] in the 
philosophical community at large of the persisting conceptual importance  … of 
Aristotle’s biology and philosophy of life’, and finds it welcome. 493
  The stress we find here on the organisation of forms of life contrasts sharply with 
Parfit’s apparent satisfaction with a categorisation of ourselves as consisting of ‘brain 
and body’. 494  In the 1999 article, restating his whole position, he declares:
492 Yet not to be reduced to these ‘lower level’ facts, or to one of them – for instance 
the body – by definition. Here is the difference between Parfit’s view and that of the 
hyper-reductionists or, as Siderits has it, the ‘eliminativists’.  
493 For all this, see WIGGINS: Preface p.xi 
494 I remarked on the oddity of this expression above. See p.150 above.
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Our existence consists in the existence of a 
body, and the occurrence of various 
interrelated mental processes and events. Our 
identity over time consists in physical and/or 
psychological continuity. 495
I should by now made it sufficiently clear what I take this to leave out.  The alternative 
which I have set out in this chapter, prompted in its expression by Wiggins, is that 
‘human being’ should be taken to be a classification of ‘living thing’ or, at a ‘lower’ 
level, of Young’s ‘living system’, and ‘person’ to be a bracket within ‘living thing’. 
84. Parfit’s ‘what matters’, and other matters
  I must now address more fully the question of what it is to ‘matter’, as this has an 
important place within Parfit’s thinking, and because it seems insufficient to take the 
notion to be clear, simply from the contexts in which Parfit brings it up - for instance, in 
suggesting that identity is not what matters. 
  
  There are at least three ways in which we might find something to matter: 
(1)  it may be the point of a subject of dispute. If I find that 
discussion is losing its focus, I might say, ‘it is X, not Y, that 
matters’, in the hope of directing attention to X;
(2)  it may be what is of particular concern or advantage. I 
might say, ‘what matters is that I keep my job;
(3)  what matters may be what is of importance generally or 
intrinsically. I might say, ‘what matters is the general good’, 
or ‘what matters is that the human race keeps going’.
495 PARFIT(6) p.218
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  All these employments are to be found in Parfit, often together, drawn out by his 
interest in the concern for survival. He presumes that it is this that is most worth 
discussing. He also takes the clear-headed to set more store by the perpetuation of 
chains of (their) psychological connections and continuities than by that of their 
identities. These leads to his claim that such perpetuation is of intrinsic importance and 
that it is what ought to matter to everyone. There need be no confusion in this, but it is a 
weakness that the three senses are hardly distinguished. What matters in the first sense 
comes to be assimilated to what matters in the third. In cases where perpetuation is 
‘what matters’ – as the point of attention – Parfit seems to find it also the point of prime 
importance – that is, it is what we should care about.
  This is surely too easy. It leaves Parfit open to a very obvious challenge, which cuts to 
the basis of mattering. We may be asked: why should perpetuation, by way of Relation 
R or otherwise, be of concern? Why does it matter to me?  The challenge may go 
further: why does anything matter? Where is the mattering of mattering?
 Parfit is open to this challenge because of his failure to make an important distinction, 
which the questions just suggested should have conveyed: one between what is 
grounded in instinct and what is held to as the outcome of a process of reasoning. These 
come together in the case of going–on, though they remain distinguishable and the 
distinction is important. The concern to go on – that is, to perpetuate or preserve 
oneself, is primarily instinctual. This is not to deny that I may also judge my going-on 
to be desirable: I may be happy on the whole and judge that it is good to maximise 
happiness; I may have a project in hand, which I wish to complete and which, along 
with my wishing, I judge to be for the future general good.
  A notable weakness in Parfit is his disregard of the instinctual. While it is hardly 
deniable that the concern to go on has both an instinctual and a rational basis, Parfit 
probes and ponders ‘what matters’, as if the mattering, or falling short from mattering, 
of going-on were a subject of rational determination only. This must be an imperfect 
view of something at least largely instinctual. When I find myself in danger, I run. In a 
more familiar context, my desire to go on living is likely to be paramount, and to be 
recognised as such, even in desperate circumstances. This is not a matter of calculation.
227
  What I am pointing to is an excessively rationalist stress in Parfit’s presentation, which 
goes with a corresponding disregard of the ‘animal’ side of human life. Animals, 
including human animals, have instincts. In Part Three, Parfit discusses the wish to 
persist, whether through the perpetuation of identity or otherwise, in a way that reflects 
a disregard of this. This makes it difficult for him to bring up, and to try to answer some 
intrusive questions: Why should I wish to go on? What is good about my going on? 
Why should I care about the perpetuation of ‘my’ memories?’ The answers to – or 
evasions of – these questions surely has to be, in the first place, that it is of the nature of 
an animal to strive to persist and, if self-aware, to wish to persist. While I may well be 
able to give reasons for wishing to persist, such considerations will be secondary. I seek 
to persist because I am what I am.
  In pointing to this, I am suggesting that Parfit has a rationalistic habit of mind. The 
tendency of this is to render those who have it less able to take proper account of the 
‘non-rational’ (not ‘irrational’) and the instinctual; also less able to grant that there are 
areas of life with no place for rational calculation. Here is a misapplication of reason, 
which may issue – as, I am suggesting, it sometimes does in the present case – in 
something obtuse. 496  This is a habit of mind which goes readily with the utilitarian 
predisposition to be registered in Parfit’s approach throughout Reasons and Persons, 
though more in Parts Two and Four than in Part Three, and in the later work. This finds 
two ringing declarations. One is from the 1999 article, ‘I believe that if sentient beings 
suffer, that is not only bad for them. It is bad, or what some call bad, period’. 497  The 
other is Parfit’s endorsement of Sidgwick’s judgment that ‘the destruction of mankind 
would be by far the greatest of all conceivable crimes’. This is because such destruction 
would cut out the possibility of happiness in the lives of future generations. 498  
  Neither of these judgments, it hardly needs saying, is peculiarly utilitarian: the former, 
at least, is thoroughly compatible with a central Buddhist emphasis. 499 I quote them here 
496 The rationalistic is to the reasonable as the legalistic is to the equitable. I am 
concerned to identify a disabling rigidity, perhaps a professional deformation.
497 PARFIT (6) p.258.
498 PARFIT(3) p.454. Parfit sems to assume that the aggregate of such happiness 
would outweigh that of misery.
499 The objectionable quality of duḥkha is taken as self-evident. This insight is at the 
heart of the āryasatyāni. See p.38 above.
228
for their very plain expression of Benthamite presuppositions. My suggestion is that, 
while there may be no necessary connection between the two, the rationalistic bias will 
often be seen to go happily with recourse to the Benthamite calculus, and that it does so 
in the case of Parfit. 
  Here is a view of how things are, and of how moral enterprise ought to be directed, 
which is conspicuous in Part Four, where it is plain that Parfit sees well-being as a 
quantum, open to be registered in Benthamite terms. I refer, in particular, to the chapter 
entitled ‘The Repugnant Conclusion’, on which I touched briefly in Chapter Five. 500 
There, Parfit envisages the possibility of the modest excess of happiness over misery to 
be found in the members of a very large population exceeding as an aggregate the 
greater excess to be found in the less numerous members of one much smaller. 
Application of the calculus might then suggest that we should favour the former state of 
affairs, even to the extent of being obliged to bring it about. 501
 What this example brings out is the wide distinction of the Benthamite smack to be 
found sometimes in Parfit from the emphases of virtue ethics, both Buddhist and 
Western. Proponents of virtue ethics will happily concur that the more well-being, and 
the less pain, the better. What will seem odd from their perspective is the seemingly 
unthinking recourse to quantifiability. It should have been evident from what I 
suggested in Chapter Two and elsewhere that the well-being of a living thing is a matter 
of evaluation irreducible to calculation. This should be no controversial view of the 
matter, as the same is the case with the purely physical well-being of a living thing – 
that is, with its health. Healthiness is one of the attributes of a system – that is, here, of a 
living thing - and, while we can say that someone is in better or worse health than he 
was a year ago, it would be odd to venture to ‘count up’ that healthiness, as if writing a 
bill, and to contribute it to a larger total. It would be odd because living things cannot 
sensibly be so regarded. 502 
500 Page 195 above
501 This is, I think, a fair account of what the argument of Chapter 17 of Reasons and 
Persons comes to; I do not present it as an adequate summary of something quite 
complex.
502 I am not concerned to deny that a Government statistician might usefully do just 
what I find to be odd. The statistician has special purposes of his own. 
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  The limitation which I have been discussing should not be over-stated. A reading of 
Appendix I to Reasons and Persons should be enough to show that Parfit’s general 
allegiance to a utilitarian approach is no simple matter. Its complexities are analysed 
with subtlety. In the next chapter, I will recall what I have said about Part Two of the 
work and make use of it to support the approach to Buddhist ethics which I conclude by 
recommending. It is with this in mind that I recall my brief mention of Matilal’s 
judgment at the end of Chapter Five. Matilal suggested that there was a gulf between 
Buddhist presumptions and concerns and those of Parfit, such that the Buddhist 
advocate should not look to that way of doing philosophy for fundamental support. This 
suggeston, which I found persuasive, seems all the more plausible with an appreciation 
of the extent of Parfit’s utilitarianism. It may well be that Parfit can provide incidental 
support, by way of insights and analysis which may be open to appropriation. But our 
conclusion seems to be that this is the limit of it.  
85. Unfinished business?
  Reasons and Persons was published nearly 25 years ago. While the argument of Part 
Three seems self-sufficient to a degree which would have permitted Part Three’s 
separate publication, the closer scrutiny I have offered above may have brought out its 
incompleteness. This is evident in a certain scrappiness, both (I am aware) of comment 
on my own part and (I believe) of Parfit’s own presentation. This is much more obvious 
when his work on personal identity is viewed as a whole, extending to his respose to 
critical appraisal. In my own remarks on this, I have suggested that there is very little by 
way of retraction, but a notable reordering. This has, I think been for the better, but 
Parfit has seemed not to appreciate the extent to which his argument has acquired a 
different look. The two modifications discussed here, which were offered in the 1999 
article, are instances of this. 
  All this suggests that Parfit’s views on personal identity and matters related to it are 
still developing. This is, of course, unsurprising. It is also true, to repeat a point just 
made, that his reaction to his critics has been notably dogged, so much so that I have 
suggested above that the effect of a main argumentative strand in the 1999 article has 
been to weaken his case. 503 None the less, I have come to find the coherence and 
completeness of Part Three and of what has followed it to be less than it seemed on a 
503 Page 221 above.
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first reading. If I am right in this, it seems not implausible to attribute it to the natural 
awkwardness of presenting a position which is still, to some degree, taking shape. I am 
strengthened in this view by one of Parfit’s endnotes to the 1999 article, in which he 
refers to ‘a projected book The Metaphysics of the Self’.  504  The comprehensiveness of 
this title suggests that what I have come to find, in Parfit’s existing work , to be too little 
co-ordinated might be brought into a higher unity. 
86. Conclusions.
  Little seems to be required by way of conclusion. I have considered Parfit’s claims for 
‘quasi-memory’, concluding that no impregnable account could be offered of an 
identity-free substratum of mental life. I remarked on the width of meaning of the term 
‘person’, and of other denotations of the subject, and suggested that Parfit was not 
always successful in specifying the object of his consideration. I also questioned the 
adequacy of his treatment of apparent alternatives to Reductionism. I suggested that his 
argument was over-precipitate in its ruling out of Non-Reductionist conceptions of the 
person. In broad concurrence with McDowell, Wiggins and Cassam, I argued that there 
was an alternative to Reductionism left unconsidered by Parfit. I suggested (following 
Parfit’s own usage) that this might be expressed by way of a Living Thing Criterion. I 
found this approach to be characterised in Aristotelian terms by McDowell and Wiggins 
and as ‘animalism’ by Cassam. I concluded that it was not only an alternative for 
consideration, but also a persuasive option. It is this which I have sought to present, by 
way of positive response to the question this chapter has addressed. 
504 PARFIT(6) note 22
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CHAPTER  SEVEN
Conclusions
87. The identity problem as it stands: how helpful has Parfit been?
  The identity problem is a problem within a problem. In its ‘inner’ dimension, it is one 
of the ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ notions of the subject, asserted or taken for granted within the 
Buddhist record. The ‘weak’notion is open to the criticisms attendant on all 
‘reductionist’ notions. The ‘strong’ notion escapes these, but seems even less compatible 
than the ‘weak’notion with the supposition of rebirth. In this supposition and in that of 
the interwoven notion of karman, we find the ‘outer’ dimension of the problem. 
Karman and rebirth are fundamental to the Buddhist understanding of the motivation of 
action, and also of regard for other beings and for the future. In this combination of 
‘inner’ and ‘outer’, the problem becomes one of morality, bearing on all the concerns of 
morality.  
  The arguments of Reasons and Persons bear largely on this complex of difficulties. In 
Part Three, the parallel between Parfit’s characteristic assertions and those of the 
Buddhist proponent is close - closer than Parfit himself appreciates. This is helpful to 
the Buddhist proponent, as fresh and telling arguments are available to him. Even so, 
the help to be found in Part Three has its limitations. I spelled these out in Chapter Five, 
and set out in Chapter Six some objections, which I found to be telling, to Parfit’s whole 
procedure. I then turned to Part Two and found it possible to draw from it a line of 
thought well fitted to be used, though with caution, in support of the Buddhist insistence 
on disinterested concern. 505 This was an unexpected finding, in part because it cut 
against Parfit’s own presumption of a Buddhist bias towards self-interest. 
 The complex argument which I must now bring to a conclusion has had within it two 
separate, though often connected, strands. It has been concerned with how things are, 
505 Caution, because Parfit’s argument for consistency is two-edged. See p.191 
above.
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and also with what matters. Consideration of the first leads very easily, perhaps 
inevitably, to a shift of attention to the second. In Chapter Four, the Middling Claim 
came naturally to mind in the course of discussion of the straightforward Going-on 
Claim and of Buddhaghosa’s claim (‘neither the same, nor different’). The first two of 
these are concerned with how things are; the Middling Claim reflects this concern, but 
embraces what we might, or should, care about. In Chapter Five, discussion of the 
Extreme and Moderate Claims set out in Part Three of Reasons and Persons gave rise 
naturally to the Minimal Claim. This resembles the Middling Claim in its focus on 
concern. 
  These two strands have been long drawn-out, which is why I offer this summary. I 
ended Chapter Four, dealing with rebirth, inconclusively. I then picked up in Chapter 
Five the discussion of future prospects broken off in Chapter Four, in the course of 
dealing with Parfit’s Part Three and, in respect of Paul Williams’ contribution, of 
dealing with his Part Two. I will now resume it again in considering the Middling 
Claim.
88. The Middling Claim: what is ‘as good as’ survival
The Middling Claim is to the effect that, in the succession of B to A, there might be 
something of A about B such as to be ‘as good as’ the unrealisable state of B ‘being’ A, 
so that we can reasonably give up concern about B ‘being’ A.506 I have shown that Part 
Three of Reasons and Persons found a carrying-on into another life to be at least 
intelligible: chains of psychological continuity and connectedness may remain in being, 
and be sustained there by some abnormal cause.  In what follows, I will set aside the 
doubts cast by Chapter Six and, for the sake of the argument, let pass as intelligible 
certain instances of perpetuation. My object will be to bring out what might be ‘as good 
as’ survival and – what is closely related to this - what it might be to ‘matter’. I will be 
concerned with mattering as a motivating factor in morality – that is, with how 
determinations of importance, or of mattering in other sense, may be a spur to action or 
abstention. 
506 See section 49
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  Admit, therefore, the case of someone living in the future, with at least very much of 
his or her psychological continuity and connectedness having its derivation from 
someone living now. This is clearly close to the account of perpetuation offered by 
Buddhaghosa and considered above, in treating of the Buddhist commentators’ 
restatement of the Buddhist understanding of rebirth. It fits with Buddhaghosa’s account 
to take such a man or woman as an instance of an entity ‘neither the same as nor 
different’. To meet the Buddhist case, the chain would have to be one of the elements of 
character and fate as much as those of memory. This, by itself, makes for no great 
difference from Parfit, as Parfit admits such other continuities. 507 
  Assume for the moment that Buddhaghosa was right in understanding such succession 
to be what the Buddha meant in such declarations as, ‘at that time Sariputta was X’; 
assume that his glossing of these words is no retreat, but a proper elucidation. If we 
follow him in this, we will believe that an entity, ‘neither the same nor different’, is such 
a perpetuation in the Buddha’s distinctive sense of an entity made by karman. This will 
be the case, despite the difference of parentage and upbringing, and along with an 
almost certain ignorance of this ‘descent’ on the part of the successor being. 508 Call this 
Buddhaghosa’s view. It is clearly one of what I have called ‘going-on’ and, as such, it is 
outside the ambit of the Middling Claim. I bring it up in this context on account of what 
appears to be its openness to be restated – against Buddhaghosa’s intention, no doubt - 
in terms of what would be ‘as good as’ going on. 
   Turn then to Parfit’s view. This is founded on explicit disregard of ‘going on’. It is the 
view that a future entity has much in him of the psychological make-up of someone 
now alive – that is, of those many chains of psychological continuity and connectedness 
that Parfit finds to constitute personhood. If we are content with Parfit’s methodology, 
and find conceivable the counter-factual extremities brought about by ‘scanning’ and 
the like, we may find this constitution conceivable. This future entity will not be ‘me’, if 
it is my future that is in question, as he (or she) will be a different – Lockean – ‘man’. 
507 PARFIT(3) section 78 and elsewhere
508 I repeat that I am considering only rebirth as a human being. Rebirth as an 
animal, which the Buddhist tradition admits, seems yet more baffling than this. 
Rebirth in hellish state is, in contrast, much easier to understand. When we are told 
that X has been reborn in hell, it seems at least clear enough who or what is now in 
hell. Rebirth in heaven is more complicated than this, as it may involve something 
like appointment to a pre-existing role. See above, especially Chapters One and 
Four. 
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He will have his own life as a living thing, with all the characteristics engendered by 
parentage and upbringing. Though my identity will not be preserved in his existence, 
this existence is ‘as good as’ its preservation. Here is what I have called the Middling 
Claim. Call this Parfit’s view. Its difference from Buddhaghosa’s will be apparent.
  Parfit’s view prompts two questions. The first is the one raised by Parfit himself: do I 
regard this relationship as being ‘as good as’ the perpetuation of myself? Is this ‘what 
matters’? The second bears on the way I regard this future individual: do I care about 
his or her well-being? If I do not, should I try to develop such concern? How far will 
my belief in his succession to myself govern my conduct now, and if so how? Is this, in 
a rather different sense, what matters? Parfit has argued at length that it is this 
perpetuation that ‘matters’. I must now say how far I find this claim persuasive.
  It will be helpful, in making this judgment, if we consider, first, the case of another 
living thing similar, in respect of parentage, upbringing and all external circumstances 
to the entity described by Parfit. This entity lacks, however, those chains of 
psychological continuity and connectedness attributable to myself, and of course has 
others ‘in lieu’. That is as much to say that he lacks memories, character and fate of a 
kind in which I might have an interest. He is, we may say, just one out of a myriad of 
future beings, remarkable only for his partial resemblance to an entity in which I may 
have a special interest. I now ask myself how I should regard this contrasting entity. The 
answer is, surely, that I can have no reason for special concern for, or any interest in, 
one who is neither more nor less than a future being, one out of billions who will live 
after my death. How could anyone feel otherwise? 
  When I turn back to the entity supposed on Parfit’s view, which the one just considered 
resembles in his external features, I may ask myself how the case differs. Why should 
this entity’s possession of some of the factors of continuity with myself be a ground for 
special regard? There seems no reason why I should be more concerned with M, one 
future human being out of many, whose bare existence, and just that, may safely be 
postulated, than with N, like M in all respects but in his possession of a character or 
chain of habits and so a fate, all attributable to me. Of this fact – unless he is close to 
enlightenment – he will be quite ignorant. Pure chance, I may reflect, along with natural 
limits on the range of possibilities, may be relied on to produce people like me in many 
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respects, and I will care no more for them than for the rest. Why should it be different 
when the resemblance is brought about not by chance but by some ‘abnormal cause’?
  When we go back to the subject marked out by Buddhaghosa’s view, an entity 
postulated as being ‘neither the same nor different’, the conclusion forced on us will be 
the same. Here the resemblance is attributable not to some Parfitian ‘abnormal cause’ 
but to karmic process – on a traditional view of karman. The outcome, however, seems 
to be the same. Why, in this case, should resemblance be a cause of concern, or a 
motivating factor, any more than it should be when it has been brought about by the 
means envisaged by Parfit? Buddhaghosa’s expression of what is involved looks very 
much like an admission of non-identity, whether or not he would have granted that. 
Where, therefore, is the significant difference between this case and the one just 
discussed? I conclude that Buddhaghosa’s restatement of the earlier form of the rebirth-
claim cannot be saved by its being understood in terms of ‘mattering’. Parfit’s 
innovatory suggestion does nothing to rescue it from the general objections to the 
Buddhist rebirth-claim brought out above.
 It may help, at this point, to recall a comparable case from quite another philosophical 
tradition. The point of concern was summed up in the lines quoted above from De 
Rerum Natura. Here we find Lucretius considering the possibility of the atoms 
composing the subject being restored, by pure chance (we assume), long after the death 
of that subject to their original configuration. Lucretius declares, and surely 
persuasively, that this is not survival. Here, too, the question of mattering comes up.  If I 
am that subject and a good Epicurean, will I feel that this possibility, should it be 
realised, is ‘as good as’ my survival? It is hard to suppose that I will. I might have a 
benevolent interest in that future being’s prosperity and happiness, but why should this 
interest be special or unusually intense simply on account of a chance reconfiguration of 
atoms? Lucretius was surely right, both in ruling out continuity explicitly and in ruling 
out concern by implication. 
  Here we may be able to see – if ruefully – at least the polemical merits of the very 
simple statements of the rebirth-claim to be found in the early texts and in the popular, 
non-canonical literature. I have in mind the claim that A was B or that C will be D. It is 
in such instances that we find a basis for interest and concern – that is, a motivating 
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factor of a self-interested kind. If I am to ‘go on’ in this literal sense, and if the nature of 
my going-on is to be determined karmically, I have an excellent motive for governing 
my actions appropriately. The problem, I hope I have shown, is that this full-blooded 
claim is one of which it is impossible to make sense. This has been dealt with at length 
above. One living thing cannot ‘become’ another, and any account of such becoming in 
terms of rebirth runs up against that impossibility.
  How would an advocate of Buddhaghosa’s claim seek to rebut this conclusion? His 
best course might be to do so by way of definition. The karmic element, the ongoing 
flow, is what is meant by the person, the object of concern. 509  It is here that all happens: 
action and consequence, the perfection or degradation of character. This is a good 
answer, as it is open to no rebuttal from within the Buddhist tradition. It is however still 
open to the riposte that it has no motivating force. Why should I care about what 
happens a long way ‘downstream’, long after my own departure?
  We seem, then, to be driven to admit the defeat of the Buddhist claim, both in its 
canonical statement and in its restatement in the commentaries, and also, at least in this 
respect, in that of the alternative expressed in terms of ‘mattering’. From this 
standpoint, when we contemplate future individuals, it can only be with an equality of 
indifference.   
  
89. How it stands with Buddhist ethics: ‘Buddhist’ and ‘Buddhistic’
  Our conclusion, at this late stage of my argument, can only be decidedly negative. We 
have found both the ‘inner’ and the ‘outer’ dimensions of the problem perplexing, and I 
am now suggesting also that there is little profit in the shift of attention to ‘what 
matters’ from ‘how things are’. It follows that that I must consider how it stands with 
Buddhist ethics in the light of these conclusions. If the identity problem has the 
centrality which I have accorded it, its obduracy may be destructive. 
  I will now seek to show that such a drastic conclusion is unnecessary.  Its avoidance 
formed part of my intention in Chapter Two, where I showed that there were strands 
509 Gowans sets out and appears to accept such an argument. See p.12 above.
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within Buddhist ethics unexposed to the consequences of the identity problem. The first 
two components of my account were examples of such. In the Buddha’s time, it was 
possible to revalue inherited and customary values, attitudes and practices, and it was 
natural to make of the Buddha an exemplar and object of worship. Together, these 
strands make up something significant. The works of religious anthropology to which I 
have referred above all show how far this has been the common practice of laypeople in 
traditional Buddhist countries, at least around the middle of the last century. 510  The 
contemporary Westerner – once seized of the problems I have been considering, and 
finding them obdurate – is however more likely to adopt a different form of practice. 
What this amounts to will vary with his starting-point. As a form of ‘virtue ethics’, the 
Buddhist ethical scheme has an appeal detachable from its metaphysical frame. I have 
shown that karman is at the heart of it; I have also shown that karman as K1 has few 
shocks for anyone coming to it from an Aristotelian starting-point. A Westerner whose 
moral practice has been of this kind, who then feels the attraction of something 
Buddhist – Buddha, Dharma or Sangha, perhaps - may come to see his moral 
presumptions in a new light. He may see little reason to modify his practice, except in 
detail or emphasis, such as avoidance of any killing of animals. For a Westerner in a 
different moral tradition, or in none that is fully articulated, a sharper adaptation may be 
necessary. I have in mind someone whose presumptions, conscious or not, are deontic 
or utilitarian. The adoption of Buddhist practice may be registered in his coming to see 
conduct and its consequences in terms of the opposition of kuśala and akuśala, rather 
than that of right and wrong or of the furtherance of utility. Although such a move may 
be bewildering, it is readily imaginable. As a first step towards the orientation just 
described, it may be taken without concern for those aspects of Buddhism which seem 
perplexing.
  In the case of both East and West, these forms of practice – devotional and moral, 
however combined – may be supported by the regular practice of bhāvanā. To the 
contemporary West, this is probably the most intriguing element in the Buddhist system. 
It is common enough to find meditation taught, even by members of the Sangha, with 
no hint that it finds its proper place only in a larger context, at least in part dogmatic. 
From the standpoint of Buddhist tradition, this procedure may be dubious. Seen from 
outside, the association of Buddhist elements, moral orientation and meditation practice, 
510 GOMBRICH(1), SPIRO, TAMBIAH. 
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will be registered as ‘Buddhist’, and understandably so. My negative conclusion on the 
bearing of the identity problem may therefore seem to go beyond what is warranted. 
What I have just described is the practice of many – I would say, of the majority - of 
contemporary Western practitioners of Buddhism. Who is to say that it should not count 
as ‘Buddhism’? 
  There is a close Christian parallel to this form of Buddhist practice. At least since the 
middle of the 19th Century, there has been a kind of Christian profesion notable for its 
playing-down of dogma and corresponding emphasis on conduct and religious 
sentiment. Its proponents are likely to present it as a commitment to spirituality for its 
own sake, apart from all doctrinal statement. I have no space for an adequate account of 
this development. It may be enough if I say that it finds its classic expression, in 
English, in the work of Matthew Arnold.511  In our own day it is well expounded, with a 
polemical edge, in the numerous works of Don Cupitt.512  What Cupitt offers is a line of 
argument that recalls Arnold in point and substance, though hardly in manner.  He is 
concerned to show how the notion of ‘God’ may still figure in the practice and moral 
orientation of the believer who has discarded dogma. 
  Here, I recall the definitions I offered in my opening chapter. I distinguished the terms 
’Buddhist’ and ‘Buddhistic’, very much with the needs of the present case in mind. If I 
were concerned primarily with Cupitt and his kind, I would introduce the term 
’Christianist’, not in disparagement (any more than ‘Neo-Aristotelian’) but for 
clarification. What I have described as being the effective beliefs and practice of many 
contemporary Buddhists is, I believe, parallel to the ‘Christianist’.  They are, therefore, 
best called Buddhistic. The term has a wide extension, covering the positions of 
Easterners who have never taken doctrine on board and contemporary Westerners who, 
consciously or not, have given it a wide berth. What marks it out is the omission of parts 
of the traditional scheme – that which is caught in good textbooks, one might say – 
which the tradition would have held to be of the essence. On this understanding, the 
Buddhistic is at least less of a shortfall from the Buddhist than the Cupittian Christian or 
‘Christianist’ equivalent is from the traditional Christian. It registers no such shock as 
the ‘revaluation’ of the notion of God. From the traditional Christian standpoint, as from 
511 In particular, in Literature and Dogma. See ARNOLD, especially Ch.1.
512 Especially in Taking Leave of God. See CUPITT.
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the Brahmanical, even traditional Buddhism has much of the ‘demythologised’ about it. 
I have brought this out in dealing with ‘revaluation’ above.
    I disparage none of the Buddhistic positions to which practioners may have had 
recourse, and grant that a form of practice made up of the moral code and bhāvanā may 
well be life-transforming.  Consider, however, the general account of the Buddhist 
scheme offered in Chapter Two. I set out the eight components of the 
āryāṣṭaṅgamarga and noted that the commentarial tradition took them to fall into three 
sets. The range of Buddhistic practices just described amounts, in all its forms, to only 
two of these. The third, made up of the first two components, amounting together to the 
cultivation of ‘wisdom’ or ‘insight’ (prajña), makes no part of it. Here is the falling-
short from what it should be uncontroversial to call the full Buddhist practice. This 
point may be made another way. Karman – K2 as much as K1 - and rebirth – that is, its 
extension as K3 - were at the heart of the Buddha’s liberating insight on the occasion of 
his enlightenment, extending to knowledge of the previous lives, governed by karman, 
of all beings. With its peculiar prominence, nothing in the Buddha’s teaching counts for 
more. What I have called ‘Buddhistic’, in its various expressions, is notable for its 
effective disregard. 
  In this section, I have been treading a middle way. I have been urging that the 
persistence of the identity problem is not such as to destroy the possibility of a kind of 
religious and moral practice inspired by the Buddha. Should the problem be found 
insoluble, something will be left. Along with this, I have claimed that when, in 
consequence, components of the traditional Buddhist scheme are discarded, what is left 
will be significantly impaired We are at too early a stage of the present argument for me 
to grant that a ‘Buddhistic’ restatement of the kind I have been discussing is the best – 
let alone, the only - answer to the problem. What I exposed in Chapter Four were 
perplexities, rather than conclusions requiring the outright giving up of the notions of 
karman and rebirth. I return now to the question of what we should make of these 
notions in the light of everything that has gone before.     
90. A new view of  karman  
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 I have already pointed out parallels to karman as K1 in the Western tradition. I will 
now go further and claim that karman may be seen, profitably, as the Indian 
formulation, in the language of Indian religion, of an understanding of the course of 
existence that may be universal. This is found widely in non-philosophical writings of 
all kinds in English. Anyone with karman in mind will find it in such declarations as 
this:
Sow an act and you reap a habit. Sow a habit and you 
reap a character. Sow a character and you reap a 
destiny.513
These words of a largely forgotten Victorian novelist, Charles Reade, will be found 
persuasive to the extent that they ring true in practice. What he declares is brought out 
in the work of the great novelists, and in that of many not great. Any artist concerned 
with presenting human life over a period will adopt something like Reade’s words as a 
principle of narration, as a stop against presenting action and consequence as arbitrary. 
  I am concerned, at this stage of the argument, with the single human life-span only, 
and to suggest that works of the imagination may tell a truth about life and display the 
connection between action and destiny. For this to be possible, the truth-teller may be 
either a writer of fiction or a historian. While this is the sphere in which the great 
novelists are conspicuous, the plainest expression in English of what I have in mind is 
probably a work of history, Carlyle’s The French Revolution. This is a narrative of fact, 
of large imaginative scope, with a cumulative effect which is hard to convey by 
quotation.  Carlyle’s object is the exposure, across a large field not only of what was but 
of why it was, the ‘why’ having a dimension which, I claim, is properly called ‘karmic’. 
Sometimes this strain within the explanation is made explicit: ‘Throughout all time, if 
we read aright, sin was, is, will be, the parent of misery’. 514 The language of this 
‘reading’ recalls Carlyle’s Calvinist formation but the conviction is grounded in 
experience at its most general and diverse.
513 See Notes & Queries, 9th Series, Vol 12, p377
514 CARLYLE, Book I, Ch 7
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  Carlyle shows the ancien regime as a living thing.515 It attracts a doom that he shows to 
be the outcome of a process by no means only karmic. The karmic is only an element 
within it but, if it were absent, the explanation would lose much of its force, perhaps 
much of its cogency. The obvious comparison, with Marxist explanation, is 
enlightening. The difference is less than total, but still of prime importance. Carlyle and 
the Marxists both see the determining force of power relations founded on economic 
power, and Carlyle shows the ripeness for supersession of a regime left exposed by 
changes in these relations. Admirers of Carlyle may grant everything the Marxists may 
wish to press on the importance of material factors. What Carlyle insists on in addition 
to this is an interlocking moral order. This is neither more nor less than a part of reality, 
a matter of truth, and it is this that I have characterised as ‘karmic’.516 The point may be 
made more simply by saying that there are moral truths and that disregard of these 
truths will rebound on the agent, in the same way as disregard or ignorance of other 
facts of the matter. This is hardly something to be argued, at least not by the procedure 
taken up by Carlyle. The reader will be persuaded or not, to the degree to which he finds 
that procedure dramatically satisfying or moving. All I am concerned to establish is that 
karmic explanation is regularly intelligible and may be cogent.
  Karman by way of the attribution of particular consequences to individuals – which I 
have called K2 - finds only limited support in what I have described above. This does 
not mean it should be abandoned, as something persuasive only to those with a 
Buddhist view of the Buddha. An example may bring out the way it has a moral 
significance of its own. John Cornford was killed in the Spanish Civil War, just after 
leaving Cambridge, in combat as a volunteer on the Republican side. A memorial 
volume was published in 1938. In his recollections of Cornford, the historian VG 
Kiernan records:
I recall his telling, with genuine relish, a story of Bela 
Kun machine-gunning five thousand prisoners during 
a forced retreat in the Russian Civil war: he told it not 
515 ‘ … it is singular how long the rotten will hold together, provided you do not 
handle it roughly. For whole generations it continues standing, ‘with a ghastly 
affectation of life’, after all truth and life has fled out of it ..’ Op cit, Book II, Ch 3
516 ‘For Nature is true and not a lie. No lie that you can speak or act but it will come, 
after longer or shorter circulation, like a Bill drawn on Nature’s Reality, and be 
presented there for payment – with the answer, No effects.’ Op cit Book III, Ch 1
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in a spirit of sadism, but of appreciation of an act of 
political necessity firmly carried out.
A few lines before this, Kiernan has said:
Cornford had the same sense of absolute separation 
from the ‘enemy’, of irreconcilable antagonism and 
difference … For ‘they’ were not merely oppressive, 
they were empty; they forced everyone else to live 
wretchedly in order to maintain a manner of life 
which did not even make themselves happy. For him, 
also, the Revolution was as unquestionable a certainty 
as the Resurrection to a Christian. 517  
This passage throws light on both the K1 and the K2 versions of karman, and may 
suggest how they might be vindicated. Cornford’s belief in the inevitability of 
revolution is a matter of course, but he seems equally firm in his belief in the 
unhappiness of the bourgeoisie, this deriving – as if by law – from their exploitation of 
‘every one else’. Cornford must have taken happiness to be more than enjoyment or 
pleasure; his use of the term carries a strong evaluative charge, and its realisation is 
incompatible with wrong-doing.   On an Aristotelian understanding of action and well-
being, this makes excellent sense, but it may be surprising to find a view of the matter 
plainly ‘karmic’, in the broad sense, in a Marxist of Cornford’s intransigence. May not 
such an understanding be inescapable, forced even on the reluctant by experience?
  This makes the first passage quoted problematic, as well as – perhaps - shocking. 
What, one wonders, did Cornford take ‘political necessity’ to be. It has presumably a 
law-like quality, conformity to its requirements ensuring a desirable outcome. This view 
of it seems simply to be given. Cornford’s consistency has to come into question. His 
case seems to bring out the difficulty of maintaining a consistent view of the notion of 
law in understanding experience and historical consequence. Though he would have 
insisted on this notion, his case seems to show the difficulty of doing without a sense of 
517 SLOAN, pp.121/22
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a moral dimension to law: he admits this dimension in considering the case of the 
bourgeoisie, if not explicitly, and over-rides it in considering the disposal of prisoners, 
with his plea of ‘necessity’.
  I am suggesting that something like a karmic understanding of experience is 
ubiquitous, so much so that it is to be found in the most surprising places and among 
those whose conscious attitudes are highly resistant to it. So much may be taken as a 
vindication of K1. In the course through history, and the fate, of the Marxist cause, we 
may also find something of K2, for all the devotion and self-sacrifice sometimes found 
in its proponents. Anyone inclined to credit K2 (‘Don’t do that or you’ll pay for it’) will 
be likely to attribute the wreckage of much disinterested hope to the brisk and law-
determined callousness approved – at least once, it seems - by Cornford. On the 
assumptions of K2, anyone thinking of emulating Bela Kun should recall the likelihood 
– or inevitability – of the action rebounding on its perpetrator. If this seems fanciful, the 
advocate of K2 may go on to suggest that achieving a desirable end by such means 
cannot but corrupt the end. Even more than in the case of K1, this is something that has 
to be pointed to rather than argued. One can do no more than advert to history, or to 
imaginative literature, or to such day-to-day experience as tends to enforce the claim. 518
  Some remarks in the recently published memoirs of a historian and communist (a 
Party-member to the end) suggest that this point may not be easy to take. Hobsbawm 
writes:
The USSR and most of the states and societies built on 
its model, children of the October Revolution of 1917 
which inspired us, have collapsed so completely,  
leaving behind a landscape of material and moral  
ruin, that it must now be obvious that failure was built  
into this enterprise from the start (my emphasis)
518 Yeats’ poems dealing with the Easter Rising, and with the struggle and civil war 
that followed 1918, are an example of the history and of the imaginative literature 
that I have in mind.
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Here is a statement of karman, unrecognised as such by Hobsbawm, and all the more 
striking on account of his apparent lack of interest in all matters of religion. He goes 
on:
What power does, especially in times of crisis and 
war, is to make us do and seek to justify things 
unacceptable when done by private persons. 519
Someone who accepts the reality of karman might say in response to this that while the 
distinction of public and private is a vital one it is not that distinction that is most to the 
point here. The truth which seems to escape Hobsbawm is the one caught by karmic-
theory, that ill-judged, or akuśala, action corrupts the whole subsequent process. The 
notion of karman is therefore the best of guides to action.
91  . Karman   as a guiding metaphor 
   I am suggesting that karman, extending to K2, may serve as what I will call ‘a guiding 
metaphor’. Its use is by way of a postulate – that of the ‘fruiting’ of action – which is 
not to be taken literally, but the imagination of which serves as a moral guideline. Here 
is a notion which anyone might take to himself for application in practice.  Cornford, 
contemplating the action of Bela Kun, might have recalled that karman is a matter of 
speech as much as of action. 520  He might then have been careful to give no verbal 
endorsement to an act of mass murder, for fear of the consequences – a fear which 
might have had two aspects. The first, corresponding to K1, would have concerned the 
consequences for himself in point of character; the second, to K2, would have 
concerned the outcome in practice, for himself and others. If his imagination had 
extended to what is expounded by Carlyle, this fear - or line of reflection – might have 
been a powerful restraint. 521 
519 HOBSBAWM , pp.127 & 129
520 In setting out the Dasakusalakammapatha in Chapter Two, I showed how it 
presented a progression: bodily, verbal and mental abstentions. Karman bears on all 
three.
521 Here I pick up the point made on p.123 above that karman is a vital notion and 
that discussion will be impoverished without it.
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   All this should recall something advocated, in a well-known paper, by Braithwaite.522 
Braithwaite writes as a strict empiricist and verificationist, concerned at the same time 
to commit himself to religious practice of a Christian character. His concern is with how 
he might make this commitment without qualifying his philosophical stance. His first 
move is to extend his verificationist requirement from ‘meaning’, in a narrow sense, to 
‘use’. Finding that ‘moral statements have a use in guiding conduct’, he takes this to be 
a significant sense in which they have meaning. He then declares that a religious 
statement ‘is used by a man who asserts it in order to express his religious conviction’. 
He supposes that the point of a moral assertion is to express the intention to act in a 
certain way – that is, in line with a general policy or principle or set of principles. A 
religious assertion is a moral assertion of a particular kind. What characterises it is the 
nature of the general policy, religious in character, behind the assertion. He asserts: 
‘Unless religious principles are moral principles, it makes no sense to speak of putting 
them into practice’.
  The assertion, ‘God is love’, may be taken as an instance of what Braithwaite has in 
mind, meaningless – it may be argued – on verificationist principles, but finding a 
meaning here as an expression of the intention to live in a way which Braithwaite calls 
‘agapeistic’. What is required for this intention to be fulfilled is a conversion both of the 
will – in the resolution to act – and also of the heart. The resolution to live in an 
agapeistic way requires both. It is a resolution which will be backed up by reference to 
religious stories, which need not be taken as history – as the orthodox would take them 
– to be properly motivating. What counts as a ‘story’ is perhaps less than clear. Are all, 
or very many, religious assertions to be so regarded, or only those parts of religious 
narrative which are indubitably story-like?  What Braithwaite has in mind certainly 
extends to the gospel accounts of the charitable works ascribed to Jesus. In telling of the 
Good Samaritan – not one of Braithwaite’s examples – Jesus employs a story of the 
kind likely to prompt such works. The gospel-writer reporting Jesus’ telling is doing the 
same at one remove. What he records is therefore apt for the use on which Braithwaite 
founds his religious profession. He is clear that it is not only stories in the Christian 
tradition which are open to adoption for this use:
522 BRAITHWAITE. This paper received a strong endorsement from Hare. See HARE 
(2).
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On the assumption that the ways of life advocated 
by Christianity and by Buddhism are essentially 
the same, it will be the fact that the intention to 
follow this way of life …. is associated in the 
mind of a Buddhist with thinking of another set of 
stories (the Buddhist stories) [which distinguishes 
the two]. 523 
92. What a guiding metaphor is, and what it is not
  What I call ‘a guiding metaphor’ is hardly obscure as a notion, and its adoption in 
practice – fully conscious or not – is readily observable. This is especially so in the 
development of religion, though it need not be confined to religion.  Much of the 
‘revaluation’ of Brahmanical notions of which I gave some account in Chapter Two 
might have been described in such terms. An example outside religion is to be found in 
talk of the ‘fairness’ and ‘unfairness’ of what may be thrown up by the chances of 
human existence. It is hardly contestable that judgments of fairness and unfairness are 
applicable only to only social structures and arrangements – in the broadest sense –and 
to human actions or inactions. Such features of the natural order as the distribution of 
talents and happy or unhappy genetic endowments cannot be held to be fair or unfair, 
nor can accident or luck. At the same time, while quite aware of this, we find ourselves 
speaking of strikingly favourable or unfavourable outcomes within this sphere in just 
those terms. For example, a family already much afflicted by misfortune, such as 
disabilities of genetic origin among its members, loses a child in a traffic accident. To 
regard such a catastrophe as ‘unfair’ is, at once, to be muddled – on a strict and literal 
view - and perfectly natural. We are seized by a thought of the unfairness of life. What I 
am suggesting is that this second, metaphorical, understanding may be useful in 
practice, by virtue of serving as a guiding principle. This is because the sense of outrage 
likely to go with an apprehension of ‘unfairness’ will be a stronger spur to remedial 
action than pity by itself. To work for justice within the world as if the world could be 
just, when we know that in another sense it cannot be, is to adopt and be governed by a 
guiding metaphor.
523 See MITCHELL p.84
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  In proposing that karman should be understood in this way, I am not claiming that all 
problems with the notion will thereby be rendered soluble. At least one obvious problem 
remains, that of what to do in painful circumstances where the good of others, or the 
discharge of a plain duty to others, seems to require what is certainly the wrong choice 
of action in karmic terms. 524  In raising this problem above, I gave the example of the 
man who goes fishing, because only by doing so can he feed his children. Coming to 
see the karman-notion in metaphorical terms will not do away with that problem. What 
I am claiming is that the karman-notion itself is quite as intelligible, and otherwise more 
acceptable, on a metaphorical understanding. I am not claiming that acting on it will, as 
a matter of course, become any easier.
  It may bring the notion of a guiding metaphor into sharper relief if I treat briefly of 
what it is not. It is, in the first place, no equivalent to what is found referred to as 
‘Pascal’s wager’. This term relates to what Pascal recommends to someone unsure 
whether there is a god or not. That question will seem too important to be ignored, and 
the choice of what to believe to be inescapable. Pascal urges that it is reasonable to 
choose to believe:  if one does, and after death there turns out to be a god, the benefit of 
such a choice can be assumed to be vast; if there is no god, and death is the end, there 
can be no corresponding bad consequences.  Pascal takes this to be persuasive, not only 
when the arguments, for and against belief in a god, seem finely balanced, but also 
when the existence of a god seems improbable. 525  
  There is a superficial resemblance between what Pascal advocates and what I have 
described as the adoption and employment of a guiding metaphor. In each case, the 
recommendation is by way of response to acknowledged uncertainty, when choice or 
action – commitment, in a word – is inescapable. The sharp difference is that in 
accepting a guiding metaphor one is aware of so doing: there will and should be no self-
persuasion that what is understood to be a metaphor is anything else. Pascal seems to 
think one can come to ‘believe’ by a process of self-bemusement. He describes such a 
524 Section 43 above. The difficulty is caught by a once well-known line of verse: ‘The 
conscious acceptance of guilt in the fact of murder’. This comes from W H Auden’s 
poem, Spain 1937, published in the volume Another Time, in 1940. Auden’s 
extensive revisions of this poem suggest his discomfort.  
525 PASCAL pp.174/78
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process, which he says ‘will make [you] more docile (abêtira)’. 526  What I mean by 
following a guiding metaphor is no sort of stultification, as this seems to be. 
  Another contrasting approach, much in vogue in one form or other, is the one grounded 
in remarks attributed to Wittgenstein. 527  These are not easy to summarise, but main 
themes can be picked out. One such is Wittgenstein’s insistence that religious beliefs are 
not held on evidence and do not become more or less probable in the light of fresh 
evidence. Two people might discuss whether or not there is a German aircraft overhead, 
and one of them might sensibly remark that he can’t be sure: ‘Possibly, or possibly not’. 
Wittgenstein rules out any such response if the question is one of religious belief, the 
instance he has in mind being the Last Judgment.  In such a case, there is no question of 
probability.
Why shouldn’t one form of life culminate in an 
utterance of belief in a Last Judgment? But I 
couldn’t say either ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to the statement 
that there wll be such a thing. Nor ‘Perhaps’ or 
‘I’m not sure’.
The reference to ‘form of life’ takes us some way further to understanding Wittgenstein, 
as does the following:
Suppose we said that a certain picture might 
play the role of constantly admonishing me, or 
I always think of it. Here, an enormous 
difference would be between people for whom 
the picture is constantly in the foreground, and 
the others who just didn’t use it at all.
‘Admonishing’ evokes the guiding metaphor notion. There is, it seems, a real parallel 
between Wittgenstein’s view of characteristic religious vocabulary and the view, 
526 Krailsheimer’s translation. Mackie translates ‘make you stupid’. MACKIE (3) p.202. 
Pascal is perhaps more concerned with commitment of some sort rather than with 
belief, though the word he uses is ‘believe’ (croire).
527 WITTGENSTEIN, pp.53-72. The remarks are not verbatim.
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associated with Braithwaite, which I have been setting out. One may grant as much, 
while being concerned to exclude a common development of Wittgensteinian character. 
I take the work of DZ Phillips as an example of this development, both because of its 
considerable influence and because Phillips deals explicitly, and critically, with 
Braithwaite. 528
  One of Phillips’ main concerns is to deal critically with Hume’s treatment of theistic 
religion – that is, with its treatment as a natural phenomenon, explicable as such, and so 
to be explained away. He grants that ‘given its assumptions, Hume’s attack on certain 
theistic arguments is entirely successful’. He proceeds – in sum – by seeking to dispose 
of these assumptions, doing so from a Wittgensteinian standpoint, characterising 
Hume’s followers as ‘reductionist’ – that is, as holding that religious beliefs can be 
restated in the language of the realities which produced them, and so disposed of. Quite 
late in the argument, he refers to Braithwaite, whom he sees as a reductionist, 
consciously so or not. 529 : It is not unfair, I think, to say simply that he finds Braithwaite 
too little of a follower of Wittgenstein:
Because [Braithwaite] shares the same conception 
of truth and falsity as the philosophers he 
disagrees with, he cannot call the religious stories 
true or false. He simply speaks of them as 
psychologically efficacious in supporting moral 
conduct. Braithwaite does not realise that in these 
religious beliefs, the grammar of ‘belief’ and 
‘truth’ is not the same as in the case of empirical 
propositions or the prediction of future events.
  This puts the difference between Braithwaite and Wittgenstein’s followers clearly 
enough. I take it to be persuasive enough to show that in talking of a ‘guiding metaphor’ 
we are not – for all that is to be found in Wittgenstein – taking up a Wittgensteinian 
position. My own use of the expression is, I hope, all the more clear.
528 See PHILLIPS, especially Chapter 9.
529 Op cit p.140
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   The approach which I am commending may readily be taken out of its Christian 
context of origin, in which it is exposed to peculiar stresses. Its greater acceptability 
within a Buddhist context has already been recognised. The argument of Cupitt’s best-
known book, Taking Leave of God, is sufficiently like an advocacy of Buddhism for 
Cupitt to define the position of ‘Christian Buddhism’ and to ask what is wrong with it. 
530  He answers ‘not much’, before proceeding to find it ‘incomplete’. He goes on to 
explain why he stays where he is. Broadly friendly critics, such as John Hick, have 
questioned the coherence of this stance. Quoting Cupitt’s own description of his 
position as ‘objectively atheous’, Hick asks whether ‘God can indeed be 
demythologised, and regarded as an imaginative personification of spirituality, without 
religious loss’. He goes on ‘There would be no loss for a Buddhist’. 531This is plainly 
right, and it permits the general conclusion that the line of thought I have been 
recommending is one much more easily accepted by the Buddhist advocate or 
practitioner than by the Christian equivalent of either.
93. Equality of indifference – or of concern? Another view of rebirth
  
  A revised understanding of karman requires a compatible revision of that of rebirth. 
The two notions have always been found to be interdependent and this interdependence 
brings up a difficulty. In its expression as K3, karman was held to extend beyond the 
limit of one existence. It was taken to follow from its traditional derivation from the 
sacrificial process that any part of it ‘unspent’ in one life would be spent in a later life or 
lives. On the revised understanding of karman just offered, there can be no such 
consequence. This would be a problem for the tradition even if it were not the case, as I 
take it to be, that the traditional view is doubtfully intelligible. 
  I have already shown how the conclusions of Part Two of Reasons and Persons are of 
more support to the Buddhist view than Parfit appreciates. It will be recalled that he 
takes the karman-doctrine to be a Buddhist expression of the self-interested concern 
which he finds ubiquitous in discussion of reasons for action, and a support for the Self-
interest theory, or ‘S’. In Chapter Five, I suggested that Parfit’s own discussion provided 
530 CUPITT, p.82.
531 GOULDER & HICK p.106
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all the materials for a correction of this misunderstanding, especially in its extension to 
the notion of karman. Parfit’s rebuttal of S seems to bring in its train the dislodgment 
also of Sidgwick’s ‘philosophical’ Egoism and what I called the ‘vulgar’ egoism of 
everyday life. Here we have support for something much more positive than equality of 
indifference. Parfit leaves us with a philosophically grounded presentation of the case 
for disinterested concern. The deployment of this case will also pick up the concern for 
future generations, the main subject of Part Four, which I have had too little space to 
discuss in detail. This strand in Parfit’s work fits very well with the altruistic, warm-
hearted, strain in Buddhist teaching and legend which I have sought to bring out. This 
finds a classic statement in the Pali Mettāsutta (quoted in full above). I have also 
pointed to a parallel in the Bodhicaryāvatāra to Parfit’s argument for disinterestedness, 
and can add that this whole work, distinct in genre from the Mettāsutta, is in this 
respect at one with it. It is in this strain that I find the basis for the understanding of 
rebirth to which I proceed.
 I begin with some account of the practice of mettābhāvana (the cultivation or causing-
to-be of friendliness). Mettā is one of a set of four qualities, the development of which 
is at the heart of practice. The others are karunā (compassion), muditā (happiness in the 
happiness of others), and uppekha (equanimity). Uppekha is not only the completion of 
the practice, but is taken to contain within itself the other three. 532
 A version of mettābhāvanā taught within the Theravada school, in which the 
Mettāsutta is found, has the meditator begin his practice by developing mettā towards 
himself. Various ways are suggested for doing this: one may be the reflection that 
dislike is painful and damaging, self-dislike as much as any other; another may be the 
discovery of friendly feeling that was always present, if obscured. Once mettā has been 
developed to some degree, the focus of the practice moves to someone regarded 
sympathetically, then to someone regarded neutrally, and finally to someone regarded – 
at least to some degree – with animosity or to someone found difficult to deal with. The 
532 The four-fold practice is known as the cultivation of the Brahmavihārā˙ (Divine 
Abidings). In cosmological terms, these are four gradations of a heavenly state in 
which one might hope to be reborn. The Buddhist tradition in large part substitutes 
meditative realisation – that is, the realisation of heaven in the present life, if only 
partially and temporarily – for cosmological aspiration. Here is a good example of 
what is discussed in Chapter 2, the adaptation by the Buddha of existing religious 
notions for his own purposes.
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prime intention is to come to feel the same sentiment, that of friendliness, and that to the 
same degree, to four successive objects - in other words, to remove, by means of the 
practice, a normally inescapable difference of regard. This intention may be expressed 
by the visualisation together of the four objects of meditation at the close of the 
practice. A deeper intention is the weakening, and finally removal, of the sense of 
difference. It should weaken the habitual presumption of the priority of oneself. To the 
extent that the practice is fruitful, its outcome should be a lessening of self-concern and 
the substitution of a general benevolence, no mere sentiment but an orientation of the 
will. What it has in common with the Parfit of Part Two is a ruling-out of speciality of 
concern. For Parfit, there are no grounds in reason for such speciality. The practice of 
mettābhāvanā is complementary to that, as it is directed towards the correction of bias 
towards oneself or particular others at the affective level of being.
 
 The examples within the text of the objects of the loving attention towards which the 
practice is directed - the tall, the small, the medium-sized, and so on – make a way of 
saying ‘everything’, and the aspiration with which the text concludes does the same:  ‘ 
… born (or existent) or to-be-born, may all beings be happy-minded.’ 533 The Pali word, 
bhavesi (wishing-to-be-born), may mean ‘those in the womb’ – as it is often rendered - 
in the first place, but it may stand for ‘to-be-born’ or ‘all future beings’. Concern for 
future beings is one of the aspirations of the practice. The practitioner has good grounds 
for reflecting that there is ‘going-on’, and that he has every reason to be concerned for 
it, as his practice is one of the extension to all beings of an originally self-interested 
concern. He will avoid action that is akuśala, with a view indeed to his own well-being 
in the present existence, and with a view to the general well-being, into which an earlier 
concern has merged, in all future existences. In so acting he will be taking karman as a 
guiding metaphor. In this respect, and in the ‘agapeistic’ formation of the whole 
exercise, his action will be hardly distinguishable from that commended by Braithwaite.
  The view of the matter which I am recommending here was anticipated above. In 
Chapter Five, in the context of Parfit’s Extreme and Moderate Claims, I pointed out the 
basis of a Minimal Claim. 534  To paraphrase what I said then: if I can care 
disinterestedly for the future of others, so – in a sense, disinterestedly and to the same 
533 Bhūta vā sambhavesi vā, sabbe sattā bhavantu sukhitattā.
534 See section 63 above, especially p.172. For Parfit’s ‘Claims’, see PARFIT(3), 
section 102.
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degree – I can care for my own future.  This suggestion could not be taken further in the 
context in which it was put, which was one of whether Reductionism permitted special 
concern for one’s future being. Parfit left this question open, being unable to choose 
between the two Claims he had brought up. If the case I have just made is persuasive, 
that otherwise intractable problem finds a solution. Special concern should be given up, 
but concern for an all-embracing well-being should be developed. 
  I must make it clear that I take the revised understanding which I am recommending to 
be grounded in the Budhist tradition itself. It is there that I find the emphasis just 
described. The support I have found in Parfit’s Part Two is incidental, however 
welcome. For all that, an account of this grounding of morality as it is found in other 
traditions would be well worth offering. It could only be done at some length. Among 
writers of the present day, I would have referred to Nagel, for the comparison with the 
The View fron Nowhere, and more especially with the earlier The Possibility of Altruism. 
535 The most conspicuous figure on the philosophical hinterland is, however, 
Schopenhauer. Two emphases within his extensive output are much to the point. One is 
the claim that all living things are phenomenal manifestations of the Will and so, in a 
sense, one and the same, this consideration being one which should count against 
egoistic concern. The other is the stress on compassion for others, presented as the 
defining factor of moral action. Both emphases are at the heart of his thinking. 536
 After dismissing an apparent solution to the identity problem by way of recourse to 
Parfit, we conclude with one of a certain Parfitian character. Parfit offers us what is ‘as 
good as’ the perpetuation of our identity, after concluding that ‘we are not as we 
suppose’. What I am urging is that this line of thought should be taken further. The 
survival, for a time, of chains of psychological continuity and connection, however 
brought about, would not, I have argued, be as good as - or as bad as - survival. It is too 
little of a substitute for identity for it to serve as a motivating factor for proper action. 
But a general concern for all that goes on may provide such motivation, and such 
concern may be developed. For one’s own immediate good, it should be developed. 
Together with the restated notion of karman that has been offered above, it gives good 
grounds for disinterested motivation. If I am right in this, what follows is of prime 
535 NAGEL (1) & (2)
536 SCHOPENHAUER (1) & (2). Peculiarly to the point are Chapters 16 and 18 of the 
earlier work, and Chapter 51 of the later.
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importance: the identity problem, at least in its ‘outer’ dimension, is in large part solved. 
The solution is by way, not of equality of indifference, but of equality of concern. It is a 
solution which allows us to drop the caveat I interposed when putting forward Paul 
Williams’ comments on Santideva in the context of Parfit’s discussion in Part Two. The 
caveat was to the effect that insistency on consistency might be two-edged, and that it 
might lead to the giving up of all concern rather than to its extension. This implication is 
avoidable only when, along with the plea for consistency, there is a stress on the all-
embracing benevolence which is in one’s own interest, as the practice of the virtues is 
regularly in one’s own interest, as well as for the general benefit.
94. Is the restated position authentic?
  A readily imaginable response to these restatements would be to call into question the 
authenticity of the position which they are brought forward to support. It may be asked 
whether this is ‘Buddhism’. I have referred above to worthwhile ways of following the 
Buddha which are best described as ‘Buddhistic’. Only a form of practice grounded on 
the whole marga seemed to count as Buddhist – that is, to be ‘authentic’. 
  I take my restatement of karman and rebirth to permit the claim that my restated 
position as a whole is authentic. By this, I mean that it has this grounding in the marga 
and that, in consequence, nothing vital to the Buddhist scheme has been left out. The 
Buddhist traditionalist certainly, and some modern commentators very probably, will be 
reluctant to concede this. Their riposte may be that the Buddha was enlightened, that 
enlightenment cannot err, while it is implicit in my restatements that much that he said – 
understood literally – is unsustainable. In any vigorous polemic, the point could be 
made with more force. To put it plainly, no Buddhist practitioner could be content to 
regard the Buddha as teaching what is not the case, and doing so on points of prime 
importance. Is the restatement that I have suggested one that inevitably puts the Buddha 
in the wrong in vital respects? If this is the case, then the restated view is surely 
‘inauthentic’. The best that it could be called is ‘Buddhistic’.
  Here, I can only suggest how the restated view which I have offered as a solution 
might be found compatible with the traditional claims made for the Buddha. First, we 
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may regard the Buddha’s pronouncements on karman and rebirth as being an example 
of action of the kind with which the Buddhist tradition is quite familiar – that is, of 
upāya-kausalya (skill-in-means). Only the briefest account of this celebrated notion, 
characteristically one of the Mahayana, but found in germ earlier, is possible here. The 
notion is one of skilful exposition and action. In a sense, all Buddhist teaching and 
practice on the part of an agent of high attainment is a case of skill-in-means. It is often 
found applied more narrowly, to refer to words and actions commonly unfamiliar, 
startling or rule-breaking. The connection with the antinomian strain in the Mahayana 
will be evident. The agent – taken to be well advanced on the path, perhaps a 
Bodhisattva – may say or do what would normally be wrong, even bizarre, in his 
purpose of acting for the benefit of beings. 537  The exception finds its justification both 
in intention and outcome. As a contemporary scholar puts it, ‘… the Mahayana stresses 
that it is a teaching differentiated according to needs and fashioned entirely in the light 
of the problem and its resolution’. 538  The Buddha’s conduct is naturally taken to be the 
perfect case of the exercise of skill-in-means: might it not be that his declarations in the 
early texts are properly recorded instances of such an exercise, intended to direct the 
actions of particular auditors for their good?   
  The other line of defence is to admit, at this late stage, the possibility which my 
distinction between ‘the ethics of the Buddha’ and ‘Buddhist ethics’ was intended to 
exclude. I drew this distinction in Chapter One, and should repeat now that what I have 
called ‘Buddhist ethics’ is the ethics of the texts. My whole argument has been 
conducted on the understanding that that was all we have as evidence. None the less, it 
is plainly conceivable that the teaching of the Buddha on karman and rebirth was too 
subtle and too highly nuanced to be open to being transmitted without over-
simplification and without the introduction of some crudity. If there was a partial 
distortion of the record, it would have coincided in time with the wide and rapid 
dissemination of the teaching and its adoption by a penumbra of followers for whom 
only hell might have been thought to serve as an effective and motivating deterrent. It 
seems, therefore, possible – though beyond proof either way – that the difficulties in the 
orthodox doctrine with which we have been concerned should be attributed to the 
removal or blurring, in the course of transcription, of necessary qualifications and to the 
537 In this context, ‘Bodhisattva’ means ‘virtual Buddha’.
538 PYE (1) p.133
257
effects of the popularisation brought about by missionary success. This seems at least 
arguable, though success in maintaining it might come only at the price of removing a 
vital restraint: how much else might not be brought forward as arguable in just the same 
way? 
 Of these two possible lines of response, the first is to the effect that we should read the 
texts with an eye to a subtlety we have probably missed; the second that we should do 
so with a view to removing imperfections that have crept in. The two seem not to be 
incompatible. Either one might prove effective polemically, and might tend to the 
comfort of the practitioner.
95. The coercive force of Buddhist ethics
  How far is the motivation to live skilfully is preserved through these restatements? The 
verses from the Pali Dhammapada to which I have referred more than once presented 
the consequences of adultery as immediately bad and as issuing in bad karman and a 
bad rebirth. When I first quoted them, I granted that for some prospective adulterers 
only the future consequences would be decisive. What greater deterrent could there be 
than the threat of hell or the prospect of a pain-ridden and degraded rebirth in the human 
realm, or the two in succession? 539 Would the target of the warning not take the fresh 
understanding of karman and rebirth put forward here as draining that threat of all 
force, as he would not be the one to suffer? 
  
  This challenge can be answered, in part, on its own terms. The fresh understanding has 
been prompted by problems with the traditional view in respect of human rebirth. 
Difficulties over personal identity seem not to bear to anything like the same degree, if 
at all, on the other possibilities asserted. Most notably, as already hinted above, rebirth 
in hell seems broadly comprehensible on the traditional view and an exceptionally nasty 
prospect. Here is part of the answer. Its force is weakened by the consideration that 
existence in hell is not for ever, and the question of continuity through animal or human 
rebirth is postponed rather than avoided.
539 Both these possibilities are covered by the Pali word gatī (destiny/destination), in 
the passage quoted from the Dhammapāda. See p.9 above.  
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  Setting this qualification aside, it has to be granted that the traditional view brought in 
sanctions, made up of suffering and bearing on individuals who merited it, for which 
there is no place on the view which I am now proposing. The challenge I have 
anticipated here can therefore be met only in part. The appeal of the fresh understanding 
will be to those practitioners who are at least a little way along the Path.
 The Buddhist-advocate can, however, say that the contentment of the contented 
adulterer is hardly worth having. The slightest progress along the Path brings 
satisfaction of a more durable kind. This suggestion may be hard to put to those 
resistant to it, though it is not only the Buddhist scheme that has to rely on such an 
answer. Aristotle declares that one needs to have been brought up in good habits to be a 
student of moral philosophy, on one occasion quoting Plato in support. 540  The 
Buddhist-advocate will regard the beginnings of progress on the Path as the equivalent 
of such an upbringing. Most of those who heard the first teachings of the Buddha were, 
in all likelihood, at least as far advanced. It is clear from the record that those teachings 
were addressed to his contemporary mendicants, with whom, for all their differences, he 
enjoyed a large convergence of view and practice. Later on, it was addressed largely to 
his disciples, fellow-monks. In the case of each group, it may be supposed that 
motivation was of a kind that I have associated with mettābhāvanā, rather than in the 
threat of hell directed to that wider circle of the Buddha’s followers furthest from the 
centre. 541 
  The point may be developed further if we associate the adulterer with the ‘sensible 
knave’ of Hume’s Enquiry.542  Hume says of the knave, 
540 ARISTOTLE (3), 1104. ‘ .. we ought to have been brought up in a particular way 
from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and to be pained by the 
things we ought ..’.  Also 1095.
541 A parallel with Christianity might be developed at length. Nothing is more plainly 
presented in the Gospels than the possibility of everlasting punishment, and no 
threat could be a more powerful restraint on action. None the less, it is a Christian 
commonplace that a motivation to action founded in the love of God, or by way of 
response to Christ’s sacrifice, is one to which a developed faith will naturally move, 
and that this move is for the better. 
542 HUME (2), IX, II, 232
259
 [he] may think that an act of iniquity or infidelity will 
make a considerable addition to his fortune, without 
causing any considerable breach in the social union 
and confederacy. That ‘honesty is the best policy’, 
may be a good general rule, but is liable to many 
exceptions ….
Hume finds something of the difficulty in dealing with this calculating wrongdoing – as 
he has no doubt it is – that we have just found in the prospective adulterer’s case. His 
response, in the closing paragraphs on the Enquiry, comes close at moments to bluster. 
He relies quite largely on the suggestion that those who are clever in the sense in which 
the sensible knave is clever are often ‘too clever by half’. This goes with the concession 
that the knave is not easily answered on his own terms.
…. if a man think that this reasoning much requires an 
answer, it will be a little difficult to find any which 
will appear to him satisfactory and convincing. If his 
heart rebel not against such pernicious maxims, if he 
feel no reluctance to the thoughts of villainy or 
baseness ….
Hume’s difficulty is that he has too little of an answer to the objector who declines to 
think morally.  His procedure throughout,  in  considering morality,  leans so  much on 
benevolent sentiment that he seems to be left  gasping by its  absence. The Buddhist 
advocate is at least in a better case than Hume, in that his concern is to defend a form of 
virtue ethics. As I presented the virtue ethical tradition above, it is one which is founded 
on the intimate association of ‘right’ or ‘skilful’ action and well-being. In the Buddhist 
form of the tradition,  this  association is  caught  by the doctrine of  karman,  and the 
restated expression of karman can – I claim - be offered as a support for the point being 
pressed. Against a plain refusal to think morally, all that can be said from the Buddhist 
standpoint is that the unsatisfactoriness of life in saṃsāra can only be diminished by 
the adoption, over-riding such refusal, of the Buddha’s counsel. In so saying, the appeal 
is to the other party’s experience, not to anything that can be enforced from outside it by 
the arguments of others.
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96. The ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ notions: the problem of conduct
  I now return to the ‘inner’dimension of the problem, made up of the assertion of 
‘weak’ and ‘strong’ notions of the subject. In opening, I remarked on the problematic 
status of each of these notions and on their apparent incompatibility. In the present 
chapter, I have been concerned, in the first place, with the ‘strong’ notion, and have 
sought to meet to meet the obvious objection, that it makes the extension across lives of 
personal continuity by way of karman and rebirth incredible. If my restatement of these 
notions has been persuasive, we may conclude – in respect of the ‘strong’ notion - as 
follows. The notion is non-reductionist. As a living thing, the subject is persistent 
throughout its present existence. He or she may find concern for the future, and for 
others, in the adoption of karman as a guiding metaphor and in the cultivation of 
equality of concern. The grounding of such concern may be found inadequate by those 
who decline to think morally and whose concern for the future is confined absolutely to 
consequences for themselves. With this qualification, to which I have suggested a line 
of response, we have – I now suggest, in concluding – an answer to the identity 
problem, which does indeed leave open the question of the reconciliation of the ‘strong’ 
notion with the ‘weak’.
  This leaves the ‘weak’ notion, which appears to be open to the objections to all 
reductionist accounts of the subject. The most damning of these is that which I have 
referred to as ‘Butler’s objection’. In discussing Parfit, who is well seized of the force of 
this objection, I considered how far it might be met. While I found that the objections to 
Parfit’s response were decisive, to give up the ‘weak’ notion, in consequence, would be 
too destructive of the Buddhist scheme of things to be imaginable. Its abandonment 
would drain the assertion of the three lakṣaṇāḥ/lakkhaṇāḥ of all its force and point. 
How does it stand, therefore, in respect of their conduct, with those who continue to 
hold to the ‘weak’ notion? 
  They may follow Parfit in his presentation of the ‘normal cause’ of psychological 
connectedness and continuity and confine their application of the ‘weak’ notion to the 
person of one life-span. They may be untroubled by the difficulties over extended 
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persistence which I have sought to resolve, or they may choose to adopt the solution to 
those difficulties which I have just set out. Parfitian adherents to a reductionist view 
may choose to take karman as a guiding metaphor and to act on the principle of equality 
of concern. The appeal of such a moral strategy will be enhanced if they take seriously 
the claims of future generations which Parfit considers in Part Four.
 Most Buddhists will however hold to the prospect of persistence across lives. This is so 
much at the centre of what we find in the Buddhist record that its abandonment might be 
felt as an embarrassment. If these Buddhists understand the prospect in the terms 
suggested by Buddhaghosa – the succession of what is ‘neither the same nor different – 
they can, I suggest, join the Parfitians in accepting the broad lines of the solution I have 
offered. Parfit offers support for this option in his account of causes of continuity going 
beyond the ‘normal’ cause. In so doing, these Buddhists may continue to act on the 
traditional understanding of karman which I have criticised, or they may replace this 
understanding with one of karman as a guiding metaphor.  
 Those who take both the ‘weak’ view and the view of persistence expressed widely in 
the early texts – those, that is, who do not rely on Buddhaghosa’s re-expression of it – 
face a difficulty which is more obvious. Throughout this work, I have laboured to bring 
out above the problem of conceiving oneself, at once, as an assembly of the flux of six 
skandhāḥ, and as an entity with the prospect of rebirth as a discrete individual, 
conceived as being so fully one’s persistent self as to make that rebirth a point of 
concern. There is, I have found, no answer to this problem. Here, we have something 
directly comparable to our difficulty with the prospective adulterer. In each case, the 
question is one of how motivation is to be secured once its regular underpinning has 
become insecure.
   In the case of the prospective adulterer and – more widely – of others who hold to the 
‘strong’ notion, we concede to the intending agent that he will not go on – but stress, in 
ways I have just suggested, that that is by no means all he should consider. Adherents to 
the ‘weak’ notion will know that already. In that instance too we need not assume that a 
common concern will be to act badly with impunity. Someone conscious of the dilemma 
as a dilemma is likely to be far enough along the Path to find the practice of the virtues, 
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on their Buddhist conception, to be life-enhancing and, in karmic terms, traditional or 
restated, profitable in itself.
  The problem, then, shrinks to one of the compatibility of the ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ 
notions. Here, I can only say that, though this may persist as a metaphysical problem, 
one of the subject, it is not such as to bear on the Buddhist ethical scheme in a way 
likely to make it ineffective. With the restatements I have offered, the problems of 
conduct, with some qualifications, are soluble. Given the scope of the present work, if 
there is no persistent problem for morality in the co-existence of the ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ 
notions, it should be permissible to give no further attention to the question of their 
compatibility. 
97. The ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ notions: the problem of credibility
  One problem with the ‘weak’ notion has been that of its credibility. In Buddhist terms, 
this takes the form of saying that the account of the subject in terms of the skandhāḥ 
may, after a fashion, be credited but not truly accepted. I have referred above to works 
with an anthropological approach, which suggest that such a failure of acceptance – that 
is, of real conviction – is often lacking among traditional Buddhists. Parfit considers this 
possibility in the context of his own argument and admits to the difficulty of holding the 
view of himself of which he is intellectually persuaded: 
What I find is this. I can believe this [Reductionist] 
view at the intellectual or reflective level. I am 
convinced by the arguments in favour of this view. 
But I think it likely that, at some other level, I shall 
always have doubts. 543
543 PARFIT (3) p.279
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What Parfit registers has been appreciated ever since Locke’s marking out of personal 
identity – and no doubt before, without being recorded. In a survey of the reaction to 
Locke’s treatment of identity over the course of the Eighteenth Century, Martin and 
Barresi bring out the discomfort, and worse, of the prospect of taking something as 
insubstantial as the Lockean person – as it seemed to be - as a substitute for the soul. If 
this did not follow inevitably from subscription to Locke’s conclusions, it appears to 
have been a common reaction. Martin and Barresi write:
… the debate over how to understand ourselves, over 
what it is essentially that each of us is, provoked not 
only intellectual controversy but existential terror.  …. 
To many important thinkers of the time it seemed that 
what could not possibly be a question – whether we 
even exist as selves that persist from moment to 
moment, let alone into an afterlife – had suddenly 
become one. What [these thinkers] saw – that the self 
may be merely imaginary – caused them to draw back 
in horror.544
What Parfit records, contemplating his own conclusions, is only a mercifully mild 
version of this reaction. It is no surprise that an adoption of Reductionism should have 
had that effect. The contemplation of the skandha-account of the subject may have the 
same effect.
  The problem is one both of belief and of believing. Those inclined, at least broadly, to 
accept Buddhist doctrine should find its solution, in both respects, by way of reference 
to anātman. The discomfort which Parfit records, to which Buddhists will be equally 
liable, will then be seen as no more than a concomitant of the highly desirable process 
of ceasing to be attached. In discussing anātman in Chapter Three, I distinguished 
asmimāna (I-am delusion, or infatuation) from the notions of ātman as a soul and of 
ātman as being some part of the subject, for instance consciousness. The thrust of the 
assertion of anātman was against all three. It is with asmimāna alone that I am now 
concerned. Its characteristic manifestation was found to be the generation or 
544 Op cit, Introduction
264
construction of the idea of self and the maintenance of a sense of identity. This process 
seems to be much the same, as I observed in Chapter Five, as the process of the 
‘appropriation’ of consciousness which is a prime constituent element in Locke’s 
account of the person. For the Buddhist, that process is something to be abandoned, as 
being an instance of asmimāna. Its abandonment, as with the giving up of other forms 
of ‘wrong-view’ to which there may be strong attachment, is only too likely to be 
painful. Here is what issues in a sense of vertigo. In other words, the discomfort which 
Parfit registers is, on the Buddhist view, only what goes with a significant step to 
enlightenment. As such, it will pass. It will be, at least, no part of a problem.
98. Summing up
  My final conclusions may now be stated briefly. What follows is more a check-list 
than a summary. For fuller detail, I refer to the conclusions to previous chapters.
  First, there are strands within the Buddhist ethical scheme unaffected by the identity 
problem. I picked out as such the revaluation of components of traditional religion and 
culture, and the worship of the Buddha, extending to the taking of refuge in the Buddha. 
Second, as a form of virtue ethics, the main strand within the Buddhist ethical scheme 
has an independent viability. If the identity problem is left out of account, this may be a 
sufficient basis for practice. For many practitioners, this may be enough. Third, for all 
this, the identity problem is central. Karmically conditioned continuity through death is 
so prominent in the record of the Buddha’s teaching that its disregard will confine the 
practitioner to a rump. It is of prime importance for motivation. Fourth, Parfitian 
reductionism offers an instructive parallel, both in its presentation of the subject, or 
person, and in its insistence that identity is not what matters; rather that it is 
psychological, and other, connections and continuities with which we should be 
concerned. Fifth, Parfit’s discussion of reasons for action, once misunderstandings of 
karman have been corrected, offers support to the Buddhist concern for unselfishness 
and disinterestedness. Sixth, examination of Parfit’s case for reductionism exposes 
weaknesses, which I can see no way to correct. I conclude that the only viable view of 
the subject is that of an animal, or living thing – as such irreducible. This conclusion 
implies that the ‘weak’ notion of the subject is unsustainable. Seventh, the ‘strong’ 
notion of the subject is compatible with the conclusion. It will be unproblematic in 
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respect of the present life. The problem with karmically conditioned continuity through 
death may be overcome by way of understanding karman in terms of guiding metaphor 
and rebirth in terms of the general disinterested benevolence for which the Buddhist 
tradition offers sufficient support. Eighth, the incompatibility of the ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ 
notions appears, in this light to be theoretical only, and hardly problematic for morality. 
Ninth, this view of the matter amounts to a rejection, as to support, of the Parfit of Part 
Three of Reasons and Persons and to a qualified endorsement of Part Two. It is fully in 
harmony with the concerns of Part Four. My conclusion therefore has a Parfitian 
character, despite its rejection of Parfitian reductionism.
  I therefore offer this conclusion  as an answer to the identity problem, which I set out 
in opening. It is not a total solution, offering – as it does – no equivalent to the deterrent 
threat of a bad human rebirth, where this is understood, as it would normally be, as the 
rebirth of the agent and no other. I have, however, argued that no vindication of this 
deterrent claim is available, if it is to be strictly construed. I claim therefore that no 
more complete solution may be found.  
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ABBREVIATIONS
Akb Abhidharmakośabhāṣya 
AN Aṅguttara Nikāya
DhP Dhammapāda
DN Dīgha Nikāya
Kvu Kathāvatthu
MN Majjhima Nikāya
Miln Milindapañha
SN Saṃyutta Nikāya
Vism Visuddhimagga
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